This makes tests slightly more realistic by delivering
`channel_update`s to `ChannelManager`s, ensuring we have
forwarding data stored locally for all channels, including public
ones.
In 2d3a210897, we increased the
default ping timer in `lightning-background-processor` to ten
seconds from five. However, we didn't change the timer count at
which we disconnect peers if they're not responding, which we
likely should have done. We do so here, as well as update the
documentation for `PeerManager::timer_tick_occurred` to suggest
always ticking the timer every ten seconds instead of five.
Its very confusing to have multiple fields that do the same thing,
one of which isn't even used for its stated purpose anymore after
the previous few commits.
There are currently two issues with
`bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1` which counteract
each other and hide that the test isn't testing what it should be.
First of all, the final `create_channel` call actually fails
because we try to open a channel with ourselves, instead of
panicing as the test is supposed to check for.
However, when we fix the create_channel call to panic, when we
drop `nodes[1]` after `create_channel` panics, we fail the
no-pending-messages test as it as an expeted `accept_channel` in
its outbound buffer. This causes a double-panic.
Previously, these two offset each other - instead of panicing in
`create_channel` we'd panic in the Node drop checks.
This fixes both by fetching the `accept_channel` before we go into
the panic'ing `create_channel` call (who's arguments were
corrected).
... by calling it both before and after every chain event in
testing and fuzzing.
This requires fixing some blockchain inconsistencies in
`do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg`, `do_retry_with_no_persist`, and
`do_test_dup_htlc_onchain_fails_on_reload` where we'd connect
conflicting transactions in the same chain.
When handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions
(with associated CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly
handled the CSV delays on HTLC transactions. This caused us to miss
spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV delay.
Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as
`get_claimable_balances` asserted that HTLCs were resolved after
the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the HTLC did
not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it
being an HTLC claim by our counterparty).
This fixes both bugs, also converting some assertions to
`debug_assert`s to avoid future issues as balance mis-calculation
is not currently an indication of potential funds loss.
Thanks to Cash App for reporting this bug.
This doesn't (appear) to change behavior, however if we have a
non-public node, we assign an A* heuristic of max-u32 fees, which
may result in us de-prioritizing the path in some rare cases around
multi-hop route hints which compete with public nodes.
When we added support for routing through a multi-hop invoice hint
we failed to remove an assertion that we always are able to fill
in features for each hop except the last one. However, when a
multi-hop invoice hint is used, we will not have features for any
of the hinted hops, causing us to panic.
Failing an HTLC with onion error channel_disabled requires encoding a 'flags' field into the failure
packet. However, we were encoding this 'flags' field for all failures packets that were failing on
update_add_htlc with an update (error 0x1000 UPDATE).
Discovered in the course of adding phantom payment failure tests, which also added testing for this bug
In any place where fail_htlc_backwards_internal was called for a phantom payment
failure, we weren't encoding the onion failure as if the phantom were the one
failing. Instead, we were encoding the failure as if it were coming from the
second-to-last hop. This caused our failures to not be parsed properly on the
payer's side.
Places we were encoding failures incorrectly include:
* on failure of a call to inbound_payment::verify
* on a user call to fail_htlc_backwards
Also drop some unnecessary panics when reading OnionHopData objects. This also
enables one of the phantom failure tests because we can construct OnionHopDatas
with invalid amounts.
Lastly, remove a bogus comment
This also fixes a bug where we were failing back phantom payments with the
wrong scid, causing them to never actually be failed backwards (L3022 in
channelmanager.rs)
This new field will be used in upcoming commit(s) to encrypt phantom payment failure
packets.
Add other fields to log for PathBuildingHop
Use DebugStruct to print PathBuildingHop
Fix PathBuildingHop visibility
Add more useful fee print-outs
Remove Features<NodeContext> from hop print-out
Remove logging fields we don’t need
Add fields to log back to PathBuildingHop
The take-self-return-Self idiom in Rust is substantially less
usable than it is in Java, where its more common. Because we have
to take self by move, it prevents using the update methods to
actually update features, something we occasionally want to do.
See, eg, the change in lightning-invoice where we previously had
to copy and re-create an entire vec of fields just to update the
features field, which is nuts.
There are a few places where this makes things a little less clean,
but the tradeoff to enable more effecient and broader uses of the
update methods seems worth it.
The docs were hidden since a type alias should be used. However, the
alias docs don't contain much useful information and don't link to the
corresponding struct.
Prior to cryptographic payment secrets, when we process a received
payment in `process_pending_htlc_fowards` we'd remove its entry
from the `pending_inbound_payments` map and give the user a
`PaymentReceived` event.
Thereafter, if a second HTLC came in with the same payment hash, it
would find no entry in the `pending_inbound_payments` map and be
immediately failed in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
Thus, each HTLC will either result in a `PaymentReceived` event or
be failed, with no possibility for both.
As of 8464875555, we no longer
materially have a pending-inbound-payments map, and thus
more-than-happily accept a second payment with the same payment
hash even if we just failed a previous one for having mis-matched
payment data.
This can cause an issue if the two HTLCs are received back-to-back,
with the first being accepted as valid, generating a
`PaymentReceived` event. Then, when the second comes in we'll hit
the "total value {} ran over expected value" condition and fail
*all* pending HTLCs with the same payment hash. At this point,
we'll have a pending failure for both HTLCs, as well as a
`PaymentReceived` event for the user.
Thereafter, if the user attempts to fail the HTLC in response to
the `PaymentReceived`, they'll get a debug panic at channel.rs:1657
'Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed'.
The solution is to avoid bulk-failing all pending HTLCs for a
payment. This feels like the right thing to do anyway - if a sender
accidentally sends an extra HTLC after a payment has ben fully
paid, we shouldn't fail the entire payment.
Found by the `chanmon_consistency` fuzz test.
Somehow, our channel type implementation doesn't echo back the
channel type as we believe it was negotiated, as we should. Though
the spec doesn't explicitly require this, some implementations may
require it and it appears to have been in the BOLTs from the start
of the channel type logic.
To support the feature of generating invoices that can be paid to any of
multiple nodes, a key manager need to be able to share an inbound_payment_key
and phantom secret key. This is because a phantom payment may be received by
any node participating in the invoice, so all nodes must be able to decrypt the
phantom payment (and therefore must share decryption key(s)) in the act of
pretending to be the phantom node. Thus we add a new `PhantomKeysManager` that
supports these features.
To be more specific, the inbound payment key must be shared because it is used
to decrypt the payment details for verification (LDK avoids storing inbound
payment data by encrypting payment metadata in the payment hash and/or payment
secret).
The phantom secret must be shared because enables any real node included in the
phantom invoice to decrypt the final layer of the onion packet, since the onion
is encrypted by the sender using the phantom public key provided in the
invoice.
