//! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to //! claim outputs on-chain. use chain::chaininterface; use chain::transaction::OutPoint; use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface}; use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor}; use chain::keysinterface; use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC}; use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash}; use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor}; use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT}; use ln::onion_utils; use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop, Router}; use ln::msgs; use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate}; use util::test_utils; use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider}; use util::errors::APIError; use util::logger::Logger; use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs}; use util::config::UserConfig; use util::rng; use bitcoin::util::hash::{BitcoinHash, Sha256dHash}; use bitcoin::util::bip143; use bitcoin::util::address::Address; use bitcoin::util::bip32::{ChildNumber, ExtendedPubKey, ExtendedPrivKey}; use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader}; use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, SigHashType}; use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script}; use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes; use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block; use bitcoin::network::constants::Network; use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256; use bitcoin_hashes::Hash; use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message}; use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey}; use rand::{thread_rng,Rng}; use std::cell::RefCell; use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap, HashSet}; use std::default::Default; use std::rc::Rc; use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex}; use std::sync::atomic::Ordering; use std::time::Instant; use std::mem; const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 100; fn confirm_transaction(chain: &chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, tx: &Transaction, chan_id: u32) { assert!(chain.does_match_tx(tx)); let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; chain.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[tx; 1], &[chan_id; 1]); for i in 2..CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; chain.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &[tx; 0], &[0; 0]); } } struct Node { chain_monitor: Arc, tx_broadcaster: Arc, chan_monitor: Arc, keys_manager: Arc, node: Arc, router: Router, node_seed: [u8; 32], network_payment_count: Rc>, network_chan_count: Rc>, } impl Drop for Node { fn drop(&mut self) { if !::std::thread::panicking() { // Check that we processed all pending events assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(self.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(self.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty()); } } } fn create_chan_between_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a, node_b, 100000, 10001) } fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { let (funding_locked, channel_id, tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat); let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a, node_b, &funding_locked); (announcement, as_update, bs_update, channel_id, tx) } macro_rules! get_revoke_commit_msgs { ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => { { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); (match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id); (*msg).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }, match events[1] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); updates.commitment_signed.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }) } } } macro_rules! get_event_msg { ($node: expr, $event_type: path, $node_id: expr) => { { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { $event_type { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id); (*msg).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } } macro_rules! get_htlc_update_msgs { ($node: expr, $node_id: expr) => { { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_id); (*updates).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } } macro_rules! get_feerate { ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => { { let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap(); chan.get_feerate() } } } fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> Transaction { node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42).unwrap(); node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); let chan_id = *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow(); let tx; let funding_output; let events_2 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2[0] { Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref temporary_channel_id, ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, user_channel_id } => { assert_eq!(*channel_value_satoshis, channel_value); assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); tx = Transaction { version: chan_id as u32, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut { value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(), }]}; funding_output = OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0); node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, funding_output); let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); added_monitors.clear(); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); { let mut added_monitors = node_b.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); added_monitors.clear(); } node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); { let mut added_monitors = node_a.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1); assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output); added_monitors.clear(); } let events_4 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); match events_4[0] { Event::FundingBroadcastSafe { ref funding_txo, user_channel_id } => { assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42); assert_eq!(*funding_txo, funding_output); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; tx } fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, tx: &Transaction) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32]) { confirm_transaction(&node_b.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.node.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); let channel_id; confirm_transaction(&node_a.chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); let events_6 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 2); ((match events_6[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => { channel_id = msg.channel_id.clone(); assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }, match events_6[1] { MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }), channel_id) } fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> ((msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures), [u8; 32], Transaction) { let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(node_a, node_b, channel_value, push_msat); let (msgs, chan_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(node_a, node_b, &tx); (msgs, chan_id, tx) } fn create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, as_funding_msgs: &(msgs::FundingLocked, msgs::AnnouncementSignatures)) -> (msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate) { node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.0).unwrap(); let bs_announcement_sigs = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); node_b.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_msgs.1).unwrap(); let events_7 = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1); let (announcement, bs_update) = match events_7[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { (msg, update_msg) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; node_a.node.handle_announcement_signatures(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs).unwrap(); let events_8 = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1); let as_update = match events_8[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => { assert!(*announcement == *msg); assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, announcement.contents.short_channel_id); assert_eq!(update_msg.contents.short_channel_id, bs_update.contents.short_channel_id); update_msg }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; *node_a.network_chan_count.borrow_mut() += 1; ((*announcement).clone(), (*as_update).clone(), (*bs_update).clone()) } fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes, a, b, 100000, 10001) } fn create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize, channel_value: u64, push_msat: u64) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction) { let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes[a], &nodes[b], channel_value, push_msat); for node in nodes { assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement.0).unwrap()); node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.1).unwrap(); node.router.handle_channel_update(&chan_announcement.2).unwrap(); } (chan_announcement.1, chan_announcement.2, chan_announcement.3, chan_announcement.4) } macro_rules! check_spends { ($tx: expr, $spends_tx: expr) => { { let mut funding_tx_map = HashMap::new(); let spends_tx = $spends_tx; funding_tx_map.insert(spends_tx.txid(), spends_tx); $tx.verify(&funding_tx_map).unwrap(); } } } macro_rules! get_closing_signed_broadcast { ($node: expr, $dest_pubkey: expr) => { { let events = $node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert!(events.len() == 1 || events.len() == 2); (match events[events.len() - 1] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }, if events.len() == 2 { match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dest_pubkey); Some(msg.clone()) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { None }) } } } macro_rules! check_closed_broadcast { ($node: expr) => {{ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } }} } fn close_channel(outbound_node: &Node, inbound_node: &Node, channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_tx: Transaction, close_inbound_first: bool) -> (msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, Transaction) { let (node_a, broadcaster_a, struct_a) = if close_inbound_first { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster, inbound_node) } else { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster, outbound_node) }; let (node_b, broadcaster_b) = if close_inbound_first { (&outbound_node.node, &outbound_node.tx_broadcaster) } else { (&inbound_node.node, &inbound_node.tx_broadcaster) }; let (tx_a, tx_b); node_a.close_channel(channel_id).unwrap(); node_b.handle_shutdown(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, node_b.get_our_node_id())).unwrap(); let events_1 = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert!(events_1.len() >= 1); let shutdown_b = match events_1[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id()); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; let closing_signed_b = if !close_inbound_first { assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); None } else { Some(match events_1[1] { MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, &node_a.get_our_node_id()); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }) }; node_a.handle_shutdown(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &shutdown_b).unwrap(); let (as_update, bs_update) = if close_inbound_first { assert!(node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); let (as_update, closing_signed_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id()); node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (bs_update, none_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id()); assert!(none_b.is_none()); assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); (as_update, bs_update) } else { let closing_signed_a = get_event_msg!(struct_a, MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, node_b.get_our_node_id()); node_b.handle_closing_signed(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_a).unwrap(); assert_eq!(broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); tx_b = broadcaster_b.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); let (bs_update, closing_signed_b) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_b, node_a.get_our_node_id()); node_a.handle_closing_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_b.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (as_update, none_a) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(node_a, node_b.get_our_node_id()); assert!(none_a.is_none()); assert_eq!(broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); tx_a = broadcaster_a.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().remove(0); (as_update, bs_update) }; assert_eq!(tx_a, tx_b); check_spends!(tx_a, funding_tx); (as_update, bs_update, tx_a) } struct SendEvent { node_id: PublicKey, msgs: Vec, commitment_msg: msgs::CommitmentSigned, } impl SendEvent { fn from_commitment_update(node_id: PublicKey, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate) -> SendEvent { assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); SendEvent { node_id: node_id, msgs: updates.update_add_htlcs, commitment_msg: updates.commitment_signed } } fn from_event(event: MessageSendEvent) -> SendEvent { match event { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => SendEvent::from_commitment_update(node_id, updates), _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), } } fn from_node(node: &Node) -> SendEvent { let mut events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap()) } } macro_rules! check_added_monitors { ($node: expr, $count: expr) => { { let mut added_monitors = $node.chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), $count); added_monitors.clear(); } } } macro_rules! commitment_signed_dance { ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */) => { { check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0); assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, false); } }; ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => { { let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!($node_a, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!($node_b, 0); assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); $node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!($node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1); $node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap(); let (bs_revoke_and_ack, extra_msg_option) = { let events = $node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert!(events.len() <= 2); (match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); (*msg).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }, events.get(1).map(|e| e.clone())) }; check_added_monitors!($node_b, 1); if $fail_backwards { assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) } }; ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* return extra message */, true /* return last RAA */) => { { check_added_monitors!($node_a, 0); assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); $node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &$commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true); assert!(extra_msg_option.is_none()); bs_revoke_and_ack } }; ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, true /* return extra message */) => { { let (extra_msg_option, bs_revoke_and_ack) = commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true, true); $node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); extra_msg_option } }; ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, (), $fail_backwards: expr, true /* skip last step */, false /* no extra message */) => { { assert!(commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, (), $fail_backwards, true, true).is_none()); } }; ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr, $commitment_signed: expr, $fail_backwards: expr) => { { commitment_signed_dance!($node_a, $node_b, $commitment_signed, $fail_backwards, true); if $fail_backwards { expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node_a); check_added_monitors!($node_a, 1); let channel_state = $node_a.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(channel_state.pending_msg_events.len(), 1); if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } = channel_state.pending_msg_events[0] { assert_ne!(*node_id, $node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); } } else { assert!($node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } } } } macro_rules! get_payment_preimage_hash { ($node: expr) => { { let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([*$node.network_payment_count.borrow(); 32]); *$node.network_payment_count.borrow_mut() += 1; let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()); (payment_preimage, payment_hash) } } } macro_rules! expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable { ($node: expr) => {{ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; let node_ref: &Node = &$node; node_ref.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); }} } fn send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) { let mut payment_event = { origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(origin_node, 1); let mut events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; let mut prev_node = origin_node; for (idx, &node) in expected_route.iter().enumerate() { assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(node, 0); commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node); if idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(amt, recv_value); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); check_added_monitors!(node, 1); payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); } prev_node = node; } } fn send_along_route(origin_node: &Node, route: Route, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) { let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node); send_along_route_with_hash(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value, our_payment_hash); (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) } fn claim_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); macro_rules! get_next_msgs { ($node: expr) => { { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fee.is_none()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); Some((update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } } macro_rules! last_update_fulfill_dance { ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr) => { { $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!($node, 0); assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false); } } } macro_rules! mid_update_fulfill_dance { ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $new_msgs: expr) => { { $node.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!($node, 1); let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs { get_next_msgs!($node) } else { assert!($node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); None }; commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, false); next_msgs = new_next_msgs; } } } let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() { assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); let update_next_msgs = !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1; if next_msgs.is_some() { mid_update_fulfill_dance!