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core-lightning/channeld/channeld.c
Rusty Russell 7401b26824 cleanup: remove unneeded includes in C files. 
Before:
 Ten builds, laptop -j5, no ccache:

```
real	0m36.686000-38.956000(38.608+/-0.65)s
user	2m32.864000-42.253000(40.7545+/-2.7)s
sys	0m16.618000-18.316000(17.8531+/-0.48)s
```

 Ten builds, laptop -j5, ccache (warm):

```
real	0m8.212000-8.577000(8.39989+/-0.13)s
user	0m12.731000-13.212000(12.9751+/-0.17)s
sys	0m3.697000-3.902000(3.83722+/-0.064)s
```

After:
 Ten builds, laptop -j5, no ccache: 8% faster

```
real	0m33.802000-35.773000(35.468+/-0.54)s
user	2m19.073000-27.754000(26.2542+/-2.3)s
sys	0m15.784000-17.173000(16.7165+/-0.37)s
```

 Ten builds, laptop -j5, ccache (warm): 1% faster

```
real	0m8.200000-8.485000(8.30138+/-0.097)s
user	0m12.485000-13.100000(12.7344+/-0.19)s
sys	0m3.702000-3.889000(3.78787+/-0.056)s
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2021-09-17 09:43:22 +09:30

3939 lines
119 KiB
C
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/* Main channel operation daemon: runs from funding_locked to shutdown_complete.
*
* We're fairly synchronous: our main loop looks for gossip, master or
* peer requests and services them synchronously.
*
* The exceptions are:
* 1. When we've asked the master something: in that case, we queue
* non-response packets for later processing while we await the reply.
* 2. We queue and send non-blocking responses to peers: if both peers were
* reading and writing synchronously we could deadlock if we hit buffer
* limits, unlikely as that is.
*/
#include <ccan/asort/asort.h>
#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
#include <channeld/channeld_wiregen.h>
#include <channeld/full_channel.h>
#include <channeld/watchtower.h>
#include <common/billboard.h>
#include <common/crypto_sync.h>
#include <common/dev_disconnect.h>
#include <common/ecdh_hsmd.h>
#include <common/gossip_store.h>
#include <common/key_derive.h>
#include <common/memleak.h>
#include <common/msg_queue.h>
#include <common/onionreply.h>
#include <common/peer_billboard.h>
#include <common/peer_failed.h>
#include <common/ping.h>
#include <common/private_channel_announcement.h>
#include <common/read_peer_msg.h>
#include <common/status.h>
#include <common/subdaemon.h>
#include <common/timeout.h>
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
#include <common/wire_error.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <gossipd/gossip_store_wiregen.h>
#include <gossipd/gossipd_peerd_wiregen.h>
#include <hsmd/hsmd_wiregen.h>
#include <wire/common_wiregen.h>
#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
/* stdin == requests, 3 == peer, 4 = gossip, 5 = gossip_store, 6 = HSM */
#define MASTER_FD STDIN_FILENO
#define HSM_FD 6
struct peer {
struct per_peer_state *pps;
bool funding_locked[NUM_SIDES];
u64 next_index[NUM_SIDES];
/* Features peer supports. */
u8 *their_features;
/* Features we support. */
struct feature_set *our_features;
/* Tolerable amounts for feerate (only relevant for fundee). */
u32 feerate_min, feerate_max;
/* Feerate to be used when creating penalty transactions. */
u32 feerate_penalty;
/* Local next per-commit point. */
struct pubkey next_local_per_commit;
/* Remote's current per-commit point. */
struct pubkey remote_per_commit;
/* Remotes's last per-commitment point: we keep this to check
* revoke_and_ack's `per_commitment_secret` is correct. */
struct pubkey old_remote_per_commit;
/* Their sig for current commit. */
struct bitcoin_signature their_commit_sig;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A sending node:
*...
* - for the first HTLC it offers:
* - MUST set `id` to 0.
*/
u64 htlc_id;
struct channel_id channel_id;
struct channel *channel;
/* Messages from master: we queue them since we might be
* waiting for a specific reply. */
struct msg_queue *from_master;
struct timers timers;
struct oneshot *commit_timer;
u64 commit_timer_attempts;
u32 commit_msec;
/* Are we expecting a pong? */
bool expecting_pong;
/* The feerate we want. */
u32 desired_feerate;
/* Current blockheight */
u32 our_blockheight;
/* Announcement related information */
struct node_id node_ids[NUM_SIDES];
struct short_channel_id short_channel_ids[NUM_SIDES];
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature announcement_node_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature announcement_bitcoin_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
bool have_sigs[NUM_SIDES];
/* Which direction of the channel do we control? */
u16 channel_direction;
/* CLTV delta to announce to peers */
u16 cltv_delta;
u32 fee_base;
u32 fee_per_satoshi;
/* The scriptpubkey to use for shutting down. */
u8 *final_scriptpubkey;
/* If master told us to shut down */
bool send_shutdown;
/* Has shutdown been sent by each side? */
bool shutdown_sent[NUM_SIDES];
/* If master told us to send wrong_funding */
struct bitcoin_outpoint *shutdown_wrong_funding;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
/* Do we want quiescence? */
bool stfu;
/* Which side is considered the initiator? */
enum side stfu_initiator;
/* Has stfu been sent by each side? */
bool stfu_sent[NUM_SIDES];
/* Updates master asked, which we've deferred while quiescing */
struct msg_queue *update_queue;
#endif
/* Information used for reestablishment. */
bool last_was_revoke;
struct changed_htlc *last_sent_commit;
u64 revocations_received;
u8 channel_flags;
bool announce_depth_reached;
bool channel_local_active;
/* Make sure timestamps move forward. */
u32 last_update_timestamp;
/* Make sure peer is live. */
struct timeabs last_recv;
/* Additional confirmations need for local lockin. */
u32 depth_togo;
/* Non-empty if they specified a fixed shutdown script */
u8 *remote_upfront_shutdown_script;
/* Empty commitments. Spec violation, but a minor one. */
u64 last_empty_commitment;
/* Penalty bases for this channel / peer. */
struct penalty_base **pbases;
/* We allow a 'tx-sigs' message between reconnect + funding_locked */
bool tx_sigs_allowed;
};
static u8 *create_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer);
static void start_commit_timer(struct peer *peer);
static void billboard_update(const struct peer *peer)
{
const char *update = billboard_message(tmpctx, peer->funding_locked,
peer->have_sigs,
peer->shutdown_sent,
peer->depth_togo,
num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel));
peer_billboard(false, update);
}
static const u8 *hsm_req(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *req TAKES)
{
u8 *msg;
int type = fromwire_peektype(req);
if (!wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, req))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Writing %s to HSM: %s",
hsmd_wire_name(type),
strerror(errno));
msg = wire_sync_read(ctx, HSM_FD);
if (!msg)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Reading resp to %s: %s",
hsmd_wire_name(type),
strerror(errno));
return msg;
}
/*
* The maximum msat that this node will accept for an htlc.
* It's flagged as an optional field in `channel_update`.
*
* We advertize the maximum value possible, defined as the smaller
* of the remote's maximum in-flight HTLC or the total channel
* capacity the reserve we have to keep.
* FIXME: does this need fuzz?
*/
static struct amount_msat advertized_htlc_max(const struct channel *channel)
{
struct amount_sat lower_bound;
struct amount_msat lower_bound_msat;
/* This shouldn't fail */
if (!amount_sat_sub(&lower_bound, channel->funding,
channel->config[REMOTE].channel_reserve)) {
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"funding %s - remote reserve %s?",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&channel->funding),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&channel->config[REMOTE]
.channel_reserve));
}
if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&lower_bound_msat, lower_bound)) {
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"lower_bound %s invalid?",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&lower_bound));
}
return lower_bound_msat;
}
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
static void maybe_send_stfu(struct peer *peer)
{
if (!peer->stfu)
return;
if (!peer->stfu_sent[LOCAL] && !pending_updates(peer->channel, LOCAL, false)) {
u8 *msg = towire_stfu(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
peer->stfu_initiator == LOCAL);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
peer->stfu_sent[LOCAL] = true;
}
if (peer->stfu_sent[LOCAL] && peer->stfu_sent[REMOTE]) {
status_unusual("STFU complete: we are quiescent");
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
towire_channeld_dev_quiesce_reply(tmpctx));
}
}
static void handle_stfu(struct peer *peer, const u8 *stfu)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u8 remote_initiated;
if (!fromwire_stfu(stfu, &channel_id, &remote_initiated))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad stfu %s", tal_hex(peer, stfu));
if (!channel_id_eq(&channel_id, &peer->channel_id)) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &channel_id,
"Wrong stfu channel_id: expected %s, got %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&peer->channel_id),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&channel_id));
}
/* Sanity check */
if (pending_updates(peer->channel, REMOTE, false))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"STFU but you still have updates pending?");
if (!peer->stfu) {
peer->stfu = true;
if (!remote_initiated)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Unsolicited STFU but you said"
" you didn't initiate?");
peer->stfu_initiator = REMOTE;
} else {
/* BOLT-quiescent #2:
*
* If both sides send `stfu` simultaneously, they will both
* set `initiator` to `1`, in which case the "initiator" is
* arbitrarily considered to be the channel funder (the sender
* of `open_channel`).
*/
if (remote_initiated)
peer->stfu_initiator = peer->channel->opener;
}
/* BOLT-quiescent #2:
* The receiver of `stfu`:
* - if it has sent `stfu` then:
* - MUST now consider the channel to be quiescent
* - otherwise:
* - SHOULD NOT send any more update messages.
* - MUST reply with `stfu` once it can do so.
*/
peer->stfu_sent[REMOTE] = true;
maybe_send_stfu(peer);
}
/* Returns true if we queued this for later handling (steals if true) */
static bool handle_master_request_later(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
if (peer->stfu) {
msg_enqueue(peer->update_queue, take(msg));
return true;
}
return false;
}
static bool match_type(const struct channel_type *desired,
const struct channel_type *current,
struct channel_type **upgradable)
{
/* Missing fields are possible. */
if (!desired || !current)
return false;
if (channel_type_eq(desired, current))
return true;
return channel_type_eq_any(desired, upgradable);
}
static void set_channel_type(struct channel *channel,
const struct channel_type *type)
{
const struct channel_type *cur = channel->type;
if (channel_type_eq(cur, type))
return;
/* We only allow one upgrade at the moment, so that's it. */
assert(!channel_has(channel, OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY));
assert(feature_offered(type->features, OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY));
/* Do upgrade, tell master. */
tal_free(channel->type);
channel->type = channel_type_dup(channel, type);
status_unusual("Upgraded channel to [%s]",
fmt_featurebits(tmpctx, type->features));
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_upgraded(NULL, channel->type)));
}
#else /* !EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */
static bool handle_master_request_later(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
return false;
}
static void maybe_send_stfu(struct peer *peer)
{
}
#endif
/* Create and send channel_update to gossipd (and maybe peer) */
static void send_channel_update(struct peer *peer, int disable_flag)
{
u8 *msg;
assert(disable_flag == 0 || disable_flag == ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED);
/* Only send an update if we told gossipd */
if (!peer->channel_local_active)
return;
assert(peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL].u64);
msg = towire_gossipd_local_channel_update(NULL,
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
disable_flag
== ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED,
peer->cltv_delta,
peer->channel->config[REMOTE].htlc_minimum,
peer->fee_base,
peer->fee_per_satoshi,
advertized_htlc_max(peer->channel));
wire_sync_write(peer->pps->gossip_fd, take(msg));
}
/* Get the latest channel update for this channel from gossipd */
static const u8 *get_local_channel_update(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer)
{
const u8 *msg;
msg = towire_gossipd_get_update(NULL, &peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL]);
wire_sync_write(peer->pps->gossip_fd, take(msg));
/* Wait for reply to come back; handle other gossipd msgs meanwhile */
while ((msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, peer->pps->gossip_fd)) != NULL) {
u8 *update;
if (fromwire_gossipd_get_update_reply(ctx, msg, &update))
return update;
handle_gossip_msg(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
/* Gossipd hangs up on us to kill us when a new
* connection comes in. */
peer_failed_connection_lost();
}
/**
* Add a channel locally and send a channel update to the peer
*
* Send a local_add_channel message to gossipd in order to make the channel
* usable locally, and also tell our peer about our parameters via a
* channel_update message. The peer may accept the update and use the contained
* information to route incoming payments through the channel. The
* channel_update is not preceeded by a channel_announcement and won't make much
* sense to other nodes, so we don't tell gossipd about it.
