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Expose the amount of funds available for claim in ChannelMonitor
In general, we should always allow users to query for how much is currently in-flight being claimed on-chain at any time. This does so by examining the confirmed claims on-chain and breaking down what is left to be claimed into a new `ClaimableBalance` enum. Fixes #995.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo
parent
f9febb0351
commit
00906418aa
2 changed files with 676 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -535,6 +535,59 @@ impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep,
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},
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);
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/// Details about the balance(s) available for spending once the channel appears on chain.
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///
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/// See [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] for more details on when these will or will not
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/// be provided.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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#[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialOrd, Ord))]
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pub enum Balance {
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/// The channel is not yet closed (or the commitment or closing transaction has not yet
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/// appeared in a block). The given balance is claimable (less on-chain fees) if the channel is
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/// force-closed now.
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ClaimableOnChannelClose {
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/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
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/// required to do so.
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claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
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},
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/// The channel has been closed, and the given balance is ours but awaiting confirmations until
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/// we consider it spendable.
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ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, possibly excluding the on-chain fees which
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/// were spent in broadcasting the transaction.
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claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
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/// The height at which an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event will be generated for this
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/// amount.
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confirmation_height: u32,
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},
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/// The channel has been closed, and the given balance should be ours but awaiting spending
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/// transaction confirmation. If the spending transaction does not confirm in time, it is
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/// possible our counterparty can take the funds by broadcasting an HTLC timeout on-chain.
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///
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/// Once the spending transaction confirms, before it has reached enough confirmations to be
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/// considered safe from chain reorganizations, the balance will instead be provided via
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/// [`Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`].
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ContentiousClaimable {
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/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
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/// required to do so.
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claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
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/// The height at which the counterparty may be able to claim the balance if we have not
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/// done so.
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timeout_height: u32,
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},
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/// HTLCs which we sent to our counterparty which are claimable after a timeout (less on-chain
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/// fees) if the counterparty does not know the preimage for the HTLCs. These are somewhat
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/// likely to be claimed by our counterparty before we do.
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MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
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/// The amount available to claim, in satoshis, excluding the on-chain fees which will be
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/// required to do so.
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claimable_amount_satoshis: u64,
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/// The height at which we will be able to claim the balance if our counterparty has not
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/// done so.
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claimable_height: u32,
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},
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}
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/// An HTLC which has been irrevocably resolved on-chain, and has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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struct IrrevocablyResolvedHTLC {
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@ -1302,6 +1355,173 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitor<Signer> {
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pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
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self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
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}
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/// Gets the balances in this channel which are either claimable by us if we were to
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/// force-close the channel now or which are claimable on-chain (possibly awaiting
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/// confirmation).
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///
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/// Any balances in the channel which are available on-chain (excluding on-chain fees) are
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/// included here until an [`Event::SpendableOutputs`] event has been generated for the
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/// balance, or until our counterparty has claimed the balance and accrued several
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/// confirmations on the claim transaction.
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///
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/// Note that the balances available when you or your counterparty have broadcasted revoked
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/// state(s) may not be fully captured here.
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// TODO, fix that ^
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///
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/// See [`Balance`] for additional details on the types of claimable balances which
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/// may be returned here and their meanings.
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pub fn get_claimable_balances(&self) -> Vec<Balance> {
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let mut res = Vec::new();
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let us = self.inner.lock().unwrap();
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let mut confirmed_txid = us.funding_spend_confirmed;
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let mut pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = None;
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let funding_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::FundingSpendConfirmation { .. } = event.event {
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Some((event.txid, event.confirmation_threshold()))
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} else { None }
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});
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if let Some((txid, conf_thresh)) = funding_spend_pending {
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debug_assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_none(),
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"We have a pending funding spend awaiting anti-reorg confirmation, we can't have confirmed it already!");
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confirmed_txid = Some(txid);
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pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh = Some(conf_thresh);
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}
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macro_rules! walk_htlcs {
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($holder_commitment: expr, $htlc_iter: expr) => {
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for htlc in $htlc_iter {
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if let Some(htlc_input_idx) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
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if us.htlcs_resolved_on_chain.iter().any(|v| v.input_idx == htlc_input_idx) {
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assert!(us.funding_spend_confirmed.is_some());
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} else if htlc.offered == $holder_commitment {
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// If the payment was outbound, check if there's an HTLCUpdate
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// indicating we have spent this HTLC with a timeout, claiming it back
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// and awaiting confirmations on it.
