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159fc7d1a2
Instead of open coding in connectd/onion_message, we move it to common with a nice API. This lets us process the BOLT test vectors. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
188 lines
5.1 KiB
C
188 lines
5.1 KiB
C
/* Caller does fromwire_onion_message(), this does the rest. */
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#include "config.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <common/blindedpath.h>
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#include <common/ecdh.h>
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#include <common/onion_message_parse.h>
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#include <common/sphinx.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <wire/onion_wire.h>
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#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
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static bool decrypt_final_onionmsg(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct pubkey *blinding,
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const struct secret *ss,
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const u8 *enctlv,
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const struct pubkey *my_id,
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struct pubkey *alias,
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struct secret **path_id)
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{
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struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg;
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if (!blindedpath_get_alias(ss, my_id, alias))
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return false;
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encmsg = decrypt_encrypted_data(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
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if (!encmsg)
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return false;
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if (tal_bytelen(encmsg->path_id) == sizeof(**path_id)) {
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*path_id = tal(ctx, struct secret);
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memcpy(*path_id, encmsg->path_id, sizeof(**path_id));
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} else
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*path_id = NULL;
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return true;
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}
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static bool decrypt_forwarding_onionmsg(const struct pubkey *blinding,
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const struct secret *ss,
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const u8 *enctlv,
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struct pubkey *next_node,
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struct pubkey *next_blinding)
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{
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struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *encmsg;
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encmsg = decrypt_encrypted_data(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
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if (!encmsg)
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return false;
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/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
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*
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* The reader:
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* - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
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*...
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* - if the `enctlv` ... does not contain
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* `next_node_id`:
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* - MUST drop the message.
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*/
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if (!encmsg->next_node_id)
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return false;
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/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
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* The reader:
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* - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
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*...
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* - if the `enctlv` contains `path_id`:
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* - MUST drop the message.
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*/
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if (encmsg->path_id)
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return false;
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*next_node = *encmsg->next_node_id;
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blindedpath_next_blinding(encmsg, blinding, ss, next_blinding);
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return true;
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}
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/* Returns false on failure */
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bool onion_message_parse(const tal_t *ctx,
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const u8 *onion_message_packet,
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const struct pubkey *blinding,
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const struct node_id *peer,
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const struct pubkey *me,
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u8 **next_onion_msg,
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struct pubkey *next_node_id,
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struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **final_om,
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struct pubkey *final_alias,
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struct secret **final_path_id)
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{
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enum onion_wire badreason;
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struct onionpacket *op;
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struct pubkey ephemeral;
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struct route_step *rs;
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struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv *om;
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struct secret ss, onion_ss;
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const u8 *cursor;
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size_t max, maxlen;
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/* We unwrap the onion now. */
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op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx,
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onion_message_packet,
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tal_bytelen(onion_message_packet),
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&badreason);
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if (!op) {
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status_peer_debug(peer, "onion_message_parse: can't parse onionpacket: %s",
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onion_wire_name(badreason));
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return false;
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}
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ephemeral = op->ephemeralkey;
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if (!unblind_onion(blinding, ecdh, &ephemeral, &ss)) {
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status_peer_debug(peer, "onion_message_parse: can't unblind onionpacket");
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return false;
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}
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/* Now get onion shared secret and parse it. */
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ecdh(&ephemeral, &onion_ss);
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rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, op, &onion_ss, NULL, 0, false);
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if (!rs) {
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status_peer_debug(peer,
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"onion_message_parse: can't process onionpacket ss=%s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret, &onion_ss));
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return false;
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}
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/* The raw payload is prepended with length in the modern onion. */
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cursor = rs->raw_payload;
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max = tal_bytelen(rs->raw_payload);
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maxlen = fromwire_bigsize(&cursor, &max);
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if (!cursor) {
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status_peer_debug(peer, "onion_message_parse: Invalid hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return false;
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}
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if (maxlen > max) {
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status_peer_debug(peer, "onion_message_parse: overlong hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return false;
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}
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om = fromwire_tlv_onionmsg_tlv(tmpctx, &cursor, &maxlen);
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if (!om) {
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status_peer_debug(peer, "onion_message_parse: invalid onionmsg_tlv %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return false;
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}
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if (rs->nextcase == ONION_END) {
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*next_onion_msg = NULL;
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*final_om = tal_steal(ctx, om);
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/* Final enctlv is actually optional */
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if (!om->encrypted_recipient_data) {
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*final_alias = *me;
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*final_path_id = NULL;
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} else if (!decrypt_final_onionmsg(ctx, blinding, &ss,
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om->encrypted_recipient_data, me,
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final_alias,
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final_path_id)) {
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status_peer_debug(peer,
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"onion_message_parse: failed to decrypt encrypted_recipient_data"
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" %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, om->encrypted_recipient_data));
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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struct pubkey next_blinding;
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*final_om = NULL;
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/* This fails as expected if no enctlv. */
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if (!decrypt_forwarding_onionmsg(blinding, &ss, om->encrypted_recipient_data, next_node_id,
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&next_blinding)) {
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status_peer_debug(peer,
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"onion_message_parse: invalid encrypted_recipient_data %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, om->encrypted_recipient_data));
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return false;
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}
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*next_onion_msg = towire_onion_message(ctx,
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&next_blinding,
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serialize_onionpacket(tmpctx, rs->next));
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}
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/* Exactly one is set */
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assert(!*next_onion_msg + !*final_om == 1);
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return true;
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}
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