*/
static void make_channel_local_active(struct peer *peer)
{
u8 *msg;
const u8 *ann;
const u8 *annfeatures = get_agreed_channelfeatures(tmpctx,
peer->our_features,
peer->their_features);
ann = private_channel_announcement(tmpctx,
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[REMOTE],
annfeatures);
/* Tell gossipd about local channel. */
msg = towire_gossip_store_private_channel(NULL,
peer->channel->funding, ann);
wire_sync_write(peer->pps->gossip_fd, take(msg));
/* Tell gossipd and the other side what parameters we expect should
* they route through us */
send_channel_update(peer, 0);
}
static void send_announcement_signatures(struct peer *peer)
{
/* First 2 + 256 byte are the signatures and msg type, skip them */
size_t offset = 258;
struct sha256_double hash;
const u8 *msg, *ca, *req;
struct pubkey mykey;
status_debug("Exchanging announcement signatures.");
ca = create_channel_announcement(tmpctx, peer);
req = towire_hsmd_cannouncement_sig_req(tmpctx, ca);
msg = hsm_req(tmpctx, req);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_cannouncement_sig_reply(msg,
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[LOCAL]))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Reading cannouncement_sig_resp: %s",
strerror(errno));
/* Double-check that HSM gave valid signatures. */
sha256_double(&hash, ca + offset, tal_count(ca) - offset);
if (!pubkey_from_node_id(&mykey, &peer->node_ids[LOCAL]))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could not convert my id '%s' to pubkey",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct node_id,
&peer->node_ids[LOCAL]));
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, &peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL],
&mykey)) {
/* It's ok to fail here, the channel announcement is
* unique, unlike the channel update which may have
* been replaced in the meantime. */
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"HSM returned an invalid node signature");
}
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, &peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[LOCAL],
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[LOCAL])) {
/* It's ok to fail here, the channel announcement is
* unique, unlike the channel update which may have
* been replaced in the meantime. */
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"HSM returned an invalid bitcoin signature");
}
msg = towire_announcement_signatures(
NULL, &peer->channel_id, &peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[LOCAL],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[LOCAL]);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
/* Tentatively create a channel_announcement, possibly with invalid
* signatures. The signatures need to be collected first, by asking
* the HSM and by exchanging announcement_signature messages. */
static u8 *create_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer)
{
int first, second;
u8 *cannounce, *features
= get_agreed_channelfeatures(tmpctx, peer->our_features,
peer->their_features);
if (peer->channel_direction == 0) {
first = LOCAL;
second = REMOTE;
} else {
first = REMOTE;
second = LOCAL;
}
cannounce = towire_channel_announcement(
ctx, &peer->announcement_node_sigs[first],
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[second],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[first],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[second],
features,
&chainparams->genesis_blockhash,
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[first],
&peer->node_ids[second],
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[first],
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[second]);
return cannounce;
}
/* Once we have both, we'd better make sure we agree what they are! */
static void check_short_ids_match(struct peer *peer)
{
assert(peer->have_sigs[LOCAL]);
assert(peer->have_sigs[REMOTE]);
if (!short_channel_id_eq(&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE]))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"We disagree on short_channel_ids:"
" I have %s, you say %s",
type_to_string(peer, struct short_channel_id,
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL]),
type_to_string(peer, struct short_channel_id,
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE]));
}
static void announce_channel(struct peer *peer)
{
u8 *cannounce;
cannounce = create_channel_announcement(tmpctx, peer);
wire_sync_write(peer->pps->gossip_fd,
take(towire_gossipd_local_channel_announcement(NULL,
cannounce)));
send_channel_update(peer, 0);
}
static void channel_announcement_negotiate(struct peer *peer)
{
/* Don't do any announcement work if we're shutting down */
if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
return;
/* Can't do anything until funding is locked. */
if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] || !peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
return;
if (!peer->channel_local_active) {
peer->channel_local_active = true;
make_channel_local_active(peer);
}
/* BOLT #7:
*
* A node:
* - if the `open_channel` message has the `announce_channel` bit set AND a `shutdown` message has not been sent:
* - MUST send the `announcement_signatures` message.
* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until `funding_locked`
* has been sent and received AND the funding transaction has at least six confirmations.
* - otherwise:
* - MUST NOT send the `announcement_signatures` message.
*/
if (!(peer->channel_flags & CHANNEL_FLAGS_ANNOUNCE_CHANNEL))
return;
/* BOLT #7:
*
* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until `funding_locked`
* has been sent and received AND the funding transaction has at least six confirmations.
*/
if (peer->announce_depth_reached && !peer->have_sigs[LOCAL]) {
/* When we reenable the channel, we will also send the announcement to remote peer, and
* receive the remote announcement reply. But we will rebuild the channel with announcement
* from the DB directly, other than waiting for the remote announcement reply.
*/
send_announcement_signatures(peer);
peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] = true;
billboard_update(peer);
}
/* If we've completed the signature exchange, we can send a real
* announcement, otherwise we send a temporary one */
if (peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] && peer->have_sigs[REMOTE]) {
check_short_ids_match(peer);
/* After making sure short_channel_ids match, we can send remote
* announcement to MASTER. */
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_got_announcement(NULL,
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[REMOTE],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[REMOTE])));
/* Give other nodes time to notice new block. */
notleak(new_reltimer(&peer->timers, peer,
time_from_sec(GOSSIP_ANNOUNCE_DELAY(dev_fast_gossip)),
announce_channel, peer));
}
}
static void handle_peer_funding_locked(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id chanid;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A node:
*...
* - upon reconnection:
* - MUST ignore any redundant `funding_locked` it receives.
*/
if (peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
return;
/* Too late, we're shutting down! */
if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
return;
peer->old_remote_per_commit = peer->remote_per_commit;
if (!fromwire_funding_locked(msg, &chanid,
&peer->remote_per_commit))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad funding_locked %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
if (!channel_id_eq(&chanid, &peer->channel_id))
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &chanid,
"Wrong channel id in %s (expected %s)",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg),
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id,
&peer->channel_id));
peer->tx_sigs_allowed = false;
peer->funding_locked[REMOTE] = true;
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_got_funding_locked(NULL,
&peer->remote_per_commit)));
channel_announcement_negotiate(peer);
billboard_update(peer);
}
static void handle_peer_announcement_signatures(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id chanid;
if (!fromwire_announcement_signatures(msg,
&chanid,
&peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE],
&peer->announcement_node_sigs[REMOTE],
&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[REMOTE]))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad announcement_signatures %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
/* Make sure we agree on the channel ids */
if (!channel_id_eq(&chanid, &peer->channel_id)) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &chanid,
"Wrong channel_id: expected %s, got %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&peer->channel_id),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id, &chanid));
}
peer->have_sigs[REMOTE] = true;
billboard_update(peer);
channel_announcement_negotiate(peer);
}
static void handle_peer_add_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u64 id;
struct amount_msat amount;
u32 cltv_expiry;
struct sha256 payment_hash;
u8 onion_routing_packet[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE(ROUTING_INFO_SIZE)];
enum channel_add_err add_err;
struct htlc *htlc;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
struct tlv_update_add_tlvs *tlvs = tlv_update_add_tlvs_new(msg);
#endif
struct pubkey *blinding = NULL;
if (!fromwire_update_add_htlc(msg, &channel_id, &id, &amount,
&payment_hash, &cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, tlvs
#endif
))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad peer_add_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
blinding = tlvs->blinding;
#endif
add_err = channel_add_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE, id, amount,
cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
onion_routing_packet, blinding, &htlc, NULL);
if (add_err != CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad peer_add_htlc: %s",
channel_add_err_name(add_err));
}
/* We don't get upset if they're outside the range, as long as they're
* improving (or at least, not getting worse!). */
static bool feerate_same_or_better(const struct channel *channel,
u32 feerate, u32 feerate_min, u32 feerate_max)
{
u32 current = channel_feerate(channel, LOCAL);
/* Too low? But is it going upwards? */
if (feerate < feerate_min)
return feerate >= current;
if (feerate > feerate_max)
return feerate <= current;
return true;
}
static void handle_peer_feechange(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u32 feerate;
if (!fromwire_update_fee(msg, &channel_id, &feerate)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fee %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
*...
* - if the sender is not responsible for paying the Bitcoin fee:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (peer->channel->opener != REMOTE)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_fee from non-opener?");
status_debug("update_fee %u, range %u-%u",
feerate, peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - if the `update_fee` is too low for timely processing, OR is
* unreasonably large:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
if (!feerate_same_or_better(peer->channel, feerate,
peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_fee %u outside range %u-%u"
" (currently %u)",
feerate,
peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max,
channel_feerate(peer->channel, LOCAL));
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if the sender cannot afford the new fee rate on the receiving
* node's current commitment transaction:
* - SHOULD fail the channel,
* - but MAY delay this check until the `update_fee` is committed.
*/
if (!channel_update_feerate(peer->channel, feerate))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_fee %u unaffordable",
feerate);
status_debug("peer updated fee to %u", feerate);
}
static void handle_peer_blockheight_change(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u32 blockheight, current;
if (!fromwire_update_blockheight(msg, &channel_id, &blockheight))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_blockheight %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
/* BOLT- #2:
* A receiving node:
* ...
* - if the sender is not the initiator:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (peer->channel->opener != REMOTE)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_blockheight from non-opener?");
current = get_blockheight(peer->channel->blockheight_states,
peer->channel->opener, LOCAL);
status_debug("update_blockheight %u. last update height %u,"
" our current height %u",
blockheight, current, peer->our_blockheight);
/* BOLT- #2:
* A receiving node:
* - if the `update_blockheight` is less than the last
* received `blockheight`:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
* ...
* - if `blockheight` is more than 1008 blocks behind
* the current blockheight:
* - SHOULD fail the channel
*/
/* Overflow check */
if (blockheight + 1008 < blockheight)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"blockheight + 1008 overflow (%u)",
blockheight);
/* If they're behind the last one they sent, we just warn and
* reconnect, as they might be catching up */
/* FIXME: track for how long they send backwards blockheight? */
if (blockheight < current)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_blockheight %u older than previous %u",
blockheight, current);
/* BOLT- #2:
* A receiving node:
* ...
* - if `blockheight` is more than 1008 blocks behind
* the current blockheight:
* - SHOULD fail the channel
*/
assert(blockheight < blockheight + 1008);
if (blockheight + 1008 < peer->our_blockheight)
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"update_blockheight %u outside"
" permissible range", blockheight);
channel_update_blockheight(peer->channel, blockheight);
status_debug("peer updated blockheight to %u", blockheight);
}
static struct changed_htlc *changed_htlc_arr(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs)
{
struct changed_htlc *changed;
size_t i;
changed = tal_arr(ctx, struct changed_htlc, tal_count(changed_htlcs));
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
changed[i].id = changed_htlcs[i]->id;
changed[i].newstate = changed_htlcs[i]->state;
}
return changed;
}
static u8 *sending_commitsig_msg(const tal_t *ctx,
u64 remote_commit_index,
struct penalty_base *pbase,
const struct fee_states *fee_states,
const struct height_states *blockheight_states,
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
const struct bitcoin_signature *commit_sig,
const struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs)
{
struct changed_htlc *changed;
u8 *msg;
/* We tell master what (of our) HTLCs peer will now be
* committed to. */
changed = changed_htlc_arr(tmpctx, changed_htlcs);
msg = towire_channeld_sending_commitsig(ctx, remote_commit_index,
pbase, fee_states,
blockheight_states, changed,
commit_sig, htlc_sigs);
return msg;
}
static bool shutdown_complete(const struct peer *peer)
{
return peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]
&& peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE]
&& num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel) == 0
/* We could be awaiting revoke-and-ack for a feechange */
&& peer->revocations_received == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A sending node:
*...
* - if there are updates pending on the receiving node's commitment
* transaction:
* - MUST NOT send a `shutdown`.
*/
/* So we only call this after reestablish or immediately after sending commit */
static void maybe_send_shutdown(struct peer *peer)
{
u8 *msg;
struct tlv_shutdown_tlvs *tlvs;
if (!peer->send_shutdown)
return;
/* Send a disable channel_update so others don't try to route
* over us */
send_channel_update(peer, ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED);
if (peer->shutdown_wrong_funding) {
tlvs = tlv_shutdown_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
tlvs->wrong_funding
= tal(tlvs, struct tlv_shutdown_tlvs_wrong_funding);
tlvs->wrong_funding->txid = peer->shutdown_wrong_funding->txid;
tlvs->wrong_funding->outnum = peer->shutdown_wrong_funding->n;
} else
tlvs = NULL;
msg = towire_shutdown(NULL, &peer->channel_id, peer->final_scriptpubkey,
tlvs);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
peer->send_shutdown = false;
peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] = true;
billboard_update(peer);
}
static void send_shutdown_complete(struct peer *peer)
{
/* Now we can tell master shutdown is complete. */
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_shutdown_complete(NULL, peer->pps)));
per_peer_state_fdpass_send(MASTER_FD, peer->pps);
close(MASTER_FD);
}
/* This queues other traffic from the fd until we get reply. */
static u8 *master_wait_sync_reply(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer,
const u8 *msg,
int replytype)
{
u8 *reply;
status_debug("Sending master %u", fromwire_peektype(msg));
if (!wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, msg))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could not set sync write to master: %s",
strerror(errno));
status_debug("... , awaiting %u", replytype);
for (;;) {
int type;
reply = wire_sync_read(ctx, MASTER_FD);
if (!reply)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could not set sync read from master: %s",
strerror(errno));
type = fromwire_peektype(reply);
if (type == replytype) {
status_debug("Got it!");
break;
}
status_debug("Nope, got %u instead", type);
msg_enqueue(peer->from_master, take(reply));
}
return reply;
}
/* Returns HTLC sigs, sets commit_sig */
static struct bitcoin_signature *calc_commitsigs(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct peer *peer,
struct bitcoin_tx **txs,
const u8 *funding_wscript,
const struct htlc **htlc_map,
u64 commit_index,
struct bitcoin_signature *commit_sig)
{
size_t i;
struct pubkey local_htlckey;
const u8 *msg;
struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs;
msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_commitment_tx(NULL, txs[0],
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
&peer->remote_per_commit,
channel_has(peer->channel,
OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY));
msg = hsm_req(tmpctx, take(msg));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, commit_sig))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Reading sign_remote_commitment_tx reply: %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
status_debug("Creating commit_sig signature %"PRIu64" %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s",
commit_index,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
commit_sig),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[0]),
tal_hex(tmpctx, funding_wscript),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[LOCAL]));
dump_htlcs(peer->channel, "Sending commit_sig");
if (!derive_simple_key(&peer->channel->basepoints[LOCAL].htlc,
&peer->remote_per_commit,
&local_htlckey))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Deriving local_htlckey");
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A sending node:
*...
