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Allow unset onion_hash in invalid_onion_blinding (#1093)

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In most cases the `onion_hash` isn't actionable in the case of blinded
payments and it's wasteful to keep track of the incoming onion, so we
allow setting it to an all zero value.
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Bastien Teinturier 2023-07-27 11:31:40 +02:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 7f53a3e46e
commit 7d3ef5a6b2
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1 changed files with 8 additions and 6 deletions
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14
02-peer-protocol.md
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@ -1144,14 +1144,16 @@ A node:
- When failing an incoming HTLC: - When failing an incoming HTLC:
- If `current_blinding_point` is set in the onion payload and it is not the - If `current_blinding_point` is set in the onion payload and it is not the
final node: final node:
- MUST send an `update_fail_htlc` error using the - MUST send an `update_fail_htlc` error using the `invalid_onion_blinding`
`invalid_onion_blinding` failure code with the `sha256_of_onion` failure code for any local or downstream errors.
of the onion it received, for any local or downstream errors. - SHOULD use the `sha256_of_onion` of the onion it received.
- MAY use an all zero `sha256_of_onion`.
- SHOULD add a random delay before sending `update_fail_htlc`. - SHOULD add a random delay before sending `update_fail_htlc`.
- If `blinding_point` is set in the incoming `update_add_htlc`: - If `blinding_point` is set in the incoming `update_add_htlc`:
- MUST send an `update_fail_malformed_htlc` error using the - MUST send an `update_fail_malformed_htlc` error using the
`invalid_onion_blinding` failure code with the `sha256_of_onion` `invalid_onion_blinding` failure code for any local or downstream errors.
of the onion it received, for any local or downstream errors. - SHOULD use the `sha256_of_onion` of the onion it received.
- MAY use an all zero `sha256_of_onion`.
A receiving node: A receiving node:
- if the `id` does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction: - if the `id` does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction:
@ -1166,7 +1168,7 @@ A receiving node:
- MUST send a `warning` and close the connection, or send an - MUST send a `warning` and close the connection, or send an
`error` and fail the channel. `error` and fail the channel.
- if the `sha256_of_onion` in `update_fail_malformed_htlc` doesn't match the - if the `sha256_of_onion` in `update_fail_malformed_htlc` doesn't match the
onion it sent: onion it sent and is not all zero:
- MAY retry or choose an alternate error response. - MAY retry or choose an alternate error response.
- otherwise, a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by `update_fail_malformed_htlc`: - otherwise, a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by `update_fail_malformed_htlc`:
- MUST return an error in the `update_fail_htlc` sent to the link which - MUST return an error in the `update_fail_htlc` sent to the link which