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Move fail-backwards up for no to-remote output claims

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This fixes HTLC fail-backwards in case we haven't yet sent enough
to have a to_remote output to claim, plus some edge cases where it
could be removed due to a fee update, though hopefully that goes
away with simplified_commitment.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2018-12-21 14:32:44 -05:00
parent 13dc1db100
commit 24577344fa
1 changed files with 24 additions and 24 deletions
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48
src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
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@ -1179,11 +1179,34 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
}
}
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
// TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
// confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
// on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
}
// No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
}
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs, htlc_updated); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
@ -1211,29 +1234,6 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
});
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
// TODO: We really should only fail backwards after our revocation claims have been
// confirmed, but we also need to do more other tracking of in-flight pre-confirm
// on-chain claims, so we can do that at the same time.
if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
if let Some(&(_, ref latest_outpoints)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from current remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
if let Some(&(_, ref prev_outpoint)) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid) {
for &(ref payment_hash, ref source, _) in prev_outpoint.iter() {
log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from previous remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
htlc_updated.push(((*source).clone(), None, payment_hash.clone()));
}
}
}
}
// No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is