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Delete unnecessary whitespace in process_pending_forwards

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Valentine Wallace 2022-11-04 14:16:20 -04:00
parent 582b827a4d
commit b3d257d70f
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1 changed files with 66 additions and 66 deletions
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132
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
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@ -3158,79 +3158,79 @@ impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F
outgoing_cltv_value outgoing_cltv_value
} }
}) => { }) => {
macro_rules! failure_handler { macro_rules! failure_handler {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => { ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg); log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id, short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint, outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id, htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret, incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss, phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
}); });
let reason = if $next_hop_unknown { let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id } HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
} else {
HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
};
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
reason
));
continue;
}
}
macro_rules! fail_forward {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
}
}
}
macro_rules! failed_payment {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
}
}
}
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
// In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
// of the onion.
failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
},
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
},
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
}
} else { } else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None); HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
};
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
reason
));
continue;
}
}
macro_rules! fail_forward {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
}
}
}
macro_rules! failed_payment {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
}
}
}
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
// In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
// of the onion.
failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
},
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
},
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
} }
} else { } else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None); fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
} }
}, } else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => { HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
// Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is