Adds two new payment `Method`s for identifying payments with custom
`min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` as payments with LDK or user payment
hashes.
The `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` value is packed into the first 2
bytes of the expiry timestamp in the payment secret metadata.
This is purely a refactor that does not change the InitFeatures
advertised by a ChannelManager. This allows users to configure which
features should be advertised based on the values of `UserConfig`. While
there aren't any existing features currently leveraging this behavior,
it will be used by the upcoming anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx feature.
The UserConfig dependency on provided_init_features caused most
callsites of the main test methods responsible for opening channels to
be updated. This commit foregos that completely by no longer requiring
the InitFeatures of each side to be provided to these methods. The
methods already require a reference to each node's ChannelManager to
open the channel, so we use that same reference to obtain their
InitFeatures. A way to override such features was required for some
tests, so a new `override_init_features` config option now exists on
the test harness.
This change follows the rationale of commit 62236c7 and addresses the
last remaining redundant local commitment broadcast.
There's no need to broadcast our local commitment transaction if we've
already seen a confirmed one as it'll be immediately rejected as a
duplicate/conflict.
This will also help prevent dispatching spurious events for bumping
commitment and HTLC transactions through anchor outputs since the
dispatch for said events follows the same flow as our usual commitment
broadcast.
See ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc and
ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid for details
Co-authored-by: John Cantrell <johncantrell97@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Valentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>
In many complexity-reduced implementations of chain syncing using
esplora `transactions_confirmed` may be called redundantly for
transactions which were already confirmed. To ensure this is
idempotent we add two new `ConnectionStyle`s in our tests which
(a) call `transactions_confirmed` twice for each call, ensuring
simple idempotency is ensured and (b) call `transactions_confirmed`
once for each historical block every time we're connecting a new
block, ensuring we're fully idempotent even if every call is
repeated constantly.
In order to actually behave correctly this requires a simple
already-confirmed check in `ChannelMonitor`, which is included.
When a user attempts to send a payment but it fails due to
idempotency key violation, they need to know that this was the
reason as they need to handle the error programmatically
differently from other errors.
Here we simply add a new `PaymentSendFailure` enum variant for
`DuplicatePayment` to allow for that.
Previously, once a fulfilled outbound payment completed and all
associated HTLCs were resolved, we'd immediately remove the payment
entry from the `pending_outbound_payments` map.
Now that we're using the `pending_outbound_payments` map for send
idempotency, this presents a race condition - if the user makes a
redundant `send_payment` call at the same time that the original
payment's last HTLC is resolved, the user would reasonably expect
the `send_payment` call to fail due to our idempotency guarantees.
However, because the `pending_outbound_payments` entry is being
removed, if it completes first the `send_payment` call will
succeed even though the user has not had a chance to see the
corresponding `Event::PaymentSent`.
Instead, here, we delay removal of `Fulfilled`
`pending_outbound_payments` entries until several timer ticks have
passed without any corresponding event or HTLC pending.
In c986e52ce8, an `MppId` was added
to `HTLCSource` objects as a way of correlating HTLCs which belong
to the same payment when the `ChannelManager` sees an HTLC
succeed/fail. This allows it to have awareness of the state of all
HTLCs in a payment when it generates the ultimate user-facing
payment success/failure events. This was used in the same PR to
avoid generating duplicative success/failure events for a single
payment.
Because the field was only used as an internal token to correlate
HTLCs, and retries were not supported, it was generated randomly by
calling the `KeysInterface`'s 32-byte random-fetching function.
This also provided a backwards-compatibility story as the existing
HTLC randomization key was re-used for older clients.
In 28eea12bbe `MppId` was renamed to
the current `PaymentId` which was then used expose the
`retry_payment` interface, allowing users to send new HTLCs which
are considered a part of an existing payment.
At no point has the payment-sending API seriously considered
idempotency, a major drawback which leaves the API unsafe in most
deployments. Luckily, there is a simple solution - because the
`PaymentId` must be unique, and because payment information for a
given payment is held for several blocks after a payment
completes/fails, it represents an obvious idempotency token.
Here we simply require the user provide the `PaymentId` directly in
`send_payment`, allowing them to use whatever token they may
already have for a payment's idempotency token.
When a `chain::Watch` `ChannelMonitor` update method is called, the
user has three options:
(a) persist the monitor update immediately and return success,
(b) fail to persist the monitor update immediately and return
failure,
(c) return a flag indicating the monitor update is in progress and
will complete in the future.
(c) is rather harmless, and in some deployments should be expected
to be the return value for all monitor update calls, but currently
requires returning `Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure)`
which isn't very descriptive and sounds scarier than it is.
Instead, here, we change the return type used to be a single enum
(rather than a Result) and rename `TemporaryFailure`
`UpdateInProgress`.
There's no need to broadcast our local commitment transaction if we've
already seen a confirmed one as it'll be immediately rejected as a
duplicate/conflict.
This will also help prevent dispatching spurious events for bumping
commitment and HTLC transactions through anchor outputs (once
implemented in future work) and the dispatch for said events follows the
same flow as our usual commitment broadcast.
Some `NodeFeatures` will, in the future, represent features which
are not enabled by the `ChannelManager`, but by other message
handlers handlers. Thus, it doesn't make sense to determine the
node feature bits in the `ChannelManager`.
The simplest fix for this is to change to generating the
node_announcement in `PeerManager`, asking all the connected
handlers which feature bits they support and simply OR'ing them
together. While this may not be sufficient in the future as it
doesn't consider feature bit dependencies, support for those could
be handled at the feature level in the future.
This commit moves the `broadcast_node_announcement` function to
`PeerHandler` but does not yet implement feature OR'ing.
When we connect to a new peer, immediately send them any
channel_announcement and channel_update messages for any public
channels we have with other peers. This allows us to stop sending
those messages on a timer when they have not changed and ensures
we are sending messages when we have peers connected, rather than
broadcasting at startup when we have no peers connected.
When we fail to forward a probe HTLC at all and immediately fail it
(e.g. due to the first hop channel closing) we'd previously
spuriously generate only a `PaymentPathFailed` event. This violates
the expected API, as users expect a `ProbeFailed` event instead.
This fixes the oversight by ensuring we generate the correct event.
Thanks to @jkczyz for pointing out this issue.
When our counterparty is the payment destination and we receive
an `HTLCFailReason::Reason` in `fail_htlc_backwards_internal` we
currently always set `rejected_by_dest` in the `PaymentPathFailed`
event, implying the HTLC should *not* be retried.
There are a number of cases where we use `HTLCFailReason::Reason`,
but most should reasonably be treated as retryable even if our
counterparty was the destination (i.e. `!rejected_by_dest`):
* If an HTLC times out on-chain, this doesn't imply that the
payment is no longer retryable, though the peer may well be
offline so retrying may not be very useful,
* If a commitment transaction "containing" a dust HTLC is
confirmed on-chain, this definitely does not imply the payment
is no longer retryable
* If the channel we intended to relay over was closed (or
force-closed) we should retry over another path,
* If the channel we intended to relay over did not have enough
capacity we should retry over another path,
* If we received a update_fail_malformed_htlc message from our
peer, we likely should *not* retry, however this should be
exceedingly rare, and appears to nearly never appear in practice
Thus, this commit simply disables the behavior here, opting to
treat all `HTLCFailReason::Reason` errors as retryable.
Note that prior to 93e645daf4 this
change would not have made sense as it would have resulted in us
retrying the payment over the same channel in some cases, however
we now "blame" our own channel and will avoid it when routing for
the same payment.
Previously, we wouldn't mark a dust HTLC as permanently resolved if
the commitment transaction went on chain. This resulted in us
always considering the HTLC as pending on restart, when we load the
pending payments set from the monitors.
Fixes#1653.
In order to avoid failing to find paths due to the new channel
saturation limit, if we fail to find enough paths, we simply
disable the saturation limit for further path finding iterations.
Because we can now increase the maximum sent over a given channel
during routefinding, we may now generate redundant paths for the
same payment. Because this is wasteful in the network, we add an
additional pass during routefinding to merge redundant paths.
Note that two tests which previously attempted to send exactly the
available liquidity over a channel which charged an absolute fee
need updating - in those cases the router will first collect a path
that is saturation-limited, then attempt to collect a second path
without a saturation limit while stil honoring the existing
utilized capacity on the channel, causing failure as the absolute
fee must be included.
