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Track ChannelMonitor-watched-outpoints (+ remove now-uesless Mutex)

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This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2018-10-24 13:59:03 -04:00
parent 56513f2927
commit 6f08779b04
1 changed files with 38 additions and 50 deletions
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84
src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
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@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
///
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
@ -263,7 +264,7 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
@ -290,37 +291,6 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
logger: Arc<Logger>,
}
impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
fn clone(&self) -> Self {
ChannelMonitor {
funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
last_block_hash: self.last_block_hash.clone(),
secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
logger: self.logger.clone(),
}
}
}
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
@ -336,6 +306,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
@ -349,9 +320,7 @@ impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
return false
}
}
let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
*us == *them
true
}
}
}
@ -378,7 +347,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
@ -613,6 +582,20 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
}
}
/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
}
}
res
}
/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
@ -707,12 +690,13 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
}
}
{
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
for (txid, (commitment_number, txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
for script in txouts.iter() {
script.write(writer)?;
}
}
@ -826,7 +810,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
@ -966,7 +950,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
@ -1003,7 +987,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
// insert it here.
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
let revocation_point_option =
@ -1330,9 +1314,8 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
txn = remote_txn;
}
} else {
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number);
if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
if let Some(tx) = tx {
txn.push(tx);
}
@ -1521,7 +1504,12 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
}
if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
}
}
@ -1619,7 +1607,7 @@ impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelM
old_secrets,
remote_claimable_outpoints,
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
remote_hash_commitment_number,
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,