* - MUST include one `htlc_signature` for every HTLC transaction
* corresponding to the ordering of the commitment transaction
*/
htlc_sigs = tal_arr(ctx, struct bitcoin_signature, tal_count(txs) - 1);
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(htlc_sigs); i++) {
u8 *wscript;
wscript = bitcoin_tx_output_get_witscript(tmpctx, txs[0],
txs[i+1]->wtx->inputs[0].index);
msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_htlc_tx(NULL, txs[i + 1], wscript,
&peer->remote_per_commit,
channel_has(peer->channel,
OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS));
msg = hsm_req(tmpctx, take(msg));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &htlc_sigs[i]))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad sign_remote_htlc_tx reply: %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
status_debug("Creating HTLC signature %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
&htlc_sigs[i]),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[1+i]),
tal_hex(tmpctx, wscript),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&local_htlckey));
assert(check_tx_sig(txs[1+i], 0, NULL, wscript,
&local_htlckey,
&htlc_sigs[i]));
}
return htlc_sigs;
}
/* Have we received something from peer recently? */
static bool peer_recently_active(struct peer *peer)
{
return time_less(time_between(time_now(), peer->last_recv),
time_from_sec(30));
}
static void maybe_send_ping(struct peer *peer)
{
/* Already have a ping in flight? */
if (peer->expecting_pong)
return;
if (peer_recently_active(peer))
return;
/* Send a ping to try to elicit a receive. */
sync_crypto_write_no_delay(peer->pps, take(make_ping(NULL, 1, 0)));
peer->expecting_pong = true;
}
/* Peer protocol doesn't want sighash flags. */
static secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *raw_sigs(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_signature *sigs)
{
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *raw;
raw = tal_arr(ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, tal_count(sigs));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(sigs); i++)
raw[i] = sigs[i].s;
return raw;
}
static struct bitcoin_signature *unraw_sigs(const tal_t *ctx,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *raw,
bool option_anchor_outputs)
{
struct bitcoin_signature *sigs;
sigs = tal_arr(ctx, struct bitcoin_signature, tal_count(raw));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(raw); i++) {
sigs[i].s = raw[i];
/* BOLT #3:
* ## HTLC-Timeout and HTLC-Success Transactions
*...
* * if `option_anchors` applies to this commitment
* transaction, `SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY` is
* used.
*/
if (option_anchor_outputs)
sigs[i].sighash_type = SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY;
else
sigs[i].sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
}
return sigs;
}
/* Do we want to update fees? */
static bool want_fee_update(const struct peer *peer, u32 *target)
{
u32 current, val;
if (peer->channel->opener != LOCAL)
return false;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
/* No fee update while quiescing! */
if (peer->stfu)
return false;
#endif
current = channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE);
/* max is *approximate*: only take it into account if we're
* trying to increase feerate. */
if (peer->desired_feerate > current) {
/* FIXME: We should avoid adding HTLCs until we can meet this
* feerate! */
u32 max = approx_max_feerate(peer->channel);
val = peer->desired_feerate;
/* Respect max, but don't let us *decrease* us */
if (val > max)
val = max;
if (val < current)
val = current;
} else
val = peer->desired_feerate;
if (target)
*target = val;
return val != current;
}
/* Do we want to update blockheight? */
static bool want_blockheight_update(const struct peer *peer, u32 *height)
{
u32 last;
if (peer->channel->opener != LOCAL)
return false;
if (peer->channel->lease_expiry == 0)
return false;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
/* No fee update while quiescing! */
if (peer->stfu)
return false;
#endif
/* What's the current blockheight */
last = get_blockheight(peer->channel->blockheight_states,
peer->channel->opener, LOCAL);
if (peer->our_blockheight < last) {
status_broken("current blockheight %u less than last %u",
peer->our_blockheight, last);
return false;
}
if (peer->our_blockheight == last)
return false;
if (height)
*height = peer->our_blockheight;
return true;
}
static void send_commit(struct peer *peer)
{
u8 *msg;
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs;
struct bitcoin_signature commit_sig, *htlc_sigs;
struct bitcoin_tx **txs;
const u8 *funding_wscript;
const struct htlc **htlc_map;
struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
struct penalty_base *pbase;
u32 our_blockheight;
u32 feerate_target;
#if DEVELOPER
/* Hack to suppress all commit sends if dev_disconnect says to */
if (dev_suppress_commit) {
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
return;
}
#endif
/* FIXME: Document this requirement in BOLT 2! */
/* We can't send two commits in a row. */
if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1) {
assert(peer->revocations_received
== peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2);
peer->commit_timer_attempts++;
/* Only report this in extreme cases */
if (peer->commit_timer_attempts % 100 == 0)
status_debug("Can't send commit:"
" waiting for revoke_and_ack with %"
PRIu64" attempts",
peer->commit_timer_attempts);
/* Mark this as done and try again. */
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if no HTLCs remain in either commitment transaction:
* - MUST NOT send any `update` message after a `shutdown`.
*/
if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] && !num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel)) {
status_debug("Can't send commit: final shutdown phase");
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
return;
}
/* If we haven't received a packet for > 30 seconds, delay. */
if (!peer_recently_active(peer)) {
/* Mark this as done and try again. */
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
}
/* If we wanted to update fees, do it now. */
if (want_fee_update(peer, &feerate_target)) {
/* FIXME: We occasionally desynchronize with LND here, so
* don't stress things by having more than one feerate change
* in-flight! */
if (feerate_changes_done(peer->channel->fee_states, false)) {
u8 *msg;
if (!channel_update_feerate(peer->channel, feerate_target))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could not afford feerate %u"
" (vs max %u)",
feerate_target, approx_max_feerate(peer->channel));
msg = towire_update_fee(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
feerate_target);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
}
if (want_blockheight_update(peer, &our_blockheight)) {
if (blockheight_changes_done(peer->channel->blockheight_states,
false)) {
u8 *msg;
channel_update_blockheight(peer->channel,
our_blockheight);
msg = towire_update_blockheight(NULL,
&peer->channel_id,
our_blockheight);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A sending node:
* - MUST NOT send a `commitment_signed` message that does not include
* any updates.
*/
changed_htlcs = tal_arr(tmpctx, const struct htlc *, 0);
if (!channel_sending_commit(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs)) {
status_debug("Can't send commit: nothing to send,"
" feechange %s (%s)"
" blockheight %s (%s)",
want_fee_update(peer, NULL) ? "wanted": "not wanted",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct fee_states, peer->channel->fee_states),
want_blockheight_update(peer, NULL) ? "wanted" : "not wanted",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct height_states, peer->channel->blockheight_states));
/* Covers the case where we've just been told to shutdown. */
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
return;
}
txs = channel_txs(tmpctx, &htlc_map, direct_outputs,
&funding_wscript, peer->channel, &peer->remote_per_commit,
peer->next_index[REMOTE], REMOTE);
htlc_sigs =
calc_commitsigs(tmpctx, peer, txs, funding_wscript, htlc_map,
peer->next_index[REMOTE], &commit_sig);
if (direct_outputs[LOCAL] != NULL) {
pbase = penalty_base_new(tmpctx, peer->next_index[REMOTE],
txs[0], direct_outputs[LOCAL]);
/* Add the penalty_base to our in-memory list as well, so we
* can find it again later. */
tal_arr_expand(&peer->pbases, tal_steal(peer, pbase));
} else
pbase = NULL;
status_debug("Telling master we're about to commit...");
/* Tell master to save this next commit to database, then wait. */
msg = sending_commitsig_msg(NULL, peer->next_index[REMOTE],
pbase,
peer->channel->fee_states,
peer->channel->blockheight_states,
changed_htlcs,
&commit_sig,
htlc_sigs);
/* Message is empty; receiving it is the point. */
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
WIRE_CHANNELD_SENDING_COMMITSIG_REPLY);
status_debug("Sending commit_sig with %zu htlc sigs",
tal_count(htlc_sigs));
peer->next_index[REMOTE]++;
msg = towire_commitment_signed(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
&commit_sig.s,
raw_sigs(tmpctx, htlc_sigs));
sync_crypto_write_no_delay(peer->pps, take(msg));
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
/* Timer now considered expired, you can add a new one. */
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
static void start_commit_timer(struct peer *peer)
{
/* We should send a ping now if we need a liveness check. */
maybe_send_ping(peer);
/* Already armed? */
if (peer->commit_timer)
return;
peer->commit_timer_attempts = 0;
peer->commit_timer = new_reltimer(&peer->timers, peer,
time_from_msec(peer->commit_msec),
send_commit, peer);
}
/* If old_secret is NULL, we don't care, otherwise it is filled in. */
static void get_per_commitment_point(u64 index, struct pubkey *point,
struct secret *old_secret)
{
struct secret *s;
const u8 *msg;
msg = hsm_req(tmpctx,
take(towire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point(NULL, index)));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point_reply(tmpctx, msg,
point,
&s))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad per_commitment_point reply %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
if (old_secret) {
if (!s)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"No secret in per_commitment_point_reply %"
PRIu64,
index);
*old_secret = *s;
}
}
/* revoke_index == current index - 1 (usually; not for retransmission) */
static u8 *make_revocation_msg(const struct peer *peer, u64 revoke_index,
struct pubkey *point)
{
struct secret old_commit_secret;
get_per_commitment_point(revoke_index+2, point, &old_commit_secret);
return towire_revoke_and_ack(peer, &peer->channel_id, &old_commit_secret,
point);
}
/* Convert changed htlcs into parts which lightningd expects. */
static void marshall_htlc_info(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
struct changed_htlc **changed,
struct fulfilled_htlc **fulfilled,
const struct failed_htlc ***failed,
struct added_htlc **added)
{
*changed = tal_arr(ctx, struct changed_htlc, 0);
*added = tal_arr(ctx, struct added_htlc, 0);
*failed = tal_arr(ctx, const struct failed_htlc *, 0);
*fulfilled = tal_arr(ctx, struct fulfilled_htlc, 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
const struct htlc *htlc = changed_htlcs[i];
if (htlc->state == RCVD_ADD_COMMIT) {
struct added_htlc a;
a.id = htlc->id;
a.amount = htlc->amount;
a.payment_hash = htlc->rhash;
a.cltv_expiry = abs_locktime_to_blocks(&htlc->expiry);
memcpy(a.onion_routing_packet,
htlc->routing,
sizeof(a.onion_routing_packet));
if (htlc->blinding) {
a.blinding = htlc->blinding;
ecdh(a.blinding, &a.blinding_ss);
} else
a.blinding = NULL;
tal_arr_expand(added, a);
} else if (htlc->state == RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT) {
if (htlc->r) {
struct fulfilled_htlc f;
assert(!htlc->failed);
f.id = htlc->id;
f.payment_preimage = *htlc->r;
tal_arr_expand(fulfilled, f);
} else {
assert(!htlc->r);
tal_arr_expand(failed, htlc->failed);
}
} else {
struct changed_htlc c;
assert(htlc->state == RCVD_REMOVE_ACK_COMMIT
|| htlc->state == RCVD_ADD_ACK_COMMIT);
c.id = htlc->id;
c.newstate = htlc->state;
tal_arr_expand(changed, c);
}
}
}
static void send_revocation(struct peer *peer,
const struct bitcoin_signature *commit_sig,
const struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs,
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
const struct bitcoin_tx *committx)
{
struct changed_htlc *changed;
struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled;
const struct failed_htlc **failed;
struct added_htlc *added;
const u8 *msg_for_master;
/* Marshall it now before channel_sending_revoke_and_ack changes htlcs */
/* FIXME: Make infrastructure handle state post-revoke_and_ack! */
marshall_htlc_info(tmpctx,
changed_htlcs,
&changed,
&fulfilled,
&failed,
&added);
/* Revoke previous commit, get new point. */
u8 *msg = make_revocation_msg(peer, peer->next_index[LOCAL]-1,
&peer->next_local_per_commit);
/* From now on we apply changes to the next commitment */
peer->next_index[LOCAL]++;
/* If this queues more changes on the other end, send commit. */
if (channel_sending_revoke_and_ack(peer->channel)) {
status_debug("revoke_and_ack made pending: commit timer");
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
/* Tell master daemon about commitsig (and by implication, that we're
* sending revoke_and_ack), then wait for it to ack. */
/* We had to do this after channel_sending_revoke_and_ack, since we
* want it to save the fee_states produced there. */
msg_for_master
= towire_channeld_got_commitsig(NULL,
peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1,
peer->channel->fee_states,
peer->channel->blockheight_states,
commit_sig, htlc_sigs,
added,
fulfilled,
failed,
changed,
committx);
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg_for_master),
WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_COMMITSIG_REPLY);
/* Now we can finally send revoke_and_ack to peer */
sync_crypto_write_no_delay(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
static void handle_peer_commit_sig(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
struct bitcoin_signature commit_sig;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *raw_sigs;
struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs;
struct pubkey remote_htlckey;
struct bitcoin_tx **txs;
const struct htlc **htlc_map, **changed_htlcs;
const u8 *funding_wscript;
size_t i;
changed_htlcs = tal_arr(msg, const struct htlc *, 0);
if (!channel_rcvd_commit(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs)) {
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A sending node:
* - MUST NOT send a `commitment_signed` message that does not
* include any updates.
