Merge pull request #1324 from valentinewallace/2022-02-phantom-followup

#1199 Followup
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2022-02-28 18:16:21 +00:00 committed by GitHub
commit 99073c74dd
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5 changed files with 479 additions and 46 deletions

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@ -390,6 +390,9 @@ pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
};
let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
// Adding new calls to `KeysInterface::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
// keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
// it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
keys_manager.counter.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
let our_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap());
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(network).block_hash()));

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@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ mod inbound_payment {
// our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
enum PendingHTLCRouting {
pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
Forward {
onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ enum PendingHTLCRouting {
Receive {
payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
},
ReceiveKeysend {
payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
@ -375,8 +376,8 @@ enum PendingHTLCRouting {
#[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash,
pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
@ -419,6 +420,7 @@ pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: u64,
htlc_id: u64,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
// This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
// channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
@ -2072,7 +2074,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
}
fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
{
// final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
@ -2129,6 +2131,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
payment_data: data,
incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
phantom_shared_secret,
}
} else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
// We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
@ -2232,7 +2235,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
// OUR PAYMENT!
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry) {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
Ok(info) => {
// Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
// message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
@ -3012,17 +3015,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
macro_rules! fail_forward {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr) => {
($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
{
log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
short_channel_id: short_chan_id,
short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
});
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
));
continue;
}
@ -3031,34 +3035,39 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
let shared_secret = {
let phantom_shared_secret = {
let mut arr = [0; 32];
arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
arr
};
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new());
let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
// In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
// `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
// if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
// of the onion.
fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
},
Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new());
fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
},
};
match next_hop {
onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) {
match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data)
Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
}
},
_ => panic!(),
}
} else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
} else {
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new());
fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
}
},
HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
@ -3066,9 +3075,6 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
// the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
// trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
// problem, not ours.
//
// `fail_htlc_backwards_internal` is never called for
// phantom payments, so this is unreachable for them.
}
}
}
@ -3091,6 +3097,8 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
// Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
phantom_shared_secret: None,
});
match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
Err(e) => {
@ -3207,11 +3215,11 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
prev_funding_outpoint } => {
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
(incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
_ => {
panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
}
@ -3222,6 +3230,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
},
value: amt_to_forward,
cltv_expiry,
@ -3239,6 +3248,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
phantom_shared_secret,
}), payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
));
@ -3778,12 +3788,18 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
pending_events.push(path_failure);
if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
let err_packet = match onion_error {
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
} else {
let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
}
},
HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
@ -4487,7 +4503,9 @@ impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelMana
onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
}
res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
res
}[..])
@ -5978,6 +5996,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
},
(1, Receive) => {
(0, payment_data, required),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
},
(2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
@ -6069,6 +6088,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
(0, short_channel_id, required),
(1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
(2, outpoint, required),
(4, htlc_id, required),
(6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)

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@ -1299,10 +1299,6 @@ impl Readable for FinalOnionHopData {
impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
// Note that this should never be reachable if Rust-Lightning generated the message, as we
// check values are sane long before we get here, though its possible in the future
// user-generated messages may hit this.
if self.amt_to_forward > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { panic!("We should never be sending infinite/overflow onion payments"); }
match self.format {
OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => {
0u8.write(w)?;
@ -1319,9 +1315,6 @@ impl Writeable for OnionHopData {
});
},
OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { ref payment_data, ref keysend_preimage } => {
if let Some(final_data) = payment_data {
if final_data.total_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT { panic!("We should never be sending infinite/overflow onion payments"); }
}
encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, HighZeroBytesDroppedVarInt(self.amt_to_forward), required),
(4, HighZeroBytesDroppedVarInt(self.outgoing_cltv_value), required),

