The current trimming logic [1] as defined in the spec only takes
care of 2nd level txes, making sure that their outputs are greater
than the configured dust limit. However, it is very possible that
depending on the current `feeRatePerKw`, 3rd level transactions
(such as those claiming delayed outputs) are below the dust limit.
Current implementation wasn't taking care of that, and was happily
generating transactions with negative amounts, as reported in #164.
This fixes#164 by rejecting transactions with an amount below the
dust limit, similarly to what happens when the parent output is
trimmed for 2nd level txes.
[1] https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/03-transactions.md#trimmed-outputs
Current implementation was simplistic, which resulted in writes
being rejected when OS buffer was full. This happened especially
right after connection, when dumping a large routing table.
It is not clear whether we need read throttling too.
The scenario was already tested at a lower level, but this is
more realistic, with a real bitcoin core.
Note that we currently only steal the counterparty's *main output*,
we ignore pending htlcs. From an incentive point-of-view, it is an
acceptable tradeoff because the amount of in-flight htlcs should
typically be far less than the main outputs (and can be configured
with `max-htlc-value-in-flight-msat`).
* handling `update_fail_malformed` messages in payment fsm
* added check on failure code for malformed htlc errors
Spec says that the `update_fail_malformed_htlc`.`failure_code`
must have the BADONION bit set.
* removed hard-coded actor names in fuzzy tests
We previously skipped the `handleSync` function when we had to re-send
`funding_locked` messages on reconnection. This didn't take into account
the fact that we might have been disconnected right after sending the
very first `commit_sig` in the channel. In that case we need to first
re-send `funding_locked`, then re-send whatever updates were included in
the lost signature, and finally re-send the same `commit_sig`.
Note that the specification doesn't require to re-send the exact same
updates and signatures on reconnection. But doing this allows for a single
commitment history and allows us not to keep track of all signatures
sent to the other party.
Closes#165
* now requiring spv nodes to be 0.13+
* properly setting bitcoinj Context
* disconnect peers which do not provide witness data
* waiting for bitcoinj to be initialized before going further in the setup
This is less performant but our ResultSet->Iterator implementation
was buggy due to java/scala iterators requiring look-ahead capabilities
when iterating over the result, which ResultSet does not support.
This is a quick fix in the meantime.
When a node return a `TemporaryChannelFailure` for its outgoing
channel, along with an unchanged `ChannelUpdate`, we temporarily
exclude this channel from route calculation.
Note that the exclusion is directed, as we expect this will mostly
happen when all funds are on one side of the channel.
The duration of the exclusion can be configured by setting the
key `eclair.channel-exclude-duration`. Default value is 60s.
* Add API method to accept requests with custom amount
- can be used to send up to 2x higher amount than requested according to BOLT11
- should be used for payment requests without amounts
* Refactor 'send' method in API
* Add comments and description for 'send' API method
Eclair wasn't stopping anymore when two instances were started with the
same ports.
Note: we should probably go one step further and put a lock in the datadir
directory. For now we just check if the main TCP port is in use and fail fast.
Most notably, we do not anymore discard previously signed updates.
Instead, we re-send them and re-send the exact same signature. For that to
work, we had to be careful to re-send rev/sig in the same order, because
that impacts whatever is signed.
NB: this breaks storage serialization backward compatibility
* reworked payment lifecycle
* fixed retry logic (infinite loop in some cases)
* check update signature
* keep track of the list of errors and routes tried
* added support for sending bolt11 payment request in the API
* updated eclair-cli and deleted deprecated TESTING.md (closes#112)
* removed useless application.conf in eclair-node
* now handling CMD_CLOSE in shutdown/negotiating/closing states
* added no-op handlers for FundingLocked and CurrentFeeRate messages
* cleaning up stale announcements on restart
* more informative/less spam logs in Channel
* (gui) Wrapping payment events to display date of event
* Also added controls to item content in cell factory overrides. This
should prevent prevent duplicates as reported in #115
* handle overflow for field 'max-htlc-value-in-flight'
* moved serialization of uint64 to codecs class
* moved constraint check
* fix configuration (was using hard coded values)
* using UInt64.MaxValue in test constants
* added a default handler for 'ok' messages in Channel
* update_add_htlc wire message: swap expiry and payment hash fields
see BOLT 2
* fix accept_channel wire encoding
'min depth' and 'hlc min msat' fields we swapped
* gui: set ip to "unknown" when it has not been set in node announcements
* reduced logging for Reconnect events
* peer is now able to switch transports, in case of undetected disconnection
* now using an exponential backoff retry when reconnecting to peers
* put the arguments of the 'open' http method in the same order as the uri