(node, prev_node, update_next_msgs); } else if update_next_msgs { next_msgs = get_next_msgs!(node); } else { assert!(node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); } prev_node = node; } if !skip_last { last_update_fulfill_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap()); let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } fn claim_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) { claim_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_preimage); } const TEST_FINAL_CLTV: u32 = 32; fn route_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash) { let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); } send_along_route(origin_node, route, expected_route, recv_value) } fn route_over_limit(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { let route = origin_node.router.get_route(&expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); assert_eq!(route.hops.len(), expected_route.len()); for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.hops.iter()) { assert_eq!(hop.pubkey, node.node.get_our_node_id()); } let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(origin_node); let err = origin_node.node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); match err { APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"), _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), }; } fn send_payment(origin: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], recv_value: u64) { let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&origin, expected_route, recv_value).0; claim_payment(&origin, expected_route, our_payment_preimage); } fn fail_payment_along_route(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], skip_last: bool, our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) { assert!(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, 0)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(expected_route.last().unwrap()); check_added_monitors!(expected_route.last().unwrap(), 1); let mut next_msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)> = None; macro_rules! update_fail_dance { ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $last_node: expr) => { { $node.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&$prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().0).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!($node, $prev_node, next_msgs.as_ref().unwrap().1, !$last_node); if skip_last && $last_node { expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!($node); } } } } let mut expected_next_node = expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(); let mut prev_node = expected_route.last().unwrap(); for (idx, node) in expected_route.iter().rev().enumerate() { assert_eq!(expected_next_node, node.node.get_our_node_id()); if next_msgs.is_some() { // We may be the "last node" for the purpose of the commitment dance if we're // skipping the last node (implying it is disconnected) and we're the // second-to-last node! update_fail_dance!(node, prev_node, skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1); } let events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if !skip_last || idx != expected_route.len() - 1 { assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fee.is_none()); expected_next_node = node_id.clone(); next_msgs = Some((update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { assert!(events.is_empty()); } if !skip_last && idx == expected_route.len() - 1 { assert_eq!(expected_next_node, origin_node.node.get_our_node_id()); } prev_node = node; } if !skip_last { update_fail_dance!(origin_node, expected_route.first().unwrap(), true); let events = origin_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); assert!(rejected_by_dest); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } fn fail_payment(origin_node: &Node, expected_route: &[&Node], our_payment_hash: PaymentHash) { fail_payment_along_route(origin_node, expected_route, false, our_payment_hash); } fn create_network(node_count: usize) -> Vec { let mut nodes = Vec::new(); let mut rng = thread_rng(); let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let chan_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); let payment_count = Rc::new(RefCell::new(0)); for i in 0..node_count { let logger: Arc = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i))); let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }); let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))); let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())}); let mut seed = [0; 32]; rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed); let keys_manager = Arc::new(test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger))); let chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone())); let mut config = UserConfig::new(); config.channel_options.announced_channel = true; config.channel_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false; let node = ChannelManager::new(Network::Testnet, feeest.clone(), chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config).unwrap(); let router = Router::new(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()), chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger)); nodes.push(Node { chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, chan_monitor, node, router, keys_manager, node_seed: seed, network_payment_count: payment_count.clone(), network_chan_count: chan_count.clone(), }); } nodes } #[test] fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() { let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; // balancing send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); // A B // update_fee -> // send (1) commitment_signed -. // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -. // (1) commitment_signed is delivered -> // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) // (2) RAA is delivered -> // .- send (4) commitment_signed // <- (3) RAA is delivered // send (5) commitment_signed -. // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered // send (6) RAA -. // (5) commitment_signed is delivered -> // <- RAA // (6) RAA is delivered -> // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1) MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => { (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]... let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let payment_event = { let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0)) }; assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2) let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); // deliver(1), generate (3): nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (2) let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4) assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4) check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); // deliver (3) let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5) assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5) check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (4) let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); // deliver (5) let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2[0] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); // deliver (6) check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); } #[test] fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() { // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch) let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; // balancing send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id) + 20).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1) MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => { update_fee.as_ref() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]... let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[1].node.send_payment(nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(), our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let payment_event = { let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0)) }; assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); // (2) let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); // deliver (2) check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature } #[test] fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() { let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; // A B // update_fee/commitment_signed -> // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed // update_fee (never committed) -> // (3) update_fee -> // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet. // <- (1) RAA delivered // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -. // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't // know the per_commitment_point to use for it. // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered // revoke_and_ack -> // B should send no response here // (4) commitment_signed delivered -> // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered // revoke_and_ack -> // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee let initial_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id); nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 20).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1) MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => { (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2): nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1).unwrap(); let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment // transaction: nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, initial_feerate + 40).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does... let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee { channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(), feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32, }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap(); update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32; // Deliver (3) nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2).unwrap(); // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4) nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg).unwrap(); let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered: assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id); assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw); // Deliver (2) commitment_signed nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap(); let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Delever (4) nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment).unwrap(); let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); } #[test] fn test_update_fee_vanilla() { let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id); nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+25).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); } #[test] fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() { let nodes = create_network(2); let channel_value = 1888; let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000); let channel_id = chan.2; let feerate = 260; nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false); //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above. //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve) { let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap(); //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs let num_htlcs = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len() - 2; let total_fee: u64 = feerate * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000; let mut actual_fee = chan.last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value); actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee; assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee); } //drop the mutex //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down) nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+2).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let update2_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.update_fee.unwrap()).unwrap(); //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve) //Should produce and error. let err = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update2_msg.commitment_signed).unwrap_err(); assert!(match err.err { "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee" => true, _ => false, }); //clear the message we could not handle nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); } #[test] fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() { let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; // balancing send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id); nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 800000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1]); // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); { let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0); added_monitors.clear(); } assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); // node[1] has nothing to do nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true); nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000); close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true); } #[test] fn test_update_fee() { let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_id = chan.2; // A B // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed -> // <- (2) revoke_and_ack // .- send (3) commitment_signed // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed -> // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke) // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered // send (6) revoke_and_ack -. // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack -> // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4) // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed // revoke_and_ack -> // Create and deliver (1)... let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id); nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+20).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); // Generate (2) and (3): nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Deliver (2): nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); // Create and deliver (4)... nodes[0].node.update_fee(channel_id, feerate+30).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1); let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap()).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // ... creating (5) let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes // Handle (3), creating (6): nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes // Deliver (5): nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); // Deliver (6), creating (7): nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0).unwrap(); let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Deliver (7) nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30); assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30); close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true); } #[test] fn pre_funding_lock_shutdown_test() { // Test sending a shutdown prior to funding_locked after funding generation let nodes = create_network(2); let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 8000000, 0); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[1; 1]); nodes[0].node.close_channel(&OutPoint::new(tx.txid(), 0).to_channel_id()).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap(); let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_none.is_none()); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); } #[test] fn updates_shutdown_wait() { // Test sending a shutdown with outstanding updates pending let mut nodes = create_network(3); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let route_1 = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let route_2 = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000); nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, payment_hash) {} else { panic!("New sends should fail!") }; if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[1].node.send_payment(route_2, payment_hash) {} else { panic!("New sends should fail!") }; assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false); assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap(); let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_none.is_none()); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty()); } #[test] fn htlc_fail_async_shutdown() { // Test HTLCs fail if shutdown starts even if messages are delivered out-of-order let mut nodes = create_network(3); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap(); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], (), false, true, false); let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash); assert!(!rejected_by_dest); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2); let node_0_closing_signed = match msg_events[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); (*msg).clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; match msg_events[1] { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => { assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_1.0.contents.short_channel_id); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap(); let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_none.is_none()); assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty()); } fn do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(recv_count: u8) { // Test that shutdown/closing_signed is re-sent on reconnect with a variable number of // messages delivered prior to disconnect let nodes = create_network(3); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100000); nodes[1].node.close_channel(&chan_1.2).unwrap(); let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); if recv_count > 0 { nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); if recv_count > 1 { nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown).unwrap(); } } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let node_0_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let node_1_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_reestablish).unwrap(); let node_1_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_1_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_reestablish).unwrap(); let node_0_2nd_shutdown = if recv_count > 0 { let node_0_2nd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap(); node_0_2nd_shutdown } else { assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown).unwrap(); get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()) }; nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_shutdown).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false); assert!(updates_2.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates_2.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates_2.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates_2.commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_preimage, *payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); if recv_count > 0 { nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed).unwrap(); let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_1_closing_signed.is_some()); } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let node_0_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); if recv_count == 0 { // If all closing_signeds weren't delivered we can just resume where we left off... let node_1_2nd_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_2nd_reestablish).unwrap(); let node_0_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_2nd_shutdown == node_0_3rd_shutdown); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish).unwrap(); let node_1_3rd_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_1_3rd_shutdown == node_1_2nd_shutdown); nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_3rd_shutdown).