eclair/eclair-core/src/main/resources/reference.conf

eclair {
  datadir = ${user.home}"/.eclair"

  chain = "mainnet" // "regtest" for regtest, "testnet" for testnet, "mainnet" for mainnet, "signet" for signet

  server {
    public-ips = [] // external ips, will be announced on the network
    binding-ip = "0.0.0.0"
    port = 9735
  }

  api {
    enabled = false // disabled by default for security reasons
    binding-ip = "127.0.0.1"
    port = 8080
    password = "" // password for basic auth, must be non empty if json-rpc api is enabled
  }

  bitcoind {
    host = "localhost"
    rpcport = 8332
    auth = "password" // "password" for user/password authentication, "safecookie" for cookie authentication
    cookie = ${user.home}"/.bitcoin/.cookie"
    rpcuser = "foo"
    rpcpassword = "bar"
    // Name of the bitcoind wallet that should be used to fund channels.
    // Once set you should NOT change it if your node has channels open, otherwise you may lose funds.
    // NB: leave this field commented to automatically select the default loaded wallet.
    // wallet = ""
    zmqblock = "tcp://127.0.0.1:29000"
    zmqtx = "tcp://127.0.0.1:29000"
    // Batching requests saves bandwidth but may slightly degrade latency and reliability. It is useful for the watcher,
    // which can generate a lot of requests to validate channels, iterate over blocks to find a spending tx, etc.
    // You may want to disable this when bitcoin is running on a remote machine with an unreliable network.
    batch-watcher-requests = true
    // If some utxos are locked when eclair starts, it is likely because it was previously stopped in the middle of
    // funding a transaction. The supported behaviors to handle this case are:
    //  - stop: eclair won't start until the corresponding utxos are unlocked by the node operator
    //  - unlock: eclair will automatically unlock the corresponding utxos
    //  - ignore: eclair will leave these utxos locked and start
    startup-locked-utxos-behavior = "stop"
    final-pubkey-refresh-delay = 3 seconds
    // If true, eclair will poll bitcoind for 30 seconds at start-up before giving up.
    wait-for-bitcoind-up = true
  }

  node-alias = "eclair"
  node-color = "49daaa"

  trampoline-payments-enable = false // TODO: @t-bast: once spec-ed this should use a global feature flag
  // see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/09-features.md
  features {
    // option_upfront_shutdown_script is not activated by default.
    // If you activate it, eclair will ask bitcoin core for a wallet address whenever a new channel is created, and
    // funds will be sent to that address when the channel is closed.
    // You will not be able to change this address, which can be dangerous, especially for very long lived channels.
    // Make sure you understand what it implies before you activate this feature.
    option_upfront_shutdown_script = disabled
    option_data_loss_protect = mandatory
    gossip_queries = optional
    gossip_queries_ex = optional
    var_onion_optin = mandatory
    option_static_remotekey = mandatory
    payment_secret = mandatory
    basic_mpp = optional
    option_support_large_channel = optional
    // NB: option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx should always be preferred to option_anchor_outputs (it's safer).
    // Do not enable option_anchor_outputs unless you really know what you're doing.
    option_anchor_outputs = disabled
    option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = optional
    option_route_blinding = optional
    option_shutdown_anysegwit = optional
    option_dual_fund = optional
    option_quiesce = optional
    option_onion_messages = optional
    option_channel_type = optional
    option_scid_alias = optional
    option_payment_metadata = optional
    // By enabling option_zeroconf, you will be trusting your peer as fundee. You will lose funds if they double spend
    // their funding tx. Eclair does not let you activate this feature by default, you have to activate it for every
    // node that you trust using override-init-features (see below).
    option_zeroconf = disabled
    keysend = disabled
    trampoline_payment_prototype = disabled
    async_payment_prototype = disabled
  }
  // The following section lets you customize features for specific nodes.
  // The overrides will be applied on top of the default features settings.
  override-init-features = [ // optional per-node features
    #  {
    #    nodeid = "02aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
    #    features { }
    #  }
  ]
  sync-whitelist = [] // a list of public keys; if non-empty, we will only do the initial sync with those peers

