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Remove outpoint_to_peer map in ChannelManager

Browse source 
Now that we require `ChannelMonitor`s to track the channel's
counterparty node ID, we can remove the `outpoint_to_peer` map that was
used throughout `MonitorEvent` handling. This is a big win for a
post-splicing future, as we'll no longer have to bother updating this
map when a splice is proposed.

Some existing tests providing coverage have been removed as a result.
This commit is contained in:
Wilmer Paulino 2025-02-06 15:15:39 -08:00
parent 601bf4bd8f
commit f0bb9001b6
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GPG key ID: 634FE5FC544DCA31
4 changed files with 107 additions and 282 deletions
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6
lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs
View file

@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
use crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::events::bump_transaction::WalletSource;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::ClosingTransaction;
@ -1091,9 +1090,4 @@ fn do_test_closing_signed(extra_closing_signed: bool, reconnect: bool) {
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// Check that our maps have been updated after async signing channel closure.
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.compute_txid(), index: 0 };
assert!(nodes[0].node().outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).is_none());
assert!(nodes[1].node().outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).is_none());
}

29
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
View file

@ -3457,6 +3457,18 @@ impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
}
fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, funding: &mut FundingScope) {
debug_assert!(
matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
|| matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_))
);
funding.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
self.channel_id = self.temporary_channel_id.expect(
"temporary_channel_id should be set since unset_funding_info is only called on funded \
channels that were unfunded immediately beforehand"
);
}
fn validate_commitment_signed<L: Deref>(
&self, funding: &FundingScope, holder_commitment_point: &HolderCommitmentPoint,
msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L,
@ -5310,14 +5322,7 @@ impl<SP: Deref> FundedChannel<SP> where
/// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
/// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
debug_assert!(matches!(
self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
));
self.funding.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
self.context.channel_id = self.context.temporary_channel_id.expect(
"temporary_channel_id should be set since unset_funding_info is only called on funded \
channels that were unfunded immediately beforehand"
);
self.context.unset_funding_info(&mut self.funding);
}
/// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
@ -9315,6 +9320,14 @@ impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
} else { None };
(open_channel, funding_created)
}
/// Unsets the existing funding information.
///
/// The channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
/// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
self.context.unset_funding_info(&mut self.funding);
}
}
/// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.

