mirrors/rust-lightning
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git synced 2025-02-24 23:08:36 +01:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

Use new chan_restoration macros in channel_reestablish handling.

Browse source 
This merges the code for restoring channel functionality between
channel monitor updating restored and peer reconnection, reducing
redundant code.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2021-03-18 12:44:31 -04:00
parent 1fa2da391c
commit b2cb1fb533
2 changed files with 107 additions and 89 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

191
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
View file

@ -886,16 +886,74 @@ macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
}
macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
($self: expr, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
$raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr,
($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
$raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
$pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
let mut htlc_forwards = None;
let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
{
if !$pending_forwards.is_empty() {
let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
let res = loop {
let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
if !forwards.is_empty() {
htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
$channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), $pending_forwards));
$channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
}
if chanmon_update.is_some() {
// On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
// no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
// associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
// monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
// funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
// monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
// A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
// commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
// only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
}
if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
// Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
// before it should be allowed to.
assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
}
$channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
}
let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
// We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
// message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
// message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
// processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
// cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
// Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
// only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
// have some commitment updates to send as well.
assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
// for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
// re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
let mut order = $order;
if $raa.is_none() {
order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
}
break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
}
}
macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
@ -924,31 +982,29 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
handle_cs!();
},
}
if let Some(tx) = $funding_broadcastable {
if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
$self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg,
});
if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
$channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
node_id: counterparty_node_id,
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
}
$channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
}
break Ok(());
};
if chanmon_update_is_none {
// If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
// above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
// should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
assert!(res.is_ok());
}
htlc_forwards
(htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
} }
}
macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
($self: expr, $locked_res: expr) => { {
let htlc_forwards = $locked_res;
($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
$self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
@ -2676,7 +2732,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
}
let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
(pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
(pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
@ -3292,77 +3348,34 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
}
fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
let chan_restoration_res = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
// Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
// disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
// channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
// for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
// re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
}
if commitment_update.is_none() {
order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
}
return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
//TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
}
}
if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg
});
}
macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
// Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
// disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
// freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, shutdown) =
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg
msg,
});
}
} }
macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
updates
});
}
} }
match order {
RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
send_raa!();
send_cu!();
},
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
send_cu!();
send_raa!();
},
}
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
}
Ok(())
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
Ok(())
}
/// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.

5
lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs
View file

@ -1515,6 +1515,11 @@ macro_rules! handle_chan_reestablish_msgs {
None
};
if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, msg: _ }) = msg_events.get(idx) {
idx += 1;
assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
}
let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
let mut commitment_update = None;
let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {