This resolves a lockorder inversion in
`ChannelManager::finalize_claims` where `pending_outbound_payments`
is locked after `pending_events`, opposite of, for example, the
lockorder in `ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_internal` where
`pending_outbound_payments` is locked at the top of the
`HTLCSource::OutboundRoute` handling and then `pending_events` is
locked at the end.
In https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/950, the (somewhat
strange) requirement that error messages be handled even if the
length field is set larger than the size of the package was
removed. Here we change the code to drop the special handling for
this, opting to just fail to read the message if the length is
incorrect.
As required by the warning messages PR, we should simply warn our
counterparty in this case and let them try again, continuing to try
to use the channel until they tell us otherwise.
and replace payment_secret with encrypted metadata
See docs on `inbound_payment::verify` for details
Also add min_value checks to all create_inbound_payment* methods
When a payment fails, a payer needs to know when they can consider
a payment as fully-failed, and when only some of the HTLCs in the
payment have failed. This isn't possible with the current event
scheme, as discovered recently and as described in the previous
commit.
This adds a new event which describes when a payment is fully and
irrevocably failed, generating it only after the payment has
expired or been marked as expired with
`ChannelManager::mark_retries_exceeded` *and* all HTLCs for it
have failed. With this, a payer can more simply deduce when a
payment has failed and use that to remove payment state or
finalize a payment failure.
When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they don't know
for sure what the current state of the event queue is.
Specifically, they cannot be sure that there are not multiple
additional `PaymentPathFailed` or even `PaymentSuccess` events
pending which they will see later. Thus, they have a very hard
time identifying whether a payment has truly failed (and informing
the UI of that fact) or if it is still pending. See [1] for more
information.
In order to avoid this mess, we will resolve it here by having the
payer give `ChannelManager` a bit more information - when they
have given up on a payment - and using that to generate a
`PaymentFailed` event when all paths have failed.
This commit adds the neccessary storage and changes for the new
state inside `ChannelManager` and a public method to mark a payment
as failed, the next few commits will add the new `Event` and use
the new features in our `PaymentRetrier`.
[1] https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
Note that this feature bit does absolutely nothing. We signal it
(as we already support channel type negotiation), but do not bother
to look to see if peers support it, as we don't care - we simply
look for the TLV entry and deduce if a peer supports channel type
negotiation from that.
The only behavioral change at all here is that we don't barf if a
peer sets channel type negotiation to required via the feature bit
(instead of failing the channel at open-time), but of course no
implementations do this, and likely won't for some time (if ever -
you can simply fail channels with unknown types later, and there's
no reason to refuse connections, really).
As defined in https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/906
During event handling, ChannelManager methods may need to be called as
indicated in the Event documentation. Ensure that these calls are
idempotent for the same event rather than panicking. This allows users
to persist events for later handling without needing to worry about
processing the same event twice (e.g., if ChannelManager is not
persisted but the events were, the restarted ChannelManager would return
some of the same events).
OnionV2s don't (really) work on Tor anymore anyway, and the field
is set for removal in the BOLTs [1]. Sadly because of the way
addresses are parsed we have to continue to understand that type 3
addresses are 12 bytes long. Thus, for simplicity we keep the
`OnionV2` enum variant around and just make it an opaque 12 bytes,
with the documentation updated to note the deprecation.
[1] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/940
A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our
dust limit) is insecure, but only for them. Because some LSPs do it
with some level of trust of the clients (for a substantial UX
improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because its unlikely to
happen often in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
