Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a
funding-spend transaction confirmed. This would allow a race
condition where we could receive a payment (including the
counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it
without recourse as long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block
first, the full commitment update dance occurs after the block is
connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the
counterparty would be risking their full channel balance for it,
but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the potential
ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
The test in this commit also tests the behavior changed in the
previous commit.
`ChannelMonitorUpdate`s may contain multiple updates, including, eg
a payment preimage after a commitment transaction update. While
such updates are generally not generated today, we shouldn't return
early out of the update loop, causing us to miss any updates after
an earlier update fails.
`scoring::Time` exists in part to make testing the passage of time
in `Scorer` practical. To allow no-std users to provide a time
source it was exposed as a trait as well. However, it seems
somewhat unlikely that a no-std user is going to have a use for
providing their own time source (otherwise they wouldn't be a
no-std user), and likely they won't have a graph in memory either.
`scoring::Time` as currently written is also exceptionally hard to
write C bindings for - the C bindings trait mappings relies on the
ability to construct trait implementations at runtime with function
pointers (i.e. `dyn Trait`s). `scoring::Time`, on the other hand,
is a supertrait of `core::ops::Sub` which requires a `sub` method
which takes a type parameter and returns a type parameter. Both of
which aren't practical in bindings, especially given the
`Sub::Output` associated type is not bound by any trait bounds at
all (implying we cannot simply map the `sub` function to return an
opaque trait object).
Thus, for simplicity, we here simply seal `scoring::Time` and make
it effectively-private, ensuring the bindings don't need to bother
with it.
Ultimately we likely need to wrap the locked `Score` in a struct
that exposes writeable somehow, but because all traits have to be
fully concretized for C bindings we'll still need `Writeable` on
all `Score` in order to expose `Writeable` on the locked score.
Otherwise, we'll only have a `LockedScore` with a `Score` visible
that only has the `Score` methods, never the original type.
A single PaymentSent event is generated when a payment is fulfilled.
This is occurs when the preimage is revealed on the first claimed HTLC.
For subsequent HTLCs, the event is not generated.
In order to score channels involved with a successful payments, the
scorer must be notified of each successful path involved in the payment.
Add a PaymentPathSuccessful event for this purpose. Generate it whenever
a part is removed from a pending outbound payment. This avoids duplicate
events when reconnecting to a peer.
This adds a new (non-feature) cfg argument `c_bindings` which will
be set when building C bindings. With this, we can (slightly) tweak
behavior and API based on whether we are being built for Rust or C
users.
Ideally we'd never need this, but as long as we can keep the API
consistent-enough to avoid material code drift, this gives us a
cheap way of doing the "right" thing for both C and Rust when the
two are in tension.
We also move lightning-background-processor to support the same
MSRV as the main lightning crate, instead of only
lightning-net-tokio's MSRV.
Previously, we would reject inbound channels if the funder wasn't
able to meet our channel reserve on their first commitment
transaction only if they also failed to push enough to us for us
to not meet their initial channel reserve as well.
There's not a lot of reason to care about us meeting their reserve,
however - its largely expected that they may not push enough to us
in the initial open to meet it, and its not actually our problem if
they don't.
Further, we used our own fee, instead of the channel's actual fee,
to calculate fee affordability of the initial commitment
transaction.
We resolve both issues here, rewriting the combined affordability
check conditionals in inbound channel open handling and adding a
fee affordability check for outbound channels as well.
The prior code may have allowed a counterparty to start the channel
with "no punishment" states - violating the reason for the reserve
threshold.
Instead of magic hard-coded constants, its better for tests to
derive the values used so that they change if constants are changed
and so that it is easier to re-derive constants in the future as
needed.
This may avoid risk of bugs in the future as it requires the caller
to think about the fee being used, not just blindly use the current
(committed) channel feerate.
In upcoming commits, we'll be making the payment secret and payment hash/preimage
derivable from info about the payment + a node secret. This means we don't
need to store any info about incoming payments and can eventually get rid of the
channelmanager::pending_inbound_payments map.
Traits in top-level modules is somewhat confusing - generally
top-level modules are just organizational modules and don't contain
things themselves, instead placing traits and structs in
sub-modules. Further, its incredibly awkward to have a `scorer`
sub-module, but only have a single struct in it, with the relevant
trait it is the only implementation of somewhere else. Not having
`Score` in the `scorer` sub-module is further confusing because
it's the only module anywhere that references scoring at all.
Sending HTLCs which are any greater than a very small fraction of the
channel size tend to fail at a much higher rate. Thus, by default
we start applying a penalty at only 1/8th the channel size and
increase it linearly as the amount reaches the channel's capacity,
20 msat per 1024th of the channel capacity.
This should allow `Score` implementations to make substantially
better decisions, including of the form "willing to pay X to avoid
routing over this channel which may have a high failure rate".
Currently, we write out the Channel's `ChannelTypeFeatures` as an
odd type, implying clients which don't understand the
`ChannelTypeFeatures` field can simply ignore it. This is obviously
nonsense if the channel type is some future version - the client
needs to fail to deserialize as it doesn't understand the channel's
type.
We adapt the serialization logic here to only write out the
`ChannelTypeFeatures` field if it is something other than
only-static-remote-key, and simply consider that "default" (as it
is the only supported type today). Then, we write out the channel
type as an even TLV, implying clients which do not understand it
must fail to read the `Channel`.
Note that we do not need to bother reserving the TLV type no longer
written as it never appeared in a release (merged post-0.0.103).
We currently assume our counterparty is naive and misconfigured and
may force-close a channel to get an HTLC we just forwarded them.
There shouldn't be any reason to do this - we don't have any such
bug, and we shouldn't start by assuming our counterparties are
buggy. Worse, this results in refusing to forward payments today,
failing HTLCs for largely no reason.
Instead, we keep a fairly conservative check, but not one which
will fail HTLC forwarding spuriously - testing only that the HTLC
doesn't expire for a few blocks from now.
Fixes#1114.