rust-lightning/lightning/src/util/enforcing_trait_impls.rs

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// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, TrustedCommitmentTransaction};
use ln::{chan_utils, msgs};
use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, InMemoryChannelKeys};
use std::cmp;
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use std::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
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use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
use std::io::Error;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
/// An implementation of ChannelKeys that enforces some policy checks.
///
/// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
/// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
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#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct EnforcingChannelKeys {
pub inner: InMemoryChannelKeys,
pub(crate) last_commitment_number: Arc<Mutex<Option<u64>>>,
pub(crate) revoked_commitment: Arc<Mutex<u64>>,
}
impl EnforcingChannelKeys {
pub fn new(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
revoked_commitment: Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER))
}
}
pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys, revoked_commitment: Arc<Mutex<u64>>) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
revoked_commitment
}
}
}
impl ChannelKeys for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn get_per_commitment_point<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, idx: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> PublicKey {
self.inner.get_per_commitment_point(idx, secp_ctx)
}
fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
println!("XXX revoke {} for {}", idx, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
{
let mut revoked = self.revoked_commitment.lock().unwrap();
assert!(idx == *revoked || idx == *revoked - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, revoked {}", idx, *revoked);
*revoked = idx;
}
self.inner.release_commitment_secret(idx)
}
fn pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys { self.inner.pubkeys() }
fn key_derivation_params(&self) -> (u64, u64) { self.inner.key_derivation_params() }
fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
self.verify_counterparty_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
{
let mut last_commitment_number_guard = self.last_commitment_number.lock().unwrap();
let actual_commitment_number = commitment_tx.commitment_number();
let last_commitment_number = last_commitment_number_guard.unwrap_or(actual_commitment_number);
// These commitment numbers are backwards counting. We expect either the same as the previously encountered,
// or the next one.
assert!(last_commitment_number == actual_commitment_number || last_commitment_number - 1 == actual_commitment_number, "{} doesn't come after {}", actual_commitment_number, last_commitment_number);
*last_commitment_number_guard = Some(cmp::min(last_commitment_number, actual_commitment_number))
}
Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let trusted_tx = self.verify_holder_commitment_tx(commitment_tx, secp_ctx);
let commitment_txid = trusted_tx.txid();
let holder_csv = self.inner.counterparty_selected_contest_delay();
let revoked = self.revoked_commitment.lock().unwrap();
let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
println!("XXX sign {} for {}", commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
if *revoked - 1 != commitment_number && *revoked - 2 != commitment_number {
println!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
*revoked, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
return Err(());
}
for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
let keys = trusted_tx.keys();
let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(), holder_csv, &this_htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&this_htlc, &keys);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
}
// TODO: enforce the ChannelKeys contract - error if this commitment was already revoked
// TODO: need the commitment number
Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
Ok(self.inner.unsafe_sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_justice_transaction(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_closing_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, closing_tx: &Transaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Ok(self.inner.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
fn sign_channel_announcement<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
self.inner.sign_channel_announcement(msg, secp_ctx)
}
fn ready_channel(&mut self, channel_parameters: &ChannelTransactionParameters) {
self.inner.ready_channel(channel_parameters)
}
}
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impl Writeable for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), Error> {
self.inner.write(writer)?;
let last = *self.last_commitment_number.lock().unwrap();
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last.write(writer)?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let inner: InMemoryChannelKeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let last_commitment_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
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Ok(EnforcingChannelKeys {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(last_commitment_number)),
revoked_commitment: Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER)),
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})
}
}
impl EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn verify_counterparty_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_counterparty_broadcastable(),
self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), self.inner.pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
.expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
}
fn verify_holder_commitment_tx<'a, T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &'a CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
commitment_tx.verify(&self.inner.get_channel_parameters().as_holder_broadcastable(),
self.inner.pubkeys(), self.inner.counterparty_pubkeys(), secp_ctx)
.expect("derived different per-tx keys or built transaction")
}
}