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Merge pull request #48 from TheBlueMatt/2018-07-monitor-serialize
Implement channelmonitor (de)serialization
This commit is contained in:
commit
155f2ef188
7 changed files with 552 additions and 20 deletions
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@ -51,6 +51,11 @@ Assorted random TODOs:
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* Some kind of logging subsystem/API.
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* Some kind of logging subsystem/API.
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* Migrate all our serialize() -> Vec stuff to serialize(byte_writer) so that we
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can avoid allocating a huge buffer for everything we serialize/deserialize.
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* Migrate the above TODOs to GitHub issues.
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Notes on coding style:
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Notes on coding style:
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* Use tabs. If you want to align lines, use spaces. Any desired alignment
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* Use tabs. If you want to align lines, use spaces. Any desired alignment
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should display fine at any tab-length display setting.
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should display fine at any tab-length display setting.
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@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ path = "fuzz_targets/channel_target.rs"
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name = "full_stack_target"
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name = "full_stack_target"
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path = "fuzz_targets/full_stack_target.rs"
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path = "fuzz_targets/full_stack_target.rs"
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[[bin]]
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name = "channelmonitor_deserialize_target"
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path = "fuzz_targets/channelmonitor_deserialize_target.rs"
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# message fuzz targets
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# message fuzz targets
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[[bin]]
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[[bin]]
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name = "msg_ping_target"
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name = "msg_ping_target"
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63
fuzz/fuzz_targets/channelmonitor_deserialize_target.rs
Normal file
63
fuzz/fuzz_targets/channelmonitor_deserialize_target.rs
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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// This file is auto-generated by gen_target.sh based on msg_target_template.txt
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// To modify it, modify msg_target_template.txt and run gen_target.sh instead.
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extern crate lightning;
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use lightning::ln::channelmonitor;
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use lightning::util::reset_rng_state;
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#[inline]
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pub fn do_test(data: &[u8]) {
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reset_rng_state();
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if let Some(monitor) = channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::deserialize(data) {
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assert!(channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::deserialize(&monitor.serialize_for_disk()[..]).unwrap() == monitor);
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monitor.serialize_for_watchtower();
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}
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
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extern crate afl;
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#[cfg(feature = "afl")]
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fn main() {
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afl::read_stdio_bytes(|data| {
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do_test(&data);
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});
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
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#[macro_use] extern crate honggfuzz;
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#[cfg(feature = "honggfuzz")]
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fn main() {
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loop {
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fuzz!(|data| {
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do_test(data);
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});
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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fn extend_vec_from_hex(hex: &str, out: &mut Vec<u8>) {
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let mut b = 0;
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for (idx, c) in hex.as_bytes().iter().enumerate() {
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b <<= 4;
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match *c {
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b'A'...b'F' => b |= c - b'A' + 10,
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b'a'...b'f' => b |= c - b'a' + 10,
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b'0'...b'9' => b |= c - b'0',
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_ => panic!("Bad hex"),
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}
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if (idx & 1) == 1 {
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out.push(b);
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b = 0;
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}
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn duplicate_crash() {
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let mut a = Vec::new();
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extend_vec_from_hex("00", &mut a);
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super::do_test(&a);
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}
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}
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@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u1
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.into_script()
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.into_script()
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
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pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
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pub offered: bool,
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pub offered: bool,
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pub amount_msat: u64,
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pub amount_msat: u64,
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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
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use bitcoin::network::serialize;
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use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
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use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
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use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
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use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
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use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
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use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use util::sha2::Sha256;
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use util::sha2::Sha256;
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use util::byte_utils;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
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use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
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@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
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/// HTLC-Success transaction.
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/// HTLC-Success transaction.
