Add test yielding anchor-related events

This commit is contained in:
Wilmer Paulino 2022-08-25 13:39:46 -07:00
parent d9dd21b086
commit 660165ce67
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GPG key ID: 6DF57B9F9514972F

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@ -9,17 +9,29 @@
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::ln::channel;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId};
use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use crate::util::events::BumpTransactionEvent;
use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
#[cfg(anchors)]
use bitcoin::{Amount, Script, TxIn, TxOut, PackedLockTime};
use bitcoin::Transaction;
use crate::prelude::*;
@ -1666,3 +1678,141 @@ fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
}
#[cfg(anchors)]
#[test]
fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
// Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
// it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
// force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
// allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
// broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
// emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
let secp = Secp256k1::new();
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
).2;
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
);
let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { commitment_tx, anchor_descriptor, .. }) => {
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 6);
let mut anchor_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
input: vec![
TxIn { previous_output: anchor_descriptor.outpoint, ..Default::default() },
TxIn { ..Default::default() },
],
output: vec![TxOut {
value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
}],
};
let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
anchor_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &anchor_descriptor.channel_keys_id,
);
let funding_sig = signer.sign_holder_anchor_input(&mut anchor_tx, 0, &secp).unwrap();
anchor_tx.input[0].witness = chan_utils::build_anchor_input_witness(
&signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey, &funding_sig
);
(commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
// Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
// best block is being updated prior to the confirmed transactions.
match *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow() {
ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
},
_ => assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2),
};
let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
for event in holder_events {
match event {
Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { htlc_descriptors, .. }) => {
assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 1);
let htlc_descriptor = &htlc_descriptors[0];
let signer = nodes[0].keys_manager.derive_channel_keys(
htlc_descriptor.channel_value_satoshis, &htlc_descriptor.channel_keys_id
);
let per_commitment_point = signer.get_per_commitment_point(htlc_descriptor.per_commitment_number, &secp);
let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: if htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered {
PackedLockTime(htlc_descriptor.htlc.cltv_expiry)
} else {
PackedLockTime::ZERO
},
input: vec![
htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input(), // HTLC input
TxIn { ..Default::default() } // Fee input
],
output: vec![
htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&per_commitment_point, &secp), // HTLC output
TxOut { // Fee input change
value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
script_pubkey: Script::new_op_return(&[]),
}
]
};
let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, 0, htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&per_commitment_point, &secp);
htlc_tx.input[0].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
for event in holder_events {
match event {
Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
// Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
}