*/
status_debug("Oh hi LND! Empty commitment at #%"PRIu64,
peer->next_index[LOCAL]);
if (peer->last_empty_commitment == peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"commit_sig with no changes (again!)");
peer->last_empty_commitment = peer->next_index[LOCAL];
}
/* We were supposed to check this was affordable as we go. */
if (peer->channel->opener == REMOTE) {
status_debug("Feerates are %u/%u",
channel_feerate(peer->channel, LOCAL),
channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE));
assert(can_opener_afford_feerate(peer->channel,
channel_feerate(peer->channel,
LOCAL)));
}
if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg,
&channel_id, &commit_sig.s, &raw_sigs))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad commit_sig %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
/* SIGHASH_ALL is implied. */
commit_sig.sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
htlc_sigs = unraw_sigs(tmpctx, raw_sigs,
channel_has(peer->channel, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS));
txs =
channel_txs(tmpctx, &htlc_map, NULL,
&funding_wscript, peer->channel, &peer->next_local_per_commit,
peer->next_index[LOCAL], LOCAL);
/* Set the commit_sig on the commitment tx psbt */
if (!psbt_input_set_signature(txs[0]->psbt, 0,
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
&commit_sig))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Unable to set signature internally");
if (!derive_simple_key(&peer->channel->basepoints[REMOTE].htlc,
&peer->next_local_per_commit, &remote_htlckey))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Deriving remote_htlckey");
status_debug("Derived key %s from basepoint %s, point %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &remote_htlckey),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->channel->basepoints[REMOTE].htlc),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->next_local_per_commit));
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - once all pending updates are applied:
* - if `signature` is not valid for its local commitment transaction
* OR non-compliant with LOW-S-standard rule...:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (!check_tx_sig(txs[0], 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE], &commit_sig)) {
dump_htlcs(peer->channel, "receiving commit_sig");
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad commit_sig signature %"PRIu64" %s for tx %s wscript %s key %s feerate %u",
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_signature,
&commit_sig),
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[0]),
tal_hex(msg, funding_wscript),
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
&peer->channel->funding_pubkey
[REMOTE]),
channel_feerate(peer->channel, LOCAL));
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
*...
* - if `num_htlcs` is not equal to the number of HTLC outputs in the
* local commitment transaction:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (tal_count(htlc_sigs) != tal_count(txs) - 1)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Expected %zu htlc sigs, not %zu",
tal_count(txs) - 1, tal_count(htlc_sigs));
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if any `htlc_signature` is not valid for the corresponding HTLC
* transaction OR non-compliant with LOW-S-standard rule...:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(htlc_sigs); i++) {
u8 *wscript;
wscript = bitcoin_tx_output_get_witscript(tmpctx, txs[0],
txs[i+1]->wtx->inputs[0].index);
if (!check_tx_sig(txs[1+i], 0, NULL, wscript,
&remote_htlckey, &htlc_sigs[i]))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad commit_sig signature %s for htlc %s wscript %s key %s",
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_signature, &htlc_sigs[i]),
type_to_string(msg, struct bitcoin_tx, txs[1+i]),
tal_hex(msg, wscript),
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
&remote_htlckey));
}
status_debug("Received commit_sig with %zu htlc sigs",
tal_count(htlc_sigs));
send_revocation(peer,
&commit_sig, htlc_sigs, changed_htlcs, txs[0]);
/* We may now be quiescent on our side. */
maybe_send_stfu(peer);
/* This might have synced the feerates: if so, we may want to
* update */
if (want_fee_update(peer, NULL))
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
/* Pops the penalty base for the given commitnum from our internal list. There
* may not be one, in which case we return NULL and leave the list
* unmodified. */
static struct penalty_base *
penalty_base_by_commitnum(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer, u64 commitnum)
{
struct penalty_base *res = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(peer->pbases); i++) {
if (peer->pbases[i]->commitment_num == commitnum) {
res = tal_steal(ctx, peer->pbases[i]);
tal_arr_remove(&peer->pbases, i);
break;
}
}
return res;
}
static u8 *got_revoke_msg(struct peer *peer, u64 revoke_num,
const struct secret *per_commitment_secret,
const struct pubkey *next_per_commit_point,
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs,
const struct fee_states *fee_states,
const struct height_states *blockheight_states)
{
u8 *msg;
struct penalty_base *pbase;
struct changed_htlc *changed = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct changed_htlc, 0);
const struct bitcoin_tx *ptx = NULL;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
struct changed_htlc c;
const struct htlc *htlc = changed_htlcs[i];
status_debug("HTLC %"PRIu64"[%s] => %s",
htlc->id, side_to_str(htlc_owner(htlc)),
htlc_state_name(htlc->state));
c.id = changed_htlcs[i]->id;
c.newstate = changed_htlcs[i]->state;
tal_arr_expand(&changed, c);
}
pbase = penalty_base_by_commitnum(tmpctx, peer, revoke_num);
if (pbase) {
ptx = penalty_tx_create(
NULL, peer->channel, peer->feerate_penalty,
peer->final_scriptpubkey, per_commitment_secret,
&pbase->txid, pbase->outnum, pbase->amount,
HSM_FD);
}
msg = towire_channeld_got_revoke(peer, revoke_num, per_commitment_secret,
next_per_commit_point, fee_states,
blockheight_states, changed,
pbase, ptx);
tal_free(ptx);
return msg;
}
static void handle_peer_revoke_and_ack(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct secret old_commit_secret;
struct privkey privkey;
struct channel_id channel_id;
struct pubkey per_commit_point, next_per_commit;
const struct htlc **changed_htlcs = tal_arr(msg, const struct htlc *, 0);
if (!fromwire_revoke_and_ack(msg, &channel_id, &old_commit_secret,
&next_per_commit)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad revoke_and_ack %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Unexpected revoke_and_ack");
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - if `per_commitment_secret` is not a valid secret key or does not
* generate the previous `per_commitment_point`:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
memcpy(&privkey, &old_commit_secret, sizeof(privkey));
if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&privkey, &per_commit_point)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad privkey %s",
type_to_string(msg, struct privkey, &privkey));
}
if (!pubkey_eq(&per_commit_point, &peer->old_remote_per_commit)) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Wrong privkey %s for %"PRIu64" %s",
type_to_string(msg, struct privkey, &privkey),
peer->next_index[LOCAL]-2,
type_to_string(msg, struct pubkey,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit));
}
/* We start timer even if this returns false: we might have delayed
* commit because we were waiting for this! */
if (channel_rcvd_revoke_and_ack(peer->channel, &changed_htlcs))
status_debug("Commits outstanding after recv revoke_and_ack");
else
status_debug("No commits outstanding after recv revoke_and_ack");
/* Tell master about things this locks in, wait for response */
msg = got_revoke_msg(peer, peer->revocations_received++,
&old_commit_secret, &next_per_commit,
changed_htlcs,
peer->channel->fee_states,
peer->channel->blockheight_states);
master_wait_sync_reply(tmpctx, peer, take(msg),
WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_REVOKE_REPLY);
peer->old_remote_per_commit = peer->remote_per_commit;
peer->remote_per_commit = next_per_commit;
status_debug("revoke_and_ack %s: remote_per_commit = %s, old_remote_per_commit = %s",
side_to_str(peer->channel->opener),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->remote_per_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit));
/* We may now be quiescent on our side. */
maybe_send_stfu(peer);
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
static void handle_peer_fulfill_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u64 id;
struct preimage preimage;
enum channel_remove_err e;
struct htlc *h;
if (!fromwire_update_fulfill_htlc(msg, &channel_id,
&id, &preimage)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fulfill_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
e = channel_fulfill_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, &preimage, &h);
switch (e) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
/* FIXME: We could send preimages to master immediately. */
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
/* These shouldn't happen, because any offered HTLC (which would give
* us the preimage) should have timed out long before. If we
* were to get preimages from other sources, this could happen. */
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fulfill_htlc: failed to fulfill %"
PRIu64 " error %s", id, channel_remove_err_name(e));
}
abort();
}
static void handle_peer_fail_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u64 id;
enum channel_remove_err e;
u8 *reason;
struct htlc *htlc;
struct failed_htlc *f;
/* reason is not an onionreply because spec doesn't know about that */
if (!fromwire_update_fail_htlc(msg, msg,
&channel_id, &id, &reason)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fail_htlc %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, &htlc);
switch (e) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK: {
htlc->failed = f = tal(htlc, struct failed_htlc);
f->id = id;
f->sha256_of_onion = NULL;
f->onion = new_onionreply(f, take(reason));
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
}
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fail_htlc: failed to remove %"
PRIu64 " error %s", id,
channel_remove_err_name(e));
}
abort();
}
static void handle_peer_fail_malformed_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u64 id;
enum channel_remove_err e;
struct sha256 sha256_of_onion;
u16 failure_code;
struct htlc *htlc;
struct failed_htlc *f;
if (!fromwire_update_fail_malformed_htlc(msg, &channel_id, &id,
&sha256_of_onion,
&failure_code)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if the `BADONION` bit in `failure_code` is not set for
* `update_fail_malformed_htlc`:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (!(failure_code & BADONION)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc failure code %u",
failure_code);
}
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, id, &htlc);
switch (e) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
htlc->failed = f = tal(htlc, struct failed_htlc);
f->id = id;
f->onion = NULL;
f->sha256_of_onion = tal_dup(f, struct sha256, &sha256_of_onion);
f->badonion = failure_code;
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad update_fail_malformed_htlc: failed to remove %"
PRIu64 " error %s", id, channel_remove_err_name(e));
}
abort();
}
static void handle_peer_shutdown(struct peer *peer, const u8 *shutdown)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u8 *scriptpubkey;
struct tlv_shutdown_tlvs *tlvs = tlv_shutdown_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
struct bitcoin_outpoint *wrong_funding;
/* Disable the channel. */
send_channel_update(peer, ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED);
if (!fromwire_shutdown(tmpctx, shutdown, &channel_id, &scriptpubkey,
tlvs))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad shutdown %s", tal_hex(peer, shutdown));
/* FIXME: We shouldn't let them initiate a shutdown while the
* channel is active (if we leased funds) */
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if both nodes advertised the `option_upfront_shutdown_script`
* feature, and the receiving node received a non-zero-length
* `shutdown_scriptpubkey` in `open_channel` or `accept_channel`, and
* that `shutdown_scriptpubkey` is not equal to `scriptpubkey`:
* - MUST fail the connection.
*/
/* openingd only sets this if feature was negotiated at opening. */
if (tal_count(peer->remote_upfront_shutdown_script)
&& !memeq(scriptpubkey, tal_count(scriptpubkey),
peer->remote_upfront_shutdown_script,
tal_count(peer->remote_upfront_shutdown_script)))
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"scriptpubkey %s is not as agreed upfront (%s)",
tal_hex(peer, scriptpubkey),
tal_hex(peer, peer->remote_upfront_shutdown_script));
/* We only accept an wrong_funding if:
* 1. It was negotiated.
* 2. It's not dual-funding.
* 3. They opened it.
* 4. The channel was never used.
*/
if (tlvs->wrong_funding) {
if (!feature_negotiated(peer->our_features,
peer->their_features,
OPT_SHUTDOWN_WRONG_FUNDING))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"wrong_funding shutdown needs"
" feature %u",
OPT_SHUTDOWN_WRONG_FUNDING);
if (feature_negotiated(peer->our_features,
peer->their_features,
OPT_DUAL_FUND))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"wrong_funding shutdown invalid"
" with dual-funding");
if (peer->channel->opener != REMOTE)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"No shutdown wrong_funding"
" for channels we opened!");
if (peer->next_index[REMOTE] != 1
|| peer->next_index[LOCAL] != 1)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"No shutdown wrong_funding"
" for used channels!");
/* Turn into our outpoint type. */
wrong_funding = tal(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_outpoint);
wrong_funding->txid = tlvs->wrong_funding->txid;
wrong_funding->n = tlvs->wrong_funding->outnum;
} else {
wrong_funding = NULL;
}
/* Tell master: we don't have to wait because on reconnect other end
* will re-send anyway. */
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_got_shutdown(NULL, scriptpubkey,
wrong_funding)));
peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE] = true;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* ...
