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Merge pull request #813 from jkczyz/2021-02-channel-monitor-mutex

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Use interior mutability in ChannelMonitor
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2021-03-02 07:00:20 -08:00 • committed by GitHub
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10 changed files with 368 additions and 192 deletions
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2
fuzz/src/chanmon_consistency.rs
View file

@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ impl chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => entry,
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => panic!("Didn't have monitor on update call"),
};
let mut deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
let deserialized_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::
read(&mut Cursor::new(&map_entry.get().1), &OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
deserialized_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &&TestBroadcaster{}, &&FuzzEstimator{}, &self.logger).unwrap();
let mut ser = VecWriter(Vec::new());

5
lightning-block-sync/src/init.rs
View file

@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ use lightning::chain;
///
/// use lightning_block_sync::*;
///
/// use std::cell::RefCell;
/// use std::io::Cursor;
///
/// async fn init_sync<
@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ use lightning::chain;
///
/// // Synchronize any channel monitors and the channel manager to be on the best block.
/// let mut cache = UnboundedCache::new();
/// let mut monitor_listener = (RefCell::new(monitor), &*tx_broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
/// let mut monitor_listener = (monitor, &*tx_broadcaster, &*fee_estimator, &*logger);
/// let listeners = vec![
/// (monitor_block_hash, &mut monitor_listener as &mut dyn chain::Listen),
/// (manager_block_hash, &mut manager as &mut dyn chain::Listen),
@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ use lightning::chain;
/// block_source, Network::Bitcoin, &mut cache, listeners).await.unwrap();
///
/// // Allow the chain monitor to watch any channels.
/// let monitor = monitor_listener.0.into_inner();
/// let monitor = monitor_listener.0;
/// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
///
/// // Create an SPV client to notify the chain monitor and channel manager of block events.

36
lightning/src/chain/chainmonitor.rs
View file

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ use util::events;
use util::events::Event;
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::sync::RwLock;
use std::ops::Deref;
/// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ pub struct ChainMonitor<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: De
P::Target: channelmonitor::Persist<ChannelSigner>,
{
/// The monitors
pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>>>,
pub monitors: RwLock<HashMap<OutPoint, ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>>>,
chain_source: Option<C>,
broadcaster: T,
logger: L,
@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values() {
let mut txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(header, txdata, height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
if let Some(ref chain_source) = self.chain_source {
@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
///
/// [`ChannelMonitor::block_disconnected`]: ../channelmonitor/struct.ChannelMonitor.html#method.block_disconnected
pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
for monitor in monitors.values() {
monitor.block_disconnected(header, disconnected_height, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator, &*self.logger);
}
}
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
pub fn new(chain_source: Option<C>, broadcaster: T, logger: L, feeest: F, persister: P) -> Self {
Self {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
monitors: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_source,
broadcaster,
logger,
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
///
/// [`chain::Filter`]: ../trait.Filter.html
fn watch_channel(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let mut monitors = self.monitors.write().unwrap();
let entry = match monitors.entry(funding_outpoint) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to add new channel data: channel monitor for given outpoint is already present");
@ -209,8 +209,8 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
/// `ChainMonitor` monitors lock.
fn update_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
// Update the monitor that watches the channel referred to by the given outpoint.
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
let monitors = self.monitors.read().unwrap();
match monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
None => {
log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor: no such monitor registered");
@ -222,15 +222,15 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
#[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget")))]
Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure)
},
Some(orig_monitor) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
let update_res = orig_monitor.update_monitor(&update, &self.broadcaster, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
Some(monitor) => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor));
let update_res = monitor.update_monitor(&update, &self.broadcaster, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
if let Err(e) = &update_res {
log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor: {:?}", e);
}
// Even if updating the monitor returns an error, the monitor's state will
// still be changed. So, persist the updated monitor despite the error.
let persist_res = self.persister.update_persisted_channel(funding_txo, &update, orig_monitor);
let persist_res = self.persister.update_persisted_channel(funding_txo, &update, monitor);
if let Err(ref e) = persist_res {
log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to persist channel monitor update: {:?}", e);
}
@ -245,8 +245,8 @@ where C::Target: chain::Filter,
fn release_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
let mut pending_monitor_events = Vec::new();
for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
pending_monitor_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
for monitor in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
pending_monitor_events.append(&mut monitor.get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events());
}
pending_monitor_events
}
@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ impl<ChannelSigner: Sign, C: Deref, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref, P: Deref> even
{
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
for monitor in self.monitors.read().unwrap().values() {
pending_events.append(&mut monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events());
}
pending_events
}

