lnd/routing/ann_validation.go
bitromortac 6aac2762b3
routing: stricter maxHTLC checks
We require channel updates to have the max HTLC message flag set.

Several flows need to pass that check before channel updates are
forwarded to peers:
* after channel funding: `addToRouterGraph`
* after receiving channel updates from a peer:
  `ProcessRemoteAnnouncement`
* after we update channel policies: `PropagateChanPolicyUpdate`
2023-02-21 14:03:51 +01:00

191 lines
5.4 KiB
Go

package routing
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec/v2"
"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcutil"
"github.com/btcsuite/btcd/chaincfg/chainhash"
"github.com/davecgh/go-spew/spew"
"github.com/go-errors/errors"
"github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/lnwire"
)
// ValidateChannelAnn validates the channel announcement message and checks
// that node signatures covers the announcement message, and that the bitcoin
// signatures covers the node keys.
func ValidateChannelAnn(a *lnwire.ChannelAnnouncement) error {
// First, we'll compute the digest (h) which is to be signed by each of
// the keys included within the node announcement message. This hash
// digest includes all the keys, so the (up to 4 signatures) will
// attest to the validity of each of the keys.
data, err := a.DataToSign()
if err != nil {
return err
}
dataHash := chainhash.DoubleHashB(data)
// First we'll verify that the passed bitcoin key signature is indeed a
// signature over the computed hash digest.
bitcoinSig1, err := a.BitcoinSig1.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
bitcoinKey1, err := btcec.ParsePubKey(a.BitcoinKey1[:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !bitcoinSig1.Verify(dataHash, bitcoinKey1) {
return errors.New("can't verify first bitcoin signature")
}
// If that checks out, then we'll verify that the second bitcoin
// signature is a valid signature of the bitcoin public key over hash
// digest as well.
bitcoinSig2, err := a.BitcoinSig2.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
bitcoinKey2, err := btcec.ParsePubKey(a.BitcoinKey2[:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !bitcoinSig2.Verify(dataHash, bitcoinKey2) {
return errors.New("can't verify second bitcoin signature")
}
// Both node signatures attached should indeed be a valid signature
// over the selected digest of the channel announcement signature.
nodeSig1, err := a.NodeSig1.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodeKey1, err := btcec.ParsePubKey(a.NodeID1[:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !nodeSig1.Verify(dataHash, nodeKey1) {
return errors.New("can't verify data in first node signature")
}
nodeSig2, err := a.NodeSig2.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodeKey2, err := btcec.ParsePubKey(a.NodeID2[:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !nodeSig2.Verify(dataHash, nodeKey2) {
return errors.New("can't verify data in second node signature")
}
return nil
}
// ValidateNodeAnn validates the node announcement by ensuring that the
// attached signature is needed a signature of the node announcement under the
// specified node public key.
func ValidateNodeAnn(a *lnwire.NodeAnnouncement) error {
// Reconstruct the data of announcement which should be covered by the
// signature so we can verify the signature shortly below
data, err := a.DataToSign()
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodeSig, err := a.Signature.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
nodeKey, err := btcec.ParsePubKey(a.NodeID[:])
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Finally ensure that the passed signature is valid, if not we'll
// return an error so this node announcement can be rejected.
dataHash := chainhash.DoubleHashB(data)
if !nodeSig.Verify(dataHash, nodeKey) {
var msgBuf bytes.Buffer
if _, err := lnwire.WriteMessage(&msgBuf, a, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
return errors.Errorf("signature on NodeAnnouncement(%x) is "+
"invalid: %x", nodeKey.SerializeCompressed(),
msgBuf.Bytes())
}
return nil
}
// ValidateChannelUpdateAnn validates the channel update announcement by
// checking (1) that the included signature covers the announcement and has been
// signed by the node's private key, and (2) that the announcement's message
// flags and optional fields are sane.
func ValidateChannelUpdateAnn(pubKey *btcec.PublicKey, capacity btcutil.Amount,
a *lnwire.ChannelUpdate) error {
if err := ValidateChannelUpdateFields(capacity, a); err != nil {
return err
}
return VerifyChannelUpdateSignature(a, pubKey)
}
// VerifyChannelUpdateSignature verifies that the channel update message was
// signed by the party with the given node public key.
func VerifyChannelUpdateSignature(msg *lnwire.ChannelUpdate,
pubKey *btcec.PublicKey) error {
data, err := msg.DataToSign()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to reconstruct message data: %v", err)
}
dataHash := chainhash.DoubleHashB(data)
nodeSig, err := msg.Signature.ToSignature()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !nodeSig.Verify(dataHash, pubKey) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid signature for channel update %v",
spew.Sdump(msg))
}
return nil
}
// ValidateChannelUpdateFields validates a channel update's message flags and
// corresponding update fields.
func ValidateChannelUpdateFields(capacity btcutil.Amount,
msg *lnwire.ChannelUpdate) error {
// The maxHTLC flag is mandatory.
if !msg.MessageFlags.HasMaxHtlc() {
return errors.Errorf("max htlc flag not set for channel "+
"update %v", spew.Sdump(msg))
}
maxHtlc := msg.HtlcMaximumMsat
if maxHtlc == 0 || maxHtlc < msg.HtlcMinimumMsat {
return errors.Errorf("invalid max htlc for channel "+
"update %v", spew.Sdump(msg))
}
// For light clients, the capacity will not be set so we'll skip
// checking whether the MaxHTLC value respects the channel's
// capacity.
capacityMsat := lnwire.NewMSatFromSatoshis(capacity)
if capacityMsat != 0 && maxHtlc > capacityMsat {
return errors.Errorf("max_htlc (%v) for channel update "+
"greater than capacity (%v)", maxHtlc, capacityMsat)
}
return nil
}