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Merge pull request #152 from TheBlueMatt/2018-09-chan-cleanups
Channel cleanups
This commit is contained in:
commit
60e0ab127c
2 changed files with 36 additions and 45 deletions
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@ -138,18 +138,16 @@ enum HTLCState {
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AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke,
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/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
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/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
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/// we'll promote to LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment if we fulfilled, otherwise we'll drop at
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/// that point.
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/// we'll drop it.
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/// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
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/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
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/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
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/// anyway).
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/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
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/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
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/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
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/// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
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/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
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LocalRemoved,
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/// Removed by us, sent a new commitment_signed and got a revoke_and_ack. Just waiting on an
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/// updated local commitment transaction. Implies local_removed_fulfilled.
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/// Implies HTLCOutput::outbound: false
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LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment,
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}
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struct HTLCOutput { //TODO: Refactor into Outbound/InboundHTLCOutput (will save memory and fewer panics)
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@ -338,18 +336,17 @@ const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence:
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pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
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macro_rules! secp_call {
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( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
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( $res: expr, $err: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
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match $res {
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Ok(key) => key,
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//TODO: make the error a parameter
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Err(_) => return Err(HandleError{err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{ msg: None })})
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Err(_) => return Err(HandleError {err: $err, action: Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {channel_id: $chan_id, data: $err.to_string()}})})
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}
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};
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}
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macro_rules! secp_derived_key {
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( $res: expr ) => {
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secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters")
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( $res: expr, $chan_id: expr ) => {
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secp_call!($res, "Derived invalid key, peer is maliciously selecting parameters", $chan_id)
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}
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}
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impl Channel {
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@ -707,7 +704,6 @@ impl Channel {
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HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => generated_by_local,
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HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => false,
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HTLCState::LocalRemoved => !generated_by_local,
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HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => false,
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};
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if include {
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@ -750,10 +746,6 @@ impl Channel {
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value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
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}
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},
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HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => {
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assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
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value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
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},
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_ => {},
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}
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}
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@ -883,7 +875,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key);
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let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
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Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap())))
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Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &self.their_revocation_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap()), self.channel_id()))
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}
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#[inline]
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@ -896,7 +888,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.revocation_base_key);
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let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key);
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Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint)))
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Ok(secp_derived_key!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &self.their_delayed_payment_basepoint.unwrap(), &self.their_htlc_basepoint.unwrap(), &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), self.channel_id()))
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}
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/// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
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@ -960,7 +952,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
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let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
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let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
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let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&tx).sighash_all(&tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
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let is_local_tx = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &our_htlc_key) == keys.a_htlc_key;
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Ok((htlc_redeemscript, self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key), is_local_tx))
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@ -1019,7 +1011,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
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for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
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if !htlc.outbound && htlc.payment_hash == payment_hash_calc &&
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htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemoved && htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
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htlc.state != HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
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if let Some(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(_)) = htlc.pending_forward_state {
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} else {
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if pending_idx != std::usize::MAX {
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@ -1144,7 +1136,7 @@ impl Channel {
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// we'll fail this one as soon as remote commits to it.
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continue;
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}
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} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved || htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
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} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given payment preimage", action: None});
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} else {
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panic!("Have an inbound HTLC when not awaiting remote revoke that had a garbage state");
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@ -1268,7 +1260,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
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// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer", self.channel_id());
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// We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
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Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, self.secp_ctx.sign(&remote_sighash, &self.local_keys.funding_key)))
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@ -1331,7 +1323,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
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// They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer", self.channel_id());
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self.sign_commitment_transaction(&mut local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature);
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self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx.clone(), local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
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@ -1380,7 +1372,6 @@ impl Channel {
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HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
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HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
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HTLCState::LocalRemoved => {},
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HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment => { if for_remote_update_check { continue; } },
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}
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if !htlc.outbound {
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inbound_htlc_count += 1;
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@ -1515,7 +1506,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let mut local_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false);
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let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
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let local_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
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if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1.len() {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote", action: None});
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@ -1530,7 +1521,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let mut htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, htlc, true, &local_keys);
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let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
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let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer");
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx siganture from peer", self.channel_id());
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let htlc_sig = if htlc.offered {
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let htlc_sig = self.sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &None, htlc, &local_keys)?;
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new_local_commitment_txn.push(htlc_tx);
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@ -1557,16 +1548,6 @@ impl Channel {
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need_our_commitment = true;
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}
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}
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// Finally delete all the LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment HTLCs
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// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
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let mut claimed_value_msat = 0;
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self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
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if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment {
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claimed_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
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false
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} else { true }
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});
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self.value_to_self_msat += claimed_value_msat;
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self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
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self.last_local_commitment_txn = new_local_commitment_txn;
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@ -1666,7 +1647,7 @@ impl Channel {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state", action: None});
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}
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if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
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if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
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if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_call!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret", self.channel_id())) != their_prev_commitment_point {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey", action: None});
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}
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}
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@ -1690,7 +1671,10 @@ impl Channel {
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// We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
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self.pending_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
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if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
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if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled { true } else { false }
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if htlc.local_removed_fulfilled {
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value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
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}
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false
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} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {
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if let Some(reason) = htlc.fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
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revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.payment_hash, reason));
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@ -1725,9 +1709,6 @@ impl Channel {
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} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {
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htlc.state = HTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke;
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require_commitment = true;
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} else if htlc.state == HTLCState::LocalRemoved {
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assert!(htlc.local_removed_fulfilled);
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htlc.state = HTLCState::LocalRemovedAwaitingCommitment;
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}
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}
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self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
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@ -1893,7 +1874,7 @@ impl Channel {
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// limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
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closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
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sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
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secp_call!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey.unwrap()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer", self.channel_id());
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},
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};
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@ -2335,6 +2316,7 @@ impl Channel {
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/// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
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/// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
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/// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
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/// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
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pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: [u8; 32], cltv_expiry: u32, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, HandleError> {
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if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down", action: None});
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@ -2402,6 +2384,8 @@ impl Channel {
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}
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/// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
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/// Always returns a Channel-failing HandleError::action if an immediately-preceding (read: the
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/// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
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pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), HandleError> {
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if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established", action: None});
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@ -2448,7 +2432,7 @@ impl Channel {
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let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_txid, htlc, false, &remote_keys);
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let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys);
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let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
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let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key));
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let our_htlc_key = secp_derived_key!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &remote_keys.per_commitment_point, &self.local_keys.htlc_base_key), self.channel_id());
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htlc_sigs.push(self.secp_ctx.sign(&htlc_sighash, &our_htlc_key));
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}
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@ -447,6 +447,8 @@ impl ChannelManager {
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//TODO: We need to handle monitoring of pending offered HTLCs which just hit the chain and
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//may be claimed, resulting in us claiming the inbound HTLCs (and back-failing after
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//timeouts are hit and our claims confirm).
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//TODO: In any case, we need to make sure we remove any pending htlc tracking (via
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//fail_backwards or claim_funds) eventually for all HTLCs that were in the channel
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}
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/// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
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@ -1147,7 +1149,12 @@ impl ChannelManager {
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if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
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let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match forward_chan.send_commitment() {
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Ok(res) => res,
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Err(_e) => {
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Err(e) => {
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if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer{msg: Some(ref _err_msg)}) = &e.action {
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} else if let &Some(msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{msg: ref _err_msg}) = &e.action {
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} else {
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panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
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}
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//TODO: Handle...this is bad!
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continue;
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},
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