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Fix panic on reorg through the funding_locked-generating block

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We had a TODO to handle "lost confirmation" in block_connected,
which we recently did in block_disconnected (calling force_shutdown
in case we get too many blocks disconnected) but didn't handle the
case where we had a simple reorg through the block that resulted in
us generating a funding_locked.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2018-08-02 06:23:53 -04:00
parent bd01f4e0c3
commit a6161210e2
1 changed files with 21 additions and 10 deletions
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31
src/ln/channel.rs
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@ -1933,27 +1933,38 @@ impl Channel {
self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
if self.funding_tx_confirmations == CONF_TARGET as u64 {
if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
true
} else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK);
self.channel_update_count += 1;
//TODO: Something about a state where we "lost confirmation"
true
} else if self.channel_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
false
} else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?");
}
panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
} else {
// We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
// funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
false
};
self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
//TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
//as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
//they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
//a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
}));
if need_commitment_update {
let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret).unwrap();
return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
channel_id: self.channel_id,
next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
}));
}
}
}
}