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_3rd_shutdown).unwrap(); let node_0_2nd_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_closing_signed == node_0_2nd_closing_signed); nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed).unwrap(); let (_, node_1_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed.unwrap()).unwrap(); let (_, node_0_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(node_0_none.is_none()); } else { // If one node, however, received + responded with an identical closing_signed we end // up erroring and node[0] will try to broadcast its own latest commitment transaction. // There isn't really anything better we can do simply, but in the future we might // explore storing a set of recently-closed channels that got disconnected during // closing_signed and avoiding broadcasting local commitment txn for some timeout to // give our counterparty enough time to (potentially) broadcast a cooperative closing // transaction. assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg}), ..}) = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_reestablish) { nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg); let msgs::ErrorMessage {ref channel_id, ..} = msg; assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_1.2); } else { panic!("Needed SendErrorMessage close"); } // get_closing_signed_broadcast usually eats the BroadcastChannelUpdate for us and // checks it, but in this case nodes[0] didn't ever get a chance to receive a // closing_signed so we do it ourselves check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); } assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1); nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear(); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, true); assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().is_empty()); } #[test] fn test_shutdown_rebroadcast() { do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(0); do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(1); do_test_shutdown_rebroadcast(2); } #[test] fn fake_network_test() { // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways. let nodes = create_network(4); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000); // Send some more payments send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000); send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000); // Test failure packets let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1; fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1); // Add a new channel that skips 3 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000); send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000); // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 1000000, cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }); hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0; let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32 }); hops.push(RouteHop { pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, fee_msat: 1000000, cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV, }); hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000; let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { hops }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1; // Claim the rebalances... fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2); claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); // Send some payments across both channels let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000); //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5); // Close down the channels... close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false); close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false); close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false); } #[test] fn duplicate_htlc_test() { // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't effect each other let mut nodes = create_network(6); // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5); let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000); *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage); *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage); fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash); claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage); } #[derive(PartialEq)] enum HTLCType { NONE, TIMEOUT, SUCCESS } /// Tests that the given node has broadcast transactions for the given Channel /// /// First checks that the latest local commitment tx has been broadcast, unless an explicit /// commitment_tx is provided, which may be used to test that a remote commitment tx was /// broadcast and the revoked outputs were claimed. /// /// Next tests that there is (or is not) a transaction that spends the commitment transaction /// that appears to be the type of HTLC transaction specified in has_htlc_tx. /// /// All broadcast transactions must be accounted for in one of the above three types of we'll /// also fail. fn test_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, chan: &(msgs::ChannelUpdate, msgs::ChannelUpdate, [u8; 32], Transaction), commitment_tx: Option, has_htlc_tx: HTLCType) -> Vec { let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert!(node_txn.len() >= if commitment_tx.is_some() { 0 } else { 1 } + if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::NONE { 0 } else { 1 }); let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(2); node_txn.retain(|tx| { if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == chan.3.txid() { check_spends!(tx, chan.3.clone()); if commitment_tx.is_none() { res.push(tx.clone()); } false } else { true } }); if let Some(explicit_tx) = commitment_tx { res.push(explicit_tx.clone()); } assert_eq!(res.len(), 1); if has_htlc_tx != HTLCType::NONE { node_txn.retain(|tx| { if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == res[0].txid() { check_spends!(tx, res[0].clone()); if has_htlc_tx == HTLCType::TIMEOUT { assert!(tx.lock_time != 0); } else { assert!(tx.lock_time == 0); } res.push(tx.clone()); false } else { true } }); assert!(res.len() == 2 || res.len() == 3); if res.len() == 3 { assert_eq!(res[1], res[2]); } } assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); res } /// Tests that the given node has broadcast a claim transaction against the provided revoked /// HTLC transaction. fn test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(node: &Node, revoked_tx: Transaction) { let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); node_txn.retain(|tx| { if tx.input.len() == 1 && tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_tx.txid() { check_spends!(tx, revoked_tx.clone()); false } else { true } }); assert!(node_txn.is_empty()); } fn check_preimage_claim(node: &Node, prev_txn: &Vec) -> Vec { let mut node_txn = node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert!(node_txn.len() >= 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); let mut found_prev = false; for tx in prev_txn { if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == tx.txid() { check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx.clone()); assert!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness[2].len() > 106); // must spend an htlc output assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1); // must spend a commitment tx found_prev = true; break; } } assert!(found_prev); let mut res = Vec::new(); mem::swap(&mut *node_txn, &mut res); res } fn get_announce_close_broadcast_events(nodes: &Vec, a: usize, b: usize) { let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); let as_update = match events_1[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); let bs_update = match events_2[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => { msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; for node in nodes { node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap(); node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap(); } } macro_rules! expect_payment_received { ($node: expr, $expected_payment_hash: expr, $expected_recv_value: expr) => { let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!($expected_payment_hash, *payment_hash); assert_eq!($expected_recv_value, amt); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } macro_rules! get_channel_value_stat { ($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {{ let chan_lock = $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&$channel_id).unwrap(); chan.get_value_stat() }} } fn do_channel_reserve_test(test_recv: bool) { use util::rng; use std::sync::atomic::Ordering; use ln::msgs::HandleError; let mut nodes = create_network(3); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1900, 1001); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1900, 1001); let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2); let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2); let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); macro_rules! get_route_and_payment_hash { ($recv_value: expr) => {{ let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), $recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage) }} }; macro_rules! expect_forward { ($node: expr) => {{ let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); check_added_monitors!($node, 1); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)); payment_event }} } let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know? let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * 239; let recv_value_0 = stat01.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat; // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat { let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_0 + 1); assert!(route.hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat)); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); match err { APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"), _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), } } let mut htlc_id = 0; // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete // nodes[0]'s wealth loop { let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat; if stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat { break; } send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0); htlc_id += 1; let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = ( get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2), get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2), get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2), get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2), ); assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat); assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat); assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat)); assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat)); stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_; } { let recv_value = stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat; // attempt to get channel_reserve violation let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value + 1); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), our_payment_hash).err().unwrap(); match err { APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), } } // adding pending output let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat)/2; let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat; let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_1); let payment_event_1 = { nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_1, our_payment_hash_1).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]).unwrap(); // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat; { let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1); match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() { APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), } } { // test channel_reserve test on nodes[1] side let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_2 + 1); // Need to manually create update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc() let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{ let mut session_key = [0; 32]; rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); session_key }).expect("RNG is bad!"); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash); let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { channel_id: chan_1.2, htlc_id, amount_msat: htlc_msat, payment_hash: our_payment_hash, cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv, onion_routing_packet: onion_packet, }; if test_recv { let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).err().unwrap(); match err { HandleError{err, .. } => assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"), } // If we send a garbage message, the channel should get closed, making the rest of this test case fail. assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); return; } } // split the rest to test holding cell let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2; let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat; { let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat), stat.channel_reserve_msat); } // now see if they go through on both sides let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_21); // but this will stuck in the holding cell nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_21, our_payment_hash_21).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0 { let (route, our_payment_hash, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22+1); match nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).err().unwrap() { APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err} => assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our reserve value"), _ => panic!("Unknown error variants"), } } let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(recv_value_22); // this will also stuck in the holding cell nodes[0].node.send_payment(route_22, our_payment_hash_22).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); // flush the pending htlc nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg).unwrap(); let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]); nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, recv_value_1); // flush the htlcs in the holding cell assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]); assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2); nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); match events[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22); let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat); let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2); assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self); assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat); let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2); assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22); } #[test] fn channel_reserve_test() { do_channel_reserve_test(false); do_channel_reserve_test(true); } #[test] fn channel_monitor_network_test() { // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states. let nodes = create_network(5); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000); // Simple case with no pending HTLCs: nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true); { let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1); // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close: let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0; // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true); { let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn.drain(..).next().unwrap()] }, 1); test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 2); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1); macro_rules! claim_funds { ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => { { assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage)); check_added_monitors!($node, 1); let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; } } } // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2] // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces) nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true); { let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 2, 3); assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1); { // Cheat and reset nodes[4]'s height to 1 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 1); } assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1); assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire), 1); // One pending HTLC to time out: let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0; // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for // buffer space). { let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[3].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); } let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT); // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2); header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 2, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); for i in 3..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 1 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); } test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS); header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[4].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5); check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 3, 4); assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } #[test] fn test_justice_tx() { // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some new channels: let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // A pending HTLC which will be revoked: let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout // Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3); { let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); { let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); node_txn.swap_remove(0); } test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE); nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT); header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1); test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone()); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx // Create some new channels: let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // A pending HTLC which will be revoked: let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present // Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4); { let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); { let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); node_txn.swap_remove(0); } test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS); header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[1].clone()] }, 1); test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone()); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } #[test] fn revoked_output_claim() { // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty let nodes = create_network(2); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]: assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1); // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000); // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); } #[test] fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() { // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some new channel: let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid()); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); //Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new(); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len()); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len()); assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state: assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); let witness_script = node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.pop().unwrap(); assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].txid()); assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); assert_ne!