* - once there are no outstanding updates on the peer, UNLESS
* it has already sent a `shutdown`:
* - MUST reply to a `shutdown` message with a `shutdown`
*/
if (!peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]) {
peer->send_shutdown = true;
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
billboard_update(peer);
}
/* Try to handle a custommsg Returns true if it was a custom message and has
* been handled, false if the message was not handled.
*/
static bool channeld_handle_custommsg(const u8 *msg)
{
enum peer_wire type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
if (type % 2 == 1 && !peer_wire_is_defined(type)) {
/* The message is not part of the messages we know how to
* handle. Assuming this is a custommsg, we just forward it to the
* master. */
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(towire_custommsg_in(NULL, msg)));
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
static void handle_unexpected_tx_sigs(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
const struct witness_stack **ws;
struct channel_id cid;
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
/* In a rare case, a v2 peer may re-send a tx_sigs message.
* This happens when they've/we've exchanged funding_locked,
* but they did not receive our funding_locked. */
if (!fromwire_tx_signatures(tmpctx, msg, &cid, &txid,
cast_const3(struct witness_stack ***, &ws)))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad tx_signatures %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
status_info("Unexpected `tx_signatures` from peer. %s",
peer->tx_sigs_allowed ? "Allowing." : "Failing.");
if (!peer->tx_sigs_allowed)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Unexpected `tx_signatures`");
peer->tx_sigs_allowed = false;
}
static void handle_unexpected_reestablish(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u64 next_commitment_number;
u64 next_revocation_number;
struct secret your_last_per_commitment_secret;
struct pubkey my_current_per_commitment_point;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
struct tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs *tlvs = tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
#endif
if (!fromwire_channel_reestablish(msg, &channel_id,
&next_commitment_number,
&next_revocation_number,
&your_last_per_commitment_secret,
&my_current_per_commitment_point
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, tlvs
#endif
))
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Bad channel_reestablish %s", tal_hex(peer, msg));
/* Is it the same as the peer channel ID? */
if (channel_id_eq(&channel_id, &peer->channel_id)) {
/* Log this event as unusual. */
status_unusual("Got repeated WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH "
"for channel %s, ignoring: %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&peer->channel_id),
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
/* This is a mitigation for a known bug in some peer software
* that sometimes double-sends a reestablish message.
*
* Ideally we would send some kind of `error` message to the
* peer here, but if we sent an `error` message with the
* same channel ID it would cause the peer to drop the
* channel unilaterally.
* We also cannot use 0x00...00 because that means "all
* channels", so a proper peer (like C-lightning) will
* unilaterally close all channels we have with it, if we
* sent the 0x00...00 channel ID.
*
* So just do not send an error.
*/
return;
}
/* We only support one channel here, so the unexpected channel is the
* peer getting its wires crossed somewhere.
* Fail the channel they sent, not the channel we are actively
* handling. */
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &channel_id,
"Peer sent unexpected message %u, (%s) "
"for nonexistent channel %s",
WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH, "WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&channel_id));
}
static void peer_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
enum peer_wire type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
/* Only count soft errors if the channel has locked-in already;
* otherwise we can't cancel a channel before it has opened.
*/
bool soft_error = peer->funding_locked[REMOTE] || peer->funding_locked[LOCAL];
peer->last_recv = time_now();
/* Catch our own ping replies. */
if (type == WIRE_PONG && peer->expecting_pong) {
peer->expecting_pong = false;
return;
}
if (channeld_handle_custommsg(msg))
return;
/* Since LND seems to send errors which aren't actually fatal events,
* we treat errors here as soft. */
if (handle_peer_gossip_or_error(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id, soft_error, msg))
return;
/* Must get funding_locked before almost anything. */
if (!peer->funding_locked[REMOTE]) {
if (type != WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED
&& type != WIRE_PONG
&& type != WIRE_SHUTDOWN
/* We expect these for v2 !! */
&& type != WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES
/* lnd sends these early; it's harmless. */
&& type != WIRE_UPDATE_FEE
&& type != WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"%s (%u) before funding locked",
peer_wire_name(type), type);
}
}
switch (type) {
case WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED:
handle_peer_funding_locked(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
handle_peer_announcement_signatures(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_ADD_HTLC:
handle_peer_add_htlc(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED:
handle_peer_commit_sig(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_FEE:
handle_peer_feechange(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_BLOCKHEIGHT:
handle_peer_blockheight_change(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK:
handle_peer_revoke_and_ack(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC:
handle_peer_fulfill_htlc(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_HTLC:
handle_peer_fail_htlc(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_MALFORMED_HTLC:
handle_peer_fail_malformed_htlc(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_SHUTDOWN:
handle_peer_shutdown(peer, msg);
return;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
case WIRE_STFU:
handle_stfu(peer, msg);
return;
#endif
case WIRE_INIT:
case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL:
case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL:
case WIRE_FUNDING_CREATED:
case WIRE_FUNDING_SIGNED:
case WIRE_CLOSING_SIGNED:
case WIRE_TX_ADD_INPUT:
case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_INPUT:
case WIRE_TX_ADD_OUTPUT:
case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_OUTPUT:
case WIRE_TX_COMPLETE:
case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL2:
case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL2:
case WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES:
handle_unexpected_tx_sigs(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_INIT_RBF:
case WIRE_ACK_RBF:
break;
case WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH:
handle_unexpected_reestablish(peer, msg);
return;
/* These are all swallowed by handle_peer_gossip_or_error */
case WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCEMENT:
case WIRE_CHANNEL_UPDATE:
case WIRE_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT:
case WIRE_QUERY_SHORT_CHANNEL_IDS:
case WIRE_QUERY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
case WIRE_REPLY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
case WIRE_REPLY_SHORT_CHANNEL_IDS_END:
case WIRE_PING:
case WIRE_PONG:
case WIRE_WARNING:
case WIRE_ERROR:
case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
abort();
}
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Peer sent unknown message %u (%s)",
type, peer_wire_name(type));
}
static void resend_revoke(struct peer *peer)
{
struct pubkey point;
/* Current commit is peer->next_index[LOCAL]-1, revoke prior */
u8 *msg = make_revocation_msg(peer, peer->next_index[LOCAL]-2, &point);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
static void send_fail_or_fulfill(struct peer *peer, const struct htlc *h)
{
u8 *msg;
if (h->failed) {
const struct failed_htlc *f = h->failed;
if (f->sha256_of_onion) {
msg = towire_update_fail_malformed_htlc(NULL,
&peer->channel_id,
h->id,
f->sha256_of_onion,
f->badonion);
} else {
msg = towire_update_fail_htlc(peer, &peer->channel_id, h->id,
f->onion->contents);
}
} else if (h->r) {
msg = towire_update_fulfill_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id, h->id,
h->r);
} else
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s not failed/fulfilled",
h->id, htlc_state_name(h->state));
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
static int cmp_changed_htlc_id(const struct changed_htlc *a,
const struct changed_htlc *b,
void *unused)
{
/* ids can be the same (sender and receiver are indep) but in
* that case we don't care about order. */
if (a->id > b->id)
return 1;
else if (a->id < b->id)
return -1;
return 0;
}
static void resend_commitment(struct peer *peer, struct changed_htlc *last)
{
size_t i;
struct bitcoin_signature commit_sig, *htlc_sigs;
u8 *msg;
struct bitcoin_tx **txs;
const u8 *funding_wscript;
const struct htlc **htlc_map;
struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
status_debug("Retransmitting commitment, feerate LOCAL=%u REMOTE=%u,"
" blockheight LOCAL=%u REMOTE=%u",
channel_feerate(peer->channel, LOCAL),
channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE),
channel_blockheight(peer->channel, LOCAL),
channel_blockheight(peer->channel, REMOTE));
/* Note that HTLCs must be *added* in order. Simplest thing to do
* is to sort them all into ascending ID order here (we could do
* this when we save them in channel_sending_commit, but older versions
* won't have them sorted in the db, so doing it here is better). */
asort(last, tal_count(last), cmp_changed_htlc_id, NULL);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if `next_commitment_number` is equal to the commitment
* number of the last `commitment_signed` message the receiving node
* has sent:
* - MUST reuse the same commitment number for its next
* `commitment_signed`.
*/
/* In our case, we consider ourselves already committed to this, so
* retransmission is simplest. */
/* We need to send fulfills/failures before adds, so we split them
* up into two loops -- this is the 'fulfill/fail' loop */
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(last); i++) {
const struct htlc *h;
h = channel_get_htlc(peer->channel,
htlc_state_owner(last[i].newstate),
last[i].id);
/* I think this can happen if we actually received revoke_and_ack
* then they asked for a retransmit */
if (!h)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Can't find HTLC %"PRIu64" to resend",
last[i].id);
if (h->state == SENT_REMOVE_COMMIT)
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, h);
}
/* We need to send fulfills/failures before adds, so we split them
* up into two loops -- this is the 'add' loop */
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(last); i++) {
const struct htlc *h;
h = channel_get_htlc(peer->channel,
htlc_state_owner(last[i].newstate),
last[i].id);
/* I think this can happen if we actually received revoke_and_ack
* then they asked for a retransmit */
if (!h)
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Can't find HTLC %"PRIu64" to resend",
last[i].id);
if (h->state == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) {
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
struct tlv_update_add_tlvs *tlvs;
if (h->blinding) {
tlvs = tlv_update_add_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
tlvs->blinding = tal_dup(tlvs, struct pubkey,
h->blinding);
} else
tlvs = NULL;
#endif
u8 *msg = towire_update_add_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
h->id, h->amount,
&h->rhash,
abs_locktime_to_blocks(
&h->expiry),
h->routing
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, tlvs
#endif
);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
}
/* Make sure they have the correct fee and blockheight. */
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL) {
msg = towire_update_fee(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE));
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
if (peer->channel->lease_expiry > 0) {
msg = towire_update_blockheight(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
channel_blockheight(peer->channel, REMOTE));
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
}
/* Re-send the commitment_signed itself. */
txs = channel_txs(tmpctx, &htlc_map, direct_outputs,
&funding_wscript, peer->channel, &peer->remote_per_commit,
peer->next_index[REMOTE]-1, REMOTE);
htlc_sigs = calc_commitsigs(tmpctx, peer, txs, funding_wscript, htlc_map, peer->next_index[REMOTE]-1,
&commit_sig);
msg = towire_commitment_signed(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
&commit_sig.s,
raw_sigs(tmpctx, htlc_sigs));
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
/* If we have already received the revocation for the previous, the
* other side shouldn't be asking for a retransmit! */
if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2)
status_unusual("Retransmitted commitment_signed %"PRIu64
" but they already send revocation %"PRIu64"?",
peer->next_index[REMOTE]-1,
peer->revocations_received);
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - if `option_static_remotekey` or `option_anchors` applies to the
* commitment transaction:
* - if `next_revocation_number` is greater than expected above, AND
* `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
* `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
*...
* - otherwise, if it supports `option_data_loss_protect`:
* - if `next_revocation_number` is greater than expected above,
* AND `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
* `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
*/
static void check_future_dataloss_fields(struct peer *peer,
u64 next_revocation_number,
const struct secret *last_local_per_commit_secret,
/* This is NULL if option_static_remotekey */
const struct pubkey *remote_current_per_commitment_point)
{
const u8 *msg;
bool correct;
assert(next_revocation_number > peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1);
msg = towire_hsmd_check_future_secret(NULL,
next_revocation_number - 1,
last_local_per_commit_secret);
msg = hsm_req(tmpctx, take(msg));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_check_future_secret_reply(msg, &correct))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad hsm_check_future_secret_reply: %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
if (!correct)
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad future last_local_per_commit_secret: %"PRIu64
" vs %"PRIu64,
next_revocation_number,
peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1);
/* Oh shit, they really are from the future! */
peer_billboard(true, "They have future commitment number %"PRIu64
" vs our %"PRIu64". We must wait for them to close!",
next_revocation_number,
peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1);
/* BOLT #2:
* - MUST NOT broadcast its commitment transaction.
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
* - SHOULD store `my_current_per_commitment_point` to
* retrieve funds should the sending node broadcast its
* commitment transaction on-chain.
*/
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_fail_fallen_behind(NULL,
remote_current_per_commitment_point)));
/* We have to send them an error to trigger dropping to chain. */
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Awaiting unilateral close");
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - if `option_static_remotekey` or `option_anchors` applies to the
* commitment transaction:
* ...
* - if `your_last_per_commitment_secret` does not match the expected values:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
* - otherwise, if it supports `option_data_loss_protect`:
*...
