itest: refactor testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl

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yyforyongyu 2022-08-09 00:49:51 +08:00
parent f590a96372
commit 211aa4c6f2
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3 changed files with 78 additions and 187 deletions

View file

@ -300,4 +300,8 @@ var allTestCasesTemp = []*lntemp.TestCase{
"remote output",
TestFunc: testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput,
},
{
Name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution remote hodl",
TestFunc: testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl,
},
}

View file

@ -301,9 +301,7 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionZeroValueRemoteOutput(ht *lntemp.HarnessTest) {
// testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl tests that Dave properly responds to a
// channel breach made by the remote party, specifically in the case that the
// remote party breaches before settling extended HTLCs.
func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
t *harnessTest) {
func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(ht *lntemp.HarnessTest) {
const (
chanAmt = funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount
pushAmt = 200000
@ -314,34 +312,31 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
// Since this test will result in the counterparty being left in a
// weird state, we will introduce another node into our test network:
// Carol.
carol := net.NewNode(t.t, "Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, carol)
carol := ht.NewNode("Carol", []string{"--hodl.exit-settle"})
// We'll also create a new node Dave, who will have a channel with
// Carol, and also use similar settings so we can broadcast a commit
// with active HTLCs. Dave will be the breached party. We set
// --nolisten to ensure Carol won't be able to connect to him and
// trigger the channel data protection logic automatically.
dave := net.NewNode(
t.t, "Dave",
dave := ht.NewNode(
"Dave",
[]string{"--hodl.exit-settle", "--nolisten"},
)
defer shutdownAndAssert(net, t, dave)
// We must let Dave communicate with Carol before they are able to open
// channel, so we connect Dave and Carol,
net.ConnectNodes(t.t, dave, carol)
ht.ConnectNodes(dave, carol)
// Before we make a channel, we'll load up Dave with some coins sent
// directly from the miner.
net.SendCoins(t.t, btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
ht.FundCoins(btcutil.SatoshiPerBitcoin, dave)
// In order to test Dave's response to an uncooperative channel closure
// by Carol, we'll first open up a channel between them with a
// funding.MaxBtcFundingAmount (2^24) satoshis value.
chanPoint := openChannelAndAssert(
t, net, dave, carol,
lntest.OpenChannelParams{
chanPoint := ht.OpenChannel(
dave, carol, lntemp.OpenChannelParams{
Amt: chanAmt,
PushAmt: pushAmt,
},
@ -349,206 +344,122 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
// With the channel open, we'll create a few invoices for Carol that
// Dave will pay to in order to advance the state of the channel.
carolPayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
}
carolPayReqs, _, _ := ht.CreatePayReqs(carol, paymentAmt, numInvoices)
// We'll introduce a closure to validate that Carol's current balance
// matches the given expected amount.
checkCarolBalance := func(expectedAmt int64) {
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(carol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
}
if carolChan.LocalBalance != expectedAmt {
t.Fatalf("carol's balance is incorrect, "+
"got %v, expected %v", carolChan.LocalBalance,
expectedAmt)
}
}
// We'll introduce another closure to validate that Carol's current
// We'll introduce an closure to validate that Carol's current
// number of updates is at least as large as the provided minimum
// number.
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast := func(minimum uint64) {
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(carol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
}
if carolChan.NumUpdates < minimum {
t.Fatalf("carol's numupdates is incorrect, want %v "+
"to be at least %v", carolChan.NumUpdates,
minimum)
}
}
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast := func(carolChan *lnrpc.Channel,
minimum int) {
// Wait for Dave to receive the channel edge from the funding manager.
err = dave.WaitForNetworkChannelOpen(chanPoint)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dave didn't see the dave->carol channel before "+
"timeout: %v", err)
require.GreaterOrEqual(ht, int(carolChan.NumUpdates), minimum,
"carol's numupdates is incorrect")
}
// Ensure that carol's balance starts with the amount we pushed to her.
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt)
ht.AssertChannelLocalBalance(carol, chanPoint, pushAmt)
// Send payments from Dave to Carol using 3 of Carol's payment hashes
// generated above.
err = completePaymentRequests(
dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[:numInvoices/2], false,
ht.CompletePaymentRequestsNoWait(
dave, carolPayReqs[:numInvoices/2], chanPoint,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
}
// At this point, we'll also send over a set of HTLC's from Carol to
// Dave. This ensures that the final revoked transaction has HTLC's in
// both directions.
davePayReqs, _, _, err := createPayReqs(
dave, paymentAmt, numInvoices,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to create pay reqs: %v", err)
}
davePayReqs, _, _ := ht.CreatePayReqs(dave, paymentAmt, numInvoices)
