mirrors/lightning-bolts
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/lightning/bolts.git synced 2024-11-19 01:50:03 +01:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

BOLT 2: advise ping-before-commitment_signed on quiescent connections. (#508)

Browse Source 
This seems to be a cause of stuck HTLCs on the network: c-lightning has
done this for a while now (since 0.6.1).

[ Minor wording clarification merged --RR ]
Decided-at: Adelaide Summit 2018
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell 2018-11-29 04:32:11 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 4c12ae8a27
commit 20524d4109
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
1 changed files with 9 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

9
02-peer-protocol.md
View File

@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ change the commitment transaction aside from the new revocation hash
fee changes). fee changes).
- MUST include one `htlc_signature` for every HTLC transaction corresponding - MUST include one `htlc_signature` for every HTLC transaction corresponding
to BIP69 lexicographic ordering of the commitment transaction. to BIP69 lexicographic ordering of the commitment transaction.
- if it has not recently received a message from the remote node:
- SHOULD use `ping` and await the reply `pong` before sending `commitment_signed`.
A receiving node: A receiving node:
- once all pending updates are applied: - once all pending updates are applied:
@ -958,6 +960,13 @@ There's little point offering spam updates: it implies a bug.
The `num_htlcs` field is redundant, but makes the packet length check fully self-contained. The `num_htlcs` field is redundant, but makes the packet length check fully self-contained.
The recommendation to require recent messages recognizes the reality
that networks are unreliable: nodes might not realize their peers are
offline until after sending `commitment_signed`. Once
`commitment_signed` is sent, the sender considers itself bound to
those HTLCs, and cannot fail the related incoming HTLCs until the
output HTLCs are fully resolved.
### Completing the Transition to the Updated State: `revoke_and_ack` ### Completing the Transition to the Updated State: `revoke_and_ack`
Once the recipient of `commitment_signed` checks the signature and knows Once the recipient of `commitment_signed` checks the signature and knows