If a user has issues with a payment, the most obvious thing they'll
do is check logs for the payment hash. Thus, we should ensure our
logs that show a payment's lifecycle include the payment hash and
are emitted (a) as soon as LDK learns of the payment, (b) once the
payment goes out to the peer (which is already reasonably covered
in the commitment transaction building logs) and (c) when the
payment ultimately is fulfilled or fails.
Here we improve our logs for both (a) and (c).
Rather than using a holder_signer of a specific
signer type in Channel and ChannelContext, this
allows us to hold an enum such that depending on
the type of channel, the appropriate signer could
be held in its respective variant.
Doing so required the reparametrization of Channel
from using a Signer to using the SignerProvider
trait. This percolated down to the ChannelManager
and multiple tests.
Now, when accessign various signer methods, there
is a distinction between accessing methods defined
for all signers on ChannelSigner, and accessing
type-specific methods using accessors such as
`as_ecdsa`.
Benchmarks were failing because node config and
channel monitor configs were tied to the same
lifetime.
Introducing a separate lifetime allows to avoid
out-of-order deallocation errors.
Creates a new `events::ClaimedHTLC` struct that contains the relevant
information about a claimed HTLC; e.g., the channel it arrived on, its ID, the
amount of the HTLC, the overall amount of the payment, etc. Adds appropriate
serialization support.
Adds a `Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>` to the `ClaimingPayment`
structure. Populates this when creating the struct by converting the
`payment.htlcs` (which are `ClaimingHTLC` structs) into `event::ClaimedHTLC`
structs. This is a straightforward transformation.
Adds a `Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>` to the `events::Event::PaymentClaimed`
enum. This is populated directly from the `ClaimingPayment`'s `htlcs` vec.
Fixes#2477.
LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and
force-closes any time we send one while HTLCs are still present.
The issue is tracked at
https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had
multiple patches to fix it but none so far have managed to land
upstream. The issue appears to be very low priority for the LND
team despite being marked "P1".
We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead
simply repeated the Shutdown message on repeat until morale
improves.
In 0ad1f4c943 we fixed a nasty bug
where a failure to persist a `ChannelManager` faster than a
`ChannelMonitor` could result in the loss of a `PaymentSent` event,
eventually resulting in a `PaymentFailed` instead!
As noted in that commit, there's still some risk, though its been
substantially reduced - if we receive an `update_fulfill_htlc`
message for an outbound payment, and persist the initial removal
`ChannelMonitorUpdate`, then respond with our own
`commitment_signed` + `revoke_and_ack`, followed by receiving our
peer's final `revoke_and_ack`, and then persist the
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` generated from that, all prior to completing
a `ChannelManager` persistence, we'll still forget the HTLC and
eventually trigger a `PaymentFailed` rather than the correct
`PaymentSent`.
Here we fully fix the issue by delaying the final
`ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence until the `PaymentSent` event
has been processed and document the fact that a spurious
`PaymentFailed` event can still be generated for a sent payment.
The original fix in 0ad1f4c943 is
still incredibly useful here, allowing us to avoid blocking the
first `ChannelMonitorUpdate` until the event processing completes,
as this would cause us to add event-processing delay in our general
commitment update latency. Instead, we ultimately race the user
handling the `PaymentSent` event with how long it takes our
`revoke_and_ack` + `commitment_signed` to make it to our
counterparty and receive the response `revoke_and_ack`. This should
give the user plenty of time to handle the event before we need to
make progress.
Sadly, because we change our `ChannelMonitorUpdate` semantics, this
change requires a number of test changes, avoiding checking for a
post-RAA `ChannelMonitorUpdate` until after we process a
`PaymentSent` event. Note that this does not apply to payments we
learned the preimage for on-chain - ensuring `PaymentSent` events
from such resolutions will be addressed in a future PR. Thus, tests
which resolve payments on-chain switch to a direct call to the
`expect_payment_sent` function with the claim-expected flag unset.
01847277b9 switched around the logic
for inbound channel construction to assign the outbound SCID alias
after constructing the `InboundV1Channel` object. Thus, the SCID
alias argument is now unused, and we remove it here.
If we have a pending inbound un-accepted channel but receive an
error message for it from our peer, or our peer disconnects, we
should remove the pending entry, ensuring any attempts to accept
it fail.
The ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances method provides a more
straightforward approach to the balance of a channel, which satisfies
most use cases. The computation of AvailableBalances::balance_msat is
complex and originally had a different purpose that is not applicable
anymore.