View file

@ -12,25 +12,28 @@
//! returned errors decode to the correct thing.
use chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, Recipient};
use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCForwardInfo, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY};
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCForwardInfo, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PendingHTLCInfo, PendingHTLCRouting};
use ln::onion_utils;
use routing::network_graph::NetworkUpdate;
use routing::router::Route;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
use routing::router::{get_route, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate, OptionalField};
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
use io;
use prelude::*;
@ -573,3 +576,420 @@ fn test_onion_failure() {
nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
}, true, Some(23), None, None);
}
macro_rules! get_phantom_route {
($nodes: expr, $amt: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let phantom_secret = $nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode).unwrap();
let phantom_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &phantom_secret);
let phantom_route_hint = $nodes[1].node.get_phantom_route_hints();
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(phantom_pubkey)
.with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known())
.with_route_hints(vec![RouteHint(vec![
RouteHintHop {
src_node_id: $nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
short_channel_id: $channel.0.contents.short_channel_id,
fees: RoutingFees {
base_msat: $channel.0.contents.fee_base_msat,
proportional_millionths: $channel.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
},
cltv_expiry_delta: $channel.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
htlc_minimum_msat: None,
htlc_maximum_msat: None,
},
RouteHintHop {
src_node_id: phantom_route_hint.real_node_pubkey,
short_channel_id: phantom_route_hint.phantom_scid,
fees: RoutingFees {
base_msat: 0,
proportional_millionths: 0,
},
cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
htlc_minimum_msat: None,
htlc_maximum_msat: None,
}
])]);
let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
(get_route(
&$nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, $nodes[0].network_graph,
Some(&$nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
$amt, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, $nodes[0].logger, &scorer
).unwrap(), phantom_route_hint.phantom_scid)
}
}}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_onion_hmac_failure() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route.
let recv_value_msat = 10_000;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_value_msat));
let (route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, recv_value_msat, channel);
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
// Modify the payload so the phantom hop's HMAC is bogus.
let sha256_of_onion = {
let mut channel_state = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let mut pending_forward = channel_state.forward_htlcs.get_mut(&phantom_scid).unwrap();
match pending_forward[0] {
HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref mut onion_packet, .. },
..
}, ..
} => {
onion_packet.hmac[onion_packet.hmac.len() - 1] ^= 1;
Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner().to_vec()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected forward"),
}
};
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.blamed_chan_closed(true)
.expected_htlc_error_data(0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5, &sha256_of_onion);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_invalid_onion_payload() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route.
let recv_value_msat = 10_000;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_value_msat));
let (route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, recv_value_msat, channel);
// We'll use the session priv later when constructing an invalid onion packet.
let session_priv = [3; 32];
*nodes[0].keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some(session_priv);
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
// Modify the onion packet to have an invalid payment amount.
for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref mut onion_packet, .. },
..
}, ..
} => {
// Construct the onion payloads for the entire route and an invalid amount.
let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1, &Some(payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
// We only want to construct the onion packet for the last hop, not the entire route, so
// remove the first hop's payload and its keys.
onion_keys.remove(0);
onion_payloads.remove(0);
let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
onion_packet.hop_data = new_onion_packet.hop_data;
onion_packet.hmac = new_onion_packet.hmac;
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected forward"),
}
}
}
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let error_data = Vec::new();
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.blamed_chan_closed(true)
.expected_htlc_error_data(0x4000 | 22, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_final_incorrect_cltv_expiry() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route.
let recv_value_msat = 10_000;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_value_msat));
let (route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, recv_value_msat, channel);
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
// Modify the payload so the phantom hop's HMAC is bogus.
for (_, pending_forwards) in nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().forward_htlcs.iter_mut() {
for f in pending_forwards.iter_mut() {
match f {
&mut HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo { ref mut outgoing_cltv_value, .. }, ..
} => {
*outgoing_cltv_value += 1;
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected forward"),
}
}
}
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let expected_cltv = 82;
let error_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(expected_cltv).to_vec();
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.expected_htlc_error_data(18, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_failure_too_low_cltv() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route.
let recv_value_msat = 10_000;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_value_msat));
let (mut route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, recv_value_msat, channel);
// Modify the route to have a too-low cltv.
route.paths[0][1].cltv_expiry_delta = 5;
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let error_data = Vec::new();
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.expected_htlc_error_data(17, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_failure_too_low_recv_amt() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route with a too-low amount.
let recv_amt_msat = 10_000;
let bad_recv_amt_msat = recv_amt_msat - 10;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_amt_msat));
let (mut route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, bad_recv_amt_msat, channel);
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let mut error_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(bad_recv_amt_msat).to_vec();
error_data.extend_from_slice(
&byte_utils::be32_to_array(nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
);
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.expected_htlc_error_data(0x4000 | 15, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_dust_exposure_failure() {
// Set the max dust exposure to the dust limit.
let max_dust_exposure = 546;
let mut receiver_config = UserConfig::default();
receiver_config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = max_dust_exposure;
receiver_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(receiver_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route with an amount exceeding the dust exposure threshold of nodes[1].
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(max_dust_exposure + 1));
let (mut route, _) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, max_dust_exposure + 1, channel);
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let mut error_data = channel.1.encode_with_len();
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(channel.0.contents.short_channel_id)
.blamed_chan_closed(false)
.expected_htlc_error_data(0x1000 | 7, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, fail_conditions);
}
#[test]
fn test_phantom_failure_reject_payment() {
// Test that the user can successfully fail back a phantom node payment.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// Get the route with a too-low amount.
let recv_amt_msat = 10_000;
let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1], Some(recv_amt_msat));
let (mut route, phantom_scid) = get_phantom_route!(nodes, recv_amt_msat, channel);
// Route the HTLC through to the destination.
nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash.clone(), &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_0 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let mut update_add = update_0.update_add_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &update_0.commitment_signed, false, true);
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_amt_msat);
assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
let update_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(update_1.update_fail_htlcs.len() == 1);
let fail_msg = update_1.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone();
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_1.commitment_signed, false);
// Ensure the payment fails with the expected error.
let mut error_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(recv_amt_msat).to_vec();
error_data.extend_from_slice(
&byte_utils::be32_to_array(nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
);
let mut fail_conditions = PaymentFailedConditions::new()
.blamed_scid(phantom_scid)
.expected_htlc_error_data(0x4000 | 15, &error_data);
expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true, fail_conditions);
}

View file

@ -104,18 +104,15 @@ pub(crate) mod fake_scid {
let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
let segwit_activation_height = segwit_activation_height(genesis_hash);
let mut valid_block_range = if highest_seen_blockheight > segwit_activation_height {
highest_seen_blockheight - segwit_activation_height
} else {
1
};
let mut blocks_since_segwit_activation = highest_seen_blockheight.saturating_sub(segwit_activation_height);
// We want to ensure that this fake channel won't conflict with any transactions we haven't
// seen yet, in case `highest_seen_blockheight` is updated before we get full information
// about transactions confirmed in the given block.
if valid_block_range > BLOCKS_PER_MONTH { valid_block_range -= BLOCKS_PER_MONTH; }
blocks_since_segwit_activation = blocks_since_segwit_activation.saturating_sub(BLOCKS_PER_MONTH);
let rand_for_height = u32::from_be_bytes(rand_bytes[..4].try_into().unwrap());
let fake_scid_height = segwit_activation_height + rand_for_height % valid_block_range;
let fake_scid_height = segwit_activation_height + rand_for_height % (blocks_since_segwit_activation + 1);
let rand_for_tx_index = u32::from_be_bytes(rand_bytes[4..8].try_into().unwrap());
let fake_scid_tx_index = rand_for_tx_index % MAX_TX_INDEX;