  channel {
    channel-flags {
      announce-channel = true
    }

    funding {
      // Each RBF attempt adds more data that we need to store and process, so we want to limit our peers to a reasonable use of RBF.
      remote-rbf-limits {
        max-attempts = 5 // maximum number of RBF attempts our peer is allowed to make
        attempt-delta-blocks = 6 // minimum number of blocks between RBF attempts
      }
    }

    dust-limit-satoshis = 546
    max-remote-dust-limit-satoshis = 600
    htlc-minimum-msat = 1
    // The following parameters apply to each HTLC direction (incoming or outgoing), which means that the maximum amount in flight will be at most twice what is set here.
    // Note that our peer may use a lower value than ours, which would reduce the maximum amount in flight.
    // The smallest value of max-htlc-value-in-flight-msat and max-htlc-value-in-flight-percent will be applied when opening channels.
    // If for example you open a 60 mBTC channel, eclair will set max-htlc-value-in-flight to 27 mBTC.
    max-htlc-value-in-flight-msat = 5000000000 // 50 mBTC
    max-htlc-value-in-flight-percent = 45 // 45% of the channel capacity
    max-accepted-htlcs = 30

    reserve-to-funding-ratio = 0.01 // recommended by BOLT #2
    max-reserve-to-funding-ratio = 0.05 // channel reserve can't be more than 5% of the funding amount (recommended: 1%)
    min-public-funding-satoshis = 100000
    min-private-funding-satoshis = 100000
    require-confirmed-inputs-for-dual-funding = false // if true, only confirmed inputs will be accepted for channel dual funding

    to-remote-delay-blocks = 720 // number of blocks that the other node's to-self outputs must be delayed (720 ~ 5 days)
    max-to-local-delay-blocks = 2016 // maximum number of blocks that we are ready to accept for our own delayed outputs (2016 ~ 2 weeks)
    mindepth-blocks = 3
    expiry-delta-blocks = 144
    max-expiry-delta-blocks = 2016 // we won't forward HTLCs with timeouts greater than this delta
    // When we receive the preimage for an HTLC and want to fulfill it but the upstream peer stops responding, we want to
    // avoid letting its HTLC-timeout transaction become enforceable on-chain (otherwise there is a race condition between
    // our HTLC-success and their HTLC-timeout).
    // We will close the channel when the HTLC-timeout will happen in less than this number.
    // NB: this number effectively reduces the expiry-delta-blocks, so you may want to take that into account and increase
    // expiry-delta-blocks.
    fulfill-safety-before-timeout-blocks = 24
    min-final-expiry-delta-blocks = 30 // Bolt 11 invoice's min_final_cltv_expiry; must be strictly greater than fulfill-safety-before-timeout-blocks
    max-restart-watch-delay = 60 seconds // we add a random delay before watching funding transactions after restart
    max-block-processing-delay = 30 seconds // we add a random delay before processing blocks, capped at this value, to prevent herd effect
    max-tx-publish-retry-delay = 60 seconds // we add a random delay before retrying failed transaction publication
    // When a channel has been spent while we were offline, we limit how many blocks in the past we scan, otherwise we
    // may scan the entire blockchain (which is very costly). It doesn't make sense to scan too far in the past, as an
    // attacker will already have swept the funds if we didn't detect a channel close that happened a long time ago.
    max-channel-spent-rescan-blocks = 720

    // The default strategy, when we encounter an unhandled exception or internal error, is to locally force-close the
    // channel. Not only is there a delay before the channel balance gets refunded, but if the exception was due to some
    // misconfiguration or bug in eclair that affects all channels, we risk force-closing all channels.
    // This is why an alternative behavior is to simply log an error and stop the node. Note that if you don't closely
    // monitor your node, there is a risk that your peers take advantage of the downtime to try and cheat by publishing a
    // revoked commitment. Additionally, while there is no known way of triggering an internal error in eclair from the
    // outside, there may very well be a bug that allows just that, which could be used as a way to remotely stop the node
    // (with the default behavior, it would "only" cause a local force-close of the channel).
    unhandled-exception-strategy = "local-close" // local-close or stop

    revocation-timeout = 20 seconds // after sending a commit_sig, we will wait for at most that duration before disconnecting

    channel-open-limits {
      max-pending-channels-per-peer = 3 // maximum number of pending channels we will accept from a given peer
      max-total-pending-channels-private-nodes = 99 // maximum number of pending channels we will accept from all private nodes
      channel-opener-whitelist = [] // a list of public keys; we will ignore rate limits on pending channels from these peers
    }

    accept-incoming-static-remote-key-channels = false // whether we accept new incoming static_remote_key channels (which are obsolete, nodes should use anchor_output now)

    quiescence-timeout = 1 minutes // maximum time we will stay quiescent (or wait to reach quiescence) before disconnecting

    channel-update {
      // Balance thresholds at which to update the maximum HTLC amount
      // Must be in increasing order.
      // Set balance-thresholds = [] to disable this feature.
      balance-thresholds = [{
        available-sat = 1000  // If our balance goes below this,
        max-htlc-sat =  0     // set the maximum HTLC amount to this (or htlc-minimum-msat if it's higher).
      },{
        available-sat = 10000
        max-htlc-sat =  1000
      },{
        available-sat = 100000
        max-htlc-sat =  10000
      },{
        available-sat = 200000
        max-htlc-sat =  100000
      },{
        available-sat = 400000
        max-htlc-sat =  200000
      },{
        available-sat = 800000
        max-htlc-sat =  400000
      },{
        available-sat = 1600000
        max-htlc-sat =  800000
      }]

      min-time-between-updates = 1 hour // minimum time between channel updates because the balance changed
    }
  }

  balance-check-interval = 1 hour

  send {
    // When sending a payment, if the cltv expiry used for the final node is very close to the current block height, it
    // lets intermediate nodes figure out their position in the route. To protect against this, a random delta will be
    // added to the current block height, which makes it look like there are more hops after the final node.
    recipient-final-expiry {
      min-delta = 150 // minimum value to add to the current block height
      max-delta = 350 // maximum value to add to the current block height
    }
  }

  relay {
    fees {
      // Fees for public channels
      public-channels {
        fee-base-msat = 1000
        fee-proportional-millionths = 200 // fee charged per transferred satoshi in millionths of a satoshi (200 = 0.02%)
      }
      // Fees for private channels
      private-channels {
        fee-base-msat = 1000
        fee-proportional-millionths = 100
      }
      // Minimum fees for trampoline relays
      min-trampoline {
        fee-base-msat = 1000
        fee-proportional-millionths = 100
      }
      // Delay enforcement of channel fee updates
      enforcement-delay = 10 minutes
    }

    async-payments {
      // Maximum number of blocks to hold an async payment while waiting to receive a trigger from the receiver
      hold-timeout-blocks = 1008
      // Number of blocks before the incoming HTLC expires that an async payment must be triggered by the receiver
      cancel-safety-before-timeout-blocks = 144
    }

    // We assign reputation to our peers to prioritize payments during congestion.
    // The reputation is computed as fees paid divided by what should have been paid if all payments were successful.
    peer-reputation {
      // Set this parameter to false to disable the reputation algorithm and simply relay the incoming endorsement
      // value, as described by https://github.com/lightning/blips/blob/master/blip-0004.md,
      enabled = true
      // Reputation decays with the following half life to emphasize recent behavior.
      half-life = 15 days
      // Payments that stay pending for longer than this get penalized.
      max-relay-duration = 12 seconds
      // Pending payments are counted as failed, and because they could potentially stay pending for a very long time,
      // the following multiplier is applied. We want it to be as close as possible to the true cost of a worst case
      // HTLC (max-cltv-delta / max-relay-duration, around 100000 with default parameters) while still being comparable
      // to the number of HTLCs received per peer during twice the half life.
      pending-multiplier = 200 // A pending payment counts as two hundred failed ones.
    }
  }

  on-chain-fees {
    min-feerate = 1 // minimum feerate in satoshis per byte
    smoothing-window = 6 // 1 = no smoothing

    default-feerates { // the following values are in satoshis per byte
      minimum = 5
      slow = 5
      medium = 10
      fast = 20
      fastest = 30
    }

