rust-lightning/lightning/src/ln/onchaintx.rs

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//! The logic to build claims and bump in-flight transactions until confirmations.
//!
//! OnchainTxHandler objetcs are fully-part of ChannelMonitor and encapsulates all
//! building, tracking, bumping and notifications functions.
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use secp256k1;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER, InputMaterial, ClaimRequest};
use ln::channelmanager::PaymentPreimage;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCType, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable};
use util::byte_utils;
use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::cmp;
use std::ops::Deref;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
/// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
/// bump-txn candidate buffer.
Claim {
claim_request: Sha256dHash,
},
/// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
/// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
/// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
ContentiousOutpoint {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
input_material: InputMaterial,
}
}
/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
// At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
// much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
height_timer: Option<u32>,
// Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
feerate_previous: u64,
// Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
// a priority of not feerate
soonest_timelock: u32,
// Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
}
impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.height_timer.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
outp.write(writer)?;
tx_material.write(writer)?;
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl Readable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
}
Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
}
}
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub(super) enum InputDescriptors {
RevokedOfferedHTLC,
RevokedReceivedHTLC,
OfferedHTLC,
ReceivedHTLC,
RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
}
macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
{
$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
if $value <= fee {
log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
fee, $value);
false
} else {
log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
$value);
$value -= fee;
true
}
} else {
log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
$value);
$value -= fee;
true
}
} else {
$value -= fee;
true
}
}
}
}
/// OnchainTxHandler receives claiming requests, aggregates them if it's sound, broadcast and
/// do RBF bumping if possible.
pub struct OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
destination_script: Script,
funding_redeemscript: Script,
local_commitment: Option<LocalCommitmentTransaction>,
prev_local_commitment: Option<LocalCommitmentTransaction>,
local_csv: u16,
key_storage: ChanSigner,
// Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
// it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
// another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
// same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
// block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
// equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
// after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
// we need to regenerate new claim request with reduced set of still-claimable outpoints.
// Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
// us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
// Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
// Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
// Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
// is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
// post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
// block with output gets disconnected.
#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
logger: Arc<Logger>
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
pub(crate) fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
self.local_commitment.write(writer)?;
self.prev_local_commitment.write(writer)?;
self.local_csv.write(writer)?;
self.key_storage.write(writer)?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
outp.write(writer)?;
claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
}
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
for ev in events.iter() {
match *ev {
OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
claim_request.write(writer)?;
},
OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
outpoint.write(writer)?;
input_material.write(writer)?;
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
let local_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_local_commitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
let local_csv = Readable::read(reader)?;
let key_storage = Readable::read(reader)?;
let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
}
let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
}
let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
for _ in 0..events_len {
let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
OnchainEvent::Claim {
claim_request
}
},
1 => {
let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
outpoint,
input_material
}
}
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
};
events.push(ev);
}
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
}
Ok(OnchainTxHandler {
destination_script,
funding_redeemscript,
local_commitment,
prev_local_commitment,
local_csv,
key_storage,
claimable_outpoints,
pending_claim_requests,
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
})
}
}
impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner> {
pub(super) fn new(destination_script: Script, keys: ChanSigner, funding_redeemscript: Script, local_csv: u16, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Self {
let key_storage = keys;
OnchainTxHandler {
destination_script,
funding_redeemscript,
local_commitment: None,
prev_local_commitment: None,
local_csv,
key_storage,
pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
logger,
}
}
pub(super) fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
for inp in inputs {
// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
tx_weight += match inp {
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
},
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
},
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
},
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
},
// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
&InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
},
};
}
tx_weight
}
/// In LN, output claimed are time-sensitive, which means we have to spend them before reaching some timelock expiration. At in-channel
/// output detection, we generate a first version of a claim tx and associate to it a height timer. A height timer is an absolute block
/// height than once reached we should generate a new bumped "version" of the claim tx to be sure than we safely claim outputs before
/// than our counterparty can do it too. If timelock expires soon, height timer is going to be scale down in consequence to increase
/// frequency of the bump and so increase our bets of success.
fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
if timelock_expiration <= current_height + 3 {
return current_height + 1
} else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
return current_height + 3
}
current_height + 15
}
/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
/// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
fn generate_claim_tx<F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: F) -> Option<(Option<u32>, u64, Transaction)>
where F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{}", outp.txid, outp.vout);
inputs.push(TxIn {
previous_output: *outp,
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Vec::new(),
});
}
let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
version: 2,
lock_time: 0,
input: inputs,
output: vec![TxOut {
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
value: 0
}],
};
macro_rules! RBF_bump {
($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
{
let mut used_feerate;
// If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
let mut value = $amount;
if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
// Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
$amount - value
} else {
log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
return None;
}
// ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
} else {
let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
if $amount <= fee {
log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
return None;
}
fee
};
let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
// BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
// * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
// * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
} else {
new_fee
};
Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
}
}
}
// Compute new height timer to decide when we need to regenerate a new bumped version of the claim tx (if we
// didn't receive confirmation of it before, or not enough reorg-safe depth on top of it).