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let htlc_update_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { input_idx: Some(input_idx), .. } = event.event {
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if input_idx == htlc_input_idx { Some(event.confirmation_threshold()) } else { None }
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} else { None }
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});
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = htlc_update_pending {
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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} else {
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res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
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});
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}
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} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
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// Otherwise (the payment was inbound), only expose it as claimable if
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// we know the preimage.
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// Note that if there is a pending claim, but it did not use the
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// preimage, we lost funds to our counterparty! We will then continue
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// to show it as ContentiousClaimable until ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
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let htlc_spend_pending = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::HTLCSpendConfirmation { input_idx, preimage, .. } = event.event {
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if input_idx == htlc_input_idx {
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Some((event.confirmation_threshold(), preimage.is_some()))
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} else { None }
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} else { None }
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});
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if let Some((conf_thresh, true)) = htlc_spend_pending {
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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} else {
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res.push(Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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timeout_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
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});
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if let Some(txid) = confirmed_txid {
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let mut found_commitment_tx = false;
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if Some(txid) == us.current_counterparty_commitment_txid || Some(txid) == us.prev_counterparty_commitment_txid {
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walk_htlcs!(false, us.counterparty_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap().iter().map(|(a, _)| a));
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
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if let Some(value) = us.onchain_events_awaiting_threshold_conf.iter().find_map(|event| {
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if let OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
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descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(descriptor)
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} = &event.event {
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Some(descriptor.output.value)
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} else { None }
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}) {
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: value,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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} else {
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// If a counterparty commitment transaction is awaiting confirmation, we
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// should either have a StaticPaymentOutput MaturingOutput event awaiting
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// confirmation with the same height or have never met our dust amount.
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}
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}
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found_commitment_tx = true;
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} else if txid == us.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid {
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walk_htlcs!(true, us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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}
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found_commitment_tx = true;
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} else if let Some(prev_commitment) = &us.prev_holder_signed_commitment_tx {
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if txid == prev_commitment.txid {
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walk_htlcs!(true, prev_commitment.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|(a, _, _)| a));
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: prev_commitment.to_self_value_sat,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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}
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found_commitment_tx = true;
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}
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}
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if !found_commitment_tx {
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if let Some(conf_thresh) = pending_commitment_tx_conf_thresh {
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// We blindly assume this is a cooperative close transaction here, and that
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// neither us nor our counterparty misbehaved. At worst we've under-estimated
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// the amount we can claim as we'll punish a misbehaving counterparty.
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat,
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confirmation_height: conf_thresh,
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});
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}
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}
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// TODO: Add logic to provide claimable balances for counterparty broadcasting revoked
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// outputs.
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} else {
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let mut claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat = 0;
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for (htlc, _, _) in us.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
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if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() { continue; }
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if htlc.offered {
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res.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
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claimable_height: htlc.cltv_expiry,
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});
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} else if us.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash).is_some() {
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claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
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}
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}
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res.push(Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: us.current_holder_commitment_tx.to_self_value_sat + claimable_inbound_htlc_value_sat,
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});
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}
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res
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}
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}
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/// Compares a broadcasted commitment transaction's HTLCs with those in the latest state,
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@ -2488,7 +2708,7 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
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// we've already failed the HTLC as the commitment transaction
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// which was broadcasted was revoked. In that case, we should
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// spend the HTLC output here immediately, and expose that fact
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// as a ClaimableBalance, something which we do not yet do.
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// as a Balance, something which we do not yet do.
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// TODO: Track the above as claimable!
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}
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continue 'outer_loop;
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@ -9,8 +9,10 @@
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//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
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use chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
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use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
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use chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, Balance};
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use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use ln::{channel, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
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use ln::channelmanager::BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
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use ln::features::InitFeatures;
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use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
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use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
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@ -19,6 +21,10 @@ use routing::router::get_route;
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use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
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use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
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use prelude::*;
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use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
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@ -79,3 +85,450 @@ fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
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expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
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expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
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}
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#[test]
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fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
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// Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
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// Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
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// `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
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// `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
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let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
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let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
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let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
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let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
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let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
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create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
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let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
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assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
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let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
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assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000
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}],
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nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
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nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id).unwrap();
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let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
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nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_0_shutdown);
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let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
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nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_shutdown);
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let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
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nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
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let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
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nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
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let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
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nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
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let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
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assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
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let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
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assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
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assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
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mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]);
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mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]);
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assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
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assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
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assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
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assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
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assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - chan_feerate * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT / 1000,
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confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
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}],
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nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
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claimable_amount_satoshis: 1000,
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confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
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}],
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nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
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connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
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assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
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nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
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nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
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let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
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assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
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if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
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assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
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let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
|
||||
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
|
||||
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, shutdown_tx[0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
|
||||
v.sort_unstable();
|
||||
v
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
|
||||
// Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
|
||||
// We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
|
||||
// `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
|
||||
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
|
||||
if prev_commitment_tx {
|
||||
// We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
|
||||
// secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
|
||||
// secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
|
||||
// transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
|
||||
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
|
||||
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
|
||||
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
|
||||
|
||||
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
|
||||
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
|
||||
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
|
||||
assert_eq!(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(), chan_id);
|
||||
|
||||
// This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
|
||||
let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
|
||||
// This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
|
||||
// balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
|
||||
let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
|
||||
// This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
|
||||
let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
|
||||
|
||||
let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
|
||||
|
||||
let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_id) as u64;
|
||||
|
||||
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
|
||||
// Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
|
||||
// as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
|
||||
(channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
|
||||
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
|
||||
// We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
|
||||
// dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
|
||||
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
|
||||
if prev_commitment_tx {
|
||||
// To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
|
||||
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
|
||||
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
|
||||
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
|
||||
let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
|
||||
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
|
||||
let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
|
||||
let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
|
||||
// "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
|
||||
let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
|
||||
4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
|
||||
3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
|
||||
1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
|
||||
3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
|
||||
// The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs:
|
||||
chan_feerate * (channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT +
|
||||
if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } *
|
||||
channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}];
|
||||
if !prev_commitment_tx {
|
||||
a_expected_balances.push(Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
|
||||
// Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
|
||||
// broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
|
||||
let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
|
||||
let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), if prev_commitment_tx { 4 } else { 5 });
|
||||
if prev_commitment_tx {
|
||||
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[3], b_broadcast_txn[2]);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0], b_broadcast_txn[3]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1], b_broadcast_txn[4]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// b_broadcast_txn[0] should spend the HTLC output of the commitment tx for 3_000 sats
|
||||
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
|
||||
check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[2], funding_tx);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
|
||||
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
|
||||
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
|
||||
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
|
||||
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
|
||||
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
// Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
|
||||
// generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
|
||||
// available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
|
||||
// other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
|
||||
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - chan_feerate *
|
||||
(channel::COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
// The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
|
||||
// CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
|
||||
// long.
|
||||
Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
|
||||
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, true);
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
|
||||
|
||||
// After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
|
||||
// `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
|
||||
}, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
|
||||
let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
|
||||
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
|
||||
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
// After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
|
||||
// possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
|
||||
if !prev_commitment_tx {
|
||||
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}, Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::MaybeClaimableHTLCAwaitingTimeout {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
|
||||
// When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
|
||||
let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 3);
|
||||
check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], funding_tx);
|
||||
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
|
||||
check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
|
||||
check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout,
|
||||
a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
|
||||
// a_broadcast_txn [1] and [2] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
|
||||
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
|
||||
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
|
||||
|
||||
// Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
|
||||
// "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
|
||||
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
// After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
|
||||
// balance entry.
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
|
||||
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, true);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
|
||||
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
|
||||
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, a_broadcast_txn[2]);
|
||||
} else { panic!(); }
|
||||
|
||||
// Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
|
||||
// confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
|
||||
// standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
|
||||
let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 1_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
|
||||
}, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
|
||||
}, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
|
||||
// After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
|
||||
// only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
|
||||
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
|
||||
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn[0]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 3_000,
|
||||
confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
|
||||
}, Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}]),
|
||||
sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
|
||||
|
||||
// After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
|
||||
// have only one HTLC output left spendable.
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
|
||||
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
|
||||
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
|
||||
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
|
||||
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
|
||||
check_spends!(spend_tx, b_broadcast_txn[0]);
|
||||
} else { panic!(); }
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
|
||||
// Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
|
||||
// to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
|
||||
// until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
|
||||
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[2]);
|
||||
assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
|
||||
claimable_amount_satoshis: 4_000,
|
||||
timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
|
||||
}],
|
||||
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
|
||||
assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
|
||||
nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().get(&funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
|
||||
do_test_claim_value_force_close(true);
|
||||
do_test_claim_value_force_close(false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue