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BOLT 8: fix names of returned values of ECDH function

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ref. http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#overview-of-handshake-state-machine
Change `ss` to `es`, `ee`, `se` according to each case.
This commit is contained in:
Hiroki Gondo 2018-08-10 13:46:07 +09:00 committed by Olaoluwa Osuntokun
parent 57dad8161b
commit 46b616c142
1 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions
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08-transport.md
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@ -231,10 +231,10 @@ and 16 bytes for the `poly1305` tag.
2. `h = SHA-256(h || e.pub.serializeCompressed())`
* The newly generated ephemeral key is accumulated into the running
handshake digest.
3. `ss = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
3. `es = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
* The initiator performs an ECDH between its newly generated ephemeral
key and the remote node's static public key.
4. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
4. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, es)`
* A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
used to generate the authenticating MAC.
5. `c = encryptWithAD(temp_k1, 0, h, zero)`
@ -258,10 +258,10 @@ and 16 bytes for the `poly1305` tag.
4. `h = SHA-256(h || re.serializeCompressed())`
* The responder accumulates the initiator's ephemeral key into the authenticating
handshake digest.
5. `ss = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
5. `es = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
* The responder performs an ECDH between its static private key and the
initiator's ephemeral public key.
6. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
6. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, es)`
* A new temporary encryption key is generated, which will
shortly be used to check the authenticating MAC.
7. `p = decryptWithAD(temp_k1, 0, h, c)`
@ -293,10 +293,10 @@ for the `poly1305` tag.
2. `h = SHA-256(h || e.pub.serializeCompressed())`
* The newly generated ephemeral key is accumulated into the running
handshake digest.
3. `ss = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
3. `ee = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
* where `re` is the ephemeral key of the initiator, which was received
during Act One
4. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
4. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ee)`
* A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
used to generate the authenticating MAC.
5. `c = encryptWithAD(temp_k2, 0, h, zero)`
@ -315,12 +315,12 @@ for the `poly1305` tag.
3. If `v` is an unrecognized handshake version, then the responder MUST
abort the connection attempt.
4. `h = SHA-256(h || re.serializeCompressed())`
5. `ss = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
5. `ee = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
* where `re` is the responder's ephemeral public key
* The raw bytes of the remote party's ephemeral public key (`re`) are to be
deserialized into a point on the curve using affine coordinates as encoded
by the key's serialized composed format.
6. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
6. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ee)`
* A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
used to generate the authenticating MAC.
7. `p = decryptWithAD(temp_k2, 0, h, c)`
@ -353,9 +353,9 @@ construction, and 16 bytes for a final authenticating tag.
1. `c = encryptWithAD(temp_k2, 1, h, s.pub.serializeCompressed())`
* where `s` is the static public key of the initiator
2. `h = SHA-256(h || c)`
3. `ss = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
3. `se = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
* where `re` is the ephemeral public key of the responder
4. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
4. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, se)`
* The final intermediate shared secret is mixed into the running chaining key.
5. `t = encryptWithAD(temp_k3, 0, h, zero)`
* where `zero` is a zero-length plaintext
@ -383,9 +383,9 @@ construction, and 16 bytes for a final authenticating tag.
* At this point, the responder has recovered the static public key of the
initiator.
5. `h = SHA-256(h || c)`
6. `ss = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
6. `se = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
* where `e` is the responder's original ephemeral key
7. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
7. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, se)`
8. `p = decryptWithAD(temp_k3, 0, h, t)`
* If the MAC check in this operation fails, then the responder MUST
terminate the connection without any further messages.