449
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
View file

@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use util::byte_utils;
use util::events::Event;
use std::cell::RefCell;
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
use std::{cmp, mem};
use std::ops::Deref;
use std::io::Error;
use std::ops::Deref;
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
@ -626,6 +626,13 @@ impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
/// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
/// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
inner: Mutex<ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer>>,
}
pub(crate) struct ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer: Sign> {
latest_update_id: u64,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
@ -724,6 +731,17 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor<Signer: Sign> {
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
let inner = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
let other = other.inner.lock().unwrap();
inner.eq(&other)
}
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
impl<Signer: Sign> PartialEq for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
@ -770,6 +788,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
self.inner.lock().unwrap().write(writer)
}
}
impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
@ -999,54 +1023,255 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id: 0,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
latest_update_id: 0,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
broadcasted_holder_revokable_script: None,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid: None,
counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points: None,
on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
on_holder_tx_csv: counterparty_channel_parameters.selected_contest_delay,
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
counterparty_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
counterparty_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
current_holder_commitment_number,
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx: None,
current_holder_commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
current_counterparty_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
current_holder_commitment_number,
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
pending_monitor_events: Vec::new(),
pending_events: Vec::new(),
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
outputs_to_watch,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
outputs_to_watch,
onchain_tx_handler,
onchain_tx_handler,
lockdown_from_offchain: false,
holder_tx_signed: false,
lockdown_from_offchain: false,
holder_tx_signed: false,
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx,
last_block_hash: Default::default(),
secp_ctx,
}),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn provide_secret(&self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_secret(idx, secret)
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(
&self,
txid: Txid,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
commitment_number: u64,
their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
logger: &L,
) where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(
txid, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point, logger)
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
&self,
holder_commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction,
htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(
holder_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
payment_hash: &PaymentHash,
payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage,
broadcaster: &B,
fee_estimator: &F,
logger: &L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.inner.lock().unwrap().provide_payment_preimage(
payment_hash, payment_preimage, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
}
pub(crate) fn broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn<B: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
broadcaster: &B,
logger: &L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.inner.lock().unwrap().broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(broadcaster, logger)
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
/// itself.
///
/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate,
broadcaster: &B,
fee_estimator: &F,
logger: &L,
) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.inner.lock().unwrap().update_monitor(updates, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
/// ChannelMonitor.
pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_update_id()
}
/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> (OutPoint, Script) {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_funding_txo().clone()
}
/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
///
/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_outputs_to_watch().clone()
}
/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
/// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
///
/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events()
}
/// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
/// in the process.
///
/// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
/// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
/// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_and_clear_pending_events()
}
pub(crate) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_min_seen_secret()
}
pub(crate) fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number()
}
pub(crate) fn get_cur_holder_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_cur_holder_commitment_number()
}
/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
/// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
/// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
/// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
}
/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
/// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
/// revoked commitment transaction.
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction>
where L::Target: Logger {
self.inner.lock().unwrap().unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(logger)
}
/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
/// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
/// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
/// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
/// - detect settled outputs for later spending
/// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
///
/// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
///
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
header: &BlockHeader,
txdata: &TransactionData,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
fee_estimator: F,
logger: L,
) -> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_connected(
header, txdata, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
}
/// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
/// appropriately.
pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
&self,
header: &BlockHeader,
height: u32,
broadcaster: B,
fee_estimator: F,
logger: L,
) where
B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
{
self.inner.lock().unwrap().block_disconnected(
header, height, broadcaster, fee_estimator, logger)
}
}
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
/// counterparty commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
@ -1098,10 +1323,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
Ok(())
}
/// Informs this monitor of the latest counterparty (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
pub(crate) fn provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx<L: Deref>(&mut self, txid: Txid, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
@ -1178,7 +1399,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
pub(crate) fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
fn provide_payment_preimage<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
L::Target: Logger,
@ -1231,10 +1452,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
}
/// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
/// itself.
///
/// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, updates: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
@ -1287,21 +1504,14 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
Ok(())
}
/// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
/// ChannelMonitor.
pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
self.latest_update_id
}
/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> &(OutPoint, Script) {
&self.funding_info
}
/// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
/// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
///
/// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Txid, Vec<(u32, Script)>> {
// If we've detected a counterparty commitment tx on chain, we must include it in the set
// of outputs to watch for spends of, otherwise we're likely to lose user funds. Because
@ -1312,22 +1522,12 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
&self.outputs_to_watch
}
/// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
/// ChannelManager via [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`].
///
/// [`chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events`]: ../trait.Watch.html#tymethod.release_pending_monitor_events
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_monitor_events(&mut self) -> Vec<MonitorEvent> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_monitor_events);
ret
}
/// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
/// in the process.
///
/// This is called by ChainMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
/// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
/// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<Event> {
let mut ret = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
@ -1715,15 +1915,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
(claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
}
/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest holder state if its copy of
/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable holder toxic tx in case of
/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our counterparty side knows
/// a higher revocation secret than the holder commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
/// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow counterparty side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
/// broadcast them if counterparty don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
@ -1749,11 +1940,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
return res;
}
/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
/// to bypass HolderCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
/// revoked commitment transaction.
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
@ -1775,17 +1963,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
return res
}
/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
/// - update the monitor's state against resolved HTLCs
/// - punish the counterparty in the case of seeing a revoked commitment transaction
/// - force close the channel and claim/timeout incoming/outgoing HTLCs if near expiration
/// - detect settled outputs for later spending
/// - schedule and bump any in-flight claims
///
/// Returns any new outputs to watch from `txdata`; after called, these are also included in
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`].
///
/// [`get_outputs_to_watch`]: #method.get_outputs_to_watch
pub fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)-> Vec<(Txid, Vec<(u32, TxOut)>)>
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
@ -1907,8 +2084,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
watch_outputs
}
/// Determines if the disconnected block contained any transactions of interest and updates
/// appropriately.
pub fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F, logger: L)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
@ -2298,7 +2473,7 @@ pub trait Persist<ChannelSigner: Sign>: Send + Sync {
fn update_persisted_channel(&self, id: OutPoint, update: &ChannelMonitorUpdate, data: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
}
impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (RefCell<ChannelMonitor<Signer>>, T, F, L)
impl<Signer: Sign, T: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for (ChannelMonitor<Signer>, T, F, L)
where
T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator,
@ -2306,11 +2481,11 @@ where
{
fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
self.0.borrow_mut().block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
self.0.block_connected(&block.header, &txdata, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
self.0.borrow_mut().block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
self.0.block_disconnected(header, height, &*self.1, &*self.2, &*self.3);
}
}
@ -2561,51 +2736,53 @@ impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>> ReadableArgs<&'a K>
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
inner: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorImpl {
latest_update_id,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
destination_script,
broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
destination_script,
broadcasted_holder_revokable_script,
counterparty_payment_script,
shutdown_script,
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
channel_keys_id,
holder_revocation_basepoint,
funding_info,
current_counterparty_commitment_txid,
prev_counterparty_commitment_txid,
counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points,
counterparty_tx_cache,
funding_redeemscript,
channel_value_satoshis,
their_cur_revocation_points,
on_holder_tx_csv,
on_holder_tx_csv,
commitment_secrets,
counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
commitment_secrets,
counterparty_claimable_outpoints,
counterparty_commitment_txn_on_chain,
counterparty_hash_commitment_number,
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
current_holder_commitment_tx,
current_counterparty_commitment_number,
current_holder_commitment_number,
prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx,
current_holder_commitment_tx,
current_counterparty_commitment_number,
current_holder_commitment_number,
payment_preimages,
pending_monitor_events,
pending_events,
payment_preimages,
pending_monitor_events,
pending_events,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
outputs_to_watch,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
outputs_to_watch,
onchain_tx_handler,
onchain_tx_handler,
lockdown_from_offchain,
holder_tx_signed,
lockdown_from_offchain,
holder_tx_signed,
last_block_hash,
secp_ctx,
last_block_hash,
secp_ctx,
}),
}))
}
}
@ -2683,7 +2860,7 @@ mod tests {
macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
for preimage in $preimages_slice {
assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
assert!($monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
}
}
}
@ -2720,12 +2897,12 @@ mod tests {
};
// Prune with one old state and a holder commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
Script::new(), 46, 0,
HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
let monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(Secp256k1::new(), keys,
&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
(OutPoint { txid: Txid::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
&channel_parameters,
Script::new(), 46, 0,
HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy());
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
let dummy_txid = dummy_tx.txid();
@ -2741,14 +2918,14 @@ mod tests {
let mut secret = [0; 32];
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 15);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 13);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
@ -2757,7 +2934,7 @@ mod tests {
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 12);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
@ -2765,7 +2942,7 @@ mod tests {
monitor.provide_latest_holder_commitment_tx(HolderCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_holder_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
assert_eq!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().payment_preimages.len(), 5);
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
}