let new_timer = Some(Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock));
let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
let mut amt = 0;
let mut dynamic_fee = true;
for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
match per_outp_material {
&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
amt += *amount;
},
&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
amt += *amount;
},
&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
dynamic_fee = false;
},
&InputMaterial::Funding { .. } => {
dynamic_fee = false;
}
}
}
if dynamic_fee {
let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
let mut new_feerate;
// If old feerate is 0, first iteration of this claim, use normal fee calculation
if cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous != 0 {
if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
// If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
if new_fee > amt {
bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
} else {
bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
}
new_feerate = feerate;
} else { return None; }
} else {
if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, amt, predicted_weight, new_feerate) {
bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt;
} else { return None; }
}
assert!(new_feerate != 0);
for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
match per_outp_material {
&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &witness_script, *amount)[..]);
let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
if *is_htlc {
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
} else {
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
}
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
},
&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime }; // Right now we don't aggregate time-locked transaction, if we do we should set lock_time before to avoid breaking hash computation
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &witness_script, *amount)[..]);
let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
} else {
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![]);
}
bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(witness_script.clone().into_bytes());
log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}...", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
},
_ => unreachable!()
}
}
log_trace!(self, "...with timer {}", new_timer.unwrap());
assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
return Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
} else {
for (_, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
match per_outp_material {
&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
let mut htlc_tx = None;
if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
if local_commitment.txid() == outp.txid {
self.key_storage.sign_htlc_transaction(local_commitment, outp.vout, *preimage, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx);
htlc_tx = local_commitment.htlc_with_valid_witness(outp.vout).clone();
}
}
if let Some(ref mut prev_local_commitment) = self.prev_local_commitment {
if prev_local_commitment.txid() == outp.txid {
self.key_storage.sign_htlc_transaction(prev_local_commitment, outp.vout, *preimage, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx);
htlc_tx = prev_local_commitment.htlc_with_valid_witness(outp.vout).clone();
}
}
if let Some(htlc_tx) = htlc_tx {
let feerate = (amount - htlc_tx.output[0].value) * 1000 / htlc_tx.get_weight() as u64;
// Timer set to $NEVER given we can't bump tx without anchor outputs
log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Local HTLC-{} claiming HTLC output {} from {}...", if preimage.is_some() { "Success" } else { "Timeout" }, outp.vout, outp.txid);
return Some((None, feerate, htlc_tx));
}
return None;
},
&InputMaterial::Funding { ref channel_value } => {
if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment(local_commitment, &self.funding_redeemscript, *channel_value, &self.secp_ctx);
let signed_tx = local_commitment.with_valid_witness().clone();
let mut amt_outputs = 0;
for outp in signed_tx.output.iter() {
amt_outputs += outp.value;
}
let feerate = (channel_value - amt_outputs) * 1000 / signed_tx.get_weight() as u64;
// Timer set to $NEVER given we can't bump tx without anchor outputs
log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast Local Transaction {} claiming funding output {} from {}...", signed_tx.txid(), outp.vout, outp.txid);
return Some((None, feerate, signed_tx));
}
}
_ => unreachable!()
}
}
}
None
}
pub(super) fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], claimable_outpoints: Vec<ClaimRequest>, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
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log_trace!(self, "Block at height {} connected with {} claim requests", height, claimable_outpoints.len());
let mut new_claims = Vec::new();
let mut aggregated_claim = HashMap::new();
let mut aggregated_soonest = ::std::u32::MAX;
// Try to aggregate outputs if their timelock expiration isn't imminent (absolute_timelock
// <= CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER) and they don't require an immediate nLockTime (aggregable).
for req in claimable_outpoints {
// Don't claim a outpoint twice that would be bad for privacy and may uselessly lock a CPFP input for a while
if let Some(_) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&req.outpoint) { log_trace!(self, "Bouncing off outpoint {}:{}, already registered its claiming request", req.outpoint.txid, req.outpoint.vout); } else {
log_trace!(self, "Test if outpoint can be aggregated with expiration {} against {}", req.absolute_timelock, height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER);
if req.absolute_timelock <= height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER || !req.aggregable { // Don't aggregate if outpoint absolute timelock is soon or marked as non-aggregable
let mut single_input = HashMap::new();
single_input.insert(req.outpoint, req.witness_data);
new_claims.push((req.absolute_timelock, single_input));
} else {
aggregated_claim.insert(req.outpoint, req.witness_data);
if req.absolute_timelock < aggregated_soonest {
aggregated_soonest = req.absolute_timelock;
}
}
}
}
new_claims.push((aggregated_soonest, aggregated_claim));
// Generate claim transactions and track them to bump if necessary at
// height timer expiration (i.e in how many blocks we're going to take action).
for claim in new_claims {
let mut claim_material = ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer: None, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: claim.0, per_input_material: claim.1.clone() };
if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
let txid = tx.txid();
self.pending_claim_requests.insert(txid, claim_material);
for k in claim.1.keys() {
log_trace!(self, "Registering claiming request for {}:{}", k.txid, k.vout);
self.claimable_outpoints.insert(k.clone(), (txid, height));
}
log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
}
}
let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
for tx in txn_matched {
// Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
for inp in &tx.input {
if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
// If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
//... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
// outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
// by us.
let mut set_equality = true;
if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
set_equality = false;
} else {
for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
set_equality = false;
}
}
}
macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
() => {
let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
}
}
}
}
// If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
// before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
// ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
if set_equality {
clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
} else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
let mut at_least_one_drop = false;
for input in tx.input.iter() {
if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
at_least_one_drop = true;
}
// If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
}
}
//TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
if at_least_one_drop {
bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone(), claim_material.clone());
}
}
break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
} else {
panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
}
}
}
for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
}
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
}
}
}
}
// After security delay, either our claim tx got enough confs or outpoint is definetely out of reach
if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
for ev in events {
match ev {
OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
// been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
}
}
},
OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
}
}
}
}
// Check if any pending claim request must be rescheduled
for (first_claim_txid, ref claim_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
if let Some(h) = claim_data.height_timer {
if h == height {
bump_candidates.insert(*first_claim_txid, (*claim_data).clone());
}
}
}
// Build, bump and rebroadcast tx accordingly
2020-02-26 18:21:53 -05:00
log_trace!(self, "Bumping {} candidates", bump_candidates.len());
let mut pending_claim_updates = Vec::with_capacity(bump_candidates.len());
for (first_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter() {
if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(bump_tx));
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
pending_claim_updates.push((*first_claim_txid, new_timer, new_feerate));
}
}
for updates in pending_claim_updates {
if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&updates.0) {
claim_material.height_timer = updates.1;
claim_material.feerate_previous = updates.2;
}
}
}
pub(super) fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
F::Target: FeeEstimator
{
let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
//- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
//- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
for ev in events {
match ev {
OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
// Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
// resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
}
}
},
_ => {},
}
}
}
for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.generate_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, &*fee_estimator) {
claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
}
}
for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
}
//TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
// right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
if v.1 == height {
remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
false
} else { true });
for req in remove_request {
self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
}
}
pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_tx(&mut self, tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction) -> Result<(), ()> {
// To prevent any unsafe state discrepancy between offchain and onchain, once local
// commitment transaction has been signed due to an event (either block height for
// HTLC-timeout or channel force-closure), don't allow any further update of local
// commitment transaction view to avoid delivery of revocation secret to counterparty
// for the aformentionned signed transaction.
if let Some(ref local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
if local_commitment.has_local_sig() { return Err(()) }
}
self.prev_local_commitment = self.local_commitment.take();
self.local_commitment = Some(tx);
Ok(())
}
pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_local_tx(&mut self, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
self.key_storage.sign_local_commitment(local_commitment, &self.funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, &self.secp_ctx);
return Some(local_commitment.with_valid_witness().clone());
}
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx(&mut self, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
let mut local_commitment = local_commitment.clone();
self.key_storage.unsafe_sign_local_commitment(&mut local_commitment, &self.funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, &self.secp_ctx);
return Some(local_commitment.with_valid_witness().clone());
}
None
}
pub(super) fn get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(&mut self, txid: Sha256dHash, htlc_index: u32, preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Option<Transaction> {
//TODO: store preimage in OnchainTxHandler
if let Some(ref mut local_commitment) = self.local_commitment {
if local_commitment.txid() == txid {
self.key_storage.sign_htlc_transaction(local_commitment, htlc_index, preimage, self.local_csv, &self.secp_ctx);
return local_commitment.htlc_with_valid_witness(htlc_index).clone();
}
}
None
}
}