When an invoice is requested but either receives an error or never
receives a response, surface an event to indicate to the user that the
corresponding future payment has failed.
When receiving a BOLT 12 invoice originating from either an invoice
request or a refund, the invoice should only be paid once. To accomplish
this, require that the invoice includes an encrypted payment id in the
payer metadata. This allows ChannelManager to track a payment when
requesting but prior to receiving the invoice. Thus, it can determine if
the invoice has already been paid.
Metadata such as the PaymentId should be encrypted when included in an
InvoiceRequest or a Refund, as it is user data and is exposed to the
payment recipient. Add an encryption key to ExpandedKey for this purpose
instead of reusing offers_base_key.
InvoiceRequest::verify_and_respond_using_derived_keys takes a payment
hash. To avoid generating one for invoice requests that ultimately
cannot be verified, split the method into one for verifying and another
for responding.
We use `tokio`'s `io-util` feature to provide the
`Async{Read,Write}Ext` traits, which allow us to simply launch a
read future or `poll_write` directly as well as `split` the
`TcpStream` into a read/write half. However, these traits aren't
actually doing much for us - they are really just wrapping the
`readable` future (which we can trivially use ourselves) and
`poll_write` isn't doing anything for us that `poll_write_ready`
can't.
Similarly, the split logic is actually just `Arc`ing the
`TcpStream` and busy-waiting when an operation is busy to prevent
concurrent reads/writes. However, there's no reason to prevent
concurrent access at the stream level - we aren't ever concurrently
writing or reading (though we may concurrently read and write,
which is fine).
Worse, the `io-util` feature broke MSRV (though they're likely to
fix this upstream) and carries two additional dependencies (only
one on the latest upstream tokio).
Thus, we simply drop the dependency here.
Fixes#2527.
Releasing write locks in between monitor updates
requires storing a set of cloned keys to iterate
over. For efficiency purposes, that set of keys
is an actual set, as opposed to array, which means
that the iteration order may not be consistent.
The test was relying on an event array index to
access the revocation transaction. We change that
to accessing a hash map keyed by the txid, fixing
the test.
Previously, updating block data on a chain monitor
would acquire a write lock on all of its associated
channel monitors and not release it until the loop
completed.
Now, we instead acquire it on each iteration,
fixing #2470.
