This removes one more place where we directly access the node_id
secret key in `ChannelManager`, slowly marching towards allowing
the node_id secret key to be offline in the signer.
More importantly, it allows more ChannelAnnouncement logic to move
into the `Channel` without having to pass the node secret key
around, avoiding the announcement logic being split across two
files.
Previously, we would reject inbound channels if the funder wasn't
able to meet our channel reserve on their first commitment
transaction only if they also failed to push enough to us for us
to not meet their initial channel reserve as well.
There's not a lot of reason to care about us meeting their reserve,
however - its largely expected that they may not push enough to us
in the initial open to meet it, and its not actually our problem if
they don't.
Further, we used our own fee, instead of the channel's actual fee,
to calculate fee affordability of the initial commitment
transaction.
We resolve both issues here, rewriting the combined affordability
check conditionals in inbound channel open handling and adding a
fee affordability check for outbound channels as well.
The prior code may have allowed a counterparty to start the channel
with "no punishment" states - violating the reason for the reserve
threshold.
In upcoming commits, we'll be making the payment secret and payment hash/preimage
derivable from info about the payment + a node secret. This means we don't
need to store any info about incoming payments and can eventually get rid of the
channelmanager::pending_inbound_payments map.
Traits in top-level modules is somewhat confusing - generally
top-level modules are just organizational modules and don't contain
things themselves, instead placing traits and structs in
sub-modules. Further, its incredibly awkward to have a `scorer`
sub-module, but only have a single struct in it, with the relevant
trait it is the only implementation of somewhere else. Not having
`Score` in the `scorer` sub-module is further confusing because
it's the only module anywhere that references scoring at all.
NetworkGraph is owned by NetGraphMsgHandler, but DefaultRouter requires
a reference to it. Introduce shared ownership to NetGraphMsgHandler so
that both can use the same NetworkGraph.
As payments fail, the channel responsible for the failure may be
penalized. Implement Scorer::payment_path_failed to penalize the failed
channel using a configured penalty. As time passes, the penalty is
reduced using exponential decay, though penalties will accumulate if the
channel continues to fail. The decay interval is also configurable.
An upcoming Router interface will be used for finding a Route both when
initially sending a payment and also when retrying failed payment paths.
Unify the three varieties of get_route so the interface can consist of a
single method implemented by the new `find_route` method. Give get_route
pub(crate) visibility so it can still be used in tests.
A payee can be identified by a pubkey and optionally have an associated
set of invoice features and route hints. Use this in get_route instead
of three separate parameters. This may be included in PaymentPathFailed
later to use when finding a new route.
Failed payments may be retried, but calling get_route may return a Route
with the same failing path. Add a routing::Score trait used to
parameterize get_route, which it calls to determine how much a channel
should be penalized in terms of msats willing to pay to avoid the
channel.
Also, add a Scorer struct that implements routing::Score with a constant
constant penalty. Subsequent changes will allow for more robust scoring
by feeding back payment path success and failure to the scorer via event
handling.
330 sat/vbyte, the current value, is not sufficient to ensure a
future segwit script longer than 32 bytes meets the dust limit if
used for a shutdown script. Thus, we can either check the value
on shutdown or we can simply require segwit outputs and require a
dust value of no less than 354 sat/vbyte.
We swap the minimum dust value to 354 sat/vbyte here, requiring
segwit scripts in a future commit.
See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905
PaymentFailed events contain an optional NetworkUpdate describing
changes to the NetworkGraph as conveyed by a node along a failed payment
path according to BOLT 4. An EventHandler should apply the update to the
graph so that future routing decisions can account for it.
Implement EventHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler to update NetworkGraph.
Previously, NetGraphMsgHandler::handle_htlc_fail_channel_update
implemented this behavior.
Now that NetworkGraph uses interior mutability, the RwLock used around
it in NetGraphMsgHandler is no longer needed. This allows for shared
ownership without a lock.
