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Merge pull request #3248 from jkczyz/2024-08-blinded-path-utils-refactor

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Refactor `BlindedPath` construction utils
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dunxen 2024-08-27 13:28:43 +02:00 • committed by GitHub
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5 changed files with 96 additions and 58 deletions
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10
lightning/src/blinded_path/message.rs
View file

@ -374,18 +374,20 @@ pub(super) fn blinded_hops<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, intermediate_nodes: &[MessageForwardNode],
recipient_node_id: PublicKey, context: MessageContext, session_priv: &SecretKey,
) -> Result<Vec<BlindedHop>, secp256k1::Error> {
let pks = intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| &node.node_id)
.chain(core::iter::once(&recipient_node_id));
let pks = intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| node.node_id)
.chain(core::iter::once(recipient_node_id));
let tlvs = pks.clone()
.skip(1) // The first node's TLVs contains the next node's pubkey
.zip(intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| node.short_channel_id))
.map(|(pubkey, scid)| match scid {
Some(scid) => NextMessageHop::ShortChannelId(scid),
None => NextMessageHop::NodeId(*pubkey),
None => NextMessageHop::NodeId(pubkey),
})
.map(|next_hop| ControlTlvs::Forward(ForwardTlvs { next_hop, next_blinding_override: None }))
.chain(core::iter::once(ControlTlvs::Receive(ReceiveTlvs{ context: Some(context) })));
utils::construct_blinded_hops(secp_ctx, pks, tlvs, session_priv)
let path = pks.zip(tlvs);
utils::construct_blinded_hops(secp_ctx, path, session_priv)
}

9
lightning/src/blinded_path/payment.rs
View file

@ -462,11 +462,14 @@ pub(super) fn blinded_hops<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, intermediate_nodes: &[PaymentForwardNode],
payee_node_id: PublicKey, payee_tlvs: ReceiveTlvs, session_priv: &SecretKey,
) -> Result<Vec<BlindedHop>, secp256k1::Error> {
let pks = intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| &node.node_id)
.chain(core::iter::once(&payee_node_id));
let pks = intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| node.node_id)
.chain(core::iter::once(payee_node_id));
let tlvs = intermediate_nodes.iter().map(|node| BlindedPaymentTlvsRef::Forward(&node.tlvs))
.chain(core::iter::once(BlindedPaymentTlvsRef::Receive(&payee_tlvs)));
utils::construct_blinded_hops(secp_ctx, pks, tlvs, session_priv)
let path = pks.zip(tlvs);
utils::construct_blinded_hops(secp_ctx, path, session_priv)
}
/// `None` if underflow occurs.