(node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } #[test] fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() { // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx let nodes = create_network(2); let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); //Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1); { let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 12); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]); assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]); assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]); assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]); assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcated by ChannelManger assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1); let mut revoked_tx_map = HashMap::new(); revoked_tx_map.insert(revoked_local_txn[0].txid(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); node_txn[0].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); node_txn[1].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); node_txn[2].verify(&revoked_tx_map).unwrap(); let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new(); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len()); assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3); assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1); let witness_script = node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap(); assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[3].txid()); assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid); assert_ne!(node_txn[4].input[0].previous_output.txid, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid); } get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } #[test] fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() { // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to // ChainWatchInterface and pass the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past. // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage) // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local // commitment transaction was broadcast. // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards // towards B. // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx. // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a // PaymentSent event). let nodes = create_network(3); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels... send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); let (our_payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); let (our_payment_preimage_2, _payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain // Broadcast HTLC Success transation by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 4 (2*2 * HTLC-Success tx) assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]); assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: node_txn}, 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); { let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chan_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2); assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); added_monitors.clear(); } assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast { ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { { // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx.clone()); assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0); if $htlc_offered { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output } else { assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment } check_spends!(node_txn[2], $chan_tx.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(node_txn[3].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert!(node_txn[4].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_ne!(node_txn[3].lock_time, 0); assert_ne!(node_txn[4].lock_time, 0); node_txn.clear(); } } } // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success. check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3); // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan) assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as // we already checked the same situation with A. // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); let mut first_claimed = false; for event in events { match event { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage { assert!(!first_claimed); first_claimed = true; } else { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2); } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3); } #[test] fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() { // Test that in case of an unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output thanks to // ChainWatchInterface and timeout the HTLC bacward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path. // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout) // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx // \ \ // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx let nodes = create_network(3); // Create some intial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels... send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; // Brodacast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx) assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output fron C's commitment tx on B's chain // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); let timeout_tx; { let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_2.3.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); timeout_tx = node_txn[0].clone(); node_txn.clear(); } nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![timeout_tx]}, 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // Well... here we detect our own htlc_timeout_tx so no tx to be generated assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0); // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain let commitment_tx = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone()); nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71); assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); } #[test] fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() { // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx // and fail backward accordingly. let nodes = create_network(3); // Create some initial channels create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); // Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) { // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest // commitment transaction anymore. // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably. // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment // transactions: // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction). // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC, // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards. let mut nodes = create_network(3); // Create some initial channels create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 }); // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2] let revoked_local_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 }); // Revoke the old state claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage); let value = if use_dust { // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn. nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000 } else { 3000000 }; let (_, first_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value); let (_, second_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value); let (_, third_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value); assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash, 0)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true); // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash, 0)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash, 0)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking... nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting // on nodes[2]'s RAA. let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, fourth_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[1].node.send_payment(route, fourth_payment_hash).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); if deliver_bs_raa { nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa).unwrap(); // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards(). check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case } let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 2 }); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } if !deliver_bs_raa { match events[1] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; } nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }); match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } if deliver_bs_raa { match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3); assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); // If we delievered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something // that we should update our routing table for. assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 }); for event in events { match event { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[2] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0)); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0)); assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0)); assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0)); } #[test] fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() { do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false); } #[test] fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() { do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true); do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true); } #[test] fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() { // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap(). let nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000); nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); // Duplicate the block_connected call since this may happen due to other listeners // registering new transactions nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&node_txn[0], &node_txn[1]], &[1; 2]); } #[test] fn test_force_close_fail_back() { // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure let mut nodes = create_network(3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, 42).unwrap(); let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let mut payment_event = { nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0)); assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!). nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); let tx = { let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise. assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); node_txn.remove(0) }; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]); // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]! check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success.. { let mut monitors = nodes[2].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap(); monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]), 0)).unwrap() .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage); } nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx], &[1]); let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx); } #[test] fn test_unconf_chan() { // After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a channel close on nodes[0] side let nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 1); assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 1); mem::drop(channel_state); let mut headers = Vec::new(); let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; headers.push(header.clone()); for _i in 2..100 { header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; headers.push(header.clone()); } while !headers.is_empty() { nodes[0].node.block_disconnected(&headers.pop().unwrap()); } check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let channel_state = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(channel_state.by_id.len(), 0); assert_eq!(channel_state.short_to_id.len(), 0); } macro_rules! get_chan_reestablish_msgs { ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => { { let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(1); for msg in $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() { if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); res.push(msg.clone()); } else { panic!("Unexpected event") } } res } } } macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs { ($src_node: expr, $dst_node: expr) => { { let msg_events = $src_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); let mut idx = 0; let funding_locked = if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(0) { idx += 1; assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); Some(msg.clone()) } else { None }; let mut revoke_and_ack = None; let mut commitment_update = None; let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) { idx += 1; match ev { &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone()); RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst }, &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); commitment_update = Some(updates.clone()); RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst }; if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) { match ev { &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none()); revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone()); }, &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(commitment_update.is_none()); commitment_update = Some(updates.clone()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order) } } } /// pending_htlc_adds includes both the holding cell and in-flight update_add_htlcs, whereas /// for claims/fails they are separated out. fn reconnect_nodes(node_a: &Node, node_b: &Node, send_funding_locked: (bool, bool), pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pending_cell_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pending_raa: (bool, bool)) { node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b); node_b.node.peer_connected(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a); if send_funding_locked.0 { // If a expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack // from b for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() { assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); } } if send_funding_locked.1 { // If b expects a funding_locked, it better not think it has received a revoke_and_ack // from a for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() { assert_eq!(reestablish.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); } } if send_funding_locked.0 || send_funding_locked.1 { // If we expect any funding_locked's, both sides better have set // next_local_commitment_number to 1 for reestablish in reestablish_1.iter() { assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1); } for reestablish in reestablish_2.iter() { assert_eq!(reestablish.next_local_commitment_number, 1); } } let mut resp_1 = Vec::new(); for msg in reestablish_1 { node_b.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); resp_1.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_b, node_a)); } if pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 { check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); } else { check_added_monitors!(node_b, 0); } let mut resp_2 = Vec::new(); for msg in reestablish_2 { node_a.node.handle_channel_reestablish(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); resp_2.push(handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(node_a, node_b)); } if pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 { check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); } else { check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0); } // We dont yet support both needing updates, as that would require a different commitment dance: assert!((pending_htlc_adds.0 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 == 0) || (pending_htlc_adds.1 == 0 && pending_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 == 0 && pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 == 0)); for chan_msgs in resp_1.drain(..) { if send_funding_locked.0 { node_a.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap(); let announcement_event = node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if !announcement_event.is_empty() { assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1); if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] { //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none()); } if pending_raa.0 { assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); } else { assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); } if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 { let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize); } else { assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); } assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs { node_a.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap(); } for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs { node_a.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap(); } for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs { node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap(); } if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); } else { node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); } } for chan_msgs in resp_2.drain(..) { if send_funding_locked.1 { node_b.node.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.0.unwrap()).unwrap(); let announcement_event = node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if !announcement_event.is_empty() { assert_eq!(announcement_event.len(), 1); if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } = announcement_event[0] { //TODO: Test announcement_sigs re-sending } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.0.is_none()); } if pending_raa.1 { assert!(chan_msgs.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &chan_msgs.1.unwrap()).unwrap(); assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); } else { assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); } if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 { let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize); } assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_cell_htlc_fails.0); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); for update_add in commitment_update.update_add_htlcs { node_b.