* - otherwise (`your_last_per_commitment_secret` or
* `my_current_per_commitment_point` do not match the expected values):
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
static void check_current_dataloss_fields(struct peer *peer,
u64 next_revocation_number,
u64 next_commitment_number,
const struct secret *last_local_per_commit_secret,
/* NULL if option_static_remotekey */
const struct pubkey *remote_current_per_commitment_point)
{
struct secret old_commit_secret;
/* By the time we're called, we've ensured this is a valid revocation
* number. */
assert(next_revocation_number == peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 2
|| next_revocation_number == peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1);
/* By the time we're called, we've ensured we're within 1 of
* their commitment chain */
assert(next_commitment_number == peer->next_index[REMOTE] ||
next_commitment_number == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1);
if (!last_local_per_commit_secret)
return;
/* BOLT #2:
* - if `next_revocation_number` equals 0:
* - MUST set `your_last_per_commitment_secret` to all zeroes
*/
status_debug("next_revocation_number = %"PRIu64,
next_revocation_number);
if (next_revocation_number == 0)
memset(&old_commit_secret, 0, sizeof(old_commit_secret));
else {
struct pubkey unused;
/* This gets previous revocation number, since asking for
* commitment point N gives secret for N-2 */
get_per_commitment_point(next_revocation_number+1,
&unused, &old_commit_secret);
}
if (!secret_eq_consttime(&old_commit_secret,
last_local_per_commit_secret))
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish: your_last_per_commitment_secret %"PRIu64
": %s should be %s",
next_revocation_number,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret,
last_local_per_commit_secret),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret,
&old_commit_secret));
if (!remote_current_per_commitment_point) {
status_debug("option_static_remotekey: fields are correct");
return;
}
status_debug("Reestablish, comparing commitments. Remote's next local commitment number"
" is %"PRIu64". Our next remote is %"PRIu64" with %"PRIu64
" revocations received",
next_commitment_number,
peer->next_index[REMOTE],
peer->revocations_received);
/* Either they haven't received our commitment yet, or we're up to date */
if (next_commitment_number == peer->revocations_received + 1) {
if (!pubkey_eq(remote_current_per_commitment_point,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish: remote's "
"my_current_per_commitment_point %"PRIu64
"is %s; expected %s (new is %s).",
next_commitment_number - 1,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
remote_current_per_commitment_point),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->remote_per_commit));
}
} else {
/* We've sent a commit sig but haven't gotten a revoke+ack back */
if (!pubkey_eq(remote_current_per_commitment_point,
&peer->remote_per_commit)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish: remote's "
"my_current_per_commitment_point %"PRIu64
"is %s; expected %s (old is %s).",
next_commitment_number - 1,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
remote_current_per_commitment_point),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->remote_per_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit));
}
}
status_debug("option_data_loss_protect: fields are correct");
}
/* Older LND sometimes sends funding_locked before reestablish! */
/* ... or announcement_signatures. Sigh, let's handle whatever they send. */
static bool capture_premature_msg(const u8 ***shit_lnd_says, const u8 *msg)
{
if (fromwire_peektype(msg) == WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH)
return false;
/* Don't allow infinite memory consumption. */
if (tal_count(*shit_lnd_says) > 10)
return false;
status_debug("Stashing early %s msg!",
peer_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)));
tal_arr_expand(shit_lnd_says, tal_steal(*shit_lnd_says, msg));
return true;
}
static void peer_reconnect(struct peer *peer,
const struct secret *last_remote_per_commit_secret,
u8 *reestablish_only)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
/* Note: BOLT #2 uses these names! */
u64 next_commitment_number, next_revocation_number;
bool retransmit_revoke_and_ack, retransmit_commitment_signed;
struct htlc_map_iter it;
const struct htlc *htlc;
u8 *msg;
struct pubkey my_current_per_commitment_point,
remote_current_per_commitment_point;
struct secret last_local_per_commitment_secret;
bool dataloss_protect, check_extra_fields;
const u8 **premature_msgs = tal_arr(peer, const u8 *, 0);
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
struct tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs *send_tlvs, *recv_tlvs;
#endif
dataloss_protect = feature_negotiated(peer->our_features,
peer->their_features,
OPT_DATA_LOSS_PROTECT);
/* Both these options give us extra fields to check. */
check_extra_fields
= dataloss_protect || channel_has(peer->channel, OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY);
/* Our current per-commitment point is the commitment point in the last
* received signed commitment */
get_per_commitment_point(peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1,
&my_current_per_commitment_point, NULL);
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
/* Subtle: we free tmpctx below as we loop, so tal off peer */
send_tlvs = tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs_new(peer);
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
* A node sending `channel_reestablish`, if it supports upgrading channels:
* - MUST set `next_to_send` the commitment number of the next
* `commitment_signed` it expects to send.
*/
send_tlvs->next_to_send = tal_dup(send_tlvs, u64, &peer->next_index[REMOTE]);
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
* - if it initiated the channel:
* - MUST set `desired_type` to the channel_type it wants for the
* channel.
*/
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL)
send_tlvs->desired_type = channel_desired_type(send_tlvs,
peer->channel);
else {
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
* - otherwise:
* - MUST set `current_type` to the current channel_type of the
* channel.
* - MUST set `upgradable` to the channel types it could change
* to.
* - MAY not set `upgradable` if it would be empty.
*/
send_tlvs->current_type = tal_dup(send_tlvs, struct channel_type,
peer->channel->type);
send_tlvs->upgradable = channel_upgradable_types(send_tlvs,
peer->channel);
}
#endif
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - upon reconnection:
* - if a channel is in an error state:
* - SHOULD retransmit the error packet and ignore any other packets for
* that channel.
* - otherwise:
* - MUST transmit `channel_reestablish` for each channel.
* - MUST wait to receive the other node's `channel_reestablish`
* message before sending any other messages for that channel.
*
* The sending node:
* - MUST set `next_commitment_number` to the commitment number
* of the next `commitment_signed` it expects to receive.
* - MUST set `next_revocation_number` to the commitment number
* of the next `revoke_and_ack` message it expects to receive.
* - if `option_static_remotekey` or `option_anchors` applies to the commitment transaction:
* - MUST set `my_current_per_commitment_point` to a valid point.
* - otherwise:
* - MUST set `my_current_per_commitment_point` to its commitment
* point for the last signed commitment it received from its
* channel peer (i.e. the commitment_point corresponding to the
* commitment transaction the sender would use to unilaterally
* close).
* - if `next_revocation_number` equals 0:
* - MUST set `your_last_per_commitment_secret` to all zeroes
* - otherwise:
* - MUST set `your_last_per_commitment_secret` to the last
* `per_commitment_secret` it received
*/
if (channel_has(peer->channel, OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY)) {
msg = towire_channel_reestablish
(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
peer->revocations_received,
last_remote_per_commit_secret,
/* Can send any (valid) point here */
&peer->remote_per_commit
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, send_tlvs
#endif
);
} else {
msg = towire_channel_reestablish
(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
peer->revocations_received,
last_remote_per_commit_secret,
&my_current_per_commitment_point
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, send_tlvs
#endif
);
}
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
peer_billboard(false, "Sent reestablish, waiting for theirs");
bool soft_error = peer->funding_locked[REMOTE]
|| peer->funding_locked[LOCAL];
/* If they sent reestablish, we analyze it for courtesy, but also
* in case *they* are ahead of us! */
if (reestablish_only) {
msg = reestablish_only;
goto got_reestablish;
}
/* Read until they say something interesting (don't forward
* gossip *to* them yet: we might try sending channel_update
* before we've reestablished channel). */
do {
clean_tmpctx();
msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, peer->pps);
} while (channeld_handle_custommsg(msg) ||
handle_peer_gossip_or_error(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id, soft_error,
msg) ||
capture_premature_msg(&premature_msgs, msg));
got_reestablish:
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
recv_tlvs = tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
#endif
if (!fromwire_channel_reestablish(msg,
&channel_id,
&next_commitment_number,
&next_revocation_number,
&last_local_per_commitment_secret,
&remote_current_per_commitment_point
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, recv_tlvs
#endif
)) {
peer_failed_warn(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish msg: %s %s",
peer_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
if (!channel_id_eq(&channel_id, &peer->channel_id)) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&channel_id,
"bad reestablish msg for unknown channel %s: %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&channel_id),
tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
status_debug("Got reestablish commit=%"PRIu64" revoke=%"PRIu64,
next_commitment_number,
next_revocation_number);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if `next_commitment_number` is 1 in both the
* `channel_reestablish` it sent and received:
* - MUST retransmit `funding_locked`.
* - otherwise:
* - MUST NOT retransmit `funding_locked`.
*/
if (peer->funding_locked[LOCAL]
&& peer->next_index[LOCAL] == 1
&& next_commitment_number == 1) {
u8 *msg;
status_debug("Retransmitting funding_locked for channel %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id, &peer->channel_id));
/* Contains per commit point #1, for first post-opening commit */
msg = towire_funding_locked(NULL,
&peer->channel_id,
&peer->next_local_per_commit);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
/* Note: next_index is the index of the current commit we're working
* on, but BOLT #2 refers to the *last* commit index, so we -1 where
* required. */
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if `next_revocation_number` is equal to the commitment
* number of the last `revoke_and_ack` the receiving node sent, AND
* the receiving node hasn't already received a `closing_signed`:
* - MUST re-send the `revoke_and_ack`.
* - if it has previously sent a `commitment_signed` that needs to be
* retransmitted:
* - MUST retransmit `revoke_and_ack` and `commitment_signed` in the
* same relative order as initially transmitted.
* - otherwise:
* - if `next_revocation_number` is not equal to 1 greater
* than the commitment number of the last `revoke_and_ack` the
* receiving node has sent:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
* - if it has not sent `revoke_and_ack`, AND
* `next_revocation_number` is not equal to 0:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
if (next_revocation_number == peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 2) {
/* Don't try to retransmit revocation index -1! */
if (peer->next_index[LOCAL] < 2) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish revocation_number: %"
PRIu64,
next_revocation_number);
}
retransmit_revoke_and_ack = true;
} else if (next_revocation_number < peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1) {
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish revocation_number: %"PRIu64
" vs %"PRIu64,
next_revocation_number,
peer->next_index[LOCAL]);
} else if (next_revocation_number > peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1) {
if (!check_extra_fields)
/* They don't support option_data_loss_protect or
* option_static_remotekey, we fail it due to
* unexpected number */
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish revocation_number: %"PRIu64
" vs %"PRIu64,
next_revocation_number,
peer->next_index[LOCAL] - 1);
/* Remote claims it's ahead of us: can it prove it?
* Does not return. */
check_future_dataloss_fields(peer,
next_revocation_number,
&last_local_per_commitment_secret,
channel_has(peer->channel,
OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY)
? NULL :
&remote_current_per_commitment_point);
} else
retransmit_revoke_and_ack = false;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if `next_commitment_number` is equal to the commitment
* number of the last `commitment_signed` message the receiving node
* has sent:
* - MUST reuse the same commitment number for its next
* `commitment_signed`.
*/
if (next_commitment_number == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1) {
/* We completed opening, we don't re-transmit that one! */
if (next_commitment_number == 0)
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"
PRIu64,
next_commitment_number);
retransmit_commitment_signed = true;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - otherwise:
* - if `next_commitment_number` is not 1 greater than the
* commitment number of the last `commitment_signed` message the
* receiving node has sent:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
} else if (next_commitment_number != peer->next_index[REMOTE])
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"PRIu64
" vs %"PRIu64,
next_commitment_number,
peer->next_index[REMOTE]);
else
retransmit_commitment_signed = false;
/* After we checked basic sanity, we check dataloss fields if any */
if (check_extra_fields)
check_current_dataloss_fields(peer,
next_revocation_number,
next_commitment_number,
&last_local_per_commitment_secret,
channel_has(peer->channel,
OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY)
? NULL
: &remote_current_per_commitment_point);
/* BOLT #2:
* - if it has previously sent a `commitment_signed` that needs to be
* retransmitted:
* - MUST retransmit `revoke_and_ack` and `commitment_signed` in the
* same relative order as initially transmitted.
*/
if (retransmit_revoke_and_ack && !peer->last_was_revoke)
resend_revoke(peer);
if (retransmit_commitment_signed)
resend_commitment(peer, peer->last_sent_commit);
/* This covers the case where we sent revoke after commit. */
if (retransmit_revoke_and_ack && peer->last_was_revoke)
resend_revoke(peer);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - upon reconnection:
* - if it has sent a previous `shutdown`:
* - MUST retransmit `shutdown`.
*/
/* (If we had sent `closing_signed`, we'd be in closingd). */
maybe_send_shutdown(peer);
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
if (recv_tlvs->desired_type)
status_debug("They sent desired_type [%s]",
fmt_featurebits(tmpctx,
recv_tlvs->desired_type->features));
if (recv_tlvs->current_type)
status_debug("They sent current_type [%s]",
fmt_featurebits(tmpctx,
recv_tlvs->current_type->features));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(recv_tlvs->upgradable); i++) {
status_debug("They offered upgrade to [%s]",
fmt_featurebits(tmpctx,
recv_tlvs->upgradable[i]->features));
}
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
*
* A node receiving `channel_reestablish`:
* - if it has to retransmit `commitment_signed` or `revoke_and_ack`:
* - MUST consider the channel feature change failed.
