Instead of magic hard-coded constants, its better for tests to
derive the values used so that they change if constants are changed
and so that it is easier to re-derive constants in the future as
needed.
This may avoid risk of bugs in the future as it requires the caller
to think about the fee being used, not just blindly use the current
(committed) channel feerate.
Currently, we write out the Channel's `ChannelTypeFeatures` as an
odd type, implying clients which don't understand the
`ChannelTypeFeatures` field can simply ignore it. This is obviously
nonsense if the channel type is some future version - the client
needs to fail to deserialize as it doesn't understand the channel's
type.
We adapt the serialization logic here to only write out the
`ChannelTypeFeatures` field if it is something other than
only-static-remote-key, and simply consider that "default" (as it
is the only supported type today). Then, we write out the channel
type as an even TLV, implying clients which do not understand it
must fail to read the `Channel`.
Note that we do not need to bother reserving the TLV type no longer
written as it never appeared in a release (merged post-0.0.103).
We currently assume our counterparty is naive and misconfigured and
may force-close a channel to get an HTLC we just forwarded them.
There shouldn't be any reason to do this - we don't have any such
bug, and we shouldn't start by assuming our counterparties are
buggy. Worse, this results in refusing to forward payments today,
failing HTLCs for largely no reason.
Instead, we keep a fairly conservative check, but not one which
will fail HTLC forwarding spuriously - testing only that the HTLC
doesn't expire for a few blocks from now.
Fixes#1114.
This stores and tracks HTLC payee information with HTLCSource info,
allowing us to provide it back to the user if the HTLC fails and
ensuring persistence by keeping it with the HTLC itself as it
passes between Channel and ChannelMonitor.
This implements the channel type negotiation, though as we currently
only support channels with only static_remotekey set, it doesn't
implement the negotiation explicitly.
When an HTLC has been failed, we track it up until the point there
exists no broadcastable commitment transaction which has the HTLC
present, at which point Channel returns the HTLCSource back to the
ChannelManager, which fails the HTLC backwards appropriately.
When an HTLC is fulfilled, however, we fulfill on the backwards path
immediately. This is great for claiming upstream HTLCs, but when we
want to track pending payments, we need to ensure we can check with
ChannelMonitor data to rebuild pending payments. In order to do so,
we need an event similar to the HTLC failure event, but for
fulfills instead.
Specifically, if we force-close a channel, we remove its off-chain
`Channel` object entirely, at which point, on reload, we may notice
HTLC(s) which are not present in our pending payments map (as they
may have received a payment preimage, but not fully committed to
it). Thus, we'd conclude we still have a retryable payment, which
is untrue.
This commit does so, informing the ChannelManager via a new return
element where appropriate of the HTLCSource corresponding to the
failed HTLC.
During the event of a channel close, if the funding transaction
is yet to be broadcasted then a DiscardFunding event is issued
along with the ChannelClose event.
If a counterparty (or an old channel of ours) uses a non-segwit
script for their cooperative close payout, they may include an
output which is unbroadcastable due to not meeting the network dust
limit.
Here we check for this condition, force-closing the channel instead
if we find an output in the closing transaction which does not meet
the limit.
There is little reason for users to be paying out to non-Segwit
scripts when closing channels at this point. Given we will soon, in
rare cases, force-close during shutdown when a counterparty closes
to a non-Segwit script, we should also require it of our own users.
546 sat/vbyte is the current default dust limit on most
implementations, matching the network dust limit for P2SH outputs.
Implementations don't currently appear to send any larger dust
limits, and allowing a larger dust limit implies higher payment
failure risk, so we'd like to be as tight as we can here.
330 sat/vbyte, the current value, is not sufficient to ensure a
future segwit script longer than 32 bytes meets the dust limit if
used for a shutdown script. Thus, we can either check the value
on shutdown or we can simply require segwit outputs and require a
dust value of no less than 354 sat/vbyte.
We swap the minimum dust value to 354 sat/vbyte here, requiring
segwit scripts in a future commit.
See https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/905
CounterpartyForwardingInfo is public (previously exposed with a
`pub use`), and used inside of ChannelCounterparty in
channelmanager.rs. However, it is defined in channel.rs, away from
where it is used.
This would be fine, except that the bindings generator is somewhat
confused by this - it doesn't currently support interpreting
`pub use` as a struct to expose, instead ignoring it.
Fixes https://github.com/lightningdevkit/ldk-garbagecollected/issues/44
When communicating the maximum fee we're willing to accept on a
cooperative closing transaction to our peer, we currently tell them
we'll accept `u64::max_value()` if they're the ones who have to pay
it. Spec-wise this is fine - they aren't allowed to try to claim
our balance, and we don't care how much of their own funds they
want to spend on transaction fees.
However, the Eclair folks prefer to check all values on the wire
do not exceed 21 million BTC, which seems like generally good
practice to avoid overflows and such issues. Thus, our close
messages are rejected by Eclair.
Here we simply relax our stated maximum to be the real value - our
counterparty's current balance in satoshis.
Fixes#1071
