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https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
synced 2025-02-22 14:33:08 +01:00
Mark counterparty revoked offered HTLCs as Unpinnable
If the counterparty broadcasts a revoked transaction with offered HTLCs, the output is not immediately pinnable as the counterparty cannot claim the HTLC until the CLTV expires and they use an HTLC-Timeout path. Here we properly set these packages as `Unpinnable`, changing some transaction generation during tests.
This commit is contained in:
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5eb0a34ca4
commit
6c57a1fb42
3 changed files with 60 additions and 38 deletions
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@ -699,8 +699,13 @@ impl PackageSolvingData {
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match self {
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PackageSolvingData::RevokedOutput(RevokedOutput { .. }) =>
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PackageMalleability::Malleable(AggregationCluster::Unpinnable),
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PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(..) =>
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PackageMalleability::Malleable(AggregationCluster::Pinnable),
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PackageSolvingData::RevokedHTLCOutput(RevokedHTLCOutput { htlc, .. }) => {
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if htlc.offered {
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PackageMalleability::Malleable(AggregationCluster::Unpinnable)
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} else {
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PackageMalleability::Malleable(AggregationCluster::Pinnable)
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}
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},
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PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyOfferedHTLCOutput(..) =>
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PackageMalleability::Malleable(AggregationCluster::Unpinnable),
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PackageSolvingData::CounterpartyReceivedHTLCOutput(..) =>
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use crate::chain;
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use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
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use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
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use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
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use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{Balance, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
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use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{Balance, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE};
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use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider};
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use crate::events::bump_transaction::WalletSource;
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@ -2509,14 +2509,12 @@ fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
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{
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let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
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// The unpinnable, revoked to_self output, and the pinnable, revoked htlc output will
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// be claimed in separate transactions.
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
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for tx in node_txn.iter() {
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assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
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check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
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}
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
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// The revoked HTLC output is not pinnable for another `TEST_FINAL_CLTV` blocks, and is
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// thus claimed in the same transaction with the revoked to_self output.
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
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check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output);
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node_txn.clear();
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}
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check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
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@ -2736,28 +2734,26 @@ fn claim_htlc_outputs() {
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assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
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let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // Two penalty transactions:
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assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // Claims the unpinnable, revoked output.
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assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2); // Claims both pinnable, revoked HTLC outputs separately.
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check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
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check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output);
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assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output);
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty txn
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// The ChannelMonitor should claim the accepted HTLC output separately from the offered
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// HTLC and to_self outputs.
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let accepted_claim = node_txn.iter().filter(|tx| tx.input.len() == 1).next().unwrap();
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let offered_to_self_claim = node_txn.iter().filter(|tx| tx.input.len() == 2).next().unwrap();
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check_spends!(accepted_claim, revoked_local_txn[0]);
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check_spends!(offered_to_self_claim, revoked_local_txn[0]);
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assert_eq!(accepted_claim.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
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let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
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witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
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witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
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witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
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assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
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witness_lens.insert(offered_to_self_claim.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
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witness_lens.insert(offered_to_self_claim.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
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assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 2);
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assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
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assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
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assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
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assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
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// Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
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// Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
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// ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], accepted_claim);
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connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
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expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
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}
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@ -4920,8 +4916,7 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
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check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
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fn do_test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx(split_tx: bool) {
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let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
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let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
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let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
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@ -4937,20 +4932,28 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
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claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
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if split_tx {
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connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE + 1);
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}
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
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check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
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check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
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check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
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// The unpinnable, revoked to_self output and the pinnable, revoked HTLC output will be claimed
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// in separate transactions.
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// If the HTLC expires in more than COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE blocks, we'll
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// claim both the revoked and HTLC outputs in one transaction, otherwise we'll split them as we
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// consider the HTLC output as pinnable and want to claim pinnable and unpinnable outputs
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// separately.
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let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
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assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if split_tx { 2 } else { 1 });
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for tx in node_txn.iter() {
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assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), 1);
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assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), if split_tx { 1 } else { 2 });
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check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
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}
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
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if split_tx {
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assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
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}
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
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connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
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@ -4960,6 +4963,12 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
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check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
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do_test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx(true);
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do_test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx(false);
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
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let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
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@ -4992,6 +5001,10 @@ fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
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check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
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assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
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// In order to connect `revoked_htlc_txn[0]` we must first advance the chain by
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// `TEST_FINAL_CLTV` blocks as otherwise the transaction is consensus-invalid due to its
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// locktime.
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connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
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// B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
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connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
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check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
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use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, OutputSpender, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
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use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ARCHIVAL_DELAY_BLOCKS,LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance, BalanceSource, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
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use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, ARCHIVAL_DELAY_BLOCKS,LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE, Balance, BalanceSource, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep};
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use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use crate::chain::chaininterface::{ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
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use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
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@ -1734,6 +1734,12 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
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assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
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assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
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// First connect blocks until the HTLC expires with
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// `COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE` blocks, making us consider all the HTLCs
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// pinnable claims, which the remainder of the test assumes.
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connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - COUNTERPARTY_CLAIMABLE_WITHIN_BLOCKS_PINNABLE);
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expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
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[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
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// A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
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mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
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check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
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@ -1846,8 +1852,6 @@ fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
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sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
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connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
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expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
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[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
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// As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
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let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
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for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
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