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add).unwrap(); } for update_fulfill in commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs { node_b.node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill).unwrap(); } for update_fail in commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs { node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail).unwrap(); } if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); } else { node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); } } } #[test] fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() { // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages let nodes = create_network(3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0; let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1; nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), true, payment_preimage_3); fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false)); { let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 2); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5); assert!(rejected_by_dest); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4); fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6); } fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8) { // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped let mut nodes = create_network(2); if messages_delivered == 0 { create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001); // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect) } else { create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); } let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let payment_event = { nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id); if messages_delivered < 2 { // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes! } else { nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); if messages_delivered >= 3 { nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); if messages_delivered >= 4 { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); if messages_delivered >= 5 { nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed).unwrap(); let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); if messages_delivered >= 6 { nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); } } } } } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); if messages_delivered < 3 { // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them. reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } else if messages_delivered == 3 { // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false)); } else if messages_delivered == 4 { // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } else if messages_delivered == 5 { // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true)); } else if messages_delivered == 6 { // Everything was delivered... reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); match events_1[0] { Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone()) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; if messages_delivered >= 1 { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc).unwrap(); let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); match events_4[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } if messages_delivered >= 2 { nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); if messages_delivered >= 3 { nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); if messages_delivered >= 4 { nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); if messages_delivered >= 5 { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); } } } } } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); if messages_delivered < 2 { reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); //TODO: Deduplicate PaymentSent events, then enable this if: //if messages_delivered < 1 { let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); match events_4[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } //} } else if messages_delivered == 2 { // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true)); } else if messages_delivered == 3 { // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } else if messages_delivered == 4 { // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false)); } else if messages_delivered == 5 { // Everything was delivered... reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); // Channel should still work fine... let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0; claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() { do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0); do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1); do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2); do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3); } #[test] fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() { do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4); do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5); do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6); } #[test] fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() { // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected let nodes = create_network(2); let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); confirm_transaction(&nodes[0].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); match events_1[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); confirm_transaction(&nodes[1].chain_monitor, &tx, tx.version); let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2); match events_2[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, msg: _ } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events_2[1] { MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); // TODO: We shouldn't need to manually pass list_usable_chanels here once we support // rebroadcasting announcement_signatures upon reconnect. let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()), &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage, _) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); } #[test] fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() { // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending // commitment_updates when we disconnect. let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1); match events_1[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fee.is_none()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); match events_3[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed).unwrap(); let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap()).unwrap(); let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap(); let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); match events_5[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt: _ } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] fn test_simple_monitor_permanent_update_fail() { // Test that we handle a simple permanent monitor update failure let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {..}) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2); match events_1[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; match events_1[1] { MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, .. } => assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a // PaymentFailed event assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } fn do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect: bool) { // Test that we can recover from a simple temporary monitor update failure optionally with // a disconnect in between let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_1) {} else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); if disconnect { nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.pop().unwrap()); assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); match events_3[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_1); // Now set it to failed again... let (_, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); if disconnect { nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); } // ...and make sure we can force-close a TemporaryFailure channel with a PermanentFailure *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure); nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); // TODO: Once we hit the chain with the failure transaction we should check that we get a // PaymentFailed event assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0); } #[test] fn test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail() { do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(false); do_test_simple_monitor_temporary_update_fail(true); } fn do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(disconnect_count: usize) { let disconnect_flags = 8 | 16; // Test that we can recover from a temporary monitor update failure with some in-flight // HTLCs going on at the same time potentially with some disconnection thrown in. // * First we route a payment, then get a temporary monitor update failure when trying to // route a second payment. We then claim the first payment. // * If disconnect_count is set, we will disconnect at this point (which is likely as // TemporaryFailure likely indicates net disconnect which resulted in failing to update // the ChannelMonitor on a watchtower). // * If !(disconnect_count & 16) we deliver a update_fulfill_htlc/CS for the first payment // immediately, otherwise we wait sconnect and deliver them via the reconnect // channel_reestablish processing (ie disconnect_count & 16 makes no sense if // disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags is 0). // * We then update the channel monitor, reconnecting if disconnect_count is set and walk // through message sending, potentially disconnect/reconnecting multiple times based on // disconnect_count, to get the update_fulfill_htlc through. // * We then walk through more message exchanges to get the original update_add_htlc // through, swapping message ordering based on disconnect_count & 8 and optionally // disconnect/reconnecting based on disconnect_count. let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let (payment_preimage_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash_2) {} else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); // Claim the previous payment, which will result in a update_fulfill_htlc/CS from nodes[1] // but nodes[0] won't respond since it is frozen. assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); let (bs_initial_fulfill, bs_initial_commitment_signed) = match events_2[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fee.is_none()); if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); match events_3[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed) { assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"); } else { panic!(); } } (update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone()) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 { nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); } // Now fix monitor updating... *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); macro_rules! disconnect_reconnect_peers { () => { { nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); (reestablish_1, reestablish_2, as_resp, bs_resp) } } } let (payment_event, initial_revoke_and_ack) = if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 0 { assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); let mut as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); let mut bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert!(as_resp.0.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.1.is_some()); assert!(as_resp.2.is_some()); assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst); } else { assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs == vec![bs_initial_fulfill]); assert!(bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed == bs_initial_commitment_signed); assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1); match events_3[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed).unwrap(); let as_resp_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); as_resp.1 = Some(as_resp_raa); bs_resp.2 = None; } if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 1 { let (second_reestablish_1, second_reestablish_2, second_as_resp, second_bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); if (disconnect_count & 16) == 0 { assert!(reestablish_1 == second_reestablish_1); assert!(reestablish_2 == second_reestablish_2); } assert!(as_resp == second_as_resp); assert!(bs_resp == second_bs_resp); } (SendEvent::from_commitment_update(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.2.unwrap()), as_resp.1.unwrap()) } else { let mut events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 2); (SendEvent::from_event(events_4.remove(0)), match events_4[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); msg.clone() }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }) }; assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // nodes[1] is awaiting an RAA from nodes[0] still so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 2 { let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack); assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack); assert!(as_resp.2.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); } let as_commitment_update; let bs_second_commitment_update; macro_rules! handle_bs_raa { () => { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); as_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(as_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); } } macro_rules! handle_initial_raa { () => { nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); bs_second_commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_second_commitment_update.update_fee.is_none()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); } } if (disconnect_count & 8) == 0 { handle_bs_raa!(); if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 { let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); assert!(as_resp.1.unwrap() == initial_revoke_and_ack); assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); } handle_initial_raa!(); if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 { let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); } } else { handle_initial_raa!(); if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 3 { let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.1.unwrap() == bs_revoke_and_ack); assert!(as_resp.2.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); assert!(bs_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst); } handle_bs_raa!(); if disconnect_count & !disconnect_flags > 4 { let (_, _, as_resp, bs_resp) = disconnect_reconnect_peers!(); assert!(as_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none()); assert!(as_resp.2.unwrap() == as_commitment_update); assert!(bs_resp.2.unwrap() == bs_second_commitment_update); } } nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_update.commitment_signed).unwrap(); let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1); match events_5[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash); assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_a() { do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(0); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5); } #[test] fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_b() { do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(4 | 8); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(5 | 8); } #[test] fn test_monitor_temporary_update_fail_c() { do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(1 | 16); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 16); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 16); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(2 | 8 | 16); do_test_monitor_temporary_update_fail(3 | 8 | 16); } #[test] fn test_monitor_update_fail_cs() { // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming commitment_signed let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg).unwrap_err() { assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); } else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let responses = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(responses.len(), 2); match responses[0] { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, ref node_id } => { assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match responses[1] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, ref node_id } => { assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap_err() { assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); } else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } *nodes[0].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[0].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &final_raa).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, amt } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); assert_eq!(amt, 1000000); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage); } fn do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(test_ignore_second_cs: bool) { // Tests handling of a monitor update failure when processing an incoming RAA let mut nodes = create_network(3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); // Rebalance a bit so that we can send backwards from 2 to 1. send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5000000); // Route a first payment that we'll fail backwards let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000); // Fail the payment backwards, failing the monitor update on nodes[1]'s receipt of the RAA assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, 0)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let bs_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0); // While the second channel is AwaitingRAA, forward a second payment to get it into the // holding cell. let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_2).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); // Now fail monitor updating. *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap_err() { assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); } else { panic!(); } assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); // Attempt to forward a third payment but fail due to the second channel being unavailable // for forwarding. let (_, payment_hash_3) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_3).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); // We succeed in updating the monitor for the first channel send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], send_event.commitment_msg, false, true); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1); match events_2.remove(0) { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true); let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1); match msg_events[0] { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg }} => { assert_eq!(msg.contents.short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id); assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2); // temp disabled }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events[0] { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3); assert!(!rejected_by_dest); } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), }; let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = if test_ignore_second_cs { // Try to route another payment backwards from 2 to make sure 1 holds off on responding let (payment_preimage_4, payment_hash_4) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let route = nodes[2].router.get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash_4).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); send_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0)); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) }) = nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg) { assert_eq!(err, "Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"); } else { panic!(); } assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); (Some(payment_preimage_4), Some(payment_hash_4)) } else { (None, None) }; // Restore monitor updating, ensuring we immediately get a fail-back update and a // update_add update. *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let mut events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if test_ignore_second_cs { assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 3); } else { assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2); } // Note that the ordering of the events for different nodes is non-prescriptive, though the // ordering of the two events that both go to nodes[2] have to stay in the same order. let messages_a = match events_3.pop().unwrap() { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); (updates.update_fail_htlcs.remove(0), updates.commitment_signed) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event type!"), }; let raa = if test_ignore_second_cs { match events_3.remove(1) { MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, msg } => { assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); Some(msg.clone()) }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } else { None }; let send_event_b = SendEvent::from_event(events_3.remove(0)); assert_eq!(send_event_b.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); // Now deliver the new messages... nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &messages_a.0).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], messages_a.1, false); let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1); if let Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } = events_4[0] { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_1); assert!(rejected_by_dest); } else { panic!("Unexpected event!"); } nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.msgs[0]).unwrap(); if test_ignore_second_cs { nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event_b.commitment_msg).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa.unwrap()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(bs_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(bs_cs.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(as_cs.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_cs.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_cs.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(as_cs.update_fee.is_none()); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let bs_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_raa).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); } else { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], send_event_b.commitment_msg, false); } expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); let events_6 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1); match events_6[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; if test_ignore_second_cs { expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]); assert_eq!(send_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(send_event.msgs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], send_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]); let events_9 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events_9.len(), 1); match events_9[0] { Event::PaymentReceived { payment_hash, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_4.unwrap()), _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4.unwrap()); } claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2); } #[test] fn test_monitor_update_fail_raa() { do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(false); do_test_monitor_update_fail_raa(true); } #[test] fn test_monitor_update_fail_reestablish() { // Simple test for message retransmission after monitor update failure on // channel_reestablish generating a monitor update (which comes from freeing holding cell // HTLCs). let mut nodes = create_network(3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false); *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap(); if let msgs::HandleError { err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError) } = nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap_err() { assert_eq!(err, "Failed to update ChannelMonitor"); } else { panic!(); } check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(as_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())); assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish).unwrap(); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); *nodes[1].chan_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(()); nodes[1].node.test_restore_channel_monitor(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } => assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage), _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } #[test] fn test_invalid_channel_announcement() { //Test BOLT 7 channel_announcement msg requirement for final node, gather data to build customed channel_announcement msgs let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let nodes = create_network(2); let chan_announcement = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); let a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let b_channel_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); let bs_chan = b_channel_lock.by_id.get(&chan_announcement.3).unwrap(); let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } ); let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); let were_node_one = as_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..] < bs_bitcoin_key.serialize()[..]; let mut chan_announcement; macro_rules! dummy_unsigned_msg { () => { msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement { features: msgs::GlobalFeatures::new(), chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(), short_channel_id: as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), node_id_1: if were_node_one { as_network_key } else { bs_network_key }, node_id_2: if were_node_one { bs_network_key } else { as_network_key }, bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_key } else { bs_bitcoin_key }, bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_key } else { as_bitcoin_key }, excess_data: Vec::new(), }; } } macro_rules! sign_msg { ($unsigned_msg: expr) => { let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::from_data(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap(); let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().funding_key); let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret()); let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret()); chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement { node_signature_1 : if were_node_one { as_node_sig } else { bs_node_sig}, node_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_node_sig } else { as_node_sig}, bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { as_bitcoin_sig } else { bs_bitcoin_sig }, bitcoin_signature_2 : if were_node_one { bs_bitcoin_sig } else { as_bitcoin_sig }, contents: $unsigned_msg } } } let unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); assert_eq!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap(), true); let _ = nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } ); // Configured with Network::Testnet let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); unsigned_msg.chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.bitcoin_hash(); sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); let mut unsigned_msg = dummy_unsigned_msg!(); unsigned_msg.chain_hash = Sha256dHash::from_data(&[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9]); sign_msg!(unsigned_msg); assert!(nodes[0].router.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).is_err()); } struct VecWriter(Vec); impl Writer for VecWriter { fn write_all(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> { self.0.extend_from_slice(buf); Ok(()) } fn size_hint(&mut self, size: usize) { self.0.reserve_exact(size); } } #[test] fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let mut nodes = create_network(2); let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new()); nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..]; let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap(); assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty()); let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..]; let config = UserConfig::new(); let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = { let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new(); channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor); <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs { default_config: config, keys_manager, fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }), monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), channel_monitors: &channel_monitors, }).unwrap() }; assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok()); nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized); let nodes_0_as_listener: Arc = nodes[0].node.clone(); nodes[0].chain_monitor.register_listener(Arc::downgrade(&nodes_0_as_listener)); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx); let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked); for node in nodes.iter() { assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap()); node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap(); node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap(); } send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); } #[test] fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() { let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = VecWriter(Vec::new()); nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write_for_disk(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap(); nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..]; let (_, chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap(); assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty()); let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..]; let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = { let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new(); channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &chan_0_monitor); <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs { default_config: UserConfig::new(), keys_manager, fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }), monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), channel_monitors: &channel_monitors, }).unwrap() }; assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty()); assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_0_monitor).is_ok()); nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage); } #[test] fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() { // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with a out-of-date ChannelMonitor let mut nodes = create_network(4); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0); let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000); // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode(); route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/ // nodes[3]) let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new(); for monitor in nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() { let mut writer = VecWriter(Vec::new()); monitor.1.write_for_disk(&mut writer).unwrap(); node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0); } nodes[0].chan_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new(); for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() { let mut read = &serialized[..]; let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap(); assert!(read.is_empty()); node_0_monitors.push(monitor); } let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..]; let keys_manager = Arc::new(keysinterface::KeysManager::new(&nodes[0].node_seed, Network::Testnet, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))); let (_, nodes_0_deserialized) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs { default_config: UserConfig::new(), keys_manager, fee_estimator: Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }), monitor: nodes[0].chan_monitor.clone(), chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger: Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), channel_monitors: &node_0_monitors.iter().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) }).collect(), }).unwrap(); assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty()); { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx and an HTLC tx let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2); assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid()); assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, txn[0].txid()); } for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) { assert!(nodes[0].chan_monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor).is_ok()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); } nodes[0].node = Arc::new(nodes_0_deserialized); // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]... reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); //... and we can even still claim the payment! claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage); nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()); if let Err(msgs::HandleError { action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg }), .. }) = nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish) { assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id); } else { panic!("Unexpected result"); } } macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs { ($node: expr, $der_idx: expr) => { { let events = $node.chan_monitor.simple_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events(); let mut txn = Vec::new(); for event in events { match event { Event::SpendableOutputs { ref outputs } => { for outp in outputs { match *outp { SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref output } => { let input = TxIn { previous_output: outpoint.clone(), script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: 0, witness: Vec::new(), }; let outp = TxOut { script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(), value: output.value, }; let mut spend_tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: vec![input], output: vec![outp], }; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let remotepubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &key); let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&remotepubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey(); let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap(); let remotesig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotesig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec()); spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(remotepubkey.serialize().to_vec()); txn.push(spend_tx); }, SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH { ref outpoint, ref key, ref witness_script, ref to_self_delay, ref output } => { let input = TxIn { previous_output: outpoint.clone(), script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: *to_self_delay as u32, witness: Vec::new(), }; let outp = TxOut { script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(), value: output.value, }; let mut spend_tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: vec![input], output: vec![outp], }; let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap(); let local_delaysig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, key); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(local_delaysig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec()); spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(0)); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes()); txn.push(spend_tx); }, SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { ref outpoint, ref output } => { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); let input = TxIn { previous_output: outpoint.clone(), script_sig: Script::new(), sequence: 0, witness: Vec::new(), }; let outp = TxOut { script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::All::OP_RETURN).into_script(), value: output.value, }; let mut spend_tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: vec![input], output: vec![outp.clone()], }; let secret = { match ExtendedPrivKey::new_master(&secp_ctx, Network::Testnet, &$node.node_seed) { Ok(master_key) => { match master_key.ckd_priv(&secp_ctx, ChildNumber::from_hardened_idx($der_idx)) { Ok(key) => key, Err(_) => panic!("Your RNG is busted"), } } Err(_) => panic!("Your rng is busted"), } }; let pubkey = ExtendedPubKey::from_private(&secp_ctx, &secret).public_key; let witness_script = Address::p2pkh(&pubkey, Network::Testnet).script_pubkey(); let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &witness_script, output.value)[..]).unwrap(); let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &secret.secret_key); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&secp_ctx).to_vec()); spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8); spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); txn.push(spend_tx); }, } } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; } txn } } } #[test] fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() { // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000); nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() { // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000); nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3.clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone()] }, 0); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() { // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid()); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); // to_local output on local commitment tx check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()] }, 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), } // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 1 (local commitment tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx) * 2 (block-rescan) check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); // , 0, 0, 1, 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.iter().next().unwrap().1.last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let revoked_local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone()); // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()); // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone()); } #[test] fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0; let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()); // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 5); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx } #[test] fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() { // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output thanks to // ChainWatchInterface and claim HTLC on downstream peer's remote commitment tx. // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction. // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B // channel. // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction // gets broadcast. let nodes = create_network(3); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ... send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000); let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42}; let commitment_tx = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3.clone()); nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx) assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3); assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]); assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]); check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone()); check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1].clone()); assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71); assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1); { let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4); assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]); check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(b_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx check_spends!