Note that this feature bit does absolutely nothing. We signal it
(as we already support channel type negotiation), but do not bother
to look to see if peers support it, as we don't care - we simply
look for the TLV entry and deduce if a peer supports channel type
negotiation from that.
The only behavioral change at all here is that we don't barf if a
peer sets channel type negotiation to required via the feature bit
(instead of failing the channel at open-time), but of course no
implementations do this, and likely won't for some time (if ever -
you can simply fail channels with unknown types later, and there's
no reason to refuse connections, really).
As defined in https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/906
During event handling, ChannelManager methods may need to be called as
indicated in the Event documentation. Ensure that these calls are
idempotent for the same event rather than panicking. This allows users
to persist events for later handling without needing to worry about
processing the same event twice (e.g., if ChannelManager is not
persisted but the events were, the restarted ChannelManager would return
some of the same events).
We don't expect users to ever change behavior based on the string
contained in a `MonitorUpdateErr`, except log it, so there's little
reason to not just log it ourselves and return a `()` for errors.
We do so here, simplifying the callsite in `ChainMonitor` as well.
Previously, monitor updates were allowed freely even after a
funding-spend transaction confirmed. This would allow a race
condition where we could receive a payment (including the
counterparty revoking their broadcasted state!) and accept it
without recourse as long as the ChannelMonitor receives the block
first, the full commitment update dance occurs after the block is
connected, and before the ChannelManager receives the block.
Obviously this is an incredibly contrived race given the
counterparty would be risking their full channel balance for it,
but its worth fixing nonetheless as it makes the potential
ChannelMonitor states simpler to reason about.
The test in this commit also tests the behavior changed in the
previous commit.
OnionV2s don't (really) work on Tor anymore anyway, and the field
is set for removal in the BOLTs [1]. Sadly because of the way
addresses are parsed we have to continue to understand that type 3
addresses are 12 bytes long. Thus, for simplicity we keep the
`OnionV2` enum variant around and just make it an opaque 12 bytes,
with the documentation updated to note the deprecation.
[1] https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/940
An unchecked shift of more than 64 bits on u64 values causes a shift
overflow panic. This may happen if a channel is penalized only once and
(1) is not successfully routed through and (2) after 64 or more half
life decays. Use a checked shift to prevent this from happening.
If a payment failed to route through a channel, a penalty is applied to
the channel in the future when finding a route. This penalty decays over
time. Immediately decay the penalty by one half life when a payment is
successfully routed through the channel.
Expand the Score trait with a payment_path_successful function for
scoring successful payment paths. Called by InvoicePayer's EventHandler
implementation when processing PaymentPathSuccessful events. May be used
by Score implementations to revert any channel penalties that were
applied by calls to payment_path_failed.
For some reason rustc was deciding on a type for the `Option` being
deserialized for us as `_user_payment_id`. This really, really,
absolutely should have been a compile failure - the type (with
methods called on it!) was ambiguous! Instead, rustc seems to have
been defaulting to `Option<()>`, causing us to read zero of the
eight bytes in the `user_payment_id` field, which returns an
`Err(InvalidValue)` error as TLVs must always be read fully.
This should likely be reported to rustc as its definitely a bug,
but I cannot seem to cause the same error on any kinda of
vaguely-minimized version of the same code.
Found by `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target.
A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our
dust limit) is insecure, but only for them. Because some LSPs do it
with some level of trust of the clients (for a substantial UX
improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because its unlikely to
happen often in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
`ChannelMonitorUpdate`s may contain multiple updates, including, eg
a payment preimage after a commitment transaction update. While
such updates are generally not generated today, we shouldn't return
early out of the update loop, causing us to miss any updates after
an earlier update fails.
`scoring::Time` exists in part to make testing the passage of time
in `Scorer` practical. To allow no-std users to provide a time
source it was exposed as a trait as well. However, it seems
somewhat unlikely that a no-std user is going to have a use for
providing their own time source (otherwise they wouldn't be a
no-std user), and likely they won't have a graph in memory either.
`scoring::Time` as currently written is also exceptionally hard to
write C bindings for - the C bindings trait mappings relies on the
ability to construct trait implementations at runtime with function
pointers (i.e. `dyn Trait`s). `scoring::Time`, on the other hand,
is a supertrait of `core::ops::Sub` which requires a `sub` method
which takes a type parameter and returns a type parameter. Both of
which aren't practical in bindings, especially given the
`Sub::Output` associated type is not bound by any trait bounds at
all (implying we cannot simply map the `sub` function to return an
opaque trait object).
Thus, for simplicity, we here simply seal `scoring::Time` and make
it effectively-private, ensuring the bindings don't need to bother
with it.
Ultimately we likely need to wrap the locked `Score` in a struct
that exposes writeable somehow, but because all traits have to be
fully concretized for C bindings we'll still need `Writeable` on
all `Score` in order to expose `Writeable` on the locked score.
Otherwise, we'll only have a `LockedScore` with a `Score` visible
that only has the `Score` methods, never the original type.
Previously, `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` and
`holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` were constant functions
of the channel value satoshis. However, in the future we may allow
allow users to specify it. In order to do so, we'll need to track
them explicitly, including serializing them as appropriate.
We go ahead and do so here, in part as it will make testing
different counterparty-selected channel reserve values easier.
A single PaymentSent event is generated when a payment is fulfilled.
This is occurs when the preimage is revealed on the first claimed HTLC.
For subsequent HTLCs, the event is not generated.
In order to score channels involved with a successful payments, the
scorer must be notified of each successful path involved in the payment.
Add a PaymentPathSuccessful event for this purpose. Generate it whenever
a part is removed from a pending outbound payment. This avoids duplicate
events when reconnecting to a peer.
This adds a new (non-feature) cfg argument `c_bindings` which will
be set when building C bindings. With this, we can (slightly) tweak
behavior and API based on whether we are being built for Rust or C
users.
Ideally we'd never need this, but as long as we can keep the API
consistent-enough to avoid material code drift, this gives us a
cheap way of doing the "right" thing for both C and Rust when the
two are in tension.
We also move lightning-background-processor to support the same
MSRV as the main lightning crate, instead of only
lightning-net-tokio's MSRV.
Previously, we would reject inbound channels if the funder wasn't
able to meet our channel reserve on their first commitment
transaction only if they also failed to push enough to us for us
to not meet their initial channel reserve as well.
There's not a lot of reason to care about us meeting their reserve,
however - its largely expected that they may not push enough to us
in the initial open to meet it, and its not actually our problem if
they don't.
Further, we used our own fee, instead of the channel's actual fee,
to calculate fee affordability of the initial commitment
transaction.
We resolve both issues here, rewriting the combined affordability
check conditionals in inbound channel open handling and adding a
fee affordability check for outbound channels as well.
The prior code may have allowed a counterparty to start the channel
with "no punishment" states - violating the reason for the reserve
threshold.
Instead of magic hard-coded constants, its better for tests to
derive the values used so that they change if constants are changed
and so that it is easier to re-derive constants in the future as
needed.
This may avoid risk of bugs in the future as it requires the caller
to think about the fee being used, not just blindly use the current
(committed) channel feerate.
