Untractable packages are those which cannot have their fees updated once
signed, hence why they weren't retried. There's no harm in retrying
these packages by simply re-broadcasting them though, as the fee market
could have spontaneously spiked when we first broadcast it, leading to
our transaction not propagating throughout node mempools unless
broadcast manually.
We correctly send out a gossip channel disable update after one
full time tick being down (1-2 minutes). This is pretty nice in
that it avoids nodes trying to route through our nodes too often
if they're down. Other nodes have a much longer time window,
causing them to have much less aggressive channel disables. Sadly,
at one minute it's not super uncommon for tor nodes to get disabled
(once a day or so on two nodes I looked at), and this causes the
lightning terminal scorer to consider the LDK node unstable (even
though it's the one doing the disabling - so is online). This
causes user frustration and makes LDK look bad (even though it's
probably failing fewer payments).
Given this, and future switches to block-based `channel_update`
timestamp fields, it makes sense to go ahead and switch to delaying
channel disable announcements for 10 minutes. This puts us more in
line with other implementations and reduces gossip spam, at the
cost of less reliable payments.
Fixes#2175, at least the currently visible parts.
Now that we guarantee `claim_payment` will always succeed we have
to let the user know what the deadline is. We still fail payments
if they haven't been claimed in time, which we now expose in
`PaymentClaimable`.
This passes the new `RecipientOnionFields` through the internal
sending APIs, ensuring we have access to the full struct when we
go to construct the sending onion so that we can include any new
fields added there.
While most lightning nodes don't (currently) support providing a
payment secret or payment metadata for spontaneous payments,
there's no specific technical reason why we shouldn't support
sending those fields to a recipient.
Further, when we eventually move to allowing custom TLV entries in
the recipient's onion TLV stream, we'll want to support it for
spontaneous payments as well.
Here we simply add the new `RecipientOnionFields` struct as an
argument to the spontaneous payment send methods. We don't yet
plumb it through the payment sending logic, which will come when we
plumb the new struct through the sending logic to replace the
existing payment secret arguments.
This moves the public payment sending API from passing an explicit
`PaymentSecret` to a new `RecipientOnionFields` struct (which
currently only contains the `PaymentSecret`). This gives us
substantial additional flexibility as we look at add both
`PaymentMetadata`, a new (well, year-or-two-old) BOLT11 invoice
extension to provide additional data sent to the recipient.
In the future, we should also add the ability to add custom TLV
entries in the `RecipientOnionFields` struct.
Currently, users don't have good way of being notified when channel open
negotiations have succeeded and new channels are pending confirmation on
chain. To this end, we add a new `ChannelPending` event that is emitted
when send or receive a `funding_signed` message, i.e., at the last
moment before waiting for the confirmation period.
We track whether the event had previously been emitted in `Channel` and
remove it from `internal_funding_created` entirely. Hence, we now
only emit the event after ChannelMonitorUpdate completion, or upon
channel reestablish. This mitigates a race condition where where we
wouldn't persist the event *and* wouldn't regenerate it on restart,
therefore potentially losing it, if async CMU wouldn't complete before
ChannelManager persistence.
If routing nodes take less fees and pay the final node more than
`amt_to_forward`, the receiver may see that `total_msat` has been met
before all of the sender's intended HTLCs have arrived. The receiver
may then prematurely claim the payment and release the payment hash,
allowing routing nodes to claim the remaining HTLCs. Using the onion
value `amt_to_forward` to determine when `total_msat` has been met
allows the sender to control the set total.
While retrying a failed path of an MPP, a node may want to overshoot
the `total_msat` in order to use a path with an `htlc_minimum_msat`
greater than the remaining value being sent. This commit no longer
fails MPPs that overshoot the `total_msat`, however it does fail
HTLCs with the same payment hash that are received *after* a
payment has become claimable.
This only applies to all malleable packages on channels pre-dating
anchors and malleables packages for counterparty commitments
post-anchors. Malleables packages for holder commitments post-anchors
should have their transaction locktime applied manually by the consumer
of `BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution` events.
This is largely motivated by some follow-up work for anchors that will
introduce an event handler for `BumpTransaction` events, which we can
now include in this new top-level `events` module.
Taking two instances of the same mutex may be totally fine, but it
requires a total lockorder that we cannot (trivially) check. Thus,
its generally unsafe to do if we can avoid it.
To discourage doing this, here we default to panicing on such locks
in our lockorder tests, with a separate lock function added that is
clearly labeled "unsafe" to allow doing so when we can guarantee a
total lockorder.
This requires adapting a number of sites to the new API, including
fixing a bug this turned up in `ChannelMonitor`'s `PartialEq` where
no lockorder was guaranteed.