// Send payments from Carol to Dave using 3 of Dave's payment hashes
// generated above.
err = completePaymentRequests(
carol, carol.RouterClient, davePayReqs[:numInvoices/2], false,
ht.CompletePaymentRequestsNoWait(
carol, davePayReqs[:numInvoices/2], chanPoint,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
}
// Next query for Carol's channel state, as we sent 3 payments of 10k
// satoshis each, however Carol should now see her balance as being
// equal to the push amount in satoshis since she has not settled.
carolChan, err := getChanInfo(carol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol's channel info: %v", err)
}
// Ensure that carol's balance still reflects the original amount we
// pushed to her, minus the HTLCs she just sent to Dave.
carolChan := ht.AssertChannelLocalBalance(
carol, chanPoint, pushAmt-3*paymentAmt,
)
// Grab Carol's current commitment height (update number), we'll later
// revert her to this state after additional updates to force her to
// broadcast this soon to be revoked state.
carolStateNumPreCopy := carolChan.NumUpdates
// Ensure that carol's balance still reflects the original amount we
// pushed to her, minus the HTLCs she just sent to Dave.
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
carolStateNumPreCopy := int(carolChan.NumUpdates)
// Since Carol has not settled, she should only see at least one update
// to her channel.
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolChan, 1)
// With the temporary file created, copy Carol's current state into the
// temporary file we created above. Later after more updates, we'll
// restore this state.
if err := net.BackupDb(carol); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to copy database files: %v", err)
}
ht.BackupDB(carol)
// Reconnect the peers after the restart that was needed for the db
// backup.
net.EnsureConnected(t.t, dave, carol)
ht.EnsureConnected(dave, carol)
// Finally, send payments from Dave to Carol, consuming Carol's
// remaining payment hashes.
err = completePaymentRequests(
dave, dave.RouterClient, carolPayReqs[numInvoices/2:], false,
ht.CompletePaymentRequestsNoWait(
dave, carolPayReqs[numInvoices/2:], chanPoint,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to send payments: %v", err)
}
// Ensure that carol's balance still shows the amount we originally
// pushed to her (minus the HTLCs she sent to Bob), and that at least
// one more update has occurred.
time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolStateNumPreCopy + 1)
carolChan = ht.AssertChannelLocalBalance(
carol, chanPoint, pushAmt-3*paymentAmt,
)
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolChan, carolStateNumPreCopy+1)
// Suspend Dave, such that Carol won't reconnect at startup, triggering
// the data loss protection.
restartDave, err := net.SuspendNode(dave)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to suspend Dave: %v", err)
}
restartDave := ht.SuspendNode(dave)
// Now we shutdown Carol, copying over the her temporary database state
// which has the *prior* channel state over her current most up to date
// state. With this, we essentially force Carol to travel back in time
// within the channel's history.
if err = net.RestartNode(carol, func() error {
return net.RestoreDb(carol)
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to restart node: %v", err)
}
time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
ht.RestartNodeAndRestoreDB(carol)
// Ensure that Carol's view of the channel is consistent with the state
// of the channel just before it was snapshotted.
checkCarolBalance(pushAmt - 3*paymentAmt)
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(1)
carolChan = ht.AssertChannelLocalBalance(
carol, chanPoint, pushAmt-3*paymentAmt,
)
checkCarolNumUpdatesAtLeast(carolChan, 1)
// Now query for Carol's channel state, it should show that she's at a
// state number in the past, *not* the latest state.
carolChan, err = getChanInfo(carol)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to get carol chan info: %v", err)
}
if carolChan.NumUpdates != carolStateNumPreCopy {
t.Fatalf("db copy failed: %v", carolChan.NumUpdates)
}
ht.AssertChannelCommitHeight(carol, chanPoint, carolStateNumPreCopy)
// Now force Carol to execute a *force* channel closure by unilaterally
// broadcasting her current channel state. This is actually the
// commitment transaction of a prior *revoked* state, so she'll soon
// feel the wrath of Dave's retribution.
force := true
closeUpdates, closeTxID, err := net.CloseChannel(
carol, chanPoint, force,
closeUpdates, closeTxID := ht.CloseChannelAssertPending(
carol, chanPoint, true,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to close channel: %v", err)
}
// Query the mempool for the breaching closing transaction, this should
// be broadcast by Carol when she force closes the channel above.
txid, err := waitForTxInMempool(net.Miner.Client, minerMempoolTimeout)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to find Carol's force close tx in mempool: %v",
err)
}
if *txid != *closeTxID {
t.Fatalf("expected closeTx(%v) in mempool, instead found %v",
closeTxID, txid)
}
// Generate a single block to mine the breach transaction.
block := mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
block := ht.MineBlocksAndAssertNumTxes(1, 1)[0]
// We resurrect Dave to ensure he will be exacting justice after his
// node restarts.
if err := restartDave(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to stop Dave's node: %v", err)
}
require.NoError(ht, restartDave(), "unable to restart Dave's node")
