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https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
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Rename HTLC input_idx fields to commitment_tx_output_idx
Several fields used in tracking on-chain HTLC outputs were named `input_idx` despite referring to the output index in the commitment transaction. Here they are all renamed `commitment_tx_output_idx` for clarity.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo
parent
75ca50f5c0
commit
e4cc7db63e
1 changed files with 29 additions and 28 deletions
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@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
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onchain_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
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/// None in the second case, above, ie when there is no relevant output in the commitment
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/// transaction which appeared on chain.
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input_idx: Option<u32>,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: Option<u32>,
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},
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MaturingOutput {
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descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
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@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
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/// * a revoked-state HTLC transaction was broadcasted, which was claimed by the revocation
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/// signature.
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HTLCSpendConfirmation {
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input_idx: u32,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
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/// If the claim was made by either party with a preimage, this is filled in
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preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
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/// If the claim was made by us on an inbound HTLC against a local commitment transaction,
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@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
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(0, source, required),
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(1, onchain_value_satoshis, option),
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(2, payment_hash, required),
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(3, input_idx, option),
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(3, commitment_tx_output_idx, option),
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},
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(1, MaturingOutput) => {
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(0, descriptor, required),
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@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent,
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(0, on_local_output_csv, option),
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},
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(5, HTLCSpendConfirmation) => {
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(0, input_idx, required),
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(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
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(2, preimage, option),
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(4, on_to_local_output_csv, option),
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},
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@ -568,13 +568,13 @@ pub enum Balance {
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/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
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input_idx: u32,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: u32,
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/// Only set if the HTLC claim was ours using a payment preimage
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payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
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}
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impl_writeable_tlv_based!(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC, {
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(0, input_idx, required),
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(0, commitment_tx_output_idx, required),
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(2, payment_preimage, option),
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});
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@ -1391,10 +1391,10 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
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($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
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for htlc in $htlc_iter {
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if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
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if let Some(htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput(descriptor) } = &event.event {
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if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
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if descriptor.outpoint.index as u32 == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
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} else { None }
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}) {
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debug_assert!($holder_commitment);
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@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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} else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
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} else if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx) {
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// Funding transaction spends should be fully confirmed by the time any
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// HTLC transactions are resolved, unless we're talking about a holder
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// commitment tx, whose resolution is delayed until the CSV timeout is
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@ -1414,8 +1414,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
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// and awaiting confirmations on it.
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let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
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if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
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if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
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Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
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} else { None }
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});
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
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@ -1436,8 +1437,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
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// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
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let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
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if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
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if commitment_tx_output_idx == htlc_commitment_tx_output_idx {
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Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
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} else { None }
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} else { None }
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@ -1546,7 +1547,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
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($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
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for (htlc, source) in $htlc_iter {
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if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
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if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| Some(v.commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index) {
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// We should assert that funding_spend_confirmed is_some() here, but we
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// have some unit tests which violate HTLC transaction CSVs entirely and
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// would fail.
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@ -1557,17 +1558,17 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
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// and awaiting confirmations on it.
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let htlc_update_confd = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().any(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(commitment_tx_output_idx), .. } = event.event {
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// If the HTLC was timed out, we wait for ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks
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// before considering it "no longer pending" - this matches when we
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// provide the ChannelManager an HTLC failure event.
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Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
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Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index &&
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us.best_block.height() >= event.height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1
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} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, .. } = event.event {
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} else if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, .. } = event.event {
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// If the HTLC was fulfilled with a preimage, we consider the HTLC
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// immediately non-pending, matching when we provide ChannelManager
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// the preimage.
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Some(input_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
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Some(commitment_tx_output_idx) == htlc.transaction_output_index
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} else { false }
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});
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if !htlc_update_confd {
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@ -1689,7 +1690,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
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source: (**source).clone(),
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payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash.clone(),
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onchain_value_satoshis: Some(htlc.amount_msat / 1000),
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input_idx: None,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: None,
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},
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};
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log_trace!($logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} counterparty commitment tx due to broadcast of {} commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})",
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@ -2522,7 +2523,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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// Produce actionable events from on-chain events having reached their threshold.
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for entry in onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.drain(..) {
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match entry.event {
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OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, input_idx } => {
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OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref source, payment_hash, onchain_value_satoshis, commitment_tx_output_idx } => {
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// Check for duplicate HTLC resolutions.
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#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
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{
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@ -2546,8 +2547,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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source: source.clone(),
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onchain_value_satoshis,
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}));
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if let Some(idx) = input_idx {
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self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
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if let Some(idx) = commitment_tx_output_idx {
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self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx: idx, payment_preimage: None });
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}
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},
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OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
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@ -2556,8 +2557,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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outputs: vec![descriptor]
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});
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},
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OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } => {
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self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { input_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
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OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { commitment_tx_output_idx, preimage, .. } => {
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self.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.push(IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC { commitment_tx_output_idx, payment_preimage: preimage });
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},
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OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } => {
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self.funding_spend_confirmed = Some(entry.txid);
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@ -2826,7 +2827,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(OnchainEventEntry {
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txid: tx.txid(), height,
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event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
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input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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preimage: if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim {
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Some(payment_preimage) } else { None },
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// If this is a payment to us (!outbound_htlc, above),
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@ -2877,7 +2878,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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txid: tx.txid(),
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height,
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event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
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input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
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on_to_local_output_csv: None,
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},
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@ -2898,7 +2899,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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txid: tx.txid(),
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height,
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event: OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation {
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input_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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commitment_tx_output_idx: input.previous_output.vout,
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preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
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on_to_local_output_csv: None,
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},
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@ -2926,7 +2927,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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event: OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
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source, payment_hash,
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onchain_value_satoshis: Some(amount_msat / 1000),
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input_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
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commitment_tx_output_idx: Some(input.previous_output.vout),
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},
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};
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log_info!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), entry.confirmation_threshold());
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