diff --git a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs index 47f5605ed..257d794ea 100644 --- a/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs +++ b/lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt}; /// much smaller than a full [`ChannelMonitor`]. However, for large single commitment transaction /// updates (e.g. ones during which there are hundreds of HTLCs pending on the commitment /// transaction), a single update may reach upwards of 1 MiB in serialized size. -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] #[must_use] pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate { pub(crate) updates: Vec, @@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OnchainEvent, ); -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep { LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx: HolderCommitmentTransaction, diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs index 18048d8ef..968de7b43 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ pub fn derive_public_revocation_key(secp_ctx: &Secp2 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the /// pre-calculated keys. -#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone)] +#[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Clone, Debug)] pub struct TxCreationKeys { /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys. pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey, @@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> { /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction. /// /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction { inner: CommitmentTransaction, /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction @@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ impl HolderCommitmentTransaction { } /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction { /// The commitment transaction pub transaction: Transaction, @@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> { /// /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant /// secret key. -#[derive(Clone)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct CommitmentTransaction { commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs index cd125c3fd..33f4bbc8c 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/chanmon_update_fail_tests.rs @@ -3038,8 +3038,8 @@ fn test_blocked_chan_preimage_release() { let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2; - create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2).2; + create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); + let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2).2; send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 5_000_000); @@ -3068,11 +3068,20 @@ fn test_blocked_chan_preimage_release() { let as_htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); // We generate only a preimage monitor update + assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash_2)); assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - // Finish the CS dance between nodes[0] and nodes[1]. - do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &as_htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false, false); + // Finish the CS dance between nodes[0] and nodes[1]. Note that until the event handling, the + // update_fulfill_htlc + CS is held, even though the preimage is already on disk for the + // channel. + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + let (a, raa) = do_main_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], false); + assert!(a.is_none()); + + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa); check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 3); @@ -3080,8 +3089,8 @@ fn test_blocked_chan_preimage_release() { if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); } if let Event::PaymentForwarded { .. } = events[1] {} else { panic!(); } - // The event processing should release the last RAA update. - check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + // The event processing should release the last RAA updates on both channels. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2); // When we fetch the next update the message getter will generate the next update for nodes[2], // generating a further monitor update. @@ -3092,3 +3101,432 @@ fn test_blocked_chan_preimage_release() { do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &bs_htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false, false); expect_payment_sent(&nodes[2], payment_preimage_2, None, true, true); } + +fn do_test_inverted_mon_completion_order(with_latest_manager: bool, complete_bc_commitment_dance: bool) { + // When we forward a payment and receive `update_fulfill_htlc`+`commitment_signed` messages + // from the downstream channel, we immediately claim the HTLC on the upstream channel, before + // even doing a `commitment_signed` dance on the downstream channel. This implies that our + // `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s are generated in the right order - first we ensure we'll get our + // money, then we write the update that resolves the downstream node claiming their money. This + // is safe as long as `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s complete in the order in which they are + // generated, but of course this may not be the case. For asynchronous update writes, we have + // to ensure monitor updates can block each other, preventing the inversion all together. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + + let persister; + let new_chain_monitor; + let nodes_1_deserialized; + + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2; + let chan_id_bc = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2).2; + + // Route a payment from A, through B, to C, then claim it on C. Once we pass B the + // `update_fulfill_htlc` we have a monitor update for both of B's channels. We complete the one + // on the B<->C channel but leave the A<->B monitor update pending, then reload B. + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 100_000); + + let mon_ab = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_ab).encode(); + let mut manager_b = Vec::new(); + if !with_latest_manager { + manager_b = nodes[1].node.encode(); + } + + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 100_000); + + chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + + // B generates a new monitor update for the A <-> B channel, but doesn't send the new messages + // for it since the monitor update is marked in-progress. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + // Now step the Commitment Signed Dance between B and C forward a bit (or fully), ensuring we + // won't get the preimage when the nodes reconnect and we have to get it from the + // ChannelMonitor. + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + if complete_bc_commitment_dance { + let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + let cs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + // At this point node B still hasn't persisted the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with the + // preimage in the A <-> B channel, which will prevent it from persisting the + // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` for the B<->C channel here to avoid "losing" the preimage. + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_raa); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + } + + // Now reload node B + if with_latest_manager { + manager_b = nodes[1].node.encode(); + } + + let mon_bc = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_bc).encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[1], &manager_b, &[&mon_ab, &mon_bc], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + if with_latest_manager { + // If we used the latest ChannelManager to reload from, we should have both channels still + // live. The B <-> C channel's final RAA ChannelMonitorUpdate must still be blocked as + // before - the ChannelMonitorUpdate for the A <-> B channel hasn't completed. + // When we call `timer_tick_occurred` we will get that monitor update back, which we'll + // complete after reconnecting to our peers. + persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + // Now reconnect B to both A and C. If the B <-> C commitment signed dance wasn't run to + // the end go ahead and do that, though the + // `pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor` in `reconnect_args` indicates that we + // expect to *not* receive the final RAA ChannelMonitorUpdate. + if complete_bc_commitment_dance { + reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])); + } else { + let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]); + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true; + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor.1 = true; + reconnect_args.pending_raa = (false, true); + reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); + } + + reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1])); + + // (Finally) complete the A <-> B ChannelMonitorUpdate, ensuring the preimage is durably on + // disk in the proper ChannelMonitor, unblocking the B <-> C ChannelMonitor updating + // process. + let (outpoint, _, ab_update_id) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id_ab).unwrap().clone(); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, ab_update_id).unwrap(); + + // When we fetch B's HTLC update messages next (now that the ChannelMonitorUpdate has + // completed), it will also release the final RAA ChannelMonitorUpdate on the B <-> C + // channel. + } else { + // If the ChannelManager used in the reload was stale, check that the B <-> C channel was + // closed. + // + // Note that this will also process the ChannelMonitorUpdates which were queued up when we + // reloaded the ChannelManager. This will re-emit the A<->B preimage as well as the B<->C + // force-closure ChannelMonitorUpdate. Once the A<->B preimage update completes, the claim + // commitment update will be allowed to go out. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, false, &[nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2); + + nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + + // Don't bother to reconnect B to C - that channel has been closed. We don't need to + // exchange any messages here even though there's a pending commitment update because the + // ChannelMonitorUpdate hasn't yet completed. + reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1])); + + let (outpoint, _, ab_update_id) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id_ab).unwrap().clone(); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, ab_update_id).unwrap(); + + // The ChannelMonitorUpdate which was completed prior to the reconnect only contained the + // preimage (as it was a replay of the original ChannelMonitorUpdate from before we + // restarted). When we go to fetch the commitment transaction updates we'll poll the + // ChannelMonitorUpdate completion, then generate (and complete) a new ChannelMonitorUpdate + // with the actual commitment transaction, which will allow us to fulfill the HTLC with + // node A. + } + + let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + + nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &bs_updates.commitment_signed, false, false); + + expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], &nodes[0], &nodes[2], Some(1_000), false, !with_latest_manager); + + // Finally, check that the payment was, ultimately, seen as sent by node A. + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true); +} + +#[test] +fn test_inverted_mon_completion_order() { + do_test_inverted_mon_completion_order(true, true); + do_test_inverted_mon_completion_order(true, false); + do_test_inverted_mon_completion_order(false, true); + do_test_inverted_mon_completion_order(false, false); +} + +fn do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(close_chans_before_reload: bool, close_only_a: bool, hold_post_reload_mon_update: bool) { + // Test that we can apply a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` with a payment preimage even if the channel + // is force-closed between when we generate the update on reload and when we go to handle the + // update or prior to generating the update at all. + + if !close_chans_before_reload && close_only_a { + // If we're not closing, it makes no sense to "only close A" + panic!(); + } + + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + + let persister; + let new_chain_monitor; + let nodes_1_deserialized; + + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2; + let chan_id_bc = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2).2; + + // Route a payment from A, through B, to C, then claim it on C. Once we pass B the + // `update_fulfill_htlc` we have a monitor update for both of B's channels. We complete the one + // on the B<->C channel but leave the A<->B monitor update pending, then reload B. + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000); + + let mon_ab = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_ab).encode(); + + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 1_000_000); + + chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + + // B generates a new monitor update for the A <-> B channel, but doesn't send the new messages + // for it since the monitor update is marked in-progress. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + // Now step the Commitment Signed Dance between B and C forward a bit, ensuring we won't get + // the preimage when the nodes reconnect, at which point we have to ensure we get it from the + // ChannelMonitor. + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + let _ = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + + let mon_bc = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_bc).encode(); + + if close_chans_before_reload { + if !close_only_a { + chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id_bc, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + } + + chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id_ab, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + } + + // Now reload node B + let manager_b = nodes[1].node.encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[1], &manager_b, &[&mon_ab, &mon_bc], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized); + + nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + + if close_chans_before_reload { + // If the channels were already closed, B will rebroadcast its closing transactions here. + let bs_close_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + if close_only_a { + assert_eq!(bs_close_txn.len(), 2); + } else { + assert_eq!(bs_close_txn.len(), 3); + } + } + + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + let as_closing_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(as_closing_tx.len(), 1); + + // In order to give A's closing transaction to B without processing background events first, + // use the _without_consistency_checks utility method. This is similar to connecting blocks + // during startup prior to the node being full initialized. + mine_transaction_without_consistency_checks(&nodes[1], &as_closing_tx[0]); + + // After a timer tick a payment preimage ChannelMonitorUpdate is applied to the A<->B + // ChannelMonitor (possible twice), even though the channel has since been closed. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + let mons_added = if close_chans_before_reload { if !close_only_a { 4 } else { 3 } } else { 2 }; + if hold_post_reload_mon_update { + for _ in 0..mons_added { + persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + } + } + nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred(); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], mons_added); + + // Finally, check that B created a payment preimage transaction and close out the payment. + let bs_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + assert_eq!(bs_txn.len(), if close_chans_before_reload && !close_only_a { 2 } else { 1 }); + let bs_preimage_tx = &bs_txn[0]; + check_spends!(bs_preimage_tx, as_closing_tx[0]); + + if !close_chans_before_reload { + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000); + } else { + // While we forwarded the payment a while ago, we don't want to process events too early or + // we'll run background tasks we wanted to test individually. + expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], None, true, !close_only_a); + } + + mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&as_closing_tx[0], bs_preimage_tx]); + check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true); + expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, true); + + if !close_chans_before_reload || close_only_a { + // Make sure the B<->C channel is still alive and well by sending a payment over it. + let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]); + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true; + if !close_chans_before_reload { + // TODO: If the A<->B channel was closed before we reloaded, the `ChannelManager` + // will consider the forwarded payment complete and allow the B<->C + // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` to complete, wiping the payment preimage. This should not + // be allowed, and needs fixing. + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor.1 = true; + } + reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true; + + reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); + let (outpoint, ab_update_id, _) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id_ab).unwrap().clone(); + nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.force_channel_monitor_updated(outpoint, ab_update_id); + expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), true, false); + if !close_chans_before_reload { + // Once we call `process_pending_events` the final `ChannelMonitor` for the B<->C + // channel will fly, removing the payment preimage from it. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + } + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], 100_000); + } +} + +#[test] +fn test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel() { + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(true, true, true); + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(true, true, false); + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(true, false, true); + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(true, false, false); + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(false, false, true); + do_test_durable_preimages_on_closed_channel(false, false, false); +} + +fn do_test_reload_mon_update_completion_actions(close_during_reload: bool) { + // Test that if a `ChannelMonitorUpdate` completes but a `ChannelManager` isn't serialized + // before restart we run the monitor update completion action on startup. + let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3); + let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs); + + let persister; + let new_chain_monitor; + let nodes_1_deserialized; + + let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]); + let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); + + let chan_id_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2; + let chan_id_bc = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2).2; + + // Route a payment from A, through B, to C, then claim it on C. Once we pass B the + // `update_fulfill_htlc`+`commitment_signed` we have a monitor update for both of B's channels. + // We complete the commitment signed dance on the B<->C channel but leave the A<->B monitor + // update pending, then reload B. At that point, the final monitor update on the B<->C channel + // is still pending because it can't fly until the preimage is persisted on the A<->B monitor. + let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000); + + nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 1_000_000); + + chanmon_cfgs[1].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress); + let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); + + // B generates a new monitor update for the A <-> B channel, but doesn't send the new messages + // for it since the monitor update is marked in-progress. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); + + // Now step the Commitment Signed Dance between B and C and check that after the final RAA B + // doesn't let the preimage-removing monitor update fly. + nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.commitment_signed); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1); + let (bs_raa, bs_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()); + + nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1); + + let cs_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_final_raa); + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 0); + + // Finally, reload node B and check that after we call `process_pending_events` once we realize + // we've completed the A<->B preimage-including monitor update and so can release the B<->C + // preimage-removing monitor update. + let mon_ab = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_ab).encode(); + let mon_bc = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_bc).encode(); + let manager_b = nodes[1].node.encode(); + reload_node!(nodes[1], &manager_b, &[&mon_ab, &mon_bc], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized); + + if close_during_reload { + // Test that we still free the B<->C channel if the A<->B channel closed while we reloaded + // (as learned about during the on-reload block connection). + nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); + check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1); + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true); + check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000); + let as_closing_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0); + mine_transaction_without_consistency_checks(&nodes[1], &as_closing_tx[0]); + } + + let bc_update_id = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id_bc).unwrap().2; + let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + assert_eq!(events.len(), if close_during_reload { 2 } else { 1 }); + expect_payment_forwarded(events.pop().unwrap(), &nodes[1], &nodes[0], &nodes[2], Some(1000), close_during_reload, false); + if close_during_reload { + match events[0] { + Event::ChannelClosed { .. } => {}, + _ => panic!(), + } + check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); + } + + // Once we run event processing the monitor should free, check that it was indeed the B<->C + // channel which was updated. + check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], if close_during_reload { 2 } else { 1 }); + let post_ev_bc_update_id = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_id_bc).unwrap().2; + assert!(bc_update_id != post_ev_bc_update_id); + + // Finally, check that there's nothing left to do on B<->C reconnect and the channel operates + // fine. + nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); + reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])); + send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], 100_000); +} + +#[test] +fn test_reload_mon_update_completion_actions() { + do_test_reload_mon_update_completion_actions(true); + do_test_reload_mon_update_completion_actions(false); +} diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs index ed00282fb..e2d7c90f7 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo { } /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC -#[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData { // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel. short_channel_id: u64, @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ impl Readable for InterceptId { } } -#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] +#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`]. pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId { PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 }, @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId, /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash -#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] +#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub(crate) enum HTLCSource { PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData), OutboundRoute { @@ -656,7 +656,6 @@ pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction { } impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction { - #[allow(unused)] fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self { Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim { channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(), @@ -5175,11 +5174,17 @@ where self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events); } - fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) { + fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, + forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option, from_onchain: bool, + next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint + ) { match source { HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => { debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire), "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet"); + if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { + debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey); + } let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate { channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey, @@ -5190,6 +5195,7 @@ where }, HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => { let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint; + let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data); let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage, |htlc_claim_value_msat| { if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat { @@ -5205,7 +5211,17 @@ where next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()), outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat, }, - downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None, + downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: + if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id { + Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker)) + } else { + // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a + // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we + // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream + // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already + // closed. + None + }, }) } else { None } }); @@ -6044,6 +6060,17 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => { if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() { let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry); + if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 { + peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id) + .or_insert_with(Vec::new) + .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop)); + } + // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates` + // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update. + // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a + // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the + // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we + // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially. funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded"); res } else { @@ -6054,7 +6081,7 @@ where hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)) } }; - self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo); Ok(()) } @@ -6256,6 +6283,23 @@ where }) } + #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))] + pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self, + counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId + ) -> bool { + let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); + if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) { + let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap(); + let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck; + + if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) { + return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, + chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id); + } + } + false + } + fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> { let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = { let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap(); @@ -6477,8 +6521,8 @@ where match monitor_event { MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => { if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage { - log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage); - self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint); + log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage); + self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint); } else { log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash); let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() }; @@ -9298,6 +9342,7 @@ where // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a // channel_id -> peer map entry). counterparty_opt.is_none(), + counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()), monitor.get_funding_txo().0)) } else { None } } else { @@ -9576,12 +9621,12 @@ where channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver); } - for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay { + for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay { // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim. channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), - downstream_closed, downstream_funding); + downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding); } //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs index fbfa7e5b6..f6684485d 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_test_utils.rs @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; use crate::events::{ClaimedHTLC, ClosureReason, Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, PaymentFailureReason}; use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEventHandler, Wallet, WalletSource}; use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret}; -use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, AChannelManager, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentId, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA}; +use crate::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, PaymentId, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA}; use crate::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate}; use crate::routing::router::{self, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters}; use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures; @@ -73,6 +73,20 @@ pub fn mine_transactions<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, txn: &[&Tra let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1; confirm_transactions_at(node, txn, height); } +/// Mine a single block containing the given transaction without extra consistency checks which may +/// impact ChannelManager state. +pub fn mine_transaction_without_consistency_checks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, tx: &Transaction) { + let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1; + let mut block = Block { + header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: node.best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: height, bits: 42, nonce: 42 }, + txdata: Vec::new(), + }; + for _ in 0..*node.network_chan_count.borrow() { // Make sure we don't end up with channels at the same short id by offsetting by chan_count + block.txdata.push(Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() }); + } + block.txdata.push((*tx).clone()); + do_connect_block_without_consistency_checks(node, block, false); +} /// Mine the given transaction at the given height, mining blocks as required to build to that /// height /// @@ -211,16 +225,16 @@ pub fn connect_blocks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, depth: u32) -> assert!(depth >= 1); for i in 1..depth { let prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash(); - do_connect_block(node, block, skip_intermediaries); + do_connect_block_with_consistency_checks(node, block, skip_intermediaries); block = create_dummy_block(prev_blockhash, height + i, Vec::new()); } let hash = block.header.block_hash(); - do_connect_block(node, block, false); + do_connect_block_with_consistency_checks(node, block, false); hash } pub fn connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: &Block) { - do_connect_block(node, block.clone(), false); + do_connect_block_with_consistency_checks(node, block.clone(), false); } fn call_claimable_balances<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>) { @@ -230,8 +244,14 @@ fn call_claimable_balances<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>) { } } -fn do_connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: Block, skip_intermediaries: bool) { +fn do_connect_block_with_consistency_checks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: Block, skip_intermediaries: bool) { call_claimable_balances(node); + do_connect_block_without_consistency_checks(node, block, skip_intermediaries); + call_claimable_balances(node); + node.node.test_process_background_events(); +} + +fn do_connect_block_without_consistency_checks<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: Block, skip_intermediaries: bool) { let height = node.best_block_info().1 + 1; #[cfg(feature = "std")] { eprintln!("Connecting block using Block Connection Style: {:?}", *node.connect_style.borrow()); @@ -286,8 +306,6 @@ fn do_connect_block<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, block: Block, sk } } } - call_claimable_balances(node); - node.node.test_process_background_events(); for tx in &block.txdata { for input in &tx.input { @@ -1772,20 +1790,7 @@ pub fn do_commitment_signed_dance(node_a: &Node<'_, '_, '_>, node_b: &Node<'_, ' check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); // If this commitment signed dance was due to a claim, don't check for an RAA monitor update. - let got_claim = node_a.node.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(ev, action)| { - let matching_action = if let Some(channelmanager::EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate - { channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id }) = action - { - if channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() == commitment_signed.channel_id { - assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()); - true - } else { false } - } else { false }; - if matching_action { - if let Event::PaymentSent { .. } = ev {} else { panic!(); } - } - matching_action - }); + let got_claim = node_a.node.test_raa_monitor_updates_held(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed.channel_id); if fail_backwards { assert!