Create a new table in 'peer_state' to maintain unaccepted inbound
channels; i.e., a channel for which we've received an 'open_channel'
message but that user code has not yet confirmed for acceptance. When
user code accepts the channel (e.g. via 'accept_inbound_channel'),
create the channel object and as before.
Currently, the 'open_channel' message eagerly creates an
InboundV1Channel object before determining if the channel should be
accepted. Because this happens /before/ the channel has been assigned
a user identity (which happens in the handler for OpenChannelRequest),
the channel is assigned a random user identity. As part of the
creation process, the channel's cryptographic material is initialized,
which then uses this randomly generated value for the user's channel
identity e.g. in SignerProvider::generate_channel_keys_id.
By delaying the creation of the InboundV1Channel until /after/ the
channel has been accepted, we ensure that we defer cryptographic
initialization until we have given the user the opportunity to assign
an identity to the channel.
Because we don't know which custom TLV type numbers the user is
expecting (and it would be cumbersome for them to tell us), instead of
failing unknown even custom TLVs on deserialization, we accept all
custom TLVs, and pass them to the user to check whether they recognize
them and choose to fail back if they don't. However, a user may not
check for custom TLVs, in which case we should reject any even custom
TLVs as unknown.
This commit makes sure a user must explicitly accept a payment with
even custom TLVs, by (1) making the default
`ChannelManager::claim_funds` fail if the payment had even custom TLVs
and (2) adding a new function
`ChannelManager::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs` that accepts them.
This commit also refactors our custom TLVs test and updates various
documentation to account for this.
When a user decodes custom TLVs, if they fail to recognize even type
numbers they should fail back with the correct failure code and fail
data. This new variant adds the proper failure variant for the user to
pass into `ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`.
Note that the enum discriminants were removed because when adding a
struct variant we can no longer make use of the discriminant through
casting like we previously did, and instead have to manually define the
associated failure code anyway.
When serialized, the TLVs in `OutboundOnionPayload`, unlike a normal
TLV stream, are prefixed with the length of the stream. To allow a user
to add arbitrary custom TLVs, we aren't able to communicate to our
serialization macros exactly which fields to expect, so this commit
adds new macro variants to allow appending an extra set of bytes (and
modifying the prefixed length accordingly).
Because the keysend preimage TLV has a type number in the custom type
range, and a user's TLVs may have type numbers above and/or below
keysend's type number, and because TLV streams must be serialized in
increasing order by type number, this commit also ensures the keysend
TLV is properly sorted/serialized amongst the custom TLVs.
Custom TLVs allow users to send extra application-specific data with
a payment. These have the additional flexibility compared to
`payment_metadata` that they don't have to reflect recipient generated
data provided in an invoice, in which `payment_metadata` could be
reused.
We ensure provided type numbers are unique, increasing, and within the
experimental range with the `RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`
method.
This begins sender-side support for custom TLVs.
The current ChannelClosed event does not let
you know the counterparty during a channel close
event. This change adds the counterparty_node_id
and the channel_capacity to the ChannelClosed event.
This helps users to have more context during a
channel close event. Solves #2343
To support route blinding, we want to split OnionHopData into two separate
structs, one for inbound onions and one for outbound onions. This is because
blinded payloads change the fields present in the onion hop data struct based
on whether we're sending vs receiving (outbound onions include encrypted blobs,
inbound onions can decrypt those blobs and contain the decrypted fields
themselves).
In upcoming commits, we'll add variants for blinded payloads to the new
InboundPayload enum.
We introduce a `UnfundedChannelContext` which contains a counter for the
current age of an unfunded channel in timer ticks. This age is incremented
for every `ChannelManager::timer_tick_ocurred` and the unfunded channel
is removed if it exceeds `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`.
The value will not be persisted as unfunded channels themselves are not
persisted.
One of a series of follow-up commits to address some issues found
in PR 2077, where we split channels up into different maps and structs
depending on phase in their life.
We had some inconsistencies so far in referring to channels such as
`OutboundV1Channel` and `InboundV1Channel` as pending and unfunded.
From here we refer to these kinds of channels only as "unfunded".
This is a slight conflation with the term "unfunded" in the contexts
of denial of service mitigation. There, "unfunded" actually refers to
non-0conf, inbound channels that have not had their funding transaction
confirmed. This might warrant changing that usage to "unconfirmed inbound".
As done with inbound feerate updates, we can afford to commit less in
fees, as long as we still may the minimum mempool feerate. This enables
users to spend a bit more of their balance, as less funds are being
committed to transaction fees.