    // confirmation priority for each transaction type, can be slow/medium/fast
    confirmation-priority {
      funding = medium
      closing = medium
    }

    feerate-tolerance {
      ratio-low = 0.5 // will allow remote fee rates as low as half our local feerate when not using anchor outputs
      ratio-high = 10.0 // will allow remote fee rates as high as 10 times our local feerate when not using anchor outputs
      // when using anchor outputs, we only need to use a commitment feerate that allows the tx to propagate: we will use CPFP to speed up confirmation if needed.
      // the following value is the maximum feerate we'll use for our commit tx (in sat/byte)
      anchor-output-max-commit-feerate = 10
      // the following section lets you configure your tolerance to dust outputs
      dust-tolerance {
        // dust htlcs cannot be claimed on-chain and will instead go to miners if the channel is force-closed
        // a malicious peer may want to abuse that, so we limit the value of pending dust htlcs in a channel
        // this value cannot be lowered too much if you plan to relay a lot of htlcs
        max-exposure-satoshis = 50000
        // when we receive an update_fee, it could increase our dust exposure and overflow max-exposure-satoshis
        // this parameter should be set to true if you want to force-close the channel when that happens
        close-on-update-fee-overflow = false
      }
    }
    override-feerate-tolerance = [ // optional per-node feerate tolerance
      #  {
      #    nodeid = "02aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
      #    feerate-tolerance {
      #      ratio-low = 0.1
      #      ratio-high = 20.0
      #      anchor-output-max-commit-feerate = 10
      #      dust-tolerance {
      #        max-exposure-satoshis = 25000
      #        close-on-update-fee-overflow = true
      #      }
      #    }
      #  }
    ]

    // when our utxos count is below this threshold, we will use more aggressive confirmation targets in force-close scenarios
    safe-utxos-threshold = 10

    // if false, the commitment transaction will not be fee-bumped when we have no htlcs to claim (used in force-close scenario)
    // it can still be manually fee-bumped using the bumpforceclose RPC
    // *do not change this unless you know what you are doing*
    spend-anchor-without-htlcs = true
    // maximum amount of fees we will pay to bump an anchor output when we have no HTLC at risk
    anchor-without-htlcs-max-fee-satoshis = 10000

    close-on-offline-feerate-mismatch = true // do not change this unless you know what you are doing

    // the channel initiator will send an UpdateFee message if the difference between current commitment fee and actual
    // current network fee is greater than this ratio.
    update-fee-min-diff-ratio = 0.1
  }

  peer-connection {
    auth-timeout = 15 seconds // will disconnect if connection authentication doesn't happen within that timeframe
    init-timeout = 15 seconds // will disconnect if initialization doesn't happen within that timeframe
    ping-interval = 30 seconds
    ping-timeout = 20 seconds // will disconnect if peer takes longer than that to respond
    ping-disconnect = true // disconnect if no answer to our pings
    // When enabled, if we receive an incoming connection, we will echo the source IP address in our init message.
    // This should be disabled if your node is behind a load balancer that doesn't preserve source IP addresses.
    send-remote-address-init = true
    max-no-channels = 250 // maximum number of incoming connections from peers that do not have any channels with us
  }

  auto-reconnect = true
  initial-random-reconnect-delay = 5 seconds // we add a random delay before the first reconnection attempt, capped by this value
  max-reconnect-interval = 1 hour // max interval between two reconnection attempts, after the exponential backoff period

  invoice-expiry = 1 hour // default expiry for invoices generated by this node
  multi-part-payment-expiry = 60 seconds // default expiry for receiving all parts of a multi-part payment
  max-payment-attempts = 5

  autoprobe-count = 0 // number of parallel tasks that send test payments to detect invalid channels

  router {
    watch-spent-window = 60 minutes // at startup watches on public channels will be put back within that window to reduce herd effect; must be > 0s

    channel-exclude-duration = 60 seconds // when a temporary channel failure is returned, we exclude the channel from our payment routes for this duration
    broadcast-interval = 60 seconds // see BOLT #7
    init-timeout = 5 minutes
    balance-estimate-half-life = 1 day // time after which the confidence of the balance estimate is halved

    sync {
      request-node-announcements = true // if true we will ask for node announcements when we receive channel ids that we don't know
      channel-range-chunk-size = 1500 // max number of short_channel_ids (+ timestamps + checksums) in reply_channel_range *do not change this unless you know what you are doing*
      channel-query-chunk-size = 100 // max number of short_channel_ids in query_short_channel_ids *do not change this unless you know what you are doing*
    }

    message-path-finding {
      max-route-length = 6
      ratios {
        // The next three weights must sum to one.
        base = 0.6             // when computing the weight for a channel, proportion that stays the same for all channels
        channel-age = 0.1      // when computing the weight for a channel, consider its AGE in this proportion
        channel-capacity = 0.3 // when computing the weight for a channel, consider its CAPACITY in this proportion
      }
    }

    path-finding {
      default {
        randomize-route-selection = true // when computing a route for a payment we randomize the final selection

        boundaries {
          max-route-length = 6         // max route length for the 'first pass', if none is found then a second pass is made with no limit
          max-cltv = 2016              // max acceptable cltv expiry for the payment (2016 ~ 2 weeks)
          // the route must have a fee that's below max-fee-flat-sat OR below max-fee-proportional-percent / 100 * total-amount
          max-fee-flat-sat = 21
          max-fee-proportional-percent = 3 // that's 3%
        }

        use-ratios = true // if false, will use failure-cost
        // channel 'weight' is computed with the following formula: (channelFee + hop-cost) * (ratio-base + cltvDelta * ratio-cltv + channelAge * ratio-channel-age + channelCapacity * ratio-channel-capacity)
        // the following parameters can be used to ask the router to use heuristics to find i.e: 'cltv-optimized' routes, **the sum of the four ratios must be 1**
        ratios {
          base = 0.0
          cltv = 0.05             // when computing the weight for a channel, consider its CLTV delta in this proportion
          channel-age = 0.4       // when computing the weight for a channel, consider its AGE in this proportion
          channel-capacity = 0.55 // when computing the weight for a channel, consider its CAPACITY in this proportion
        }

        hop-cost {
          // virtual fee for additional hops: how much you are willing to pay to get one less hop in the payment path
          fee-base-msat = 500
          fee-proportional-millionths = 200
        }

        locked-funds-risk = 1e-8 // msat per msat locked per block. It should be your expected interest rate per block multiplied by the probability that something goes wrong and your funds stay locked.
        // 1e-8 corresponds to an interest rate of ~5% per year (1e-6 per block) and a probability of 1% that the channel will fail and our funds will be locked.

        // virtual fee for failed payments: how much you are willing to pay to get one less failed payment attempt
        // ignored if use-ratio = true
        failure-cost {
          fee-base-msat = 2000
          fee-proportional-millionths = 500
        }
        // Using a failure cost breaks Dijkstra (the path returned is no longer guaranteed to be shortest one), if
        // that's a concern, you can penalize paths with a low success chance by using the logarithm of the probability
        // of success. It satisfies Dijkstra's requirements and is a very good approximation for paths with a high
        // probability of success, however is penalizes less the paths with a low probability of success.
        use-log-probability = false

        mpp {
          min-amount-satoshis = 15000 // minimum amount sent via partial HTLCs
          max-parts = 5 // maximum number of HTLCs sent per payment: increasing this value will impact performance
        }
      }