KeysInterface::get_shutdown_pubkey is used to form P2WPKH shutdown
scripts. However, BOLT 2 allows for a wider variety of scripts. Refactor
KeysInterface to allow any supported script while still maintaining
serialization backwards compatibility with P2WPKH script pubkeys stored
simply as the PublicKey.
Add an optional TLV field to Channel and ChannelMonitor to support the
new format, but continue to serialize the legacy PublicKey format.
It is useful for accounting and informational reasons for users to
be informed when a payment has been successfully forwarded. Thus,
when an HTLC which represents a forwarded leg is claimed, we
generate a new `PaymentForwarded` event.
This requires some additional plumbing to return HTLC values from
`OnchainEvent`s. Further, when we have to go on-chain to claim the
inbound side of the payment, we do not inform the user of the fee
reward, as we cannot calculate it until we see what is confirmed
on-chain.
Substantial code structure rewrites by:
Valentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>
Currently the base fee we apply is always the expected cost to
claim an HTLC on-chain in case of closure. This results in
significantly higher than market rate fees [1], and doesn't really
match the actual forwarding trust model anyway - as long as
channel counterparties are honest, our HTLCs shouldn't end up
on-chain no matter what the HTLC sender/recipient do.
While some users may wish to use a feerate that implies they will
not lose funds even if they go to chain (assuming no flood-and-loot
style attacks), they should do so by calculating fees themselves;
since they're already charging well above market-rate,
over-estimating some won't have a large impact.
Worse, we current re-calculate fees at forward-time, not based on
the fee we set in the channel_update. This means that the fees
others expect to pay us (and which they calculate their route based
on), is not what we actually want to charge, and that any attempt
to forward through us is inherently race-y.
This commit adds a configuration knob to set the base fee
explicitly, defaulting to 1 sat, which appears to be market-rate
today.
[1] Note that due to an msat-vs-sat bug we currently actually
charge 1000x *less* than the calculated cost.
This stores transaction templates temporarily until their locktime
is reached, avoiding broadcasting (or RBF bumping) transactions
prior to their locktime. For those broadcasting transactions
(potentially indirectly) via Bitcoin Core RPC, this ensures no
automated rebroadcast of transactions on the client side is
required to get transactions confirmed.
This increases the CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER constant to 18, much better
capturing how long it takes to go on chain to claim payments.
This is also more in line with other clients, and the spec, which
sets the default CLTV delay in invoices to 18.
As a side effect, we have to increase MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as
otherwise as are subject to an attack where someone can hold an
HTLC being forwarded long enough that we *also* close the channel
on which we received the HTLC.
Current Bitcoin Core's policy will reject a p2wsh as a dust if it's
under 330 satoshis. A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes big to which
Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even
if a p2wsh witnessScript might be smaller). `dustRelayFee` is set
to 3000 sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. As all time-sensitive
outputs are p2wsh, a value of 330 sat is the lower bound desired
to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit margin to
our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted
`dust_limit_satoshis` upper bound.
As this reasoning is tricky and error-prone we hardcode it instead of
letting the user picking up a non-sense value.
Further, this lower bound of 330 sats is also hardcoded as another constant
(MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) instead of being dynamically computed on
feerate (derive_holder_dust_limit_satoshis`). Reducing risks of
non-propagating transactions in casee of failing fee festimation.
Like the payment_secret parameter, this paramter has been the source
of much confusion, so we just drop it.
Users should prefer to do this check when registering the payment
secret instead of at claim-time.
This allows users to store metadata about an invoice at
invoice-generation time and then index into that storage with a
general-purpose id when they call `get_payment_secret`. They will
then be provided the same index when the payment has been received.
There is a possible race condition when both the latest block hash and
height are needed. Combine these in one struct and place them behind a
single lock.
Instead of relying on the user to ensure the funding transaction is
correct (and panicing when it is confirmed), we should check it is
correct when it is generated. By taking the full funding transaciton
from the user on generation, we can also handle broadcasting for
them instead of doing so via an event.
