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BOLT2: rephrase cltv_expiry_delta text about accepting HTLCs
Saying "the risk is only to the node *accepting* the HTLC" is confusing because merely accepting an HTLC is risk-free. The risk comes from accepting *responsibility to route the payment*, i.e. offering an HTLC of your own in the next channel on the path, where a too-small difference in the HTLC values could end up with you cheated out of a payment. This revised paragraph hopefully makes that clearer.
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@ -670,10 +670,10 @@ the forwarding case (B). `min_final_cltv_expiry` is the minimum difference
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between HTLC CLTV timeout and the current block height, for the
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terminal case (C).
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Note that if this value is too low for a channel, the risk is only to
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the node *accepting* the HTLC, not the node offering it. For this
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reason, the `cltv_expiry_delta` for the *outgoing* channel is used as
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the delta across a node.
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Note that a node is at risk if it accepts an HTLC in one channel and
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offers an HTLC in another channel with too small of a difference between
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the CLTV timeouts. For this reason, the `cltv_expiry_delta` for the
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*outgoing* channel is used as the delta across a node.
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The worst-case number of blocks between outgoing and
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incoming HTLC resolution can be derived, given a few assumptions:
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