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const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
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const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
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#[derive(Clone)]
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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enum KeyStorage {
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enum KeyStorage {
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PrivMode {
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PrivMode {
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revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
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revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
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@ -128,8 +130,9 @@ enum KeyStorage {
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}
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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struct LocalSignedTx {
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struct LocalSignedTx {
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/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
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txid: Sha256dHash,
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txid: Sha256dHash,
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tx: Transaction,
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tx: Transaction,
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revocation_key: PublicKey,
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revocation_key: PublicKey,
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@ -140,6 +143,9 @@ struct LocalSignedTx {
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htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
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htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
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}
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}
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const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
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const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
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pub struct ChannelMonitor {
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pub struct ChannelMonitor {
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funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
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funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
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commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
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commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
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@ -155,9 +161,16 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
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old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
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old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
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remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
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/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
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//hash to commitment number mapping use to determine the state of transaction owning it
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/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
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// (revoked/non-revoked) and so lightnen pruning
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/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
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/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
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/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
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/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
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/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
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/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
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/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
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// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
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// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
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@ -188,7 +201,7 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
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old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
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old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
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remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
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remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
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remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
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@ -202,6 +215,40 @@ impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
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}
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
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/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
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/// underlying object
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impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
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fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
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if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
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self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
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self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
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self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
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self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
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self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
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self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
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self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
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self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
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self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
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self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
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self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
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self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
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self.destination_script != other.destination_script
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{
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false
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} else {
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for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
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if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
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return false
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}
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}
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let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
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let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
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*us == *them
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}
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}
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}
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impl ChannelMonitor {
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impl ChannelMonitor {
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pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
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pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
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ChannelMonitor {
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ChannelMonitor {
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@ -221,7 +268,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
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old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
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remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
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@ -264,7 +311,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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/// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
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/// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
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/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
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/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
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/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
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/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
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pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
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pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
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let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
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let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
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for i in 0..pos {
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for i in 0..pos {
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let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
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let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
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@ -334,7 +381,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
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/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
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/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
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/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
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/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
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/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
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pub fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
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pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
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// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
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// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
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// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
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// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
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// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
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// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
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@ -350,7 +397,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
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/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
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/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
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/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
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/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
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/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
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pub fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
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pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
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assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
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assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
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self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
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self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
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self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
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self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
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@ -367,7 +414,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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||||||
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/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
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/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
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/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
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/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
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pub fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
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pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
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self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
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self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
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}