(b_txn[0], c_txn[1].clone()); // timeout tx on C remote commitment tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert_ne!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Timeout tx b_txn.clear(); } let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); match msg_events[0] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match msg_events[1] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => { assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), }; // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1); let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3); check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[2]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone()); assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() { // Topology : A --> B --> C // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim let mut nodes = create_network(3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000); *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1; assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000).1, duplicate_payment_hash); let commitment_txn = nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3.clone()); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); let htlc_timeout_tx; { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]); assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]); check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]); check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone()); check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone(); } nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage); nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), } let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone()); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0], htlc_success_txn[3]); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1], htlc_success_txn[4]); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0], htlc_success_txn[1].input[0]); check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone()); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout_tx] }, 200); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1); assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 1); assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { update: msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { .. } } => { }, _ => { panic!("Unexpected event"); } } } let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => { assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash); } _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![htlc_success_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, 0); assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); } _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } #[test] fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0; let local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone()); // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } match events[1] { MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexepected event"), } let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 2); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); } fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) { // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an // unrevoked commitment transaction. // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof). // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which // use the same payment hashes. // Thus, we use a six-node network: // // A \ / E // - C - D - // B / \ F // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction let nodes = create_network(6); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5); // Rebalance and check output sanity... send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000); send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000); assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2); let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().our_dust_limit_satoshis; // 0th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 1st HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); // 2nd HTLC: send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 3rd HTLC: send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 4th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_3) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000); // 5th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_4) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000); let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); // 6th HTLC: send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_3); // 7th HTLC: send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_4); // 8th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_5) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000); // 9th HTLC: let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), ds_dust_limit*1000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 10th HTLC: let (_, payment_hash_6) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee // 11th HTLC: let route = nodes[1].router.get_route(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); send_along_route_with_hash(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 1000000, payment_hash_6); // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie, // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included). assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.len(), 1); assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 8); // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go. // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1, ds_dust_limit*1000)); assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3, 1000000)); assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5, 1000000)); assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6, ds_dust_limit*1000)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1); let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap(); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false); // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2, ds_dust_limit*1000)); assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4, 1000000)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1); let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false); let ds_prev_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1); let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap(); nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]).unwrap(); if deliver_last_raa { commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false); } else { let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true); } // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th, // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions). // // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs. // // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs. let ds_last_commitment_tx = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; if announce_latest { nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_last_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); } else { nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]], &[1; 1]); } check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2]); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2); let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2); let mut a_done = false; for msg in cs_msgs { match msg { MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => { // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed // should be failed-backwards here. let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() { // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs { assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false }); } assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 }); assert!(!a_done); a_done = true; &nodes[0] } else { // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs { assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false }); } assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 }); &nodes[1] }; target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]).unwrap(); target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]).unwrap(); if announce_latest { target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]).unwrap(); if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() { target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]).unwrap(); } } commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 }); let mut as_failds = HashSet::new(); for event in as_events.iter() { if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event { assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash)); if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 { assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa); } else { assert!(!rejected_by_dest); } } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); } } assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1)); assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2)); if announce_latest { assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3)); assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5)); } assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6)); let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 }); let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new(); for event in bs_events.iter() { if let &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, .. } = event { assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash)); if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 { assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa); } else { assert!(!rejected_by_dest); } } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); } } assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1)); assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2)); if announce_latest { assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4)); } assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5)); // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should // get a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due // to unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 // PaymentFailureNetworkUpdates. let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 }); let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 }); for event in as_msg_events.iter().chain(bs_msg_events.iter()) { match event { &MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } #[test] fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() { do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true); } #[test] fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() { do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true); } #[test] fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() { do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false); // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive() } #[test] fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); // Create some initial channels let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0; let local_txn = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone(); assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1); check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone()); // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, 200); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 8); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[4]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[6]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[5]); assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[7]); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0].clone()); check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); } #[test] fn test_static_output_closing_tx() { let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000); let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 2); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx.clone()); nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_with_filtering(&Block { header, txdata: vec![closing_tx.clone()] }, 1); let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 2); assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1); check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx); } fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) { let nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let (our_payment_preimage, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }); // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions. assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage)); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage } => { assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS }); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) { let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // As far as A is concerened, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that // to "time out" the HTLC. let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); } fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) { let nodes = create_network(3); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions. // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was // actually revoked. let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 }; let (_, our_payment_hash) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value); assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash, htlc_value)); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); if check_revoke_no_close { nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); } let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; for i in 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 { nodes[0].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, i, &Vec::new(), &Vec::new()); header.prev_blockhash = header.bitcoin_hash(); } if !check_revoke_no_close { test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]); } else { let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => { assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash); assert!(rejected_by_dest); }, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } } } // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window. // There are only a few cases to test here: // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure, // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction, // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions. // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and // non-dust HTLCs. // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests. #[test] fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() { do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true); do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false); do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true); do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false); } #[test] fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() { do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false); do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false); do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true); do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true); } fn run_onion_failure_test(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, callback_msg: F1, callback_node: F2, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option, expected_channel_update: Option) where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC), F2: FnMut(), { run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name, test_case, nodes, route, payment_hash, callback_msg, |_|{}, callback_node, expected_retryable, expected_error_code, expected_channel_update); } // test_case // 0: node1 fail backward // 1: final node fail backward // 2: payment completed but the user reject the payment // 3: final node fail backward (but tamper onion payloads from node0) // 100: trigger error in the intermediate node and tamper returnning fail_htlc // 200: trigger error in the final node and tamper returnning fail_htlc fn run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept(_name: &str, test_case: u8, nodes: &Vec, route: &Route, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, mut callback_msg: F1, mut callback_fail: F2, mut callback_node: F3, expected_retryable: bool, expected_error_code: Option, expected_channel_update: Option) where F1: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateAddHTLC), F2: for <'a> FnMut(&'a mut msgs::UpdateFailHTLC), F3: FnMut(), { use ln::msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate; // reset block height let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; for ix in 0..nodes.len() { nodes[ix].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); } macro_rules! expect_event { ($node: expr, $event_type: path) => {{ let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { $event_type { .. } => {}, _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), } }} } macro_rules! expect_htlc_forward { ($node: expr) => {{ expect_event!($node, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable); $node.node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().next_forward = Instant::now(); $node.node.process_pending_htlc_forwards(); }} } // 0 ~~> 2 send payment nodes[0].node.send_payment(route.clone(), payment_hash.clone()).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); // temper update_add (0 => 1) let mut update_add_0 = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone(); if test_case == 0 || test_case == 3 || test_case == 100 { callback_msg(&mut update_add_0); callback_node(); } // 0 => 1 update_add & CS nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_0).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true); let update_1_0 = match test_case { 0|100 => { // intermediate node failure; fail backward to 0 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()+update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1 && (update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len()==1 || update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len()==1)); update_1_0 }, 1|2|3|200 => { // final node failure; forwarding to 2 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); // forwarding on 1 if test_case != 200 { callback_node(); } expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[1]); let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1); assert_eq!(update_1.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1); // tamper update_add (1 => 2) let mut update_add_1 = update_1.update_add_htlcs[0].clone(); if test_case != 3 && test_case != 200 { callback_msg(&mut update_add_1); } // 1 => 2 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_1).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false, true); if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 { expect_htlc_forward!