Our `no-std` locks simply panic if a lock cannot be taken as there
should be no lock contention in a single-threaded environment.
However, the `held_by_thread` debug methods were delegating to the
lock methods which resulted in a panic when asserting that a lock
*is* held by the current thread.
Instead, they are updated here to call the relevant `RefCell`
testing methods.
Rather than using the std benchmark framework (which isn't
maintained and is unlikely to get any further maintenance), we swap
for criterion, which at least gets us a variable number of test
runs so our benchmarks don't take forever.
We also fix the RGS benchmark to pass now that the file in use is
stale compared to today's date.
In `no-std`, we exposed `wait` functions which rely on a dummy
`Condvar` which never actually sleeps. This is somwhat nonsensical,
not to mention confusing to users. Instead, we simply remove the
`wait` methods in `no-std` builds.
These are useful, but we previously couldn't use them due to our
MSRV. Now that we can, we should use them, so we expose them via
our normal debug_sync wrappers.
As long as the lock order on such locks is still valid, we should allow
them regardless of whether they were constructed at the same location or
not. Note that we can only really enforce this if we require one lock
call per line, or if we have access to symbol columns (as we do on Linux
and macOS). We opt for a smaller patch by relying on the latter.
This was previously triggered by some recent test changes to
`test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor`. When the
test ends and a node is dropped causing us to persist each, we'd detect
a possible lockorder violation deadlock across three different `Mutex`
instances that are held at the same location when serializing our
`per_peer_states` in `ChannelManager::write`.
The presumed lockorder violation happens because the first `Mutex` held
shares the same construction location with the third one, while the
second `Mutex` has a different construction location. When we hold the
second one, we consider the first as a dependency, and then consider the
second as a dependency when holding the third, causing a circular
dependency (since the third shares the same construction location as the
first).
This isn't considered a lockorder violation that could result in a
deadlock as the comment suggests inline though, since we are under a
dependent write lock which no one else can have access to.
When we receive an update_fulfill_htlc message, we immediately try
to "claim" the HTLC against the HTLCSource. If there is one, this
works great, we immediately generate a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` for
the corresponding inbound HTLC and persist that before we ever get
to processing our counterparty's `commitment_signed` and persisting
the corresponding `ChannelMonitorUpdate`.
However, if there isn't one (and this is the first successful HTLC
for a payment we sent), we immediately generate a `PaymentSent`
event and queue it up for the user. Then, a millisecond later, we
receive the `commitment_signed` from our peer, removing the HTLC
from the latest local commitment transaction as a side-effect of
the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` applied.
If the user has processed the `PaymentSent` event by that point,
great, we're done. However, if they have not, and we crash prior to
persisting the `ChannelManager`, on startup we get confused about
the state of the payment. We'll force-close the channel for being
stale, and see an HTLC which was removed and is no longer present
in the latest commitment transaction (which we're broadcasting).
Because we claim corresponding inbound HTLCs before updating a
`ChannelMonitor`, we assume such HTLCs have failed - attempting to
fail after having claimed should be a noop. However, in the
sent-payment case we now generate a `PaymentFailed` event for the
user, allowing an HTLC to complete without giving the user a
preimage.
Here we address this issue by storing the payment preimages for
claimed outbound HTLCs in the `ChannelMonitor`, in addition to the
existing inbound HTLC preimages already stored there. This allows
us to fix the specific issue described by checking for a preimage
and switching the type of event generated in response. In addition,
it reduces the risk of future confusion by ensuring we don't fail
HTLCs which were claimed but not fully committed to before a crash.
It does not, however, full fix the issue here - because the
preimages are removed after the HTLC has been fully removed from
available commitment transactions if we are substantially delayed
in persisting the `ChannelManager` from the time we receive the
`update_fulfill_htlc` until after a full commitment signed dance
completes we may still hit this issue. The full fix for this issue
is to delay the persistence of the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` until
after the `PaymentSent` event has been processed. This avoids the
issue entirely, ensuring we process the event before updating the
`ChannelMonitor`, the same as we ensure the upstream HTLC has been
claimed before updating the `ChannelMonitor` for forwarded
payments.
The full solution will be implemented in a later work, however this
change still makes sense at that point as well - if we were to
delay the initial `commitment_signed` `ChannelMonitorUpdate` util
after the `PaymentSent` event has been processed (which likely
requires a database update on the users' end), we'd hold our
`commitment_signed` + `revoke_and_ack` response for two DB writes
(i.e. `fsync()` calls), making our commitment transaction
processing a full `fsync` slower. By making this change first, we
can instead delay the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` from the
counterparty's final `revoke_and_ack` message until the event has
been processed, giving us a full network roundtrip to do so and
avoiding delaying our response as long as an `fsync` is faster than
a network roundtrip.
Our lockdep logic (on Windows) identifies a mutex based on which
line it was constructed on. Thus, if we have two mutexes
constructed on the same line it will generate false positives.
Taking two instances of the same mutex may be totally fine, but it
requires a total lockorder that we cannot (trivially) check. Thus,
its generally unsafe to do if we can avoid it.
To discourage doing this, here we default to panicing on such locks
in our lockorder tests, with a separate lock function added that is
clearly labeled "unsafe" to allow doing so when we can guarantee a
total lockorder.
This requires adapting a number of sites to the new API, including
fixing a bug this turned up in `ChannelMonitor`'s `PartialEq` where
no lockorder was guaranteed.
Our existing lockorder tests assume that a read lock on a thread
that is already holding the same read lock is totally fine. This
isn't at all true. The `std` `RwLock` behavior is
platform-dependent - on most platforms readers can starve writers
as readers will never block for a pending writer. However, on
platforms where this is not the case, one thread trying to take a
write lock may deadlock with another thread that both already has,
and is attempting to take again, a read lock.
Worse, our in-tree `FairRwLock` exhibits this behavior explicitly
on all platforms to avoid the starvation issue.
Thus, we shouldn't have any special handling for allowing recursive
read locks, so we simply remove it here.
In anticipation of the next commit(s) adding threaded tests, we
need to ensure our lockorder checks work fine with multiple
threads. Sadly, currently we have tests in the form
`assert!(mutex.try_lock().is_ok())` to assert that a given mutex is
not locked by the caller to a function.
The fix is rather simple given we already track mutexes locked by a
thread in our `debug_sync` logic - simply replace the check with a
new extension trait which (for test builds) checks the locked state
by only looking at what was locked by the current thread.
On windows the symbol names appear to sometimes be truncated,
which causes the symbol name to not include the `::new` at the end.
This causes the regex to mis-match and track the wrong location
for the mutex construction, leading to bogus lockorder violations.
For example, in testing the following symbol name appeared on
Windows, without the function name itself:
`lightning::debug_sync::RwLock<std::collections:#️⃣:map::HashMap<lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint,lightning::chain::chainmonitor::MonitorHolder<lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner>,std::collections:#️⃣:map::RandomState> >::`
