* Support building of outgoing payments with optional extra hops from payment requests
* Add test for route calculation with extra hops
* Simplify pattern matching in `buildExtra`
* `buildPayment` now uses a reverse Seq[Hop] to create a Seq[ExtraHop]
Since `Router` currently stores `ChannelUpdate`'s for non-public channels, it is possible to use it not only to get a route from payer to payee but also to get a "reverse" assisted route from payee when creating a `PaymentRequest`.
In principle this could be used to even generate a full reverse path to a payer which does not have an access to routing table for some reason.
* Can create `PaymentRequest`s with `RoutingInfoTag`s
* Bugfix and update test with data from live payment testing
* Move ExtraHop to PaymentRequest.scala
Instead of only subscribing to those events when we reach certain states,
we now always subscribe to them at startup. It doesn't cost a lot because
we receive an event only when a new block appears, and is much simpler.
Note that we previously didn't even bother unsubscribing when we weren't
interested anymore in the events, and were ignoring the messages in the
`whenUnhandled` block. So it is more consistent to have the same behavior
during the whole lifetime of the channel.
This fixes#187.
* payment request expiry encoding: add Anton's test
it shows that we don't encode/decode values which would take up more than 2 5-bits value
* payment request: encode expiry as a varlen unsigned value
fixes#186
Current version attempted to do everything at once, and would always
leave the NORMAL state after processing the `shutdown` message. In
addition to being overly complicated, it had bugs because it is just
not always possible to do so: for example when we have unsigned outgoing
`update_add_htlc` and are already in the process of signing older changes,
the only thing we can do is wait for the counterparty's `revoke_and_ack`
and sign again right away when we receive it. Only after that can we
send our `shutdown` message, and we can't accept new `update_add_htlc`
in the meantime.
Another issue with the current implementation was that we considered
unsigned outgoing *changes*, when only unsigned outgoing `update_add_htlc`
are relevant in the context of `shutdown` logic.
We now also fail to route htlcs in SHUTDOWN state, as recommended by BOLT 2.
This fixes#173.
The current trimming logic [1] as defined in the spec only takes
care of 2nd level txes, making sure that their outputs are greater
than the configured dust limit. However, it is very possible that
depending on the current `feeRatePerKw`, 3rd level transactions
(such as those claiming delayed outputs) are below the dust limit.
Current implementation wasn't taking care of that, and was happily
generating transactions with negative amounts, as reported in #164.
This fixes#164 by rejecting transactions with an amount below the
dust limit, similarly to what happens when the parent output is
trimmed for 2nd level txes.
[1] https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/03-transactions.md#trimmed-outputs
Current implementation was simplistic, which resulted in writes
being rejected when OS buffer was full. This happened especially
right after connection, when dumping a large routing table.
It is not clear whether we need read throttling too.
The scenario was already tested at a lower level, but this is
more realistic, with a real bitcoin core.
Note that we currently only steal the counterparty's *main output*,
we ignore pending htlcs. From an incentive point-of-view, it is an
acceptable tradeoff because the amount of in-flight htlcs should
typically be far less than the main outputs (and can be configured
with `max-htlc-value-in-flight-msat`).
* handling `update_fail_malformed` messages in payment fsm
* added check on failure code for malformed htlc errors
Spec says that the `update_fail_malformed_htlc`.`failure_code`
must have the BADONION bit set.
* removed hard-coded actor names in fuzzy tests
We previously skipped the `handleSync` function when we had to re-send
`funding_locked` messages on reconnection. This didn't take into account
the fact that we might have been disconnected right after sending the
very first `commit_sig` in the channel. In that case we need to first
re-send `funding_locked`, then re-send whatever updates were included in
the lost signature, and finally re-send the same `commit_sig`.
Note that the specification doesn't require to re-send the exact same
updates and signatures on reconnection. But doing this allows for a single
commitment history and allows us not to keep track of all signatures
sent to the other party.
Closes#165
* now requiring spv nodes to be 0.13+
* properly setting bitcoinj Context
* disconnect peers which do not provide witness data
* waiting for bitcoinj to be initialized before going further in the setup
This is less performant but our ResultSet->Iterator implementation
was buggy due to java/scala iterators requiring look-ahead capabilities
when iterating over the result, which ResultSet does not support.
This is a quick fix in the meantime.
When a node return a `TemporaryChannelFailure` for its outgoing
channel, along with an unchanged `ChannelUpdate`, we temporarily
exclude this channel from route calculation.
Note that the exclusion is directed, as we expect this will mostly
happen when all funds are on one side of the channel.
The duration of the exclusion can be configured by setting the
key `eclair.channel-exclude-duration`. Default value is 60s.
* Add API method to accept requests with custom amount
- can be used to send up to 2x higher amount than requested according to BOLT11
- should be used for payment requests without amounts
* Refactor 'send' method in API
* Add comments and description for 'send' API method
Eclair wasn't stopping anymore when two instances were started with the
same ports.
Note: we should probably go one step further and put a lock in the datadir
directory. For now we just check if the main TCP port is in use and fail fast.
Most notably, we do not anymore discard previously signed updates.
Instead, we re-send them and re-send the exact same signature. For that to
work, we had to be careful to re-send rev/sig in the same order, because
that impacts whatever is signed.
NB: this breaks storage serialization backward compatibility
* reworked payment lifecycle
* fixed retry logic (infinite loop in some cases)
* check update signature
* keep track of the list of errors and routes tried
* added support for sending bolt11 payment request in the API
* updated eclair-cli and deleted deprecated TESTING.md (closes#112)
* removed useless application.conf in eclair-node
* now handling CMD_CLOSE in shutdown/negotiating/closing states
* added no-op handlers for FundingLocked and CurrentFeeRate messages
* cleaning up stale announcements on restart
* more informative/less spam logs in Channel
* (gui) Wrapping payment events to display date of event
* Also added controls to item content in cell factory overrides. This
should prevent prevent duplicates as reported in #115
* handle overflow for field 'max-htlc-value-in-flight'
* moved serialization of uint64 to codecs class
* moved constraint check
* fix configuration (was using hard coded values)
* using UInt64.MaxValue in test constants
* added a default handler for 'ok' messages in Channel
