rust-lightning/lightning/src/util/enforcing_trait_impls.rs

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// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, ChannelPublicKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction, PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys};
use ln::{chan_utils, msgs};
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, InMemoryChannelKeys};
use std::cmp;
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use std::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
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use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
use std::io::Error;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
/// Enforces some rules on ChannelKeys calls. Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant
/// of this which would essentially be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
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#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct EnforcingChannelKeys {
pub inner: InMemoryChannelKeys,
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commitment_number_obscure_and_last: Arc<Mutex<(Option<u64>, u64)>>,
}
impl EnforcingChannelKeys {
pub fn new(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
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commitment_number_obscure_and_last: Arc::new(Mutex::new((None, 0))),
}
}
}
impl EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn check_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>,
keys: &TxCreationKeys) {
let remote_points = self.inner.remote_pubkeys();
let keys_expected = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(secp_ctx,
&keys.per_commitment_point,
&remote_points.delayed_payment_basepoint,
&remote_points.htlc_basepoint,
&self.inner.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
&self.inner.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
if keys != &keys_expected { panic!("derived different per-tx keys") }
}
}
impl ChannelKeys for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
}
fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
// TODO: enforce the ChannelKeys contract - error here if we already signed this commitment
self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
}
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.inner.key_derivation_params() }
fn sign_remote_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, feerate_per_kw: u32, commitment_tx: &Transaction, pre_keys: &PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys, htlcs: &[&HTLCOutputInCommitment], secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
if commitment_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("lightning commitment transactions have a single input"); }
self.check_keys(secp_ctx, pre_keys.trust_key_derivation());
let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = (commitment_tx.lock_time & 0xffffff) as u64 | ((commitment_tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8);
{
let mut commitment_data = self.commitment_number_obscure_and_last.lock().unwrap();
if commitment_data.0.is_none() {
commitment_data.0 = Some(obscured_commitment_transaction_number ^ commitment_data.1);
}
let commitment_number = obscured_commitment_transaction_number ^ commitment_data.0.unwrap();
assert!(commitment_number == commitment_data.1 || commitment_number == commitment_data.1 + 1);
commitment_data.1 = cmp::max(commitment_number, commitment_data.1)
}
Ok(self.inner.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, commitment_tx, pre_keys, htlcs, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
// TODO: enforce the ChannelKeys contract - error if this commitment was already revoked
// TODO: need the commitment number
Ok(self.inner.sign_local_commitment(local_commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
fn unsafe_sign_local_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_local_commitment(local_commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, local_commitment_tx: &LocalCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
let commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.txid();
let local_csv = self.inner.counterparty_to_self_delay();
for this_htlc in local_commitment_tx.per_htlc.iter() {
if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &local_commitment_tx.local_keys.delayed_payment_key, &local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc.0, &local_commitment_tx.local_keys);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, this_htlc.1.as_ref().unwrap(), &local_commitment_tx.local_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
}
}
Ok(self.inner.sign_local_commitment_htlc_transactions(local_commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_transaction(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_remote_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_remote_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
self.inner.sign_channel_announcement(msg, secp_ctx)
}
fn on_accept(&mut self, channel_pubkeys: &ChannelPublicKeys, remote_to_self_delay: u16, local_to_self_delay: u16) {
self.inner.on_accept(channel_pubkeys, remote_to_self_delay, local_to_self_delay)
}
}
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impl Writeable for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.inner.write(writer)?;
let (obscure, last) = *self.commitment_number_obscure_and_last.lock().unwrap();
obscure.write(writer)?;
last.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
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let inner = Readable::read(reader)?;
let obscure_and_last = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok(EnforcingChannelKeys {
inner: inner,
commitment_number_obscure_and_last: Arc::new(Mutex::new(obscure_and_last))
})
}
}