316
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
View file

@ -2425,8 +2425,6 @@ where
// |
// |__`peer_state`
// |
// |__`outpoint_to_peer`
// |
// |__`short_to_chan_info`
// |
// |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
@ -2525,29 +2523,6 @@ where
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
/// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
/// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
/// the handling of the events.
///
/// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
/// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
///
/// TODO:
/// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
/// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
/// would break backwards compatability.
/// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
/// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
/// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
///
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
/// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
///
/// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
@ -3067,9 +3042,6 @@ macro_rules! locked_close_channel {
let chan_id = $channel_context.channel_id();
$peer_state.closed_channel_monitor_update_ids.insert(chan_id, update_id);
}
if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_funding.get_funding_txo() {
$self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
}
let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
@ -3602,7 +3574,6 @@ where
decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
@ -3774,8 +3745,7 @@ where
fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &FundedChannel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
// of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// a scid or a scid alias. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
// the same channel.
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
@ -3804,8 +3774,7 @@ where
pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
// Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
// Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
// a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
// of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// a scid or a scid alias. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
// unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
// the same channel.
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
@ -5132,25 +5101,27 @@ where
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let counterparty;
let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
counterparty = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(&$chan.funding, false, reason);
MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
} else { unreachable!(); };
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
Err($api_err)
} } }
let funding_txo;
let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id)
.map(Channel::into_unfunded_outbound_v1)
{
Some(Ok(mut chan)) => {
macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
let counterparty;
let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
counterparty = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(&$chan.funding, false, reason);
MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
} else { unreachable!(); };
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
Err($api_err)
} } }
match find_funding_output(&chan) {
Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
Err(err) => {
@ -5184,40 +5155,34 @@ where
}),
};
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
}
if is_manual_broadcast {
chan.context.set_manual_broadcast();
}
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
// We need to `unset_funding_info` to make sure we don't close the already open
// channel and instead close the one pending.
let err = format!(
"An existing channel using ID {} is open with peer {}",
chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
);
let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
chan.unset_funding_info();
return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
let err = format!(
"An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
funding_txo, o.get()
);
mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
mem::drop(per_peer_state);
let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(&chan.funding, true, reason));
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
}
if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg,
});
}
if is_manual_broadcast {
chan.context.set_manual_broadcast();
}
e.insert(Channel::from(chan));
Ok(())
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_externalize_tests"))]
@ -8252,41 +8217,30 @@ This indicates a bug inside LDK. Please report this error at https://github.com/
fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo()) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.channel_id(), monitor);
if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
// There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
// until we have persisted our monitor.
if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
}
if let Some(funded_chan) = e.insert(Channel::from(chan)).as_funded_mut() {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
per_peer_state, funded_chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
} else {
unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
}
Ok(())
} else {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the channel ID was duplicated");
fail_chan!("Duplicate channel ID");
}
let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.channel_id(), monitor);
if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
// There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
// hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
// accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
// until we have persisted our monitor.
if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
}
if let Some(funded_chan) = e.insert(Channel::from(chan)).as_funded_mut() {
handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
per_peer_state, funded_chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
} else {
unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
}
Ok(())
} else {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the channel ID was duplicated");
fail_chan!("Duplicate channel ID");
}
}
}
@ -13621,7 +13575,6 @@ where
let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut channel_id_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
@ -13632,7 +13585,6 @@ where
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
channel_id_set.insert(channel_id);
let funding_txo = channel.funding.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&channel_id) {
if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
@ -13716,7 +13668,6 @@ where
if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
}
outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
per_peer_state.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
.or_insert_with(|| Mutex::new(empty_peer_state()))
.get_mut().unwrap()
@ -14158,9 +14109,16 @@ where
// payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
// We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
// 0.0.102+
for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo());
if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
for (channel_id, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
let mut is_channel_closed = false;
let counterparty_node_id = monitor.get_counterparty_node_id();
if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
is_channel_closed = !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id);
}
if is_channel_closed {
for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
@ -14347,11 +14305,7 @@ where
}
Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
// Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
// downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
// channel_id -> peer map entry).
counterparty_opt.is_none(),
Some(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
is_channel_closed, Some(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
monitor.get_funding_txo(), monitor.channel_id()))
} else { None }
} else {
@ -14583,7 +14537,6 @@ where
decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
@ -14733,9 +14686,8 @@ where
// without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
// restart.
let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
let peer_node_id_opt = channel_manager.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap()
.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint).cloned();
if let Some(peer_node_id) = peer_node_id_opt {
let peer_node_id = monitor.get_counterparty_node_id();
{
let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&peer_node_id).unwrap();
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
@ -14811,7 +14763,6 @@ where
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, ClosureReason};
@ -15468,125 +15419,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
// Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
// a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
// the channel is successfully closed.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.compute_txid().to_byte_array());
{
// Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
// funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(temporary_channel_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
{
// Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
// as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
{
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
{
// Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
// soon as it has the funding transaction.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
{
// Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
// channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
// fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
// party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
{
// At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
// `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
// from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
// kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
{
// `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
// therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
// closing transaction).
// Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
// fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
// Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
// doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
}
let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
{
// Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
// they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
}
fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)

38
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
View file

@ -9478,41 +9478,32 @@ pub fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
let (_, tx, funding_output) =
create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
let cs_funding_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
match cs_funding_events[0] {
Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
}
nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(temp_chan_id_ca, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(temp_chan_id_ca, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(temp_chan_id_ab, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
// Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
// SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
// appropriate error message.
let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using ID"));
assert!(err_msg.contains("is open with peer"));
let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output);
let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using ID {} is open with peer {}", channel_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()), };
check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(temp_chan_id_ab, true, reason)]);
get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
@ -9598,11 +9589,6 @@ pub fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
assert_eq!(
*nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
);
}
#[xtest(feature = "_externalize_tests")]