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Use correct to_remote script in counterparty commitments

Browse source 
While our commitment transactions did use the correct `to_remote`
script, the `ChannelMonitor`'s was not as it is tracked separately. This
would lead to users never receiving an `Event::SpendableOutputs` with a
`StaticPaymentOutput` descriptor to claim the funds.

Luckily, any users affected which had channel closures confirmed by a
counterparty commitment just need to replay the closing transaction to
receive the event.
This commit is contained in:
Wilmer Paulino 2023-09-25 16:53:42 -07:00
parent 6016101ac8
commit 33b745f54e
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 634FE5FC544DCA31
3 changed files with 24 additions and 9 deletions
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11
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
View file

@ -22,12 +22,11 @@
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint, TxOut, Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
@ -1141,8 +1140,9 @@ impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
best_block: BestBlock, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
let payment_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&keys.pubkeys().payment_point.serialize());
let counterparty_payment_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_key_hash[..]).into_script();
let counterparty_payment_script = chan_utils::get_counterparty_payment_script(
&channel_parameters.channel_type_features, &keys.pubkeys().payment_point
);
let counterparty_channel_parameters = channel_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
let counterparty_delayed_payment_base_key = counterparty_channel_parameters.pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint;
@ -2263,6 +2263,7 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.to_u8(); 136];
ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();
ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.to_u8();

12
lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs
View file

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use bitcoin::util::address::Payload;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash, WPubkeyHash};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::fee_for_weight;
use crate::chain::package::WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT;
@ -556,6 +556,16 @@ pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u1
res
}
/// Returns the script for the counterparty's output on a holder's commitment transaction based on
/// the channel type.
pub fn get_counterparty_payment_script(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures, payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh()
} else {
Script::new_v0_p2wpkh(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&payment_key.serialize()))
}
}
/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {

10
lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs
View file

@ -2287,8 +2287,8 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 2);
for event in spendable_output_events.iter() {
assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
for event in spendable_output_events {
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
@ -2296,7 +2296,11 @@ fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Script::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_a, &revoked_commitment_b);
} else {
check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
}
} else {
panic!("unexpected event");
}