100
lightning/src/blinded_path/utils.rs
View file

@ -25,42 +25,38 @@ use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
use crate::io;
use core::borrow::Borrow;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
// TODO: DRY with onion_utils::construct_onion_keys_callback
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn construct_keys_callback<'a, T, I, F>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: I, destination: Option<Destination>,
session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: F
) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
where
T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification,
I: Iterator<Item=&'a PublicKey>,
F: FnMut(PublicKey, SharedSecret, PublicKey, [u8; 32], Option<PublicKey>, Option<Vec<u8>>),
macro_rules! build_keys_helper {
($session_priv: ident, $secp_ctx: ident, $callback: ident) =>
{
let mut msg_blinding_point_priv = session_priv.clone();
let mut msg_blinding_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
let mut msg_blinding_point_priv = $session_priv.clone();
let mut msg_blinding_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key($secp_ctx, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
let mut onion_packet_pubkey_priv = msg_blinding_point_priv.clone();
let mut onion_packet_pubkey = msg_blinding_point.clone();
macro_rules! build_keys {
($pk: expr, $blinded: expr, $encrypted_payload: expr) => {{
let encrypted_data_ss = SharedSecret::new(&$pk, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
($hop: expr, $blinded: expr, $encrypted_payload: expr) => {{
let pk = *$hop.borrow();
let encrypted_data_ss = SharedSecret::new(&pk, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
let blinded_hop_pk = if $blinded { $pk } else {
let blinded_hop_pk = if $blinded { pk } else {
let hop_pk_blinding_factor = {
let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(b"blinded_node_id");
hmac.input(encrypted_data_ss.as_ref());
Hmac::from_engine(hmac).to_byte_array()
};
$pk.mul_tweak(secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(hop_pk_blinding_factor).unwrap())?
pk.mul_tweak($secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(hop_pk_blinding_factor).unwrap())?
};
let onion_packet_ss = SharedSecret::new(&blinded_hop_pk, &onion_packet_pubkey_priv);
let rho = onion_utils::gen_rho_from_shared_secret(encrypted_data_ss.as_ref());
let unblinded_pk_opt = if $blinded { None } else { Some($pk) };
callback(blinded_hop_pk, onion_packet_ss, onion_packet_pubkey, rho, unblinded_pk_opt, $encrypted_payload);
let unblinded_hop_opt = if $blinded { None } else { Some($hop) };
$callback(blinded_hop_pk, onion_packet_ss, onion_packet_pubkey, rho, unblinded_hop_opt, $encrypted_payload);
(encrypted_data_ss, onion_packet_ss)
}}
}
@ -77,7 +73,7 @@ where
};
msg_blinding_point_priv = msg_blinding_point_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(msg_blinding_point_blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
msg_blinding_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
msg_blinding_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key($secp_ctx, &msg_blinding_point_priv);
let onion_packet_pubkey_blinding_factor = {
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
@ -86,15 +82,27 @@ where
Sha256::from_engine(sha).to_byte_array()
};
onion_packet_pubkey_priv = onion_packet_pubkey_priv.mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(onion_packet_pubkey_blinding_factor).unwrap())?;
onion_packet_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &onion_packet_pubkey_priv);
onion_packet_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key($secp_ctx, &onion_packet_pubkey_priv);
};
}
}}
#[inline]
pub(crate) fn construct_keys_for_onion_message<'a, T, I, F>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: I, destination: Destination, session_priv: &SecretKey,
mut callback: F,
) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
where
T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification,
I: Iterator<Item=PublicKey>,
F: FnMut(PublicKey, SharedSecret, PublicKey, [u8; 32], Option<PublicKey>, Option<Vec<u8>>),
{
build_keys_helper!(session_priv, secp_ctx, callback);
for pk in unblinded_path {
build_keys_in_loop!(*pk, false, None);
build_keys_in_loop!(pk, false, None);
}
if let Some(dest) = destination {
match dest {
match destination {
Destination::Node(pk) => {
build_keys!(pk, false, None);
},
@ -104,27 +112,53 @@ where
}
},
}
Ok(())
}
#[inline]
pub(super) fn construct_keys_for_blinded_path<'a, T, I, F, H>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: I, session_priv: &SecretKey, mut callback: F,
) -> Result<(), secp256k1::Error>
where
T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification,
H: Borrow<PublicKey>,
I: Iterator<Item=H>,
F: FnMut(PublicKey, SharedSecret, PublicKey, [u8; 32], Option<H>, Option<Vec<u8>>),
{
build_keys_helper!(session_priv, secp_ctx, callback);
for pk in unblinded_path {
build_keys_in_loop!(pk, false, None);
}
Ok(())
}
// Panics if `unblinded_tlvs` length is less than `unblinded_pks` length
pub(crate) fn construct_blinded_hops<'a, T, I1, I2>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_pks: I1, mut unblinded_tlvs: I2, session_priv: &SecretKey
struct PublicKeyWithTlvs<W: Writeable> {
pubkey: PublicKey,
tlvs: W,
}
impl<W: Writeable> Borrow<PublicKey> for PublicKeyWithTlvs<W> {
fn borrow(&self) -> &PublicKey {
&self.pubkey
}
}
pub(crate) fn construct_blinded_hops<'a, T, I, W>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, unblinded_path: I, session_priv: &SecretKey,
) -> Result<Vec<BlindedHop>, secp256k1::Error>
where
T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification,
I1: Iterator<Item=&'a PublicKey>,
I2: Iterator,
I2::Item: Writeable
I: Iterator<Item=(PublicKey, W)>,
W: Writeable
{
let mut blinded_hops = Vec::with_capacity(unblinded_pks.size_hint().0);
construct_keys_callback(
secp_ctx, unblinded_pks, None, session_priv,
|blinded_node_id, _, _, encrypted_payload_rho, _, _| {
let mut blinded_hops = Vec::with_capacity(unblinded_path.size_hint().0);
construct_keys_for_blinded_path(
secp_ctx, unblinded_path.map(|(pubkey, tlvs)| PublicKeyWithTlvs { pubkey, tlvs }), session_priv,
|blinded_node_id, _, _, encrypted_payload_rho, unblinded_hop_data, _| {
blinded_hops.push(BlindedHop {
blinded_node_id,
encrypted_payload: encrypt_payload(unblinded_tlvs.next().unwrap(), encrypted_payload_rho),
encrypted_payload: encrypt_payload(unblinded_hop_data.unwrap().tlvs, encrypted_payload_rho),
});
})?;
Ok(blinded_hops)

