This passes the new `RecipientOnionFields` through the internal
sending APIs, ensuring we have access to the full struct when we
go to construct the sending onion so that we can include any new
fields added there.
While most lightning nodes don't (currently) support providing a
payment secret or payment metadata for spontaneous payments,
there's no specific technical reason why we shouldn't support
sending those fields to a recipient.
Further, when we eventually move to allowing custom TLV entries in
the recipient's onion TLV stream, we'll want to support it for
spontaneous payments as well.
Here we simply add the new `RecipientOnionFields` struct as an
argument to the spontaneous payment send methods. We don't yet
plumb it through the payment sending logic, which will come when we
plumb the new struct through the sending logic to replace the
existing payment secret arguments.
This moves the public payment sending API from passing an explicit
`PaymentSecret` to a new `RecipientOnionFields` struct (which
currently only contains the `PaymentSecret`). This gives us
substantial additional flexibility as we look at add both
`PaymentMetadata`, a new (well, year-or-two-old) BOLT11 invoice
extension to provide additional data sent to the recipient.
In the future, we should also add the ability to add custom TLV
entries in the `RecipientOnionFields` struct.
Many of the fields in `HTLCSource::OutboundRoute` are used to
rebuild the pending-outbound-payment map on reload if the
`ChannelManager` was not serialized though `ChannelMonitor`(s)
were after an HTLC was sent. As of 0.0.114, however, such payments
are not retryable without allowing them to fail and doing a full,
fresh, send.
Thus, some of the fields can be safely removed - we only really
care about having enough information to provide the user a failure
event, not being able to retry.
Here we drop one such field - the `payment_secret`, making our
`ChannelMonitorUpdate`s another handful of bytes smaller.
Previously, LDK would refuse to claim a payment if a channel on
which the payment was received had been closed between when the
HTLC was received and when we went to claim it. This makes sense in
the payment case - why pay an on-chain fee to claim the HTLC when
presumably the sender may retry later. Long ago it also reduced
total code in the claim pipeline.
However, this doesn't make sense if you're trying to do an atomic
swap or some other protocol that requires atomicity with some other
action - if your money got claimed elsewhere you need to be able to
claim the HTLC in lightning no matter what. Further, this is an
over-optimization - there should be a very, very low likelihood
that a channel closes between when we receive the last HTLC for a
payment and the user goes to claim the payment. Since we now have
code to handle this anyway we should allow it.
Fixes#2017.
If the user's sleep future passed to an async background processor
only returns true for exiting once and then reverts back to false,
we should exit anyway when we get a chance to. We do to this here
by always ensuring we check the exit flag even when only polling
sleep futures with no intent to (yet) exit. This is utilized in the
tests added in the coming commit(s).
If `ChannelManager` is persistable before the async background
processor even starts, it may not even get around to overwriting
the `should_exit` flag before testing it, and the default value is
(incorrectly) true, causing an immediate unconditional exit.
The default value should simply be false.
Fixes#2140
Instead of asserting a `Result` `is_ok`, we should always simply
`unwrap` to get a backgrace, and we should avoid doing so if the
thread is already panicking.
Rather than being totally silent, we need to at least note that we
are processing an RGS update when doing so in the logs, which we do
here.
Fixes#1981.
Currently, users don't have good way of being notified when channel open
negotiations have succeeded and new channels are pending confirmation on
chain. To this end, we add a new `ChannelPending` event that is emitted
when send or receive a `funding_signed` message, i.e., at the last
moment before waiting for the confirmation period.
We track whether the event had previously been emitted in `Channel` and
remove it from `internal_funding_created` entirely. Hence, we now
only emit the event after ChannelMonitorUpdate completion, or upon
channel reestablish. This mitigates a race condition where where we
wouldn't persist the event *and* wouldn't regenerate it on restart,
therefore potentially losing it, if async CMU wouldn't complete before
ChannelManager persistence.
Some users have suggested that waking every 100ms can be
CPU-intensive in deployments with hundreds or thousands of nodes
all running on the same machine. Thus, we add an option to the
futures-based `background-processor` to avoid waking every 100ms to
check for iOS having backgrounded our app and cut our TCP sockets.
This cuts the normal sleep time down from 100ms to 10s, for those
who turn it on.
If the `ChainMonitor` gets an async monitor update completion, this
means the `ChannelManager` needs to be polled for event processing.
Here we wake it using the new multi-`Future`-await `Sleeper`, or
the existing `select` block in the async BP.
