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Merge pull request #459 from ariard/2020-01-fix-htlc-height-timer
Fix bumping timer for claiming revoked HTLC outputs
This commit is contained in:
commit
f70058ea4c
2 changed files with 33 additions and 24 deletions
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@ -2057,7 +2057,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
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let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
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let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
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let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
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let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
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log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
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let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
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per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
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@ -6692,30 +6692,46 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
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// Connect three more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
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let header_132 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 3, 129, true, header_129.bitcoin_hash());
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let node_txn = {
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let penalty_local_tx;
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{
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let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 bumped penalty txn on offered/received HTLC outputs of revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tx on to_local of revoked commitment tx + 2 bumped penalty tx on revoked HTLC txn
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check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
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check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
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let mut penalty_local = ::std::usize::MAX;
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check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
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penalty_local_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
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node_txn.clear();
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};
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// Few more blocks to broadcast and confirm penalty_local_tx
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let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
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nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: vec![penalty_local_tx] }, 133);
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let header_135 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 2, 133, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
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{
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let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
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check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
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node_txn.clear();
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}
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let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 9, 135, true, header_135);
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let node_txn = {
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let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
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let mut penalty_offered = ::std::usize::MAX;
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let mut penalty_received = ::std::usize::MAX;
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{
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let iter_txn = node_txn[2..].iter();
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for (i, tx) in iter_txn.enumerate() {
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if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid() {
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penalty_local = 2 + i;
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} else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
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penalty_offered = 2+ i;
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for (i, tx) in node_txn.iter().enumerate() {
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if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[offered].txid() {
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penalty_offered = i;
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} else if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[received].txid() {
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penalty_received = 2 + i;
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penalty_received = i;
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}
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}
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}
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check_spends!(node_txn[penalty_local], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
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assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].input.len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(node_txn[penalty_received].output.len(), 1);
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@ -6733,24 +6749,17 @@ fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
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let fee = revoked_htlc_txn[received].output[0].value - node_txn[penalty_received].output[0].value;
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let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[penalty_received].get_weight() as u64;
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assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_2 * 125);
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let txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone()];
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let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()];
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node_txn.clear();
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txn
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};
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// Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
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let header_133 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_132, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
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nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_133, txdata: node_txn }, 133);
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let header_140 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 6, 134, true, header_133.bitcoin_hash());
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let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
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nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn }, 145);
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connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 20, 145, true, header_145.bitcoin_hash());
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{
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let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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node_txn.clear();
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}
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// Connect few more blocks and check only penalty transaction for to_local output have been issued
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connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 7, 140, true, header_140);
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{
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let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: should be zero when we fix check_spend_remote_htlc
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //TODO: fix check_spend_remote_htlc lack of watch output
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node_txn.clear();
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}
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check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
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