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https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
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212 lines
9 KiB
Rust
212 lines
9 KiB
Rust
//! Various user-configurable channel limits and settings which ChannelManager
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//! applies for you.
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use ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
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/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
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///
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/// Default::default() provides sane defaults for most configurations
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/// (but currently with 0 relay fees!)
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct UserConfig {
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/// Channel config that we propose to our counterparty.
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pub own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig,
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/// Limits applied to our counterparty's proposed channel config settings.
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pub peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
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/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
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pub channel_options: ChannelConfig,
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}
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impl Default for UserConfig {
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fn default() -> Self {
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UserConfig {
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own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::default(),
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peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits::default(),
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channel_options: ChannelConfig::default(),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Configuration we set when applicable.
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///
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/// Default::default() provides sane defaults.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct ChannelHandshakeConfig {
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/// Confirmations we will wait for before considering the channel locked in.
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/// Applied only for inbound channels (see ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth for the
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/// equivalent limit applied to outbound channels).
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///
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/// Default value: 6.
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pub minimum_depth: u32,
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/// Set to the amount of time we require our counterparty to wait to claim their money.
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///
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/// It's one of the main parameter of our security model. We (or one of our watchtowers) MUST
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/// be online to check for peer having broadcast a revoked transaction to steal our funds
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/// at least once every our_to_self_delay blocks.
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///
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/// Meanwhile, asking for a too high delay, we bother peer to freeze funds for nothing in
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/// case of an honest unilateral channel close, which implicitly decrease the economic value of
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/// our channel.
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///
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/// Default value: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (currently 144), we enforce it as a minimum at channel
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/// opening so you can tweak config to ask for more security, not less.
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pub our_to_self_delay: u16,
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}
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impl Default for ChannelHandshakeConfig {
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fn default() -> ChannelHandshakeConfig {
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ChannelHandshakeConfig {
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minimum_depth: 6,
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our_to_self_delay: BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Optional channel limits which are applied during channel creation.
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///
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/// These limits are only applied to our counterparty's limits, not our own.
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///
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/// Use 0/<type>::max_value() as appropriate to skip checking.
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///
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/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations.
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///
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/// Most additional limits are disabled except those with which specify a default in individual
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/// field documentation. Note that this may result in barely-usable channels, but since they
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/// are applied mostly only to incoming channels that's not much of a problem.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct ChannelHandshakeLimits {
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/// Minimum allowed satoshis when a channel is funded, this is supplied by the sender and so
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/// only applies to inbound channels.
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///
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/// Default value: 0.
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pub min_funding_satoshis: u64,
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/// The remote node sets a limit on the minimum size of HTLCs we can send to them. This allows
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/// you to limit the maximum minimum-size they can require.
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///
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/// Default value: u64::max_value.
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pub max_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
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/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum value of pending HTLCs to them at any given
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/// time to limit their funds exposure to HTLCs. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
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///
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/// Default value: 0.
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pub min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
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/// The remote node will require we keep a certain amount in direct payment to ourselves at all
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/// time, ensuring that we are able to be punished if we broadcast an old state. This allows to
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/// you limit the amount which we will have to keep to ourselves (and cannot use for HTLCs).
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///
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/// Default value: u64::max_value.
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pub max_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
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/// The remote node sets a limit on the maximum number of pending HTLCs to them at any given
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/// time. This allows you to set a minimum such value.
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///
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/// Default value: 0.
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pub min_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
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/// Outputs below a certain value will not be added to on-chain transactions. The dust value is
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/// required to always be higher than this value so this only applies to HTLC outputs (and
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/// potentially to-self outputs before any payments have been made).
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/// Thus, HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
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/// This setting allows you to set a minimum dust limit for their commitment transactions,
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/// reflecting the reality that tiny outputs are not considered standard transactions and will
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/// not propagate through the Bitcoin network.
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///
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/// Default value: 546, the current dust limit on the Bitcoin network.
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pub min_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
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/// Maximum allowed threshold above which outputs will not be generated in their commitment
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/// transactions.
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/// HTLCs below this amount plus HTLC transaction fees are not enforceable on-chain.
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///
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/// Default value: u64::max_value.
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pub max_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
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/// Before a channel is usable the funding transaction will need to be confirmed by at least a
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/// certain number of blocks, specified by the node which is not the funder (as the funder can
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/// assume they aren't going to double-spend themselves).
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/// This config allows you to set a limit on the maximum amount of time to wait.
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///
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/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
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pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
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/// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
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/// ChannelConfig.
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///
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/// Default value: true, to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
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/// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
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pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
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/// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
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///
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/// Not checking this value would be a security issue, as our peer would be able to set it to
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/// max relative lock-time (a year) and we would "lose" money as it would be locked for a long time.
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///
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/// Default value: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT (1008), which we also enforce as a maximum value
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/// so you can tweak config to reduce the loss of having useless locked funds (if your peer accepts)
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pub their_to_self_delay: u16
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}
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impl Default for ChannelHandshakeLimits {
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fn default() -> Self {
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ChannelHandshakeLimits {
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min_funding_satoshis: 0,
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max_htlc_minimum_msat: <u64>::max_value(),
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min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
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max_channel_reserve_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
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min_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
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min_dust_limit_satoshis: 546,
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max_dust_limit_satoshis: <u64>::max_value(),
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max_minimum_depth: 144,
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force_announced_channel_preference: true,
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their_to_self_delay: MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Options which apply on a per-channel basis and may change at runtime or based on negotiation
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/// with our counterparty.
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#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct ChannelConfig {
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/// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
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/// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
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/// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
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///
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/// Default value: 0.
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pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
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/// Set to announce the channel publicly and notify all nodes that they can route via this
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/// channel.
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///
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/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
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///
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/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
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/// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
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///
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/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
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///
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/// Default value: false.
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pub announced_channel: bool,
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/// When set, we commit to an upfront shutdown_pubkey at channel open. If our counterparty
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/// supports it, they will then enforce the mutual-close output to us matches what we provided
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/// at intialization, preventing us from closing to an alternate pubkey.
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///
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/// This is set to true by default to provide a slight increase in security, though ultimately
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/// any attacker who is able to take control of a channel can just as easily send the funds via
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/// lightning payments, so we never require that our counterparties support this option.
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///
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/// This cannot be changed after a channel has been initialized.
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///
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/// Default value: true.
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pub commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: bool
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}
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impl Default for ChannelConfig {
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/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with zero relay fees!).
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fn default() -> Self {
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ChannelConfig {
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fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
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announced_channel: false,
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commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
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}
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}
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}
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//Add write and readable traits to channelconfig
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impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 8+1+1, {
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fee_proportional_millionths,
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announced_channel,
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commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey
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});
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