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BOLT 5: requirement to fail HTLCs which don't have outputs in the commit tx.
BOLT 5 only talks in terms out HTLC outputs, but not all HTLCs have outputs. HTLCs which are dust for both sides are easy, but others require the commit tx to be buried before we can consider the HTLC failed. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ B's *commitment transaction*, hence the requirement to handle both.
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Each HTLC output can only be spent by us after it's timed out,
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or them if they have the payment preimage.
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There can be HTLCs which are not represented by an output: either
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because they were trimmed as dust, or in the case where B has two
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valid commitment transactions, and the HTLCs differ in each.
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The HTLC has *timed out* once the depth of the latest block is equal
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or greater than the HTLC `cltv_expiry`.
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@ -232,6 +235,13 @@ Transaction Handling". Otherwise it MUST resolve the
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output by spending it to a convenient address.
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For any committed HTLC which does not have an output in this
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commitment transaction, the node MUST fail the corresponding incoming
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HTLC (if any) once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable
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depth, and MAY fail it sooner if no valid commitment transaction
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contains an output corresponding to the HTLC.
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## Rationale
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@ -270,6 +280,16 @@ reason `permanent_channel_failure`) as detailed in [BOLT
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02](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md#forwarding-htlcs).
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If an HTLC is too small to appear in *any* commitment transaction, it
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can be safely failed immediately and `update_fail_htlc` returned to
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the incoming HTLC (if any: it might be locally-generated). Otherwise,
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if a HTLC isn't in the commitment transaction we need to make sure
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that a blockchain reorganization or race does not switch to a
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commitment transaction which does contain it, before we fail it, hence
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the wait. The requirement that we fail the incoming HTLC before its
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own timeout still applies as an upper bound.
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# On-chain HTLC Output Handling: Their Offers
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