We previously avoided holding the `total_consistency_lock` while
doing crypto operations to build onions. However, now that we've
abstracted out the outbound payment logic into a utility module,
ensuring the state is consistent at all times is now abstracted
away from code authors and reviewers, making it likely to break.
Further, because we now call `send_payment_along_path` both with,
and without, the `total_consistency_lock`, and because recursive
read locks may deadlock, it would now be quite difficult to figure
out which paths through `outbound_payment` need the lock and which
don't.
While it may slow writes somewhat, it's not really worth trying to
figure out this mess, instead we just hold the
`total_consistency_lock` before going into `outbound_payment`
functions.
fbc08477e8 purported to "move" the
`final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to `PaymentParamters` from
`RouteParameters`. However, for naive backwards-compatibility
reasons it left the existing on in place and only added a new,
redundant field in `PaymentParameters`.
It turns out there's really no reason for this - if we take a more
critical eye towards backwards compatibility we can figure out the
correct value in every `PaymentParameters` while deserializing.
We do this here - making `PaymentParameters` a `ReadableArgs`
taking a "default" `cltv_expiry_delta` when it goes to read. This
allows existing `RouteParameters` objects to pass the read
`final_cltv_expiry_delta` field in to be used if the new field
wasn't present.
This field was previous useful in manual retries for users to know when all
paths of a payment have failed and it is safe to retry. Now that we support
automatic retries in ChannelManager and no longer support manual retries, the
field is no longer useful.
For backwards compat, we now always write false for this field. If we didn't do
this, previous versions would default this field's value to true, which can be
problematic because some clients have relied on the field to indicate when a
full payment retry is safe.
Forcing users to pass a genesis block hash has ended up being
error-prone largely due to byte-swapping questions for bindings
users. Further, our API is currently inconsistent - in
`ChannelManager` we take a `Bitcoin::Network` but in `NetworkGraph`
we take the genesis block hash.
Luckily `NetworkGraph` is the only remaining place where we require
users pass the genesis block hash, so swapping it for a `Network`
is a simple change.
Building on the previous commits, this finishes our transition to
doing all message-sending in the monitor update completion
pipeline, unifying our immediate- and async- `ChannelMonitor`
update and persistence flows.
We currently have two codepaths on most channel update functions -
most methods return a set of messages to send a peer iff the
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` succeeds, but if it does not we push the
messages back into the `Channel` and then pull them back out when
the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` completes and send them then. This adds
a substantial amount of complexity in very critical codepaths.
Instead, here we swap all our channel update codepaths to
immediately set the channel-update-required flag and only return a
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` to the `ChannelManager`. Internally in the
`Channel` we store a queue of `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s, which will
become critical in future work to surface pending
`ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users at startup so they can complete.
This leaves some redundant work in `Channel` to be cleaned up
later. Specifically, we still generate the messages which we will
now ignore and regenerate later.
This commit updates the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` pipeline across all
the places we generate them.
Long ago, we used the `no_connection_possible` to signal that a
peer has some unknown feature set or some other condition prevents
us from ever connecting to the given peer. In that case we'd
automatically force-close all channels with the given peer. This
was somewhat surprising to users so we removed the automatic
force-close, leaving the flag serving no LDK-internal purpose.
Distilling the concept of "can we connect to this peer again in the
future" to a simple flag turns out to be ripe with edge cases, so
users actually using the flag to force-close channels would likely
cause surprising behavior.
Thus, there's really not a lot of reason to keep the flag,
especially given its untested and likely to be broken in subtle
ways anyway.
`PaymentParams` is all about the parameters for a payment, i.e. the
parameters which are static across all the paths of a paymet.
`RouteParameters` is about the information specific to a given
`Route` (i.e. a set of paths, among multiple potential sets of
paths for a payment). The CLTV delta thus doesn't belong in
`RouterParameters` but instead in `PaymentParameters`.
Worse, because `RouteParameters` is built from the information in
the last hops of a `Route`, when we deliberately inflate the CLTV
delta in path-finding, retries of the payment will have the final
CLTV delta double-inflated as it inflates starting from the final
CLTV delta used in the last attempt.
By moving the CLTV delta to `PaymentParameters` we avoid this
issue, leaving only the sought amount in the `RouteParameters`.
`test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success` currently
fails if the "wrong" HTLC is picked to be claimed. Given the HTLCs
are identical, there's no way to figure out which we should claim.
The test instead relies on a magic value - the first one is the
right one....unless we change our CSPRNG implementation. When we
try to do so, the test randomly fails.
Here we change one HTLC to a lower amount so we can figure out
which transaction to broadcast to make the test robust against
CSPRNG changes.