*/
if (retransmit_commitment_signed || retransmit_revoke_and_ack) {
status_debug("No upgrade: we retransmitted");
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
*
* - if `next_to_send` is missing, or not equal to the
* `next_commitment_number` it sent:
* - MUST consider the channel feature change failed.
*/
} else if (!recv_tlvs->next_to_send) {
status_debug("No upgrade: no next_to_send received");
} else if (*recv_tlvs->next_to_send != peer->next_index[LOCAL]) {
status_debug("No upgrade: they're retransmitting");
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
*
* - if updates are pending on either sides' commitment transaction:
* - MUST consider the channel feature change failed.
*/
/* Note that we can have HTLCs we *want* to add or remove
* but haven't yet: thats OK! */
} else if (pending_updates(peer->channel, LOCAL, true)
|| pending_updates(peer->channel, REMOTE, true)) {
status_debug("No upgrade: pending changes");
} else {
const struct tlv_channel_reestablish_tlvs *initr, *ninitr;
const struct channel_type *type;
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL) {
initr = send_tlvs;
ninitr = recv_tlvs;
} else {
initr = recv_tlvs;
ninitr = send_tlvs;
}
/* BOLT-upgrade_protocol #2:
*
* - if `desired_type` matches `current_type` or any
* `upgradable` `upgrades`:
* - MUST consider the channel type to be `desired_type`.
* - otherwise:
* - MUST consider the channel feature change failed.
* - if there is a `current_type` field:
* - MUST consider the channel type to be `current_type`.
*/
/* Note: returns NULL on missing fields, aka NULL */
if (match_type(initr->desired_type,
ninitr->current_type, ninitr->upgradable))
type = initr->desired_type;
else if (ninitr->current_type)
type = ninitr->current_type;
else
type = NULL;
if (type)
set_channel_type(peer->channel, type);
}
tal_free(send_tlvs);
#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */
/* Now stop, we've been polite long enough. */
if (reestablish_only) {
/* If we were successfully closing, we still go to closingd. */
if (shutdown_complete(peer)) {
send_shutdown_complete(peer);
daemon_shutdown();
exit(0);
}
peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
&peer->channel_id,
"Channel is already closed");
}
/* Corner case: we didn't send shutdown before because update_add_htlc
* pending, but now they're cleared by restart, and we're actually
* complete. In that case, their `shutdown` will trigger us. */
/* Start commit timer: if we sent revoke we might need it. */
start_commit_timer(peer);
/* Now, re-send any that we're supposed to be failing. */
for (htlc = htlc_map_first(peer->channel->htlcs, &it);
htlc;
htlc = htlc_map_next(peer->channel->htlcs, &it)) {
if (htlc->state == SENT_REMOVE_HTLC)
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, htlc);
}
/* We allow peer to send us tx-sigs, until funding locked received */
peer->tx_sigs_allowed = true;
peer_billboard(true, "Reconnected, and reestablished.");
/* BOLT #2:
* - upon reconnection:
*...
* - MUST transmit `channel_reestablish` for each channel.
* - MUST wait to receive the other node's `channel_reestablish`
* message before sending any other messages for that channel.
*/
/* LND doesn't wait. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(premature_msgs); i++)
peer_in(peer, premature_msgs[i]);
tal_free(premature_msgs);
}
/* ignores the funding_depth unless depth >= minimum_depth
* (except to update billboard, and set peer->depth_togo). */
static void handle_funding_depth(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
u32 depth;
struct short_channel_id *scid;
if (!fromwire_channeld_funding_depth(tmpctx,
msg,
&scid,
&depth))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_FUNDING_DEPTH, msg);
/* Too late, we're shutting down! */
if (peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
return;
if (depth < peer->channel->minimum_depth) {
peer->depth_togo = peer->channel->minimum_depth - depth;
} else {
peer->depth_togo = 0;
assert(scid);
peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL] = *scid;
if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL]) {
status_debug("funding_locked: sending commit index"
" %"PRIu64": %s",
peer->next_index[LOCAL],
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->next_local_per_commit));
msg = towire_funding_locked(NULL,
&peer->channel_id,
&peer->next_local_per_commit);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] = true;
}
peer->announce_depth_reached = (depth >= ANNOUNCE_MIN_DEPTH);
/* Send temporary or final announcements */
channel_announcement_negotiate(peer);
}
billboard_update(peer);
}
static void handle_offer_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
u8 *msg;
u32 cltv_expiry;
struct amount_msat amount;
struct sha256 payment_hash;
u8 onion_routing_packet[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE(ROUTING_INFO_SIZE)];
enum channel_add_err e;
const u8 *failwiremsg;
const char *failstr;
struct amount_sat htlc_fee;
struct pubkey *blinding;
if (!peer->funding_locked[LOCAL] || !peer->funding_locked[REMOTE])
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"funding not locked for offer_htlc");
if (!fromwire_channeld_offer_htlc(tmpctx, inmsg, &amount,
&cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
onion_routing_packet, &blinding))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_OFFER_HTLC, inmsg);
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
struct tlv_update_add_tlvs *tlvs;
if (blinding) {
tlvs = tlv_update_add_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
tlvs->blinding = tal_dup(tlvs, struct pubkey, blinding);
} else
tlvs = NULL;
#endif
e = channel_add_htlc(peer->channel, LOCAL, peer->htlc_id,
amount, cltv_expiry, &payment_hash,
onion_routing_packet, take(blinding), NULL, &htlc_fee);
status_debug("Adding HTLC %"PRIu64" amount=%s cltv=%u gave %s",
peer->htlc_id,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &amount),
cltv_expiry,
channel_add_err_name(e));
switch (e) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK:
/* Tell the peer. */
msg = towire_update_add_htlc(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
peer->htlc_id, amount,
&payment_hash, cltv_expiry,
onion_routing_packet
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
, tlvs
#endif
);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
start_commit_timer(peer);
/* Tell the master. */
msg = towire_channeld_offer_htlc_reply(NULL, peer->htlc_id,
0, "");
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
peer->htlc_id++;
return;
case CHANNEL_ERR_INVALID_EXPIRY:
failwiremsg = towire_incorrect_cltv_expiry(inmsg, cltv_expiry, get_local_channel_update(tmpctx, peer));
failstr = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Invalid cltv_expiry %u", cltv_expiry);
goto failed;
case CHANNEL_ERR_DUPLICATE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_DUPLICATE_ID_DIFFERENT:
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"Duplicate HTLC %"PRIu64, peer->htlc_id);
case CHANNEL_ERR_MAX_HTLC_VALUE_EXCEEDED:
failwiremsg = towire_required_node_feature_missing(inmsg);
failstr = "Mini mode: maximum value exceeded";
goto failed;
/* FIXME: Fuzz the boundaries a bit to avoid probing? */
case CHANNEL_ERR_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_EXCEEDED:
failwiremsg = towire_temporary_channel_failure(inmsg, get_local_channel_update(inmsg, peer));
failstr = tal_fmt(inmsg, "Capacity exceeded - HTLC fee: %s", fmt_amount_sat(inmsg, htlc_fee));
goto failed;
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_BELOW_MINIMUM:
failwiremsg = towire_amount_below_minimum(inmsg, amount, get_local_channel_update(inmsg, peer));
failstr = tal_fmt(inmsg, "HTLC too small (%s minimum)",
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct amount_msat,
&peer->channel->config[REMOTE].htlc_minimum));
goto failed;
case CHANNEL_ERR_TOO_MANY_HTLCS:
failwiremsg = towire_temporary_channel_failure(inmsg, get_local_channel_update(inmsg, peer));
failstr = "Too many HTLCs";
goto failed;
}
/* Shouldn't return anything else! */
abort();
failed:
msg = towire_channeld_offer_htlc_reply(NULL, 0, failwiremsg, failstr);
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
}
static void handle_feerates(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
u32 feerate;
if (!fromwire_channeld_feerates(inmsg, &feerate,
&peer->feerate_min,
&peer->feerate_max,
&peer->feerate_penalty))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_FEERATES, inmsg);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The node _responsible_ for paying the Bitcoin fee:
* - SHOULD send `update_fee` to ensure the current fee rate is
* sufficient (by a significant margin) for timely processing of the
* commitment transaction.
*/
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL) {
peer->desired_feerate = feerate;
/* Don't do this for the first feerate, wait until something else
* happens. LND seems to get upset in some cases otherwise:
* see https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/issues/3596 */
if (peer->next_index[LOCAL] != 1
|| peer->next_index[REMOTE] != 1)
start_commit_timer(peer);
} else {
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The node _not responsible_ for paying the Bitcoin fee:
* - MUST NOT send `update_fee`.
*/
/* FIXME: We could drop to chain if fees are too low, but
* that's fraught too. */
}
}
static void handle_blockheight(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
u32 blockheight;
if (!fromwire_channeld_blockheight(inmsg, &blockheight))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_BLOCKHEIGHT, inmsg);
/* Save it, so we know */
peer->our_blockheight = blockheight;
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL)
start_commit_timer(peer);
else {
u32 peer_height = get_blockheight(peer->channel->blockheight_states,
peer->channel->opener,
REMOTE);
/* BOLT- #2:
* The node _not responsible_ for initiating the channel:
* ...