      // The path-finding algo uses one or more sets of parameters named experiments. Each experiment has a percentage
      // assigned, allowing AB-testing. By default, there is a single 'control' experiment with a percentage of 100 %.
      //
      // To enable AB-testing, you need to define experiments below. Note that:
      // - each experiment must have a unique name, may override the default parameters, and must provide a percentage
      // - the percentages for all experiments must sum to 100
      // - experiments should be immutable; if you alter parameters of an experiment, you should also rename it
      // - for a complete example, refer to the documentation.
      experiments {
        control = ${eclair.router.path-finding.default} {
          percentage = 100 // 100% of the traffic use the default configuration
        }
      }
    }
  }

  socks5 {
    enabled = false
    host = "127.0.0.1"
    port = 9050
    use-for-ipv4 = true
    use-for-ipv6 = true
    use-for-tor = true
    use-for-watchdogs = true
    use-for-dnshostnames = true
    randomize-credentials = false // this allows tor stream isolation
  }

  tor {
    enabled = false
    auth = "password" // safecookie, password
    password = "foobar" // used when auth=password
    host = "127.0.0.1"
    port = 9051
    private-key-file = "tor.dat"
    targets = [] // a list of address:port, for advanced use (e.g. to send traffic to front servers). See the tor man page for syntax details.
    publish-onion-address = true
  }

  db {
    driver = "sqlite" // sqlite, postgres, dual-sqlite-primary, dual-postgres-primary
    postgres {
      database = "eclair"
      host = "localhost"
      port = 5432
      username = ""
      password = ""
      readonly-user = "" // if defined, this user will be granted read-only access to all tables in the database
      reset-json-columns = false // in case of a json format change, this allows a full re-serialization of json data
      pool {
        max-size = 10 // recommended value = number_of_cpu_cores * 2
        connection-timeout = 30 seconds
        idle-timeout = 10 minutes
        max-life-time = 30 minutes
      }
      lock-type = "lease" // lease or none (do not use none in production)
      lease {
        interval = 5 minutes // lease-interval must be greater than lease-renew-interval
        renew-interval = 1 minute
        lock-timeout = 5 seconds // timeout for the lock statement on the lease table
        auto-release-at-shutdown = true // automatically release the lock when eclair is stopping
      }
      safety-checks {
        // A set of basic checks on data to make sure we use the correct database
        // Those checks are disabled by default because they would not pass on a fresh new node with
        // zero channels. You should enable them when you already have channels, so that there is
        // something to compare to, and the values should be specific to your setup, especially
        // for local channels. If your operate a busy node, you can reduce max-age.local-channels
        // and max-age.audit-relayed to just a few minutes, this will significantly improve the safety.
        enabled = false
        max-age {
          local-channels = 15 minutes // last time a local channel was updated
          network-nodes = 30 minutes // most recent public node announcement
          audit-relayed = 1 hour // last time a payment was relayed
        }
        min-count {
          local-channels = 10 // minimum number of local channels, this entirely depends on your setup
          network-nodes = 3000 // minimum number of public nodes in the routing table
          network-channels = 20000 // minimum number of public channels in the routing table
        }
      }
    }
    dual {
      migrate-on-restart = false // migrate sqlite -> postgres on restart (only applies if sqlite is primary)
      compare-on-restart = false // compare sqlite and postgres dbs on restart (only applies if sqlite is primary)
    }
    // During normal channel operation, we need to store information about past HTLCs to be able to punish our peer if
    // they publish a revoked commitment. Once a channel closes or a splice transaction confirms, we can clean up past
    // data (which reduces the size of our DB). Since there may be millions of rows to delete and we don't want to slow
    // down the node, we delete those rows in batches at regular intervals.
    revoked-htlc-info-cleaner {
      // Number of rows to delete per batch: a higher value will clean up the DB faster, but may have a higher impact on performance.
      batch-size = 50000
      // Frequency at which batches of rows are deleted: a lower value will clean up the DB faster, but may have a higher impact on performance.
      interval = 15 minutes
    }
  }

  file-backup {
    enabled = true // enable the automatic sqlite db backup; do not change this unless you know what you are doing
    interval = 10 seconds // interval between two backups
    target-file = "eclair.sqlite.bak" // name of the target backup file; will be placed under the chain directory
    // override this with a script/exe that will be called everytime a new database backup has been created
    # notify-script = "/absolute/path/to/script.sh"
  }

