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Clarify when height is the *current* vs a *confirmation* height

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This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2021-06-25 20:27:38 +00:00
parent 496eb4526b
commit 1905570358
3 changed files with 10 additions and 9 deletions
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13
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
View file

@ -370,8 +370,8 @@ impl OnchainEventEntry {
conf_threshold
}
fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
height >= self.confirmation_threshold()
fn has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self, best_block: &BestBlock) -> bool {
best_block.height() >= self.confirmation_threshold()
}
}
@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
} else if htlc.0.cltv_expiry > self.best_block.height() + 1 {
// Don't broadcast HTLC-Timeout transactions immediately as they don't meet the
// current locktime requirements on-chain. We will broadcast them in
// `block_confirmed` when `would_broadcast_at_height` returns true.
// `block_confirmed` when `should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn` returns true.
// Note that we add + 1 as transactions are broadcastable when they can be
// confirmed in the next block.
continue;
@ -2035,7 +2035,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
{
debug_assert!(self.best_block.height() >= conf_height);
let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(self.best_block.height(), logger);
let should_broadcast = self.should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn(logger);
if should_broadcast {
let funding_outp = HolderFundingOutput::build(self.funding_redeemscript.clone());
let commitment_package = PackageTemplate::build_package(self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), self.funding_info.0.index as u32, PackageSolvingData::HolderFundingOutput(funding_outp), self.best_block.height(), false, self.best_block.height());
@ -2056,7 +2056,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.drain(..).collect::<Vec<_>>();
let mut onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf = Vec::new();
for entry in onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf {
if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(self.best_block.height()) {
if entry.has_reached_confirmation_threshold(&self.best_block) {
onchain_events_reaching_threshold_conf.push(entry);
} else {
self.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.push(entry);
@ -2213,7 +2213,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
false
}
fn would_broadcast_at_height<L: Deref>(&self, height: u32, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
fn should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> bool where L::Target: Logger {
// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
// * in any unrevoked counterparty commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
// transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
@ -2224,6 +2224,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
let height = self.best_block.height();
macro_rules! scan_commitment {
($htlcs: expr, $holder_tx: expr) => {
for ref htlc in $htlcs {

4
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
View file

@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ enum InboundHTLCState {
/// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
/// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
/// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
/// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
/// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
/// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
/// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
/// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
}

2
lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
View file

@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
// Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
// ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
#[deny(const_err)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;