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}
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@ -402,7 +449,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
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}
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}
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/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
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/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
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||||||
pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
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pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
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||||||
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
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assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
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||||||
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
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self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
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||||||
}
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}
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||||||
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@ -411,19 +458,19 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
|
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
|
||||||
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
|
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
|
||||||
/// provides slightly better privacy.
|
/// provides slightly better privacy.
|
||||||
pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
|
pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: OutPoint) {
|
||||||
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
|
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
|
pub(super) fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
|
||||||
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
|
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
|
pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
|
||||||
self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
|
self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
|
pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
|
||||||
self.funding_txo = None;
|
self.funding_txo = None;
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -431,6 +478,385 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
self.funding_txo
|
self.funding_txo
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
|
||||||
|
fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||||
|
let mut res = Vec::new();
|
||||||
|
res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
|
||||||
|
res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
match self.funding_txo {
|
||||||
|
Some(outpoint) => {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
None => {
|
||||||
|
// We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
|
||||||
|
// not much to give them.
|
||||||
|
return res;
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
match self.key_storage {
|
||||||
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
|
||||||
|
res.push(0);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
|
||||||
|
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
|
||||||
|
match second_option {
|
||||||
|
Some(second_pubkey) => {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
None => {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
None => {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(secret);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
|
||||||
|
($htlc_output: expr) => {
|
||||||
|
res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
||||||
|
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if for_local_storage {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
|
||||||
|
($local_tx: expr) => {
|
||||||
|
let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
||||||
|
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
||||||
|
res.push(1);
|
||||||
|
serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
res.push(0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
||||||
|
res.push(1);
|
||||||
|
serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
res.push(0);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
|
||||||
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
res
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
|
||||||
|
pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||||
|
self.serialize(true)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
|
||||||
|
pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||||
|
self.serialize(false)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
/// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
|
||||||
|
pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
|
||||||
|
let mut read_pos = 0;
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! read_bytes {
|
||||||
|
($byte_count: expr) => {
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
|
||||||
|
&data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
|
||||||
|
($key: expr) => {
|
||||||
|
match $key {
|
||||||
|
Ok(res) => res,
|
||||||
|
Err(_) => return None,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
|
||||||
|
let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
|
||||||
|
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
|
||||||
|
// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
|
||||||
|
let funding_txo = Some(OutPoint {
|
||||||
|
txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
|
||||||
|
index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
|
||||||
|
});
|
||||||
|
let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
||||||
|
0 => {
|
||||||
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode {
|
||||||
|
revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
|
||||||
|
htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
_ => return None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let their_cur_revocation_points = {
|
||||||
|
let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
||||||
|
if first_idx == 0 {
|
||||||
|
None
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
|
||||||
|
if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
|
||||||
|
Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
|
||||||
|
} else {
|
||||||
|
Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
|
||||||
|
let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
|
||||||
|
for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
|
||||||
|
secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
*idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
|
||||||
|
() => {
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
||||||
|
0 => false, 1 => true,
|
||||||
|
_ => return None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
|
||||||
|
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
|
||||||
|
payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
|
||||||
|
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
|
||||||
|
let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 * 32 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
|
||||||
|
outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
|
||||||
|
let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
||||||
|
if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
|
||||||
|
let mut txid = [0; 32];
|
||||||
|
txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
||||||
|
if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
macro_rules! read_local_tx {
|
||||||
|
() => {
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(read_bytes!(tx_len)));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
||||||
|
let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
|
||||||
|
htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
|
||||||
|
unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
|
||||||
|
unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
LocalSignedTx {
|
||||||
|
txid: tx.txid(),
|
||||||
|
tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
||||||
|
0 => None,
|
||||||
|
1 => {
|
||||||
|
Some(read_local_tx!())
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
_ => return None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
||||||
|
0 => None,
|
||||||
|
1 => {
|
||||||
|
Some(read_local_tx!())
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
_ => return None,
|
||||||
|
};
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
||||||
|
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
|
||||||
|
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
|
||||||
|
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
|
||||||
|
let mut preimage = [0; 32];
|
||||||
|
preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
||||||
|
sha.reset();
|
||||||
|
sha.input(&preimage);
|
||||||
|
let mut hash = [0; 32];
|
||||||
|
sha.result(&mut hash);
|
||||||
|
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
|
||||||
|
return None;
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
||||||
|
let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Some(ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
|
funding_txo,
|
||||||
|
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
key_storage,
|
||||||
|
delayed_payment_base_key,
|
||||||
|
their_htlc_base_key,
|
||||||
|
their_cur_revocation_points,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
our_to_self_delay,
|
||||||
|
their_to_self_delay,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
old_secrets,
|
||||||
|
remote_claimable_outpoints,
|
||||||
|
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
|
||||||
|
remote_hash_commitment_number,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
|
||||||
|
current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
payment_preimages,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
destination_script,
|
||||||
|
secp_ctx,
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
|
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
|
||||||
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
|
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -591,10 +1017,10 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() {
|
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
|
||||||
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
|
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
|
||||||
// TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
|
// TODO: Register commitment_txid with the ChainWatchInterface!
|
||||||
self.remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
|
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
|
if inputs.is_empty() { return txn_to_broadcast; } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -619,6 +1045,15 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
|
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
|
||||||
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
|
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
|
||||||
|
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
|
||||||
|
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
|
||||||
|
// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
|
||||||
|
// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
|
||||||
|
// already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
|
||||||
|
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
|
||||||
|
// insert it here.
|
||||||
|
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
|
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
|
||||||
let revocation_point_option =
|
let revocation_point_option =
|
||||||
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
|
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
|
||||||
|
@ -723,7 +1158,7 @@ impl ChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
} else {
|
} else {
|
||||||
//TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_htlc_outputs_on_chain map!
|
//TODO: For each input check if its in our remote_commitment_txn_on_chain map!
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
txn_to_broadcast
|
txn_to_broadcast
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
|
||||||
((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
|
((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
#[inline]
|
#[inline]
|
||||||
|
pub fn slice_to_be48(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
|
||||||
|
((v[0] as u64) << 8*5) |
|
||||||
|
((v[1] as u64) << 8*4) |
|
||||||
|
((v[2] as u64) << 8*3) |
|
||||||
|
((v[3] as u64) << 8*2) |
|
||||||
|
((v[4] as u64) << 8*1) |
|
||||||
|
((v[5] as u64) << 8*0)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#[inline]
|
||||||
pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
|
pub fn slice_to_be64(v: &[u8]) -> u64 {
|
||||||
((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
|
((v[0] as u64) << 8*7) |
|
||||||
((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
|
((v[1] as u64) << 8*6) |
|
||||||
|
@ -39,6 +48,18 @@ pub fn be32_to_array(u: u32) -> [u8; 4] {
|
||||||
v
|
v
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
#[inline]
|
#[inline]
|
||||||
|
pub fn be48_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 6] {
|
||||||
|
assert!(u & 0xffff_0000_0000_0000 == 0);
|
||||||
|
let mut v = [0; 6];
|
||||||
|
v[0] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v[1] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v[2] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v[3] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v[4] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v[5] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
v
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
#[inline]
|
||||||
pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
|
pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
|
||||||
let mut v = [0; 8];
|
let mut v = [0; 8];
|
||||||
v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
|
v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ impl TestChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
|
impl channelmonitor::ManyChannelMonitor for TestChannelMonitor {
|
||||||
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
|
fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), channelmonitor::ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
|
||||||
|
// At every point where we get a monitor update, we should be able to send a useful monitor
|
||||||
|
// to a watchtower and disk...
|
||||||
|
assert!(channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::deserialize(&monitor.serialize_for_disk()[..]).unwrap() == monitor);
|
||||||
|
monitor.serialize_for_watchtower(); // This at least shouldn't crash...
|
||||||
self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, monitor.clone()));
|
self.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().push((funding_txo, monitor.clone()));
|
||||||
self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor)
|
self.simple_monitor.add_update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue