This intent of this change is to prevent privacy leaks when routing
with aliases and also to allow routing when using an alias. The
aliases are our aliases.
Introduces are two maps:
* aliasToReal:
This is an N->1 mapping for a channel. The keys are the set of
aliases and the value is the confirmed, on-chain SCID.
* baseIndex:
This is also an N->1 mapping for a channel. The keys are the set
of aliases and the value is the "base" SCID (whatever is in the
OpenChannel.ShortChannelID field). There is also a base->base
mapping, so not all keys are aliases.
The above maps are populated when a link is added to the switch and
when the channel has confirmed on-chain. The maps are not removed
from if the link is removed, but this is fine since forwarding won't
occur.
* getLinkByMapping
This function is introduced to adhere to the spec requirements that
using the confirmed SCID of a private, scid-alias-feature-bit
channel does not work. Lnd implements a stricter version of the spec
and disallows this behavior if the feature-bit was negotiated, rather
than just the channel type. The old, privacy-leak behavior is
preserved.
The spec also requires that if we must fail back an HTLC, the
ChannelUpdate must use the SCID of whatever was in the onion, to avoid
a privacy leak. This is also done by passing in the relevant SCID to
the mailbox and link. Lnd will also cancel back on the "incoming" side
if the InterceptableSwitch was used or if the link failed to decrypt
the onion. In this case, we are cautious and replace the SCID if an
alias exists.
This introduces a BigSize migration that is used to expand the width
of the ChannelStatus and ChannelType fields. Three channel "types"
are added - ZeroConfBit, ScidAliasChanBit, and ScidAliasFeatureBit.
ScidAliasChanBit denotes that the scid-alias channel type was
negotiated for the channel. ScidAliasFeatureBit denotes that the
scid-alias feature bit was negotiated during the *lifetime* of the
channel. Several helper functions on the OpenChannel struct are
exposed to aid callers from different packages.
The RefreshShortChanID has been renamed to Refresh.
A new function BroadcastHeight is used to guard access to the
mutable FundingBroadcastHeight member. This prevents data races.
With this, extra calls to RemoveLink will wait for the link to
fully stop. This is accomplished by a map that stores a single stop
channel that callers to RemoveLink will listen on. This map is not
consulted when the Switch is shutting down and calls Stop on each
individual link. Though that could be added in the future, it is
not necessary.
Warning messages are intended to add "softer" failure modes for peers,
so to start with we simply log the warnings sent to us. While we "may"
disconnect from the peer according to the spec, we start with the least
extreme option (which is also not a change in behavior because
previously we'd just log that we received an unknown odd message).
This allows Switch-initiated payments to be failed back if they don't
make it into a commitment. Prior to this commit, a Switch-initiated
HTLC could get "lost" meaning the circuit wouldn't get deleted except
if conditions were "right" and the network result store would never
be made aware of the HTLC's fate. Switch-initiated HTLC's are now
passed to the link's mailbox to ensure they can be failed back.
This change also special-cases the ErrDuplicateKeystone error from
OpenCircuits(...) so that callers of updateCommitTx() in the link
don't send an Error to the peer if they encounter the keystone error.
With the first async change, the keystone error should now always
be recoverable.
This commit changes the `NewBreachRetribution` to use the new revocation
log format, while maintaining the compatibilty to use an older
revocation log format. Unit tests have been added to make sure a breach
retribution can be created in both log formats.
This also means the watch tower needs to pass the relevant commit tx at
its backup height when creating the breach retribution during backing
up. This is achieved by recording the current remote commitment state
before advancing the remote commitment chain.
In this commit we move the tracking of the outstanding intercepted htlcs
to InterceptableSwitch. This is a preparation for making the htlc
interceptor required.
Required interception involves tracking outstanding htlcs across
multiple grpc client sessions. The per-session routerrpc
forwardInterceptor object is therefore no longer the best place for
that.
This commit was previously split into the following parts to ease
review:
- 2d746f68: replace imports
- 4008f0fd: use ecdsa.Signature
- 849e33d1: remove btcec.S256()
- b8f6ebbd: use v2 library correctly
- fa80bca9: bump go modules
The counter-party shouldn't be doing this anyways as they would be
giving away a preimage for free. Them doing this would bork their
own channel due to open circuits not getting trimmed on startup.
Removing this faulty behavior also makes it easier to reason about
the circuit logic.
This commit modifies the channel state machine to be able to derive the
proper commitment and second-level HTLC output scripts required by the
new script-enforced leased channel commitment type.
Pass htlc amount down to the channel so that we don't need to rely
on minHtlc (and pad it when the channel sets a 0 min htlc). Update
test to just check some sane values since we're no longer relying
on minHtlc amount at all.
This commit makes SendHTLC (we are the source) evaluate the dust
threshold of the outgoing channel against the default threshold of
500K satoshis. If the threshold is exceeded by adding this HTLC, we
fail backwards. It also makes handlePacketForward (we are forwarding)
evaluate the dust threshold of the incoming channel and the outgoing
channel and fails backwards if either channel's dust sum exceeds the
default threshold.