// Finally, wait for the final close status update, then ensure that
// the closing transaction was included in the block.
breachTXID, err := net.WaitForChannelClose(closeUpdates)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("error while waiting for channel close: %v", err)
}
if *breachTXID != *closeTxID {
t.Fatalf("expected breach ID(%v) to be equal to close ID (%v)",
breachTXID, closeTxID)
}
assertTxInBlock(t, block, breachTXID)
breachTXID := ht.WaitForChannelCloseEvent(closeUpdates)
require.Equal(ht, closeTxID[:], breachTXID[:],
"expected breach ID to be equal to close ID")
ht.Miner.AssertTxInBlock(block, breachTXID)
// Query the mempool for Dave's justice transaction, this should be
// broadcast as Carol's contract breaching transaction gets confirmed
@ -556,24 +467,15 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
// outputs to the second level before Dave broadcasts his justice tx,
// we'll search through the mempool for a tx that matches the number of
// expected inputs in the justice tx.
var predErr error
var justiceTxid *chainhash.Hash
errNotFound := errors.New("justice tx not found")
findJusticeTx := func() (*chainhash.Hash, error) {
mempool, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawMempool()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to get mempool from "+
"miner: %v", err)
}
mempool := ht.Miner.GetRawMempool()
for _, txid := range mempool {
// Check that the justice tx has the appropriate number
// of inputs.
tx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(txid)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to query for "+
"txs: %v", err)
}
tx := ht.Miner.GetRawTransaction(txid)
exNumInputs := 2 + numInvoices
if len(tx.MsgTx().TxIn) == exNumInputs {
@ -583,17 +485,17 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
return nil, errNotFound
}
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
err := wait.NoError(func() error {
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
if err != nil {
predErr = err
return false
return err
}
justiceTxid = txid
return true
return nil
}, defaultTimeout)
if err != nil && predErr == errNotFound {
if err != nil && errors.Is(err, errNotFound) {
// If Dave is unable to broadcast his justice tx on first
// attempt because of the second layer transactions, he will
// wait until the next block epoch before trying again. Because
@ -602,35 +504,28 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
// transactions will be in the mempool at this point, we pass 0
// as the last argument, indicating we don't care what's in the
// mempool.
mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 0)
err = wait.Predicate(func() bool {
ht.MineBlocks(1)
err = wait.NoError(func() error {
txid, err := findJusticeTx()
if err != nil {
predErr = err
return false
return err
}
justiceTxid = txid
return true
return nil
}, defaultTimeout)
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf(predErr.Error())
}
require.NoError(ht, err, "timeout finding justice tx")
justiceTx, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(justiceTxid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to query for justice tx: %v", err)
}
justiceTx := ht.Miner.GetRawTransaction(justiceTxid)
// isSecondLevelSpend checks that the passed secondLevelTxid is a
// potentitial second level spend spending from the commit tx.
isSecondLevelSpend := func(commitTxid, secondLevelTxid *chainhash.Hash) bool {
secondLevel, err := net.Miner.Client.GetRawTransaction(
secondLevelTxid)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to query for tx: %v", err)
}
isSecondLevelSpend := func(commitTxid,
secondLevelTxid *chainhash.Hash) bool {
secondLevel := ht.Miner.GetRawTransaction(secondLevelTxid)
// A second level spend should have only one input, and one
// output.
@ -661,27 +556,23 @@ func testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl(net *lntest.NetworkHarness,
if isSecondLevelSpend(breachTXID, &txIn.PreviousOutPoint.Hash) {
continue
}
t.Fatalf("justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
require.Fail(ht, "justice tx not spending commitment utxo "+
"instead is: %v", txIn.PreviousOutPoint)
}
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// We restart Dave here to ensure that he persists he retribution state
// and successfully continues exacting retribution after restarting. At
// this point, Dave has broadcast the justice transaction, but it
// hasn't been confirmed yet; when Dave restarts, he should start
// waiting for the justice transaction to confirm again.
if err := net.RestartNode(dave, nil); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unable to restart Dave's node: %v", err)
}
ht.RestartNode(dave)
// Now mine a block, this transaction should include Dave's justice
// transaction which was just accepted into the mempool.
block = mineBlocks(t, net, 1, 1)[0]
assertTxInBlock(t, block, justiceTxid)
ht.MineBlocksAndAssertNumTxes(1, 1)
// Dave should have no open channels.
assertNodeNumChannels(t, dave, 0)
ht.AssertNodeNumChannels(dave, 0)
}
// testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower establishes a channel between

View file

@ -72,10 +72,6 @@ var allTestCases = []*testCase{
name: "switch offline delivery outgoing offline",
test: testSwitchOfflineDeliveryOutgoingOffline,
},
{
name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution remote hodl",
test: testRevokedCloseRetributionRemoteHodl,
},
{
name: "revoked uncooperative close retribution altruist watchtower",
test: testRevokedCloseRetributionAltruistWatchtower,