At `update_add_htlc()`/`send_htlc()`, we verify that the inbound/
outbound dust or the sum of both, on either sides of the link isn't
above new config setting `max_balance_dust_htlc_msat`.
A dust HTLC is hence defined as a trimmed-to-dust one, i.e including
the fee cost to publish its claiming transaction.
KeysInterface::get_shutdown_pubkey is used to form P2WPKH shutdown
scripts. However, BOLT 2 allows for a wider variety of scripts. Refactor
KeysInterface to allow any supported script while still maintaining
serialization backwards compatibility with P2WPKH script pubkeys stored
simply as the PublicKey.
Add an optional TLV field to Channel and ChannelMonitor to support the
new format, but continue to serialize the legacy PublicKey format.
It is useful for accounting and informational reasons for users to
be informed when a payment has been successfully forwarded. Thus,
when an HTLC which represents a forwarded leg is claimed, we
generate a new `PaymentForwarded` event.
This requires some additional plumbing to return HTLC values from
`OnchainEvent`s. Further, when we have to go on-chain to claim the
inbound side of the payment, we do not inform the user of the fee
reward, as we cannot calculate it until we see what is confirmed
on-chain.
Substantial code structure rewrites by:
Valentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>
As the variable name implies holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat is
intended to be in millisatoshis, but is instead calculated in
satoshis.
We fix that error here and update the relevant tests to more
accurately calculate the expected reserve value and test both
success and failure cases.
Bug discovered by chanmon_consistency fuzz target.
Currently the base fee we apply is always the expected cost to
claim an HTLC on-chain in case of closure. This results in
significantly higher than market rate fees [1], and doesn't really
match the actual forwarding trust model anyway - as long as
channel counterparties are honest, our HTLCs shouldn't end up
on-chain no matter what the HTLC sender/recipient do.
While some users may wish to use a feerate that implies they will
not lose funds even if they go to chain (assuming no flood-and-loot
style attacks), they should do so by calculating fees themselves;
since they're already charging well above market-rate,
over-estimating some won't have a large impact.
Worse, we current re-calculate fees at forward-time, not based on
the fee we set in the channel_update. This means that the fees
others expect to pay us (and which they calculate their route based
on), is not what we actually want to charge, and that any attempt
to forward through us is inherently race-y.
This commit adds a configuration knob to set the base fee
explicitly, defaulting to 1 sat, which appears to be market-rate
today.
[1] Note that due to an msat-vs-sat bug we currently actually
charge 1000x *less* than the calculated cost.
After the merge of #984, Jeff pointed out that `ChannelDetails` has
become a bit of a "bag of variables", and that a few of the variable
names in #984 were more confusing than necessary in context.
This addresses several issues by:
* Splitting counterparty parameters into a separate
`ChannelCounterpartyParameters` struct,
* using the name `unspendable_punishment_reserve` for both outbound
and inbound channel reserves, differentiating them based on their
position in the counterparty parameters struct or not,
* Using the name `force_close_spend_delay` instead of
`spend_csv_on_our_commitment_funds` to better communicate what
is occurring.
If we are a public node and have a private channel, our
counterparty needs to know the fees which we will charge to forward
payments to them. Without sending them a channel_update, they have
no way to learn that information, resulting in the channel being
effectively useless for outbound-from-us payments.
This commit fixes our lack of channel_update messages to private
channel counterparties, ensuring we always send them a
channel_update after the channel funding is confirmed.
This adds four new fields in `ChannelDetails`:
1. holder_selected_ and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_delay
are useful to determine what amount of the channel is
unavailable for payments.
2. confirmations_required is useful when awaiting funding
confirmation to determine how long you will need to wait.
3. to_self_delay is useful to determine how long it will take to
receive funds after a force-close.
Fixes#983.
Lightning invoices allow for zero or more multi-hop route hints. Update
get_route's interface to accept such hints, although only the last hop
from each is used for the time being.
Moves RouteHint from lightning-invoice crate to lightning crate. Adds a
PrivateRoute wrapper around RouteHint for use in lightning-invoice.
While trying to debug the issue ultimately tracked down to a
`PeerHandler` locking bug in #891, the ability to deliver only
individual messages at a time in chanmon_consistency looked
important. Specifically, it initially appeared there may be a race
when an update_add_htlc was delivered, then a node sent a payment,
and only after that, the corresponding commitment-signed was
delivered.
This commit adds such an ability, greatly expanding the potential
for chanmon_consistency to identify channel state machine bugs.
This stores transaction templates temporarily until their locktime
is reached, avoiding broadcasting (or RBF bumping) transactions
prior to their locktime. For those broadcasting transactions
(potentially indirectly) via Bitcoin Core RPC, this ensures no
automated rebroadcast of transactions on the client side is
required to get transactions confirmed.
If the fuzz target is failing due to a channel force-close, the
immediately-visible error is that we're signing a stale state. This
is because the ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed event
results in a signature in the test clone which was deserialized
using a OnlyReadsKeysInterface. Instead, we need to deserialize
using the full KeysInterface instance.
Because we may now generate a monitor update during
get_and_clear_pending_msg_events calls, we need to ensure we
re-serialize the relevant ChannelManager before attempting to
reload it, if such a monitor update occurred.
Because of the merge between peer reconnection and channel monitor
updating channel restoration code, we now sometimes generate
(somewhat spurious) announcement signatures when restoring channel
monitor updating. This should not result in a fuzzing failure.
This fails chanmon_consistency on IgnoreError error events and on
messages left over to be sent to a just-disconnected peer, which
should have been drained.
These should never appear, so consider them a fuzzer fail case.
Our fuzz tests previously only printed the log output of the first
fuzz test case to fail. This commit changes that (with lots of
auto-generated updates) to ensure we print all log outputs.
This increases the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER constant to 18, much better
capturing how long it takes to go on chain to claim payments.
This is also more in line with other clients, and the spec, which
sets the default CLTV delay in invoices to 18.
As a side effect, we have to increase MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as
otherwise as are subject to an attack where someone can hold an
HTLC being forwarded long enough that we *also* close the channel
on which we received the HTLC.
Current Bitcoin Core's policy will reject a p2wsh as a dust if it's
under 330 satoshis. A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes big to which
Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even
if a p2wsh witnessScript might be smaller). `dustRelayFee` is set
to 3000 sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. As all time-sensitive
outputs are p2wsh, a value of 330 sat is the lower bound desired
to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit margin to
our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted
`dust_limit_satoshis` upper bound.
As this reasoning is tricky and error-prone we hardcode it instead of
letting the user picking up a non-sense value.
Further, this lower bound of 330 sats is also hardcoded as another constant
(MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) instead of being dynamically computed on
feerate (derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis`). Reducing risks of
non-propagating transactions in casee of failing fee festimation.