Fixes#2052.
In `no-std`, we exposed `wait` functions which rely on a dummy
`Condvar` which never actually sleeps. This is somwhat nonsensical,
not to mention confusing to users. Instead, we simply remove the
`wait` methods in `no-std` builds.
Rather than having three ways to await a `ChannelManager` being
persistable, this moves to just exposing the awaitable `Future` and
having sleep functions on that.
In the next commits we'll be adding a second notify pipeline - from
the `ChainMonitor` back to the background processor. This will
cause the `background-processor` to need to await multiple wakers
at once, which we cannot do in the current scheme without taking on
a full async runtime.
Building a multi-future waiter isn't so bad, and notably will allow
us to remove the existing sleep pipeline entirely, reducing the
complexity of our wakers implementation by only having one notify
path to consider.
`Send` is rather useless on a `no-std` target - we don't have
threads and are just needlessly restricting ourselves, so here we
skip it for the wakers callback.
These are useful, but we previously couldn't use them due to our
MSRV. Now that we can, we should use them, so we expose them via
our normal debug_sync wrappers.
The `lightning-net-tokio` crate-level example contained a carryover
from when it was the primary notifier of the background processor
and now just shows an "example" of creating a method to call
another method with the same parameters and then do event
processing (which doesn't make sense, the BP should do that).
Instead, the examples are simply removed and the documentation is
tweaked to include recent changes.
As `futures` apparently makes no guarantees on MSRVs even in patch
releases we really can't rely on it at all, and while it currently
has an acceptable MSRV without the macros feature, its best to just
remove it wholesale.
Luckily, removing it is relatively trivial, even if it requires
the most trivial of unsafe tags.
`futures` recently broke our MSRV by bumping the `syn` major
version in a patch release. This makes it impractical for us to
use, instead here we replace the usage of its `select_biased` macro
with a trivial enum.
Given its simplicity we likely should have done this without ever
taking the dependency.
In general, only one request will be in flight at a time in
`lightning-block-sync`. Ideally we'd only have one connection, but
without using the `futures` mutex type.
Here we solve this narrowly for the one-request-at-a-time case by
caching the connection and takeing the connection out of the cache
while we work on it.
Some how I'd understood that `futures` had reasonable MSRV
guarantees (e.g. at least Debian stable), but apparently that isn't
actually the case, as they bumped it to upgrade to syn (with
apparently no actual features or bugfixes added as a result?) with
no minor version bump or any available alternative (unlike Tokio,
which does LTS releases).
Luckily its relatively easy to just drop the `futures` dependency -
it means a new connection for each request, which is annoying, but
certainly not the end of the world, and its easier than trying to
deal with pinning `futures`.
See https://github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/pull/2733
As long as the lock order on such locks is still valid, we should allow
them regardless of whether they were constructed at the same location or
not. Note that we can only really enforce this if we require one lock
call per line, or if we have access to symbol columns (as we do on Linux
and macOS). We opt for a smaller patch by relying on the latter.
This was previously triggered by some recent test changes to
`test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor`. When the
test ends and a node is dropped causing us to persist each, we'd detect
a possible lockorder violation deadlock across three different `Mutex`
instances that are held at the same location when serializing our
`per_peer_states` in `ChannelManager::write`.
The presumed lockorder violation happens because the first `Mutex` held
shares the same construction location with the third one, while the
second `Mutex` has a different construction location. When we hold the
second one, we consider the first as a dependency, and then consider the
second as a dependency when holding the third, causing a circular
dependency (since the third shares the same construction location as the
first).
This isn't considered a lockorder violation that could result in a
deadlock as the comment suggests inline though, since we are under a
dependent write lock which no one else can have access to.
If routing nodes take less fees and pay the final node more than
`amt_to_forward`, the receiver may see that `total_msat` has been met
before all of the sender's intended HTLCs have arrived. The receiver
may then prematurely claim the payment and release the payment hash,
allowing routing nodes to claim the remaining HTLCs. Using the onion
value `amt_to_forward` to determine when `total_msat` has been met
allows the sender to control the set total.
Final nodes previously had stricter requirements on HTLC contents
matching onion value compared to intermediate nodes. This allowed
for probing, i.e. the last intermediate node could overshoot the
value by a small amount and conclude from the acceptance or rejection
of the HTLC whether the next node was the destination. This also
applies to the msat amount, however this change was already present.