10
lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs
View file

@ -1392,19 +1392,17 @@ fn route_blinding_spec_test_vector() {
let blinding_override = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &dave_eve_session_priv);
assert_eq!(blinding_override, pubkey_from_hex("031b84c5567b126440995d3ed5aaba0565d71e1834604819ff9c17f5e9d5dd078f"));
// Can't use the public API here as the encrypted payloads contain unknown TLVs.
let path = [(dave_node_id, WithoutLength(&dave_unblinded_tlvs)), (eve_node_id, WithoutLength(&eve_unblinded_tlvs))];
let mut dave_eve_blinded_hops = blinded_path::utils::construct_blinded_hops(
&secp_ctx, [dave_node_id, eve_node_id].iter(),
&mut [WithoutLength(&dave_unblinded_tlvs), WithoutLength(&eve_unblinded_tlvs)].iter(),
&dave_eve_session_priv
&secp_ctx, path.into_iter(), &dave_eve_session_priv
).unwrap();
// Concatenate an additional Bob -> Carol blinded path to the Eve -> Dave blinded path.
let bob_carol_session_priv = secret_from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202");
let bob_blinding_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bob_carol_session_priv);
let path = [(bob_node_id, WithoutLength(&bob_unblinded_tlvs)), (carol_node_id, WithoutLength(&carol_unblinded_tlvs))];
let bob_carol_blinded_hops = blinded_path::utils::construct_blinded_hops(
&secp_ctx, [bob_node_id, carol_node_id].iter(),
&mut [WithoutLength(&bob_unblinded_tlvs), WithoutLength(&carol_unblinded_tlvs)].iter(),
&bob_carol_session_priv
&secp_ctx, path.into_iter(), &bob_carol_session_priv
).unwrap();
let mut blinded_hops = bob_carol_blinded_hops;

7
lightning/src/onion_message/messenger.rs
View file

@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ where
}
};
let (packet_payloads, packet_keys) = packet_payloads_and_keys(
&secp_ctx, &intermediate_nodes, destination, contents, reply_path, &blinding_secret
&secp_ctx, intermediate_nodes, destination, contents, reply_path, &blinding_secret
)?;
let prng_seed = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ pub type SimpleRefOnionMessenger<
/// Construct onion packet payloads and keys for sending an onion message along the given
/// `unblinded_path` to the given `destination`.
fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: OnionMessageContents, S: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<S>, unblinded_path: &[PublicKey], destination: Destination, message: T,
secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<S>, unblinded_path: Vec<PublicKey>, destination: Destination, message: T,
mut reply_path: Option<BlindedMessagePath>, session_priv: &SecretKey
) -> Result<(Vec<(Payload<T>, [u8; 32])>, Vec<onion_utils::OnionKeys>), SendError> {
let num_hops = unblinded_path.len() + destination.num_hops();
@ -1836,7 +1836,8 @@ fn packet_payloads_and_keys<T: OnionMessageContents, S: secp256k1::Signing + sec
let mut blinded_path_idx = 0;
let mut prev_control_tlvs_ss = None;
let mut final_control_tlvs = None;
utils::construct_keys_callback(secp_ctx, unblinded_path.iter(), Some(destination), session_priv,
utils::construct_keys_for_onion_message(
secp_ctx, unblinded_path.into_iter(), destination, session_priv,
|_, onion_packet_ss, ephemeral_pubkey, control_tlvs_ss, unblinded_pk_opt, enc_payload_opt| {
if num_unblinded_hops != 0 && unblinded_path_idx < num_unblinded_hops {
if let Some(ss) = prev_control_tlvs_ss.take() {