  blockchain-watchdog {
    // all available blockchain watchdog sources
    // you can remove items from this list to disable failing or non-needed sources
    sources = [
      "bitcoinheaders.net",
      "blockcypher.com",
      "blockstream.info",
      "mempool.space"
    ]
    // maximum lag of chain height observed by eclair to blockchain watchdog sources
    missing-blocks-threshold = 7
  }

  onion-messages {
    # Valid values are
    # - channels-only: Only relay messages from peers with which we have a channel to peers with which we have a channel.
    # - relay-all: Relay everything and create new connections if necessary
    relay-policy = "channels-only"
    # If you want to never relay onion messages (but still be able to send and receive them), you need to set
    # features.option_onion_messages = disabled

    # Transient connections opened to relay messages will be closed after this delay of inactivity
    kill-transient-connection-after = 30 seconds

    max-per-peer-per-second = 10

    # Minimum number of hops before our node to hide it in the reply paths that we build
    min-intermediate-hops = 6

    # Consider a message to be lost if we haven't received a reply after that amount of time
    reply-timeout = 15 seconds

    # If we expect a reply but do not get one, retry until we reach this number of attempts
    max-attempts = 3
  }

  purge-expired-invoices {
    enabled = true // enable automatic purges of expired invoices from the database
    interval = 24 hours // interval between expired invoice purges
  }
}

akka {
  io {
    tcp {
      # The maximum number of bytes delivered by a `Received` message. Before
      # more data is read from the network the connection actor will try to
      # do other work.
      # The purpose of this setting is to impose a smaller limit than the
      # configured receive buffer size. When using value 'unlimited' it will
      # try to read all from the receive buffer.
      # As per BOLT#8 lightning messages are at most 2 + 16 + 65535 + 16 = 65569bytes
      # As a tradeoff to reduce the RAM consumption, in conjunction with tcp pull mode,
      # the default value is chosen to allow for a decent number of messages to be prefetched.
      max-received-message-size = 300000b
    }
  }

  actor {
    warn-about-java-serializer-usage = on
    allow-java-serialization = off

    serializers {
      lightning = "fr.acinq.eclair.remote.LightningMessageSerializer"
      eclair-internals = "fr.acinq.eclair.remote.EclairInternalsSerializer"
    }

    serialization-bindings {
      "fr.acinq.eclair.wire.protocol.LightningMessage" = lightning
      "fr.acinq.eclair.remote.EclairInternalsSerializer$RemoteTypes" = eclair-internals
    }
  }

  remote.artery {
    transport = "tcp" // switching to tls-tcp is highly recommended in a production environment

    // We are using a simple setup (https://doc.akka.io/docs/akka/current/remoting-artery.html#remote-security):
    // > Have a single set of keys and a single certificate for all nodes and disable hostname checking
    // > - The single set of keys and the single certificate is distributed to all nodes. The certificate can be self-signed as it is distributed both as a certificate for authentication but also as the trusted certificate.
    // > - If the keys/certificate are lost, someone else can connect to your cluster.
    // > - Adding nodes to the cluster is simple as the key material can be deployed / distributed to the new node.
    // Command line used to generate the self-signed certificate:
    //    keytool -genkeypair -v \
    //    -keystore akka-cluster-tls.jks \
    //    -dname "O=ACINQ, C=FR" \
    //    -keypass:env PW \
    //    -storepass:env PW \
    //    -keyalg RSA \
    //    -keysize 4096 \
    //    -validity 9999
    ssl.config-ssl-engine {
      key-store = ${eclair.datadir}"/akka-cluster-tls.jks"
      trust-store = ${eclair.datadir}"/akka-cluster-tls.jks"

      key-store-password = ${?AKKA_TLS_PASSWORD}
      key-password = ${?AKKA_TLS_PASSWORD}
      trust-store-password = ${?AKKA_TLS_PASSWORD}

      protocol = "TLSv1.2"

      enabled-algorithms = [TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256]
    }
  }

  cluster {
    role {
      backend.min-nr-of-members = 1
      frontend.min-nr-of-members = 0
    }
    seed-nodes = ["akka://eclair-node@127.0.0.1:25520"]
  }
}