2
lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs
View file

@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ fn test_monitor_and_persister_update_fail() {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let chain_mon = {
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();

28
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
View file

@ -1570,13 +1570,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
&self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
&self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx);
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
&self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
&self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
@ -1640,13 +1640,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
let mut channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
&self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
&self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx);
let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
&self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
&self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
&self.channel_transaction_parameters,
funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
obscure_factor,
holder_commitment_tx);
channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);

6
lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
View file

@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c> Drop for Node<'a, 'b, 'c> {
let feeest = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
let mut deserialized_monitors = Vec::new();
{
let old_monitors = self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let old_monitors = self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
for (_, old_monitor) in old_monitors.iter() {
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
old_monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
@ -305,9 +305,9 @@ macro_rules! get_feerate {
macro_rules! get_local_commitment_txn {
($node: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
{
let mut monitors = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let mut commitment_txn = None;
for (funding_txo, monitor) in monitors.iter_mut() {
for (funding_txo, monitor) in monitors.iter() {
if funding_txo.to_channel_id() == $channel_id {
commitment_txn = Some(monitor.unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&$node.logger));
break;

28
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
View file

@ -3517,8 +3517,8 @@ fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
// Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
{
let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
monitors.get_mut(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
let mut monitors = nodes[2].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
monitors.get(&OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_slice(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id[..]).unwrap(), index: 0 }).unwrap()
.provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &&logger);
}
connect_block(&nodes[2], &block, 1);
@ -4314,7 +4314,7 @@ fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
@ -4423,7 +4423,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
// Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
@ -4515,7 +4515,7 @@ fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
@ -4572,7 +4572,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
@ -4591,7 +4591,7 @@ fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
// Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
// nodes[3])
let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter() {
for monitor in nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter() {
let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.1.write(&mut writer).unwrap();
node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
@ -7479,7 +7479,7 @@ fn test_data_loss_protect() {
// Cache node A state before any channel update
let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000, 8_000_000);
@ -8226,10 +8226,10 @@ fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5, 130, false, header_130.block_hash());
{
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }) {
assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
assert!(monitor.onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
}
}
}
@ -8360,7 +8360,7 @@ fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower = {
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
@ -8419,7 +8419,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower_alice = {
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
@ -8445,7 +8445,7 @@ fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let watchtower_bob = {
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&outpoint).unwrap();
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();

2
lightning/src/util/macro_logger.rs
View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ impl<'a, T> std::fmt::Display for DebugFundingInfo<'a, T> {
}
macro_rules! log_funding_info {
($key_storage: expr) => {
::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo($key_storage.get_funding_txo())
::util::macro_logger::DebugFundingInfo(&$key_storage.get_funding_txo())
}
}

2
lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs
View file

@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ impl<'a> chain::Watch<EnforcingSigner> for TestChainMonitor<'a> {
let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
// At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
// to a watchtower and disk...
let monitors = self.chain_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
let monitors = self.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
let monitor = monitors.get(&funding_txo).unwrap();
w.0.clear();
monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();