(&nodes[2]); expect_event!(&nodes[2], Event::PaymentReceived); callback_node(); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]); } let update_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); if test_case == 2 || test_case == 200 { check_added_monitors!(&nodes[2], 1); } assert!(update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1); let mut fail_msg = update_2_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(); if test_case == 200 { callback_fail(&mut fail_msg); } // 2 => 1 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap(); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_2_1.commitment_signed, true); // backward fail on 1 let update_1_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); assert!(update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1); update_1_0 }, _ => unreachable!(), }; // 1 => 0 commitment_signed_dance if update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs.len() > 0 { let mut fail_msg = update_1_0.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(); if test_case == 100 { callback_fail(&mut fail_msg); } nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg).unwrap(); } else { nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_1_0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); }; commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1_0.commitment_signed, false, true); let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); if let &Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash:_, ref rejected_by_dest, ref error_code } = &events[0] { assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, !expected_retryable); assert_eq!(*error_code, expected_error_code); } else { panic!("Uexpected event"); } let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); if expected_channel_update.is_some() { assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); match events[0] { MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => { match update { &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } => { if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { .. } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() {} else { panic!("channel_update not found!"); } }, &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => { if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: ref expected_short_channel_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() { assert!(*short_channel_id == *expected_short_channel_id); assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent); } else { panic!("Unexpected message event"); } }, &HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => { if let HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { node_id: ref expected_node_id, is_permanent: ref expected_is_permanent } = expected_channel_update.unwrap() { assert!(*node_id == *expected_node_id); assert!(*is_permanent == *expected_is_permanent); } else { panic!("Unexpected message event"); } }, } }, _ => panic!("Unexpected message event"), } } else { assert_eq!(events.len(), 0); } } impl msgs::ChannelUpdate { fn dummy() -> msgs::ChannelUpdate { use secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature; use secp256k1::Signature; msgs::ChannelUpdate { signature: Signature::from(FFISignature::new()), contents: msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate { chain_hash: Sha256dHash::from_data(&vec![0u8][..]), short_channel_id: 0, timestamp: 0, flags: 0, cltv_expiry_delta: 0, htlc_minimum_msat: 0, fee_base_msat: 0, fee_proportional_millionths: 0, excess_data: vec![], } } } } #[test] fn test_onion_failure() { use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate; use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY; use secp256k1; const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000; const PERM: u16 = 0x4000; const NODE: u16 = 0x2000; const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000; let mut nodes = create_network(3); for node in nodes.iter() { *node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(SecretKey::from_slice(&Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap()); } let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2)]; let (_, payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &Vec::new(), 40000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); // positve case send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 40000); // intermediate node failure run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap(); onion_payloads[0].realm = 3; msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash); }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here // final node failure run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap(); onion_payloads[1].realm = 3; msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash); }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); // the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node // receiving simulated fail messages // intermediate node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { // trigger error msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { // and tamper returing error message let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]); }, ||{}, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: false})); // final node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| { // and tamper returing error message let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], NODE|2, &[0;0]); }, ||{ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); }, true, Some(NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: false})); // intermediate node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]); }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true})); // final node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_node_failure", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|2, &[0;0]); }, ||{ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|2), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true})); // intermediate node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]); }, ||{ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); }, true, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[0].pubkey, is_permanent: true})); // final node failure run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_node_feature_missing", 200, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_msg| {}, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[1].shared_secret[..], PERM|NODE|3, &[0;0]); }, ||{ nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); }, false, Some(PERM|NODE|3), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure{node_id: route.hops[1].pubkey, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_version", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.version = 1; }, ||{}, true, Some(BADONION|PERM|4), None); run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_hmac", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac = [3; 32]; }, ||{}, true, Some(BADONION|PERM|5), None); run_onion_failure_test("invalid_onion_key", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key = Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey);}, ||{}, true, Some(BADONION|PERM|6), None); run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("temporary_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], UPDATE|7, &ChannelUpdate::dummy().encode_with_len()[..]); }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|7), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("permanent_channel_failure", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|8, &[0;0]); // short_channel_id from the processing node }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|8), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept("required_channel_feature_missing", 100, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); msg.reason = onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&onion_keys[0].shared_secret[..], PERM|9, &[0;0]); // short_channel_id from the processing node }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|9), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); let mut bogus_route = route.clone(); bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id -= 1; run_onion_failure_test("unknown_next_peer", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|10), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: bogus_route.hops[1].short_channel_id, is_permanent:true})); let amt_to_forward = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&channels[1].2).unwrap().get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() - 1; let mut bogus_route = route.clone(); let route_len = bogus_route.hops.len(); bogus_route.hops[route_len-1].fee_msat = amt_to_forward; run_onion_failure_test("amount_below_minimum", 0, &nodes, &bogus_route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|11), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); //TODO: with new config API, we will be able to generate both valid and //invalid channel_update cases. run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { msg.amount_msat -= 1; }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test("incorrect_cltv_expiry", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { // need to violate: cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value msg.cltv_expiry -= 1; }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|13), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true})); run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_soon", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[1].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, ||{}, true, Some(UPDATE|14), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); run_onion_failure_test("unknown_payment_hash", 2, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || { nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash, 0); }, false, Some(PERM|15), None); run_onion_failure_test("final_expiry_too_soon", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { let height = msg.cltv_expiry - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 1; let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }; nodes[2].chain_monitor.block_connected_checked(&header, height, &Vec::new()[..], &[0; 0]); }, || {}, true, Some(17), None); run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_cltv_expiry", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || { for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() { for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() { match f { &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } => forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value += 1, _ => {}, } } } }, true, Some(18), None); run_onion_failure_test("final_incorrect_htlc_amount", 1, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || { // violate amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().borrow_parts().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() { for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() { match f { &mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref mut forward_info, .. } => forward_info.amt_to_forward -= 1, _ => {}, } } } }, true, Some(19), None); run_onion_failure_test("channel_disabled", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |_| {}, || { // disconnect event to the channel between nodes[1] ~ nodes[2] nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); }, true, Some(UPDATE|20), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage{msg: ChannelUpdate::dummy()})); reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false)); run_onion_failure_test("expiry_too_far", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| { let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&::secp256k1::Secp256k1::without_caps(), &[3; 32]).unwrap(); let mut route = route.clone(); let height = 1; route.hops[1].cltv_expiry_delta += CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY + route.hops[0].cltv_expiry_delta + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); let (onion_payloads, _, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, height).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &payment_hash); msg.cltv_expiry = htlc_cltv; msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_packet; }, ||{}, true, Some(21), None); } // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message. // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve. //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO. #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() { //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0. //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these) let mut nodes = create_network(2); let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000); let mut route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); route.hops[0].fee_msat = 0; let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash); if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"); } else { assert!(false); } } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() { //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000. //It is enforced when constructing a route. let mut nodes = create_network(2); let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 0); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000000, 500000001).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash); if let Err(APIError::RouteError{err}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Channel CLTV overflowed?!"); } else { assert!(false); } } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() { //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC. //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0. //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer. let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0); let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().their_max_accepted_htlcs as u64; for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs { let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let mut payment_event = { nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] { assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i); } else { assert!(false); } SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0)) }; nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false); expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]); expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100000); } let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash); if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"); } else { assert!(false); } } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() { //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC. let mut nodes = create_network(2); let channel_value = 100000; let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0); let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat; send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], max_in_flight+1, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash); if let Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put us over our max HTLC value in flight"); } else { assert!(false); } send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight); } // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message. #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() { //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel. let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000); let htlc_minimum_msat: u64; { let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap(); let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap(); htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(); } let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], htlc_minimum_msat, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1; let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() { //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000); let their_channel_reserve = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).channel_reserve_msat; let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 5000000-their_channel_reserve, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 5000000-their_channel_reserve+1; let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() { let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new(); //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash. let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &{ let mut session_key = [0; 32]; rng::fill_bytes(&mut session_key); session_key }).expect("RNG is bad!"); let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1; let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv).unwrap(); let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap(); let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, &our_payment_hash); let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC { channel_id: chan.2, htlc_id: 0, amount_msat: 1000, payment_hash: our_payment_hash, cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv, onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(), }; for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS { msg.htlc_id = i as u64; nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg).unwrap(); } msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64; let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() { //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel let mut nodes = create_network(2); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1; let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err,"Remote HTLC add would put them over their max HTLC value in flight"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() { //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel. let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 3999999, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000; let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); } #[test] fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() { //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection. // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure. let mut nodes = create_network(2); create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); let route = nodes[0].router.get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, &[], 1000000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap(); let (_, our_payment_hash) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]); nodes[0].node.send_payment(route, our_payment_hash).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); //Disconnect and Reconnect nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false); nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1); nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]).unwrap(); handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]); nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]).unwrap(); handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]); //Resend HTLC nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]).unwrap(); assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed).unwrap(); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); let err = nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]); if let Err(msgs::HandleError{err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {..})}) = err { assert_eq!(err, "Remote skipped HTLC ID"); } else { assert!(false); } assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty()); check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1]); }