(!got_claim); } commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, (), fail_backwards, true, false, got_claim); @@ -2000,29 +2005,38 @@ macro_rules! expect_payment_path_successful { } } +pub fn expect_payment_forwarded>( + event: Event, node: &H, prev_node: &H, next_node: &H, expected_fee: Option, + upstream_force_closed: bool, downstream_force_closed: bool +) { + match event { + Event::PaymentForwarded { + fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, + outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: _ + } => { + assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, expected_fee); + if !upstream_force_closed { + // Is the event prev_channel_id in one of the channels between the two nodes? + assert!(node.node().list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == prev_node.node().get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == prev_channel_id.unwrap())); + } + // We check for force closures since a force closed channel is removed from the + // node's channel list + if !downstream_force_closed { + assert!(node.node().list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == next_node.node().get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == next_channel_id.unwrap())); + } + assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, downstream_force_closed); + }, + _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), + } +} + macro_rules! expect_payment_forwarded { ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $next_node: expr, $expected_fee: expr, $upstream_force_closed: expr, $downstream_force_closed: expr) => { - let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); + let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events(); assert_eq!(events.len(), 1); - match events[0] { - Event::PaymentForwarded { - fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, - outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: _ - } => { - assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, $expected_fee); - if fee_earned_msat.is_some() { - // Is the event prev_channel_id in one of the channels between the two nodes? - assert!($node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == prev_channel_id.unwrap())); - } - // We check for force closures since a force closed channel is removed from the - // node's channel list - if !$downstream_force_closed { - assert!($node.node.list_channels().iter().any(|x| x.counterparty.node_id == $next_node.node.get_our_node_id() && x.channel_id == next_channel_id.unwrap())); - } - assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, $downstream_force_closed); - }, - _ => panic!("Unexpected event"), - } + $crate::ln::functional_test_utils::expect_payment_forwarded( + events.pop().unwrap(), &$node, &$prev_node, &$next_node, $expected_fee, + $upstream_force_closed, $downstream_force_closed); } } @@ -2399,7 +2413,7 @@ pub fn pass_claimed_payment_along_route<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, ' } }; if $idx == 1 { fee += expected_extra_fees[i]; } - expect_payment_forwarded!($node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false); + expect_payment_forwarded!(*$node, $next_node, $prev_node, Some(fee as u64), false, false); expected_total_fee_msat += fee as u64; check_added_monitors!($node, 1); let new_next_msgs = if $new_msgs { @@ -3030,7 +3044,11 @@ pub struct ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> { pub node_a: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, pub node_b: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, pub send_channel_ready: (bool, bool), - pub pending_htlc_adds: (i64, i64), + pub pending_responding_commitment_signed: (bool, bool), + /// Indicates that the pending responding commitment signed will be a dup for the recipient, + /// and no monitor update is expected + pub pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor: (bool, bool), + pub pending_htlc_adds: (usize, usize), pub pending_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), pub pending_htlc_fails: (usize, usize), pub pending_cell_htlc_claims: (usize, usize), @@ -3044,6 +3062,8 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> { node_a, node_b, send_channel_ready: (false, false), + pending_responding_commitment_signed: (false, false), + pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor: (false, false), pending_htlc_adds: (0, 0), pending_htlc_claims: (0, 0), pending_htlc_fails: (0, 0), @@ -3059,7 +3079,8 @@ impl<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> { pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { let ReconnectArgs { node_a, node_b, send_channel_ready, pending_htlc_adds, pending_htlc_claims, pending_htlc_fails, - pending_cell_htlc_claims, pending_cell_htlc_fails, pending_raa + pending_cell_htlc_claims, pending_cell_htlc_fails, pending_raa, + pending_responding_commitment_signed, pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor, } = args; node_a.node.peer_connected(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: node_b.node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None @@ -3144,13 +3165,12 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { } else { assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); } - if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 { + if pending_htlc_adds.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.0 != 0 || + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 != 0 || + pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 + { let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); - if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed - assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0 as usize); - } else { - assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); - } + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.0 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.0); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.0 + pending_cell_htlc_fails.0); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -3164,7 +3184,7 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { node_a.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail); } - if pending_htlc_adds.0 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + if !pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 { commitment_signed_dance!(node_a, node_b, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); } else { node_a.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed); @@ -3173,7 +3193,7 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes node_b.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); assert!(node_b.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - check_added_monitors!(node_b, 1); + check_added_monitors!(node_b, if pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor.0 { 0 } else { 1 }); } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); @@ -3203,11 +3223,12 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { } else { assert!(chan_msgs.1.is_none()); } - if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 { + if pending_htlc_adds.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_htlc_fails.1 != 0 || + pending_cell_htlc_claims.1 != 0 || pending_cell_htlc_fails.1 != 0 || + pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 + { let commitment_update = chan_msgs.2.unwrap(); - if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed - assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1 as usize); - } + assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_adds.1); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_claims.1 + pending_cell_htlc_claims.1); assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), pending_htlc_fails.1 + pending_cell_htlc_fails.1); assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); @@ -3221,7 +3242,7 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { node_b.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail); } - if pending_htlc_adds.1 != -1 { // We use -1 to denote a response commitment_signed + if !pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 { commitment_signed_dance!(node_b, node_a, commitment_update.commitment_signed, false); } else { node_b.node.handle_commitment_signed(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed); @@ -3230,7 +3251,7 @@ pub fn reconnect_nodes<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(args: ReconnectArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>) { // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes node_a.node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); assert!(node_a.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty()); - check_added_monitors!(node_a, 1); + check_added_monitors!(node_a, if pending_responding_commitment_signed_dup_monitor.1 { 0 } else { 1 }); } } else { assert!(chan_msgs.2.is_none()); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs index 0a685f534..c0e334326 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator; use crate::chain::channelmonitor; use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY}; use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint; -use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider}; +use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider}; use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason}; use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash}; use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase}; @@ -3880,13 +3880,13 @@ fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken } else if messages_delivered == 3 { // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); - reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1; + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true; reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true; reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); } else if messages_delivered == 4 { // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); - reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1; + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true; reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); } else if messages_delivered == 5 { // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA @@ -4014,13 +4014,13 @@ fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken } else if messages_delivered == 2 { // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); - reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1; + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true; reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true; reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); } else if messages_delivered == 3 { // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]); - reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1; + reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true; reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args); } else if messages_delivered == 4 { // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA @@ -8777,7 +8777,8 @@ fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1); nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); - expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false); + let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1; + expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false); // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage. if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice { let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs index 440af3c9a..d88730c22 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/payment_tests.rs @@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ fn do_retry_with_no_persist(confirm_before_reload: bool) { nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]); check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1); commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false); - expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], None, false, false); + expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], None, true, false); if confirm_before_reload { let best_block = nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().last().unwrap().clone(); diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs index 846bcaf90..1310d25d4 100644 --- a/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs +++ b/lightning/src/ln/shutdown_tests.rs @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ fn test_lnd_bug_6039() { let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs); let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1); - let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000); + let (payment_preimage, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000); nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap(); let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()); diff --git a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs index 8e2be87d8..09c99815b 100644 --- a/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs +++ b/lightning/src/util/test_utils.rs @@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ use regex; use crate::io; use crate::prelude::*; use core::cell::RefCell; -use core::ops::Deref; use core::time::Duration; use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc}; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering}; @@ -297,6 +296,7 @@ pub(crate) struct WatchtowerPersister { } impl WatchtowerPersister { + #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: Script) -> Self { WatchtowerPersister { persister: TestPersister::new(), @@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ impl WatchtowerPersister { } } + #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) fn justice_tx(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, commitment_txid: &Txid) -> Option { self.watchtower_state.lock().unwrap().get(&funding_txo).unwrap().get(commitment_txid).cloned()