* - if last received `blockheight` is > 1008 behind
* currently known blockheight:
* - SHOULD fail he channel
*/
assert(peer_height + 1008 > peer_height);
if (peer_height + 1008 < blockheight)
peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
"Peer is too far behind, terminating"
" leased channel. Our current"
" %u, theirs %u",
blockheight, peer_height);
/* We're behind them... what do. It's possible they're lying,
* but if we're in a lease this is actually in our favor so
* we log it but otherwise continue on unchanged */
if (peer_height > blockheight
&& peer_height > blockheight + 100)
status_unusual("Peer reporting we've fallen %u"
" blocks behind. Our height %u,"
" their height %u",
peer_height - blockheight,
blockheight, peer_height);
}
}
static void handle_specific_feerates(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
u32 base_old = peer->fee_base;
u32 per_satoshi_old = peer->fee_per_satoshi;
if (!fromwire_channeld_specific_feerates(inmsg,
&peer->fee_base,
&peer->fee_per_satoshi))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_SPECIFIC_FEERATES, inmsg);
/* only send channel updates if values actually changed */
if (peer->fee_base != base_old || peer->fee_per_satoshi != per_satoshi_old)
send_channel_update(peer, 0);
}
static void handle_preimage(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
struct fulfilled_htlc fulfilled_htlc;
struct htlc *h;
if (!fromwire_channeld_fulfill_htlc(inmsg, &fulfilled_htlc))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_FULFILL_HTLC, inmsg);
switch (channel_fulfill_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE,
fulfilled_htlc.id,
&fulfilled_htlc.payment_preimage,
&h)) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, h);
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
/* These shouldn't happen, because any offered HTLC (which would give
* us the preimage) should have timed out long before. If we
* were to get preimages from other sources, this could happen. */
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"HTLC %"PRIu64" preimage failed",
fulfilled_htlc.id);
}
abort();
}
static void handle_fail(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
struct failed_htlc *failed_htlc;
enum channel_remove_err e;
struct htlc *h;
if (!fromwire_channeld_fail_htlc(inmsg, inmsg, &failed_htlc))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_FAIL_HTLC, inmsg);
e = channel_fail_htlc(peer->channel, REMOTE, failed_htlc->id, &h);
switch (e) {
case CHANNEL_ERR_REMOVE_OK:
h->failed = tal_steal(h, failed_htlc);
send_fail_or_fulfill(peer, h);
start_commit_timer(peer);
return;
case CHANNEL_ERR_NO_SUCH_ID:
case CHANNEL_ERR_ALREADY_FULFILLED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_UNCOMMITTED:
case CHANNEL_ERR_HTLC_NOT_IRREVOCABLE:
case CHANNEL_ERR_BAD_PREIMAGE:
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"HTLC %"PRIu64" removal failed: %s",
failed_htlc->id,
channel_remove_err_name(e));
}
abort();
}
static void handle_shutdown_cmd(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
{
u8 *local_shutdown_script;
if (!fromwire_channeld_send_shutdown(peer, inmsg, &local_shutdown_script,
&peer->shutdown_wrong_funding))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_SEND_SHUTDOWN, inmsg);
tal_free(peer->final_scriptpubkey);
peer->final_scriptpubkey = local_shutdown_script;
/* We can't send this until commit (if any) is done, so start timer. */
peer->send_shutdown = true;
start_commit_timer(peer);
}
static void handle_send_error(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
char *reason;
if (!fromwire_channeld_send_error(msg, msg, &reason))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_SEND_ERROR, msg);
status_debug("Send error reason: %s", reason);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps,
take(towire_errorfmt(NULL, &peer->channel_id,
"%s", reason)));
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_send_error_reply(NULL)));
}
#if DEVELOPER
static void handle_dev_reenable_commit(struct peer *peer)
{
dev_suppress_commit = false;
start_commit_timer(peer);
status_debug("dev_reenable_commit");
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_dev_reenable_commit_reply(NULL)));
}
static void handle_dev_memleak(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
struct htable *memtable;
bool found_leak;
memtable = memleak_find_allocations(tmpctx, msg, msg);
/* Now delete peer and things it has pointers to. */
memleak_remove_region(memtable, peer, tal_bytelen(peer));
found_leak = dump_memleak(memtable, memleak_status_broken);
wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD,
take(towire_channeld_dev_memleak_reply(NULL,
found_leak)));
}
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
static void handle_dev_quiesce(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
if (!fromwire_channeld_dev_quiesce(msg))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_QUIESCE, msg);
/* Don't do this twice. */
if (peer->stfu)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO, "dev_quiesce already");
peer->stfu = true;
peer->stfu_initiator = LOCAL;
maybe_send_stfu(peer);
}
#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
/* We were told to send a custommsg to the peer by `lightningd`. All the
* verification is done on the side of `lightningd` so we should be good to
* just forward it here. */
static void channeld_send_custommsg(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
u8 *inner;
if (!fromwire_custommsg_out(tmpctx, msg, &inner))
master_badmsg(WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_OUT, msg);
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(inner));
}
static void req_in(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
{
enum channeld_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
switch (t) {
case WIRE_CHANNELD_FUNDING_DEPTH:
handle_funding_depth(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_OFFER_HTLC:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_offer_htlc(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_FEERATES:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_feerates(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_BLOCKHEIGHT:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_blockheight(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_FULFILL_HTLC:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_preimage(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_FAIL_HTLC:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_fail(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SPECIFIC_FEERATES:
if (handle_master_request_later(peer, msg))
return;
handle_specific_feerates(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SEND_SHUTDOWN:
handle_shutdown_cmd(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SEND_ERROR:
handle_send_error(peer, msg);
return;
#if DEVELOPER
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_REENABLE_COMMIT:
handle_dev_reenable_commit(peer);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_MEMLEAK:
handle_dev_memleak(peer, msg);
return;
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_QUIESCE:
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
handle_dev_quiesce(peer, msg);
return;
#endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */
#else
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_REENABLE_COMMIT:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_MEMLEAK:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_QUIESCE:
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
case WIRE_CHANNELD_INIT:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_OFFER_HTLC_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SENDING_COMMITSIG:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_COMMITSIG:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_REVOKE:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SENDING_COMMITSIG_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_COMMITSIG_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_REVOKE_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_FUNDING_LOCKED:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_ANNOUNCEMENT:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_GOT_SHUTDOWN:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_REENABLE_COMMIT_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_FAIL_FALLEN_BEHIND:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_SEND_ERROR_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_DEV_QUIESCE_REPLY:
case WIRE_CHANNELD_UPGRADED:
break;
}
/* Now handle common messages. */
switch ((enum common_wire)t) {
case WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_OUT:
channeld_send_custommsg(peer, msg);
return;
/* We send these. */
case WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_IN:
break;
}
master_badmsg(-1, msg);
}
/* We do this synchronously. */
static void init_channel(struct peer *peer)
{
struct basepoints points[NUM_SIDES];
struct amount_sat funding;
u16 funding_txout;
struct amount_msat local_msat;
struct pubkey funding_pubkey[NUM_SIDES];
struct channel_config conf[NUM_SIDES];
struct bitcoin_txid funding_txid;
enum side opener;
struct existing_htlc **htlcs;
bool reconnected;
u8 *fwd_msg;
const u8 *msg;
struct fee_states *fee_states;
struct height_states *blockheight_states;
u32 minimum_depth, lease_expiry;
struct secret last_remote_per_commit_secret;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_ann_node_sig;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_ann_bitcoin_sig;
struct penalty_base *pbases;
u8 *reestablish_only;
struct channel_type *channel_type;
#if !DEVELOPER
bool dev_fail_process_onionpacket; /* Ignored */
#endif
assert(!(fcntl(MASTER_FD, F_GETFL) & O_NONBLOCK));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, MASTER_FD);
if (!fromwire_channeld_init(peer, msg,
&chainparams,
&peer->our_features,
&peer->channel_id,
&funding_txid, &funding_txout,
&funding,
&minimum_depth,
&peer->our_blockheight,
&blockheight_states,
&lease_expiry,
&conf[LOCAL], &conf[REMOTE],
&fee_states,
&peer->feerate_min,
&peer->feerate_max,
&peer->feerate_penalty,
&peer->their_commit_sig,
&peer->pps,
&funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
&points[REMOTE],
&peer->remote_per_commit,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit,
&opener,
&peer->fee_base,
&peer->fee_per_satoshi,
&local_msat,
&points[LOCAL],
&funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[REMOTE],
&peer->commit_msec,
&peer->cltv_delta,
&peer->last_was_revoke,
&peer->last_sent_commit,
&peer->next_index[LOCAL],
&peer->next_index[REMOTE],
&peer->revocations_received,
&peer->htlc_id,
&htlcs,
&peer->funding_locked[LOCAL],
&peer->funding_locked[REMOTE],
&peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL],
&reconnected,
&peer->send_shutdown,
&peer->shutdown_sent[REMOTE],
&peer->final_scriptpubkey,
&peer->channel_flags,
&fwd_msg,
&peer->announce_depth_reached,
&last_remote_per_commit_secret,
&peer->their_features,
&peer->remote_upfront_shutdown_script,
&remote_ann_node_sig,
&remote_ann_bitcoin_sig,
&channel_type,
&dev_fast_gossip,
&dev_fail_process_onionpacket,
&pbases,
&reestablish_only)) {
master_badmsg(WIRE_CHANNELD_INIT, msg);
}
status_debug("option_static_remotekey = %u, option_anchor_outputs = %u",
channel_type_has(channel_type, OPT_STATIC_REMOTEKEY),
channel_type_has(channel_type, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS));
/* Keeping an array of pointers is better since it allows us to avoid
* extra allocations later. */
peer->pbases = tal_arr(peer, struct penalty_base *, 0);
for (size_t i=0; i<tal_count(pbases); i++)
tal_arr_expand(&peer->pbases,
tal_dup(peer, struct penalty_base, &pbases[i]));
tal_free(pbases);
/* stdin == requests, 3 == peer, 4 = gossip, 5 = gossip_store, 6 = HSM */
per_peer_state_set_fds(peer->pps, 3, 4, 5);
status_debug("init %s: remote_per_commit = %s, old_remote_per_commit = %s"
" next_idx_local = %"PRIu64
" next_idx_remote = %"PRIu64
" revocations_received = %"PRIu64
" feerates %s range %u-%u"
" blockheights %s, our current %u",
side_to_str(opener),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->remote_per_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&peer->old_remote_per_commit),
peer->next_index[LOCAL], peer->next_index[REMOTE],
peer->revocations_received,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct fee_states, fee_states),
peer->feerate_min, peer->feerate_max,
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct height_states, blockheight_states),
peer->our_blockheight);
if (remote_ann_node_sig && remote_ann_bitcoin_sig) {
peer->announcement_node_sigs[REMOTE] = *remote_ann_node_sig;
peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[REMOTE] = *remote_ann_bitcoin_sig;
peer->have_sigs[REMOTE] = true;
/* Before we store announcement into DB, we have made sure
* remote short_channel_id matched the local. Now we initial
* it directly!
*/
peer->short_channel_ids[REMOTE] = peer->short_channel_ids[LOCAL];
tal_free(remote_ann_node_sig);
tal_free(remote_ann_bitcoin_sig);
}
/* First commit is used for opening: if we've sent 0, we're on
* index 1. */
assert(peer->next_index[LOCAL] > 0);
assert(peer->next_index[REMOTE] > 0);
get_per_commitment_point(peer->next_index[LOCAL],
&peer->next_local_per_commit, NULL);
peer->channel = new_full_channel(peer, &peer->channel_id,
&funding_txid,
funding_txout,
minimum_depth,
take(blockheight_states),
lease_expiry,
funding,
local_msat,
take(fee_states),
&conf[LOCAL], &conf[REMOTE],
&points[LOCAL], &points[REMOTE],
&funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
&funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
take(channel_type),
feature_offered(peer->their_features,
OPT_LARGE_CHANNELS),
opener);
if (!channel_force_htlcs(peer->channel,
cast_const2(const struct existing_htlc **, htlcs)))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could not restore HTLCs");
/* We don't need these any more, so free them. */
tal_free(htlcs);
peer->channel_direction = node_id_idx(&peer->node_ids[LOCAL],
&peer->node_ids[REMOTE]);
/* Default desired feerate is the feerate we set for them last. */
if (peer->channel->opener == LOCAL)
peer->desired_feerate = channel_feerate(peer->channel, REMOTE);
/* from now we need keep watch over WIRE_CHANNELD_FUNDING_DEPTH */
peer->depth_togo = minimum_depth;
/* OK, now we can process peer messages. */
if (reconnected)
peer_reconnect(peer, &last_remote_per_commit_secret,
reestablish_only);
else
assert(!reestablish_only);
/* If we have a messages to send, send them immediately */
if (fwd_msg)
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(fwd_msg));
/* Reenable channel */
channel_announcement_negotiate(peer);
billboard_update(peer);
}
static void try_read_gossip_store(struct peer *peer)
{
u8 *msg = gossip_store_next(tmpctx, peer->pps);
if (msg)
sync_crypto_write(peer->pps, take(msg));
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
setup_locale();
int i, nfds;
fd_set fds_in, fds_out;
struct peer *peer;
subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);
status_setup_sync(MASTER_FD);
peer = tal(NULL, struct peer);
peer->expecting_pong = false;
timers_init(&peer->timers, time_mono());
peer->commit_timer = NULL;
peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] = peer->have_sigs[REMOTE] = false;
peer->announce_depth_reached = false;
peer->channel_local_active = false;
peer->from_master = msg_queue_new(peer);
peer->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] = false;
peer->shutdown_wrong_funding = NULL;
peer->last_update_timestamp = 0;
/* We actually received it in the previous daemon, but near enough */
peer->last_recv = time_now();
peer->last_empty_commitment = 0;
#if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES
peer->stfu = false;
peer->stfu_sent[LOCAL] = peer->stfu_sent[REMOTE] = false;
peer->update_queue = msg_queue_new(peer);
#endif
/* We send these to HSM to get real signatures; don't have valgrind
* complain. */
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SIDES; i++) {
memset(&peer->announcement_node_sigs[i], 0,
sizeof(peer->announcement_node_sigs[i]));
memset(&peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[i], 0,
sizeof(peer->announcement_bitcoin_sigs[i]));
}
/* Prepare the ecdh() function for use */
ecdh_hsmd_setup(HSM_FD, status_failed);
/* Read init_channel message sync. */
init_channel(peer);
FD_ZERO(&fds_in);
FD_SET(MASTER_FD, &fds_in);
FD_SET(peer->pps->peer_fd, &fds_in);
FD_SET(peer->pps->gossip_fd, &fds_in);
FD_ZERO(&fds_out);
FD_SET(peer->pps->peer_fd, &fds_out);
nfds = peer->pps->gossip_fd+1;
while (!shutdown_complete(peer)) {
struct timemono first;
fd_set rfds = fds_in;
struct timeval timeout, *tptr;
struct timer *expired;
const u8 *msg;
struct timerel trel;
struct timemono now = time_mono();
/* Free any temporary allocations */
clean_tmpctx();
/* For simplicity, we process one event at a time. */
msg = msg_dequeue(peer->from_master);
if (msg) {
status_debug("Now dealing with deferred %s",
channeld_wire_name(
fromwire_peektype(msg)));
req_in(peer, msg);
tal_free(msg);
continue;
}
expired = timers_expire(&peer->timers, now);
if (expired) {
timer_expired(peer, expired);
continue;
}
if (timer_earliest(&peer->timers, &first)) {
timeout = timespec_to_timeval(
timemono_between(first, now).ts);
tptr = &timeout;
} else if (time_to_next_gossip(peer->pps, &trel)) {
timeout = timerel_to_timeval(trel);
tptr = &timeout;
} else
tptr = NULL;
if (select(nfds, &rfds, NULL, NULL, tptr) < 0) {
/* Signals OK, eg. SIGUSR1 */
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"select failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
if (FD_ISSET(MASTER_FD, &rfds)) {
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, MASTER_FD);
if (!msg)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"Can't read command: %s",
strerror(errno));
req_in(peer, msg);
} else if (FD_ISSET(peer->pps->peer_fd, &rfds)) {
/* This could take forever, but who cares? */
msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, peer->pps);
peer_in(peer, msg);
} else if (FD_ISSET(peer->pps->gossip_fd, &rfds)) {
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, peer->pps->gossip_fd);
/* Gossipd hangs up on us to kill us when a new
* connection comes in. */
if (!msg)
peer_failed_connection_lost();
handle_gossip_msg(peer->pps, take(msg));
} else /* Lowest priority: stream from store. */
try_read_gossip_store(peer);
}
/* We only exit when shutdown is complete. */
assert(shutdown_complete(peer));
send_shutdown_complete(peer);
daemon_shutdown();
return 0;
}
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